Nazi Millionaires

by Kenneth A. Alford

  Frau Scheidler was not yet finished. She had also learned from “the wife of a non-commissioned officer of the aide-de-camp’s office who stayed for a short time in Bad Aussee that a considerable quantity of gold has been found in the cellar of a house at Altmünster, in which a certain Mrs. Koplin lived.” When pressed for additional details Frau Scheidler declined, claiming, “Further particulars are not known to me.” She admitted having so little verifiable information on this story that she could not say “whether this rumor is founded by truth.” But, she stressed,“it would certainly be interesting to check the matter. It would also be possible to learn the address of Mrs. Koplin, who lives in Germany at present.” Auerboech dutifully scribbled the information into his notebook for use at a later time, recording that “further examination and investigation will have to be carried through.”8

  As earlier indicated, Inspector Auerboech’s investigation was running on parallel tracks. One of the rails comprised the Iris Scheidler saga; the other, the Elfriede Höttl story. Iris Scheidler’s statements confirmed a few of the same things 35-year-old Elfriede had told Auerboech just two weeks earlier. Of particular interest to Auerboech was Elfriede’s marriage to Dr. Wilhelm Höttl, the former SS officer and chief of the Sicherheitsdienst, or SD, for southeast Austria. Her husband had been an important and fairly powerful Nazi bureaucrat, and authorities had good reason to suspect he had intimate knowledge concerning several aspects of their investigation. Auerboech’s interviews with Frau Höttl confirmed these suspicions.

  Opportunistic. That single word sums up SS Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel) Wilhelm Höttl’s career. Indeed, by 1945 he had honed opportunism to a razor’s edge. The future member of Himmler’s notorious SS was born on March 19, 1915, in Vienna, Austria. His scholarly bent, which had been obvious from a young age, matured into something tangible when he graduated in 1938 from the prestigious University of Vienna with a doctorate in world history. A few months before graduation Höttl’s application for service with the SD (Sicherheitsdienst, or Secret Service of the SS) was accepted. Five months later he had achieved the rank of Haupsturmführer (Captain), a full member of the organization in charge of handling “church affairs.”Though Höttl’s genesis with the SD was smooth, his tenure with the organization soon developed into a stormy love-hate relationship that almost cost him his life.

  By summer of 1939 Höttl was being scrutinized by more fanatical elements within the SD. Whispers of “political unreliability” wafted through the halls of the intelligence service. A formal disciplinary investigation was launched. The exact findings are not known, but the Austrian was quietly transferred to a sub-department of the Foreign Intelligence bureau of the RSHA in Vienna. There, Höttl and his fellow SD members monitored goings-on in southeastern Europe and southern Russia. Two years passed in relative quiet while Höttl labored beneath the radar screen of the extremists who permeated his department. Although few others foresaw defeat early in the war, Höttl appreciated early and often that the spreading conflict could only bring death and destruction to Germany and his beloved Austria. As early as 1941 he may have been trying to establish a reliable contact within the Vatican in the hope of organizing a negotiated settlement of the war. Someone got wind of his efforts and word seeped up to RSHA chief Reinhard Heydrich. In October of that year another disciplinary investigation was initiated. This one had teeth. “I was called before the SS and Police Court for having religious ties and for lack of political and ideological reliability,” here called in his testimony at the main Nuremberg trial. To put a finer point on it, Höttl was not a good and true believing Nazi. Like Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and many other generally honorable officers serving Hitler’s Third Reich, Höttl had an intrinsic dislike for Nazism and what it stood for. He knew full well that evil paraded in parallel lock-step with Hitler’s jack booted armies, and that an early peace was the only way to save Austria. His conscience tugged at his sleeve, but so did the burning desire of personal ambition and a call to duty—the twin glues that kept men like Höttl, Canaris, and Albert Speer in their positions of responsibility. The employment and labors of respected army generals, politicians, diplomats, and industrialists cloaked the German State’s machinery of misery and death with a shroud of respectability. In Höttl’s case inertia was trumps. He remained in place serving an ideology whose objectives were at odds with his own, even as he worked to undermine them.9

