The Resistance

by Matthew Cobb

  774 On 4 and 5 June there were huge rows between de Gaulle, Churchill and Eisenhower over the Allies’ plans to distribute their own paper money, and the detail of Eisenhower’s planned radio broadcast to France after the operation had begun. At one point Churchill threatened to have de Gaulle put on a plane back to Algiers – it was during one of these rows that Churchill allegedly made a statement which accurately summarized not only his personal politics, but also summed up the whole orientation of the British in the subsequent sixty years: ‘in the case of a disagreement between the United States and France, Britain would side with the United States’ (Kersaudy, 1981, p. 343). In the end, Washington and London did not budge an inch, and de Gaulle broadcast in the evening of D-Day, long after Eisenhower, who did not even mention de Gaulle or the Free French, and gave orders to the French population. In turn, de Gaulle avoided all mention of the American troops and made it clear that the French should obey only the ‘French government’ (that is, the Free French). De Gaulle spoke so well that Churchill sat listening to the broadcast with tears rolling down his cheeks. See Kersaudy (1981), pp. 337–59, and Crémieux-Brilhac (2001), pp. 1220–31.

  775 Brinton (1961a), p. 12. Brinton was not your average OSS operative – he was a professor of history at Harvard, who specialized in French history.

  776 In one of his OSS reports, Crane Brinton perceptively highlighted this point and went on to make a criticism of Allied attitudes: ‘I think many of us in London and Washington underestimated the effective unity toward precisely this end – the assumption of control in liberated France – attained by the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) and the Resistance . . . This assumption of power by the Provisional Government has been made possible . . . by the willingness of the French population in the hitherto liberated regions to have it do so.’ Brinton (1961a), pp. 12–3.

  777 Paxton (2001), p. 327.

  778 Footitt & Simmonds (1988), pp. 79–82. Full recognition of the Provisional Government would not occur for several months.

  779 First code-named ANVIL, then DRAGOON, the Mediterranean landings initially involved 150,000 troops, including substantial numbers of Free French soldiers, most of them from the empire, under the command of General de Lattre. (The story of some of these soldiers is told in the French 2006 feature film Days of Glory, originally entitled Indigènes.) The Allies easily overcame German resistance in the south, which effectively evaporated as the Nazi high command ordered that all forces gradually withdraw from France, with the exception of key port garrisons, such as Marseilles and Saint-Nazaire, which were ordered to fight to the death. A combination of German withdrawal and Resistance action meant that Allied progress north was far more rapid than expected. For example, a reconnaissance column under the command of General Butler reached Grenoble in seven days, when they were expected to take three months, because the Resistance had cleared the way. Kedward (1993), p. 216.

  780 Thanks to the breaking of the German ULTRA code, Allied commanders in both Normandy and Provence were well aware of this order and its implications, and were able to take advantage. Keegan (1981), pp. 255–9; Funk (1992), pp. 110–4.

  781 This point is well made by Jackson (2001), p. 549. The chapter covering August 1944 in one French history of the Resistance covers nearly 300 pages (Noguères & Degliame-Fouché, 1981). Local historians throughout France have provided an astonishingly rich picture of what occurred, virtually none of which can be presented here. For one local example that is referred to below, and which is close to the author’s heart (see note 99 below), see the description of the Resistance in the nineteenth arrondissement of Paris and its role in the Liberation (ANACR, 2005).

  782 Buton (1993) pp. 104–5. On the basis of detailed historical records, Buton puts forward a typology of liberation: those cities that saw a fully fledged insurrection (Paris, Lille, Marseilles, Limoges and Thiers – these included all of the main French conurbations with the exception of Lyons), 28 cities that saw partial insurrections (including Annecy, Nancy, Le Havre, Nice, Toulon, Toulouse, Castellane and Brest), and the remaining 179 which saw no insurrection at all. See map on p. xi above.

  783 The clearest account in English of the Paris insurrection is Footitt & Simmonds (1988), pp. 104–51. For a brief description of the events and of what happened in the years that followed, see Beevor & Cooper (2004).

  784 Verity (2000), p. 208. Fourcade’s departure had been delayed by the D-Day operations. Her pilot was Flight-Lieutenant Affleck, who had such problems with Lucie Aubrac’s flight to London earlier in the year.

