Boyd
Page 52
Faced with such disorder or chaos, how can we reconstruct order and meaning? Going back to the idea chain of specific-to-general, induction, synthesis, and integration the thought occurs that a new domain or concept can be formed if we can find some common qualities, attributes, or operations among some or many of these constituents swimming in this sea of anarchy. Through such connecting threads (that produce meaning) we synthesize constituents from, hence across, the domains we have just shattered.24 Linking particulars together in this manner we can form a new domain or concept—providing, of course, we do not inadvertently use only those “bits and pieces” in the same arrangement that we associated with one of the domains purged from our imagination. Clearly, such a synthesis would indicate we have generated something new and different from what previously existed. Going back to our idea chain, it follows that creativity is related to induction, synthesis, and integration since we proceeded from unstructured bits and pieces to a new general pattern or concept. We call such action a creative or constructive induction. It is important to note that the crucial or key step that permits this creative induction is the separation of the particulars from their previous domains by the destructive deduction. Without this unstructuring the creation of a new structure cannot proceed—since the bits and pieces are still tied together as meaning within unchallenged domains or concepts.
Recalling that we use concepts or mental patterns to represent reality, it follows that the unstructuring and restructuring just shown reveals a way of changing our perception of reality.28 Naturally, such a notion implies that the emerging pattern of ideas and interactions must be internally consistent and match-up with reality.14,25 To check or verify internal consistency we try to see if we can trace our way back to the original constituents that were used in the creative or constructive induction. If we cannot reverse directions, the ideas and interactions do not go together in this way without contradiction. Hence, they are not internally consistent. However, this does not necessarily mean we reject and throw away the entire structure. Instead, we should attempt to identify those ideas (particulars) and interactions that seem to hold together in a coherent pattern of activity as distinguished from those ideas that do not seem to fit in. In performing this task we check for reversibility as well as check to see which ideas and interactions match-up with our observations of reality.27,14,15 Using those ideas and interactions that pass this test together with any new ideas (from new destructive deductions) or other promising ideas that popped out of the original destructive deduction we again attempt to find some common qualities, attributes or operations to re-create the concept—or create a new concept. Also, once again, we perform the check for reversibility and match-up with reality. Over and over again this cycle of Destruction and Creation is repeated until we demonstrate internal consistency and match-up with reality.19,14,15
When this orderly (and pleasant) state is reached the concept becomes a coherent pattern of ideas and interactions that can be used to describe some aspect of observed reality. As a consequence, there is little, or no, further appeal to alternative ideas and interactions in an effort to either expand, complete, or modify the concept.19 Instead, the effort is turned inward towards fine tuning the ideas and interactions in order to improve generality and produce a more precise match of the conceptual pattern with reality.19 Toward this end, the concept—and its internal workings—is tested and compared against observed phenomena over and over again in many different and subtle ways.19 Such a repeated and inward-oriented effort to explain increasingly more subtle aspects of reality suggests the disturbing idea that perhaps, at some point, ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies, or apparent inconsistencies may emerge to stifle a more general and precise match-up of concept with observed reality.19 Why do we suspect this?
On one hand, we realize that facts, perceptions, ideas, impressions, interactions, etc. separated from previous observations and thought patterns have been linked together to create a new conceptual pattern. On the other hand, we suspect that refined observations now underway will eventually exhibit either more or a different kind of precision and subtlety than the previous observations and thought patterns. Clearly, any anticipated difference, or differences, suggests we should expect a mismatch between the new observations and the anticipated concept description of these observations. To assume otherwise would be tantamount to admitting that previous constituents and interactions would produce the same synthesis as any newer constituents and interactions that exhibit either more or a different kind of precision and subtlety. This would be like admitting one equals two. To avoid such a discomforting position implies that we should anticipate a mismatch between phenomena observation and concept description of that observation. Such a notion is not new and is indicated by the discoveries of Kurt Gödel and Werner Heisenberg.
In 1931 Kurt Gödel created a stir in the World of Mathematics and Logic when he revealed that it was impossible to embrace mathematics within a single system of logic.12,23 He accomplished this by proving, first, that any consistent system—that includes the arithmetic of whole numbers—is incomplete. In other words, there are true statements or concepts within the system that cannot be deduced from the postulates that make-up the system. Next, he proved even though such a system is consistent, its consistency cannot be demonstrated within the system.
