Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  To understand fully the importance of that adventure, some explanation of the military situation at and below Island Number Ten seems necessary. After the evacuation of New Madrid, which General Pope had forced by blockading the river twelve miles below, at Point Pleasant, the Confederate forces occupied their fortified positions on Island Number Ten and the eastern shore of the Mississippi, where they were cut off by impassable swamps on the land side. They were in a cul-de-sac, and the only way open for them to obtain supplies or to effect a retreat was by the river south of Island Number Ten. General Pope, with an army of twenty thousand men, was on the western side of the river below the island. Perceiving the defect in the enemy’s position, he proceeded with great promptness and ability to take advantage of it. It was his intention to cross the river and attack the enemy from below, but he could not do this without the aid of a gun-boat to silence the enemy’s batteries opposite Point Pleasant and protect his army in crossing. He wrote repeatedly to Flag-Officer Foote, urging him to send down a gun-boat past the enemy’s batteries on Island Number Ten, and in one of his letters expressed the belief that a boat could pass down at night under cover of the darkness. But the flag-officer invariably declined, saying in one of his letters to General Pope that the attempt “would result in the sacrifice of the boat, her officers and men, which sacrifice I would not be justified in making.”

  During this correspondence the bombardment still went on, but was attended with such poor results that it became a subject of ridicule among the officers of Pope’s army, one of whom (Colonel Gilmore, of Chillicothe, Ohio) is reported to have said that often when they met, and inquiry was made respecting the operations of the flotilla, the answer would generally be: “Oh! it is still bombarding the State of Tennessee at long range.” And a Confederate officer said that no casualties resulted and no damage was sustained at Island Number Ten from the fire of the gun-boats.

  On March 20th Flag-Officer Foote consulted his commanding officers, through Commander Stembel, as to the practicability of taking a gun-boat past the enemy’s forts to New Madrid, and all except myself were opposed to the enterprise, believing with Foote that the attempt to pass the batteries would result in the almost certain destruction of the boat. I did not think so, but believed with General Pope that, under the cover of darkness and other favorable circumstances, a gun-boat might be run past the enemy’s batteries, formidable as they were with nearly fifty guns. And although fully aware of the hazardous nature of the enterprise, I knew that the aid of a gun-boat was absolutely necessary to enable General Pope to succeed in his operations against the enemy, and thought the importance of this success would justify the risk of running the gauntlet of the batteries on Island Number Ten and on the left bank. The army officers were becoming impatient, and it was well known that the Confederates had a number of small gun-boats below, and were engaged in building several large and powerful vessels, of which the renowned Arkansas was one. And there was good reason to apprehend that these gun-boats would ascend the river and pass or silence Pope’s batteries, and relieve the Confederate forces on Island Number Ten and the eastern shore of the Mississippi. That Pope and Foote apprehended this, appears from the correspondence between them.5

  The flag-officer now called a formal council of war of all his commanding officers. It was held on board the flag-steamer, on the 28th or 29th of March, and all except myself concurred in the opinion formerly expressed that the attempt to pass the batteries was too hazardous and ought not to be made. When I was asked to give my views, I favored the undertaking, and advised compliance with the requests of General Pope. When asked if I was willing to make the attempt with the Carondelet, I replied in the affirmative. Foote accepted my advice, and expressed himself as greatly relieved from a heavy responsibility, as he had determined to send none but volunteers on an expedition which he regarded as perilous and of very doubtful success.

  Having received written orders from the flag-officer, under date of March 30th, I at once began to prepare the Carondelet for the ordeal. All the loose material at hand was collected, and on the 4th of April the decks were covered with it, to protect them against plunging shot. Hawsers and chain cables were placed around the pilot-house and other vulnerable parts of the vessel, and every precaution was adopted to prevent disaster. A coal-barge laden with hay and coal was lashed to the part of the port side on which there was no iron plating, to protect the magazine. It was truly said that the Carondelet at that time resembled a farmer’s wagon prepared for market. The engineers led the escape-steam, through the pipes aft, into the wheel-house, to avoid the puffing sound it made when blown through the smoke-stacks.