  785 Fourcade (1973), p. 327. See note 53 below.

  786 Fourcade (1973), p. 336.

  787 Cointet (2006), pp. 272–4.

  788 Rajsfus (2004), p. 213, citing von Choltitz’s memoirs.

  789 Rajsfus (2004), p. 217.

  790 The previous commander, General Boineburg, had been recalled to Berlin, suspected of being involved in the 20 July plot to assassinate Hitler.

  791 All information in this paragraph from Krivopisko & Porin (2004).

  792 There are many accounts of these events. For example, Dansette (1946), pp. 97–120. For a particularly acerbic analysis, see Rajsfus (2004), pp. 184–92.

  793 Dansette (1946), p. 155. Jackson (2001), p. 566, points out that part of the reason the strike was so effective was that many workers were already on leave.

  794 For a balanced account of the role of the police, see Kitson (1995). Rajsfus (2004), pp. 127–43, provides a more polemical view.

  795 On 9 August Jean Guéhenno wrote in his diary that a kilo of butter cost 1,000 francs, while a kilo of peas was 45 francs. The real problem, however, was finding these precious commodities. Guéhenno (2002), p. 428.

  796 For a description of Eisenhower’s reasoning, see Kaspi (2004), pp. 120–2.

  797 Schoenbrun (1981), p. 422.

  798 Historians and participants (including de Gaulle himself) have often ridiculed the tendency for maquis leaders to give themselves unjustified military titles. This was not limited to the Resistance, however. ‘General’ Chaban-Delmas had been given his title by General Koenig a few months earlier. He was not a soldier but a high-ranking civil service economist. On 25 August the ultimatum addressed to General von Choltitz was signed by ‘General’ Billotte of the Free French army. Billotte was only a colonel, but gave himself a higher rank to impress the German commander (Dansette, 1946, p. 370).

  799 Jackson (2001), p. 561. The unstated pendant to this message was surely the declaration of the Sun King, Louis XIV, ‘L’état, c’est moi’.

  800 Bourderon (2004), pp. 384–5.

  801 De Beauvoir (1965), pp. 592–3. De Beauvoir’s companion, Jean-Paul Sartre, was eventually involved in writing for Combat but played no important role in the Resistance.

  802 Dansette (1946), pp. 133–4.

  803 This was the subject of an exchange between Rol-Tanguy and Léo Hamon at a meeting of COMAC. Dansette (1946), p. 164. See also Wieviorka (2007), p. 406.

  804 Dansette (1946), pp. 212–4.

  805 The role of the ceasefire has been an unhealed sore in the history of the Resistance, not so much for what it accomplished (it had very little effect on the outcome of events) as for what it might have done. For a sober summary, see Jackson (2001), pp. 563–7; for a polemical version of the arguments against the ceasefire, see Rajsfus (2004), pp. 224–43.

  806 Dansette (1946), p. 263–4.

  807 Kaspi (2004), pp. 114.

  808 This astonishing film can be seen on the CD-ROM/DVD La Résistance en Île-de-France (AERI, 2005). A small version, with English subtitles, is available free at http://www.archive.org/details/LaLiberationdeParis1944 (accessed August 2008). For a discussion of the representation of the Resistance in film after the war, which played an important role in fixing the popular vision of the war years, see Langlois (1997).

  809 Dansette (1946), p. 283.

  810 Dansette (1946), p. 282.

  811 Dansette (1946), p. 271.

  8
12 Calvès (1984), p. 102.

  813 Calvès (1984), p. 102.

  814 Madeleine Riffaud’s eyewitness account in Jorge Amat’s film Avoir vingt ans en août 1944 (2004); see also ANACR (2005), pp. 289–92.

  815 Bourderon (2004), p. 382.

  816 Kaspi (2004), pp. 122–6, summarizes the reasons behind Eisenhower’s change of mind. The appeal from the insurgents was less important than the news that the German garrison was extremely weak, and the existence of what Eisenhower saw as the threat of a Communist insurrection.

  817 Wieviorka (2007), pp. 364–6, cites the original documents from the US National Archives and Record Administration.

  818 It appears that the colonial troops were not actually removed from the 2nd DB. Wieviorka (personal communication). A newspaper account of Wieviorka’s book, however, states that there were no colonial troops (‘Liberation: The hidden truth’, Independent, 31 January 2007). Contemporary descriptions of the arrival of Captain Dronne’s 2nd DB column suggest that Moroccan Spahis were involved (Dansette, 1946, p. 354). Contemporary film shows soldiers wearing the red calot of the Spahis, but their ethnic origin is not clear (e.g. Été 44: La Libération, Patrick Rotman, 2004).