Such a result does not imply that it is impossible to prove the consistency of a system. It only means that such a proof cannot be accomplished inside the system. As a matter of fact since Gödel, Gerhard Gentzen and others have shown that a consistency proof of arithmetic can be found by appealing to systems outside that arithmetic. Thus, Gödel’s Proof indirectly shows that in order to determine the consistency of any new system we must construct or uncover another system beyond it.29,27 Over and over this cycle must be repeated to determine the consistency of more and more elaborate systems.29,27
Keeping this process in mind, let us see how Gödel’s results impact the effort to improve the match-up of concept with observed reality. To do this we will consider two kinds of consistency: The consistency of the concept and the consistency of the match-up between observed reality and concept description of reality. In this sense, if we assume—as a result of previous destructive deduction and creative induction efforts—that we have a consistent concept and consistent match-up, we should see no differences between observation and concept description. Yet, as we have seen, on one hand, we use observations to shape or formulate a concept; while on the other hand, we use a concept to shape the nature of future inquiries or observations of reality. Back and forth, over and over again, we use observations to sharpen a concept and a concept to sharpen observations. Under these circumstances, a concept must be incomplete since we depend upon an ever-changing array of observations to shape or formulate it. Likewise, our observations of reality must be incomplete since we depend upon a changing concept to shape or formulate the nature of new inquiries and observations. Therefore, when we probe back and forth with more precision and subtlety, we must admit that we can have differences between observation and concept description; hence, we cannot determine the consistency of the system— in terms of its concept, and match-up with observed reality—within itself.
Furthermore, the consistency cannot be determined even when the precision and subtlety of observed phenomena approaches the precision and subtlety of the observer—who is employing the ideas and interactions that play together in the conceptual pattern. This aspect of consistency is accounted for not only by Gödel’s Proof but also by the Heisenberg Uncertainty or Indeterminacy Principle.
The Indeterminacy Principle uncovered by Werner Heisenberg in 1927 showed that one could not simultaneously fix or determine precisely the velocity and position of a particle or body.14,9 Specifically he showed, due to the presence and influence of an observer, that the product of the velocity and position uncertainties is equal to or greater than a small number (Planck’s Constant) divided by the mass of the particle or body b
eing investigated. In other words,
V Q ≥ h/m
Where:
V is velocity uncertainty
Q is position uncertainty and
h/m is Planck’s constant (h) divided by observed mass (m).
Examination of Heisenberg’s Principle reveals that as mass becomes exceedingly small the uncertainty or indeterminacy becomes exceedingly large. Now—in accordance with this relation—when the precision, or mass, of phenomena being observed is little, or no different than the precision, or mass, of the observing phenomena the uncertainty values become as large as, or larger than, the velocity and size frame-of-reference associated with the bodies being observed.9 In other words, when the intended distinction between observer and observed begins to disappear,3 the uncertainty values hide or mask phenomena behavior; or put another way, the observer perceives uncertain or erratic behavior that bounces all over in accordance with the indeterminacy relation. Under these circumstances, the uncertainty values represent the inability to determine the character or nature (consistency) of a system within itself. On the other hand, if the precision and subtlety of the observed phenomena is much less than the precision and subtlety of the observing phenomena, the uncertainty values become much smaller than the velocity and size values of the bodies being observed.9 Under these circumstances, the character or nature of a system can be determined—although not exactly—since the uncertainty values do not hide or mask observed phenomena behavior nor indicate significant erratic behavior.
Keeping in mind that the Heisenberg Principle implicitly depends upon the indeterminate presence and influence of an observer,14 we can now see—as revealed by the two examples just cited—that the magnitude of the uncertainty values represent the degree of intrusion by the observer upon the observed. When intrusion is total (that is, when the intended distinction between observer and observed essentially disappears),3 the uncertainty values indicate erratic behavior. When intrusion is low the uncertainty values do not hide or mask observed phenomena behavior, nor indicate significant erratic behavior. In other words, the uncertainty values not only represent the degree of intrusion by the observer upon the observed but also the degree of confusion and disorder perceived by that observer.
Confusion and disorder are also related to the notion of entropy and the Second Law of Thermodynamics.11,20 Entropy is a concept that represents the potential for doing work, the capacity for taking action, or the degree of confusion and disorder associated with any physical or information activity. High entropy implies a low potential for doing work, a low capacity for taking action or a high degree of confusion and disorder. Low entropy implies just the opposite. Viewed in this context, the Second Law of Thermodynamics states that all observed natural processes generate entropy.20 From this law it follows that entropy must increase in any closed system—or, for that matter, in any system that cannot communicate in an ordered fashion with other systems or environments external to itself.20 Accordingly, whenever we attempt to do work or take action inside such a system—a concept and its match-up with reality—we should anticipate an increase in entropy hence an increase in confusion and disorder. Naturally, this means we cannot determine the character or nature (consistency) of such a system within itself, since the system is moving irreversibly toward a higher, yet unknown, state of confusion and disorder.
What an interesting outcome! According to Gödel we cannot—in general—determine the consistency, hence the character or nature, of an abstract system within itself. According to Heisenberg and the Second Law of Thermodynamics any attempt to do so in the real world will expose uncertainty and generate disorder. Taken together, these three notions support the idea that any inward-oriented and continued effort to improve the match-up of concept with observed reality will only increase the degree of mismatch. Naturally, in this environment, uncertainty and disorder will increase as previously indicated by the Heisenberg Indeterminacy Principle and the Second Law of Thermodynamics, respectively. Put another way, we can expect unexplained and disturbing ambiguities, uncertainties, anomalies, or apparent inconsistencies to emerge more and more often. Furthermore, unless some kind of relief is available, we can expect confusion to increase until disorder approaches chaos—death.