  All the necessary preparations having been made, I informed the flag-officer of my intention to run the gauntlet that night, and received his approval. Colonel N. B. Buford, who commanded the land forces temporarily with the flotilla, assisted me in preparing for the trip, and on the night of the 4th brought on board Captain Hottenstein, of the 42d Illinois, and twenty-three sharp-shooters of his command, who volunteered their services, which were gratefully accepted. Colonel Buford remained on board until the last moment, to encourage us. I informed the officers and crew of the character of the undertaking, and all expressed a readiness to make the venture. In order to resist boarding parties, in case of being disabled, the sailors were well armed, and pistols, cutlasses, muskets, boarding-pikes, and hand-grenades were within reach. Hose was attached to the boilers for throwing scalding water over any who might attempt to board. If it should be found impossible to save the vessel, it was designed to sink rather than burn her. During the afternoon there was a promise of a clear, moonlight night, and it was determined to wait until the moon was down, and then to make the attempt, whatever the chances. Having gone so far, we could not abandon the project without an effect on the men almost as bad as failure.

  MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN POPE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN EARLY IN THE WAR.

  At 10 o’clock the moon had gone down, and the sky, the earth, and the river were alike hidden in the black shadow of a thunder-storm, which had now spread itself over all the heavens. As the time seemed favorable, I ordered the first master to cast off. Dark clouds now rose rapidly over us and enveloped us in almost total darkness, except when the sky was lighted up by the welcome flashes of vivid lightning, to show us the perilous way we were to take. Now and then the dim outline of the landscape could be seen, and the forest bending under the roaring storm that came rushing up the river.

  BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. W. MACKALL, C.S.A., IN COMMAND AT ISLAND NUMBER TEN, PREVIOUSLY ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL TO GENERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

  With our bow pointing to the island, we passed the lowest point of land without being observed, it appears, by the enemy. All speed was given to the vessel to drive her through the tempest. The flashes of lightning continued with frightful brilliancy, and “almost every second,” wrote a correspondent, “every brace, post, and outline could be seen with startling distinctness, enshrouded by a bluish white glare of light, and then her form for the next minute would become merged in the intense darkness.” When opposite Battery No. 2, on the mainland,6 the smoke-stacks blazed up, but the fire was soon subdued. It was caused by the soot becoming dry, as the escape-steam, which usually kept the stacks wet, had been sent into the wheel-house, as already mentioned, to prevent noise. With such vivid lightning as prevailed during the whole passage, there was no prospect of escaping the vigilance of the enemy, but there was good reason to hope that he would be unable to point his guns accurately. Again the smoke-stacks took fire, and were soon put out; and then the roar of the enemy’s guns began, and from Batteries Nos. 2, 3, and 4 on the mainland came the continued crack and scream of their rifle-shells, which seemed to unite with the electric batteries of the clouds to annihilate us.

  While nearing the island or some shoal point, during a few minutes of total darkness, we were startled by the order, “Hard a-port!” from our brave and skillful pilot, First Master William
R. Hoel. We almost grazed the island, and it appears were not observed through the storm until we were close in, and the enemy, having no time to point his guns, fired at random. In fact, we ran so near that the enemy did not, probably could not, depress his guns sufficiently. While close under the lee of the island and during a lull in the storm and in the firing, one of our pilots heard a Confederate officer shout, “Elevate your guns!” It is probable that the muzzles of those guns had been depressed to keep the rain out, and that the officers ordered the guns elevated just in time to save us from the direct fire of the enemy’s heaviest fort; and this, no doubt, was the cause of our remarkable escape.

  Having passed the principal batteries, we were greatly relieved from suspense, patiently endured, however, by the officers and crew. But there was another formidable obstacle in the way—a floating battery, which was the great “war elephant” of the Confederates, built to blockade the Mississippi permanently. As we passed her she fired six or eight shots at us, but without effect. One ball struck the coal-barge, and one was found in a bale of hay; we found also one or two musket-bullets. We arrived at New Madrid about midnight with no one hurt, and were most joyfully received by our army. At the suggestion of Paymaster Nixon, all hands “spliced the main brace.”