  819 Bourderon (2004), p. 444.

  820 Dansette (1946), p. 350.

  821 Dansette (1946), p. 353.

  822 Bourderon (2004), p. 450.

  823 Dansette (1946), p. 362.

  824 Von Choltitz was not consulted about this change, which later caused some excitement among the more legally minded. See Dansette (1946), pp. 386–8; for Rol-Tanguy’s opinion, see Bourderon (2004), pp. 452–6.

  825 De Gaulle described his disapproval in his memoirs (de Gaulle, 1962b, p. 341). Bourderon (2004), p. 455, questions whether this is actually true, citing the rushes of an amateur film of the encounter between de Gaulle and Leclerc. These can be seen in the film Été 44: La Libération (Patrick Rotman, 2004); a French lip-reader would resolve the issue.

  826 Jackson (2001), p. 565.

  827 It is generally said that he went on to a balcony. Contemporary film clearly shows him standing precariously on a window sill (Été 1944: La Libération, Patrick Rotman, 2004).

  828 De Gaulle (1962b), p. 344. This was in keeping with the ordinance adopted by de Gaulle’s Comité Français de la Libération Nationale at the beginning of the month, which declared all legislation adopted since 16 June 1940 to be null and void. Jackson (2001), p. 602.

  829 Brossat (1994), p. 135.

  830 Rajsfus (2004), p. 251. If this story is not true, it ought to be.

  831 De Gaulle (1962b), p. 347.

  832 Dukson – sometimes written Duckson – came to a sad end. He became involved in a black-market operation to sell German stores; arrested by the FFI, he was shot in the leg while trying to escape and died on the operating table. Dunan (1976).

  833 Daniel Mayer’s eyewitness account. Noguères & Degliame-Fouché (1981), p. 565.

  834 There are no definitive figures. Dansette (1946), p. 434, gives the figures quoted in the text; Jackson (2001), p. 567, gives different figures for the French (901 FFI and 582 civilian dead; 2,000 wounded); Wieviorka (2007), p. 408 states the dead were 1,000 FFI, 600 civilians and 71 from the 2nd DB. None of these authors gives a source.

  835 The following day, the Luftwaffe bombed the nineteenth arrondissement, in reprisal for the insurrection, killing 110 people and wounding 700. ANACR (2005), p. 285.

  836 Interview with Madeleine Riffaud, Guardian, 21 August 2004. Riffaud appears in a contemporary picture of the FTP Saint-Just FTP brigade, which features on the front cover of Calvès’ book of memoirs. She is also the subject of Jorge Amat’s moving film Avoir vingt ans en août 1944 (2004). There is a brief fictionalized account for young people, describing the work of the Saint-Just brigade, including the death of Michel Tagrine, written in 1946 by Riffaud’s comrade, Max Rainat, when he was only seventeen. Rainat (2003). There is now a Parisian ‘street’ – in fact, a staircase – named after Michel Tagrine, in the nineteenth arrondissement. My family and I used to live at the bottom of it.

  CHAPTER 11

  837 Chevererau & Forlivesi (2005). In 2005 the Prosecutor General of Dormund, Herr Maass, began an enquiry into who was responsible for the massacre, and why. In July 2008 a German team of investigators visited Maillé as part of their enquiries.

  838 See Noguères & Degliame-Fouché (1981), pp. 647–51, for the details of this episode, which was explicitly disowned by the Free French and General Koenig. Similar threats were made – but not carried out – by Rol-Tanguy during the Liberation of Paris, when he threatened to execute ten German soldiers, ten SS and ten German women auxiliaries if the German commander of Colombes, near Paris, carried out his plan to execute ten French hostages (Dansette, 1946, p. 359).

  839 For summaries of the events and the dispute, see Rude (1974), pp. 87–126, and Noguères & Degliame-Fouché (1981), pp. 651–70. Alban Vistel was the overall FFI commander, while his two subordinates, Bayard of the Armée Secrète and Darciel of the FTP, were the main protagonists; Vistel generally supported Bayard. The row rumbled on for decades; see Vistel (1970), pp. 546–71.