Fortunately, there is a way out. Remember, as previously shown, we can forge a new concept by applying the destructive deduction and creative induction mental operations. Also, remember, in order to perform these dialectic mental operations we must first shatter the rigid conceptual pattern, or patterns, firmly established in our mind. (This should not be too difficult since the rising confusion and disorder is already helping us to undermine any patterns.) Next, we must find some common qualities, attributes, or operations to link isolated facts, perceptions, ideas, impressions, interactions, observations, etc. together as possible concepts to represent the real world. Finally, we must repeat this unstructuring and restructuring until we develop a concept that begins to match-up with reality. By doing this—in accordance with Gödel, Heisenberg and the Second Law of Thermodynamics—we find that the uncertainty and disorder generated by an inward-oriented system talking to itself can be offset by going outside and creating a new system. Simply stated, uncertainty and related disorder can be diminished by the direct artifice of creating a higher and broader more general concept to represent reality.
However, once again, when we begin to turn inward and use the new concept—within its own pattern of ideas and interactions—to produce a finer grain match with observed reality we note that the new concept and its match-up with observed reality begins to self-destruct just as before. Accordingly, the dialectic cycle of destruction and creation begins to repeat itself once again. In other words, as suggested by Gödel’s Proof of Incompleteness, we imply that the process of Structure, Unstructure, Restructure, Unstructure, Restructure is repeated endlessly in moving to higher and broader levels of elaboration. In this unfolding drama, the alternating cycle of entropy increase toward more and more disorder and the entropy decrease toward more and more order appears to be one part of a control mechanism that literally seems to drive and regulate this alternating cycle of destruction and creation toward higher and broader levels of elaboration. Now, in relating this deductive / inductive activity to the basic goal discussed in the beginning, I believe we have uncovered a Dialectic Engine that permits the construction of decision models needed by individuals and societies for determining and monitoring actions in an effort to improve their capacity for independent action. Furthermore, since this engine is directed toward satisfying this basic aim or goal, it follows that the goal seeking effort itself appears to be the other side of a control mechanism that seems also to drive and regulate the alternating cycle of destruction and creation toward higher and broader levels of elaboration. In this context, when acting within a rigid or essentially a closed system, the goal seeking effort of individuals and societies to improve their capacity for independent action tends to produce disorder towards randomness and death. On the other hand, as already shown, the increasing disorder generated by the increasing mismatch of the system concept with observed reality opens or unstructures the system. As the unstructuring or, as we’ll call it, the destructive deduction unfolds it shifts toward a creative induction to stop the trend toward disorder and chaos to satisfy a goal-oriented need for increased order. Paradoxically, then, an entropy increase permits both the destruction or unstructuring of a closed system and the creation of a new system to nullify the march toward randomness and death. Taken together, the entropy notion associated with the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the basic goal of individuals and societies seem to work in dialectic harmony driving and regulating the destructive / creative, or deductive / inductive, action—that we have described herein as a dialectic engine. The result is a changing and expanding universe of mental concepts matched to a changing and expanding universe of observed reality.28,27 As indicated earlier, these mental concepts are employed as decision models by individuals and societies
for determining and monitoring actions needed to cope with their environment—or to improve their capacity for independent action.
Bibliography
1. Beveridge, W. I. B., The Art of Scientific Investigation Vintage Books, Third Edition 1957
2. Boyd, John R., “Destruction and Creation,” 23 Mar 1976
3. Brown, G. Spencer, Laws of Form, Julian Press, Inc. 1972
4. Conant, James Bryant, Two Modes of Thought, Credo Perspectives, Simon and Schuster 1970
5. DeBono, Edward, New Think, Avon Books 1971
6. DeBono, Edward, Lateral Thinking: Creativity Step by Step, Harper Colophon Books 1973
7. Foster, David, The Intelligent Universe, Putnam 1975
8. Fromm, Erich, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis, Fawcett Premier Books 1971
9. Gamow, George, Thirty Years that Shook Physics, Anchor Books 1966
10. Gardner, Howard, The Quest for Mind, Vintage Books 1974
11. Georgescu-Roegen, Nicholas, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, Harvard U. Press 1971
12. Gödel, Kurt, “On Formally Undecidable Propositions of the Principia Mathematica and Related Systems,” pages 3–38, The Undecidable, Raven Press 1965
13. Heilbroner, Robert L., An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, Norton and Co. 1974
14. Heisenberg, Werner, Physics and Philosophy, Harper Torchbooks 1962
15. Heisenberg, Werner, Across the Frontiers, World Perspectives, Harper and Row 1974