  The charges brought against Höttl were serious. Somehow he managed to avoid a prison sentence (or worse), but punitive measures awaited. A demotion “to the ranks as an ordinary private” was followed by a transfer to the Russian front. Putting his brains to work, Höttl eluded service with a rifle by finagling instead a job as reporter and publisher of the SS Prinz Eugen Division news letter. His pitiless boss, however, was not so fortunate. In June of 1942, Heydrich was assassinated by Czech partisans. Several months later Höttl was pardoned by Heydrich’s successor, the equally merciless Ernst Kaltenbrunner, and recalled to duty in February 1943 as sub-department chief of Bureau VI for Southeastern Europe with headquarters in Berlin. His direct superior was the chief of Bureau VI, Walter Schellenberg. “I was in charge of matters relating to the Vatican, as well as of matters relating to some states in the Balkans. We had no executive authority,” Höttl later explained to the Nuremberg judges while testifying on Kaltenbrunner’s behalf. “The SD was purely an information service… Its task was to give to the highest German authorities and the individual Reich ministries information on all events at home and abroad.”10

  Dr. Höttl had no intention of remaining in Berlin. That December he arranged for a transfer with his staff to Vienna. Once again he delved head first into activities contrary to what was expected of a loyal SS officer. Murmurs that something was amiss circulated again around Höttl. The relocation, some whispered, was the result of contact he had established with the American embassy in Madrid, Spain. No charges were filed. Höttl opened communications with Austrians who held similar concerns that the entire ship upon which they were all passengers was heading for the shoals. Their united goal was to bring about the separation of Austria from Germany, keep the advancing Russians out of Austria, and avoid turning the country into a killing field. Securing for Austria and her citizens better treatment than the harsh retribution many expected would be meted out to Germany and her people was high among Höttl’s many priorities. In late 1944, Höttl (by now a Obersturm-bannführer, or Lieutenant Colonel) made an important break through when he established contact with Allen Welsh Dulles, the head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services in Europe with an office in Switzerland. With Dulles’s assistance Höttl obtained a visa from the Swiss General Staff and traveled to that country several times. His hand was significantly strengthened when he latched onto a powerful issue to use as leverage to achieve his ends: the existence of a plan to wage a prolonged resistance from within a powerful German Alpine redoubt in Austria.11

  “We used it [the existence of a redoubt defense] as a means to obtain better terms, if not for the whole of Germany then at least for that part of Austria which was affected,” Höttl wrote after the war. Dulles was keenly interested (and worried about) the Alamo-like stand planned in Austria.“From the very first talks with Dulles it became clear that the Alpine redoubt was to be and would remain the main subject of discussion,”remembered Höttl. He routinely furnished Dulles with specific data regarding the military strength of the German resistance movement slated for the mountainous region. The German army in Italy, he informed Dulles, was going to withdraw and hold a fortified line in the Bavarian Mountains. The plan sent shivers down the spines of Americans in high places, many of whom believed reducing the area might take years and cost tens of thousands of more lives. Ironically, the activities of Höttl and others acting in concert with him were sanctioned by ErnstKaltenbrunner, himself an Austrian native who saw a noose or firing squad looming in his future. The chief of RSHA fervently hoped and arrogantly believed his actions would catapult
him into a position of safety as a leading figure in the drive for a negotiated peace with the Western Allies, and thus earn him a place in the postwar political restructuring that would follow.

  Höttl’s effort bore mixed fruit. SS-Gruppenführer (Major General)Karl Wolff, who was sent with Heinrich Himmler’s blessings to negotiate with Dulles, was hamstrung by his lack of diplomatic or official standing. Dulles was an experienced intelligence officer and was unwilling to plow any ground beyond terms for the surrender of the Southern German Army Group. Wolff was keenly aware that he was holding few cards he could play; the deck had already been dealt and all the cards were on the Allied side of the table. He offered to arrange the capitulation of all German and Italian troops in Italy. A complex and delicate series of negotiations—complicated by Russian involvement, President Franklin Roosevelt’s untimely death, and Kaltenbrunner’s bullying interference—eventually led to the execution of terms surrendering the Southern Army Group and Italian troops on April 29, 1945, to take effect on May 2, 1945. Thus did the war in Italy end about one week sooner than the rest of the fighting in Europe. “Without [this force],” explained Höttl, “the nucleus and the mass for manning the redoubt were both lacking. The Allies now had nothing more to worry about in the South, and in the meantime they had also come to know that their original misgivings had been exaggerated.”Höttl, of course, had been pining for something much broader and lasting than Wolff’s accomplishment. Still, with hindsight Höttl was generally pleased with the outcome. “Although we did not achieve the far-reaching results for which we had striven,” he explained, “the contact of the German secret service with Dulles did at least ensure that the occupation of Austria and the reconstruction of government in that country were accomplished without vain bloodshed and senseless destruction.” At the end of the war Dr. Wilhelm Höttl joined his wife in Altaussee, and surrendered there to American army solders on May 8, 1945.12