  840 Funk (1992), pp. 243–8.

  841 Funk (1992), p. 252.

  842 Brossat (1994), pp. 159–60.

  843 In Marseilles the German commander absurdly ordered the whole French population to evacuate as the Allied armies approached; in riposte, the Resistance blew up railway and road bridges and then, on 18 August, launched a general strike followed by an insurrection. But months of savage repression had severely weakened the Resistance – with fewer than 1,000 insurgents, many of them without weapons, they were in danger of being wiped out. French troops had made unexpectedly rapid progress past Toulon, so to save the insurrection on 23 August they stormed their way into the centre of Marseilles. Shortly afterwards the Commissaire de la République, Raymond Aubrac, took control of the partially liberated city. After more fierce fighting, Marseilles was officially liberated on 28 August, heavily scarred by the explosions of German and Allied shells. A hundred FFI fighters and a hundred civilians died freeing their city. Guiral (1974), p. 107. Two days later there was a celebratory parade, at which Free French General de Lattre presided over an ‘unforgettable and poignant procession of all the makers of this second victory – the tirailleurs, the Moroccan Tabors, troopers, Zouaves and gunners – followed by the motley, fevered, bewildering mass of the FFI, between the two lines of a numberless crowd, frenzied, shouting with joy and enthusiasm, whom the guardians of order could not hold back’. Funk (1992), p. 215.

  844 Cassou’s injuries caused a power struggle at the top of the Resistance, as Free French loyalist Bertaux took over as commissaire. This led to a long dispute that lasted nearly fifty years over exactly what happened in Toulouse and why.

  845 Trempé (1983), p. 45.

  846 Trempé (1983).

  847 Trempé (1983), p. 51. Even the Catholic Church got caught up in the heady atmosphere – on 3 September Cardinal Salièges declared at a victory Mass in the city that ‘the proletariat must disappear’, and went on to outline a series of socialist measures that would encourage that to happen.

  848 Part of the problem was the rapid explosion in the size of the Resistance. For example, in the Morvan region near Dijon, the maquis grew from 18 members on D-Day to 48 at the end of June, 151 a month later and 576 at the end of August (Kaspi, 2004, p. 137). In Paris, in the five days of the insurrection, the FTP Saint-Just brigade swelled from 30 members to 800 (Calvès, 1984, p. 104). These recent recruits were potentially less disciplined than those who had been fighting for longer.

  849 Buton (1993), p. 111.

  850 Madjarian (1980), p. 113–4. The first group of FFI fighters to abandon their Resistance role and join the army was a column of about 1,000 men led by the young Communist who took the fatal step in the Party’s turn to armed struggle back in 1942 – Pierre Georges, now known as ‘Colonel Fabien’. The Fabien column – including André Calvès and young Max Rai
nat from the Saint-Just FTP brigade – joined Patton’s army and fought its way north during the Alsace campaign. In December Fabien was killed while he was demonstrating how to use a mine. The Communist Party claimed the mine had been sabotaged and hinted that right-wing forces were at work, but there was no decisive evidence. Shortly afterwards, the column was integrated into the regular French army. Durand (1985), pp. 251–66; Calvès (1984), pp. 113–4.

  851 The French Communist historian Albert Soboul, whose speciality was the French Revolution, wrote a series of articles on the parallels between 1944 and 1793 in an FFI regional newspaper. Buton (1993), p. 134. At the end of August Gaullist CNR member Deb-Bridel explained the importance of the policy in the pages of Libération: ‘by the side [of the regular army], the soldiers without uniforms who make up the whole of the FFI constitute a huge reserve of soldiers who have proved themselves with mediocre weaponry . . . This popular army, similar to that of the volunteers of 1793 . . . must not be weakened in its cohesion . . . Carrying out the amalgame is one of the concrete tasks of the government.’ Madjarian (1980), p. 109.

  852 Calvès (1984), p. 113–4. For two contrasting views on the success of the amalgame, from either side of the political spectrum, see Sentis (1982) and Michalon (1976).

  853 Rajsfus (2004), p. 254. Farge could be extremely undiplomatic; when de Gaulle asked him what he thought of the crowd in Lyons, Farge replied that there were ‘about as many people as for Pétain’s last visit’. Rajsfus (2004), p. 255.

  854 Noguères & Degliame-Fouché (1981), p. 776.

  855 A local Communist leader declared the committees would ‘ensure the correct functioning of the factories and increased production. If people speak about the “soviets” of Toulouse, it is a lie. These people are patriots, all patriots, who have made this agreement to win the war.’ Trempé (1983), p. 59.

  856 De Gaulle (1962c), p. 22; for FFI leader Serge Ravanel’s detailed account of the day, see Noguères & Degliame-Fouché (1981), pp. 777–80.

  857 De Gaulle (1962c), p. 20.

  858 Foot (2004), p. 369.