  As he had with the Scheidlers, Inspector Anton Auerboech found Elfriede Höttl and her Dachau-fettered husband willing and ready to cooperate with his investigation. On April 4, 1947, Frau Höttl sat down with Austrian investigators in Vienna and executed a detailed statement on the subject of hidden treasures in Austria. She and her husband had always disliked the Nazis, she told the agents. “We always felt ourselves to be Austrians and have always behaved in an appropriate manner.” The bromide was a standard refrain uttered amidst the smoking ruins of central Europe, but in the Höttls’ case, it was largely true. When pressed about what she knew of hidden gold and other assets, the Austrian agents discovered that Elfriede Höttl, like Iris Scheidler, had quite a story to tell.

  “As I believe it is already known to [you],” she began, “valuables of gold, foreign exchange, paper money, and so forth of [an incredible]amount have been especially brought to the area of Aussee and have been scattered afterwards.” This news was common knowledge all over the region even before the surrender, she added. In addition to verifying the story of Adolf Eichmann’s fortune in gold and Ernst Kaltenbrunner’s missing truckload of bullion, Elfriede introduced other characters who had played a role in the drama still without end. During the final days of the war, one of her husband’s fellow officers from Bureau VI-Vienna, SS Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel) Wilhelm Wanek, had taken up temporary residence in the monastery at Kremsmünster before moving on to the Villa Kery and the Park Hotel. Wanek’s group, she explained, was hauling with them a bundle in stolen loot. “The large amounts of gold and foreign exchange located there [Kremsmünster]were transferred to Altaussee.” Frau Höttl adamantly claimed that “all Departments had to deliver [their] assets of gold and foreign exchange to Wanek’s secretary,” which was why he had so much of it with him when he moved into the Aussee region. “This gold certainly had a value of[many] millions.” Frau Höttl referred several times to an unnamed “informant,” known both to her and her husband, who could substantiate these claims. Although it was never explicitly stated, the clever woman was apparently using his identity as a means of springing her husband from custody. “All of these valuables were transported from Aussee to the Blaa Alm, and they were seen again by our informant [there.]” When pressed about their final disposition, Frau Höttl maintained that “it was impossible that they were further transported from the Blaa Alm because at that time the Americans were already at Ischl and because there prevailed such snow-conditions (90 cm.) on the Blaa Alm that they hardly could be moved on. Therefore, the searching should be confined[to that area].” She concluded by adding, “The gold which was found at the Villa Kery came certainly from the group Wanek.”13

  The Villa Kery gold to which Elfriede Höttl was referring was discovered shortly after the Americans walked into Altaussee. A salt miner and farmer named Johann Pucher stumbled across a pair of half-buried iron Wehrmacht cases. The chests were taken to the local police station and turned over to a commissioner in Bad Aussee. Pucher, who was later interviewed by Austrian agents, was present when the cases were inventoried. Inside were 10,176 gold coins, plus notes totaling 92,000 Swiss francs, $22,000 American dollars, and 25,000 Dutch gulden and Belgian francs. A gold cigarette case and gold bar were also found inside. A third case was discovered a few days later when Pucher made a thorough search of the Villa Kery and it grounds. The case was hauled to Bad Aussee one evening and placed inside the town hall safe. The next morning it was cut open with an acetylene torch. More gold coins were found inside. Pucher never saw the contents of the third chest, but “could hear them make a ringing noise when the chest was carried.”The case, he remembered, “was extremely heavy.”

  The gold from these cases was inventoried properly and turned over to the correct authorities. However, a report drafted by investigator Hofrat Reith and shared with American agents concluded that “there exists no proof whatsoever at the Ministry of Property Control and Economic Planning that the large amount of paper currency was ever surrendered to the U.S. Military Government or to the Austrian Government.” Reith went on to explain that receipts for a “considerable amount of gold” were filed away, but “no receipts for paper money”could be found. What happened to all that money? No one knows.14

  Details on the Villa Kery gold were just the beginning of Elfriede Höttl’s story. Two other SS officers, Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel) Werner G ö tsch and Hauptsturmf ü hrer (Captain) Viktor Zeischka, both of whom she knew personally, had also been at the Villa Kery. The pair drove into Altaussee in a yellow-green Adler-Sturm automobile about 11:00 p.m. on May 8, 1945—the day of Germany’s official capitulation. Just a head of them was another car carrying three Obersturmbannf ü hrers. Americans were already in possession of the town, a fact of which the cars’ occupants might not have been aware. The two automobiles approached a road check and were signaled to pull over. The vehicle with the three lieutenant colonels accelerated and sped out of town, bullets zipping around it. Götsch and Zeischka prudently decided to take their chances with the Americans and pulled over. Both were arrested and dispatched to the Altaussee jail. An informant came forward and told officials that Zeischka often “stowed in the luggage hold of the car 40 kilograms (88 lbs.) of gold bullion, which he was accustomed to take with him regularly for fear of losing it.” Zeischka’s gold was held inside a large rucksack. The news reached authorities too late to do the many good.

  That same night, Maria Eibl, the owner of the Pension Eibl, in company with her lover Franz Fischer, pushed Zeischka’s car “into the yard of the Pension Eibl.” The servants of the place were “ordered to go to bed earlier than usual,” and Frau Eibl was described as being “in a state of unusual excitement.” The car disappeared. Authorities believe Fischer took the car to Vienna. After that night intelligence agents watched the pair closely. Before long they noted that both made “unusually large expenditures…The 40 kilograms of gold are thought now to be in the hands of the pair.” According to a CIC report, “It is certain that the gold was not obtained by American authorities unless it is assumed t
hat an American filched the gold for himself.” Although the report recommended additional follow-up and even identified the names of servants to be questioned, the record is silent there after. Did the investigation go forward? If so, was any thing of further use discovered?If not, why not? Unfortunately, CIC records do not hold the answers to any of these questions.15

  Werner Götsch, Viktor Zeischka’s traveling companion, may have had the last laugh in the matter. According to Frau Höttl, a high ranking SD officer arrived at the Kremsmünster monastery from Romania in early May 1945. From there, “a transport, especially guarded and handled very cautiously, rolled to Schaz in the Tyrol. The Branch-Office was on the Vomperberg, a nearby mountain, “on top of which is a housing development formerly seized by a Nazi.” One of its residents was a Frau Götsch—Werner Götsch’s wife. “As it has become known to me,”explained Höttl, “there are valuables actually lodged in this place, but it is at present impossible to approach…because the area is guarded by French guards.” That part of Austria was in the French zone of control. She did not know “whether the watch is carried through for political or for financial reasons. It is certain, however, that the French did not find anything thus far.” How was it that Frau Höttl knew that nothing had yet been discovered? No one seems to have asked the question. Did Zeischka’s gold (or some other treasure) end up with Werner Götsch’ s wife?16

  According to a CIC memorandum, Elfriede Höttl “is certain that the transport…carried gold and jewels,” and that the fortune was buried in a well within the Vomperberg housing development. She offered even more specific evidence. “The wife of Franz Steindl lives on the Vomperberg and frequently makes trips to Salzburg in order to contact her husband, who is known by [Agent Hofrat] Reith actually to live in Salzburg and who is said to be an illicit dealer in gold and jewels.” The CIC concluded that “Franz Steindl knows the location of the jewels and gold and avails himself of them from time to time.” How Frau Höttl had discovered these specific details is not clear, but in all likelihood her husband had shared these details with her, feeding her with bits of information to tantalize Allied investigators in the hope of earning a nearly release. Was Frau Höttl telling the truth or spinning a yarn? The Austrian investigators interviewed her for hours and reached the conclusion her story had veracity.17