  On Sunday, the 6th, after prayers and thanksgiving, the Carondelet, with General Gordon Granger, Colonel J. L. Kirby Smith of the 43d Ohio, and Captain Louis H. Marshall of General Pope’s staff on board, made a reconnoissance twenty miles down, nearly to Tiptonville, the enemy’s forts firing on her all the way down. We returned their fire, and dropped a few shells into their camps beyond. On the way back, we captured and spiked the guns of a battery of one 32-pounder and one 24-pounder, in about twenty-five minutes, opposite Point Pleasant. Before we landed to spike the guns, a tall Confederate soldier, with cool and deliberate courage, posted himself behind a large cottonwood tree, and repeatedly fired upon us, until our Illinois sharp-shooters got to work on him from behind the hammock nettings. He had two rifles, which he soon dropped, fleeing into the woods with his head down. The next day he was captured and brought into camp at Tiptonville, with the tip of his nose shot off. After the capture of this battery, the enemy prepared to evacuate his positions on Island Number Ten and the adjacent shores, and thus, as one of the historians of the civil war says, the Carondelet struck the blow that secured that victory.

  Returning to New Madrid, we were instructed by General Pope to attack the enemy’s batteries of six 64-pounders which protected his rear; and besides, another gun-boat was expected. The Pittsburgh (Lieutenant-Commander Thompson) ran the gauntlet without injury, during a thunder-storm, at 2 in the morning of April 7th, and arrived at 5 o’clock; but she was not ready for service, and the Carondelet attacked the principal batteries at Watson’s Landing alone and had nearly silenced them when the Pittsburgh came up astern and fired nearly over the Carondolet’s upper deck, after she and the Confederates had ceased firing. I reported to General Pope that we had cleared the opposite shores of the enemy, and were ready to cover the crossing of the river and the landing of the army. Seeing themselves cut off, the garrison at Island Number Ten surrendered to Foote on the 7th of April, the day of the Confederate repulse at Shiloh. The other Confederates retreating before Pope’s advance, were nearly all overtaken and captured at 4 o’clock on the morning of the 8th; and about the same time the cavalry under Colonel W. L. Elliott took possession of the enemy’s deserted works on the Tennessee shore.

  The result of General Pope’s operations in connection with the services of the Carondelet below Island Number Ten was the capture of three generals (including General W. W. Mackall, who ten days before the surrender had succeeded General John P. McCown in the command at Madrid Bend), over 5000 men, 20 pieces of heavy artillery, 7000 stand of arms, and a large quantity of ammunition and provisions, without the loss of a man on our side.

  On the 12th the Benton (flag-steamer), with the Cincinnati, Mound City, Cairo, and St. Louis, passed Tiptonville and signaled the Carondelet and Pittsburgh to follow. Five Confederate gun-boats came up the next day and offered battle; but after the exchange of a few shots at long range they retired down the river. We followed them all the way to Craighead’s Point, where they were under cover of their fortifications at Fort Pillow. I was not aware at the time that we were chasing the squadron of my esteemed shipmate of the U.S. Frigates Cumberland and Merrimac, Colonel John W. Dunnington, who afterward fought so bravely at Arkansas Post.

  THE “CARONDELET” AND “PITTSBURGH” CAPTURING THE CONFEDERATE BATTERIES BELOW NEW MADRID. AFTER A DRAWING BY REAR-ADMIRAL WALKE.

  On the 14th General Pope’s army landed about six miles above Craighead’s Point, near Osceola, under the protection of the gun-boats. While he was preparing to attack Fort Pillow, Foote sent his executive officer twice to me on the Carondelet to inquire whether I would undertake, with my vessel and two or three other gun-boats, to pass below the fort to coöperate with General Pope, to which inquiries I replied that I was ready at any time to make the attempt. But Pope and his army (with the exception of 1500 men) were ordered away, and the expedition against Fort Pillow was abandoned. Between the 14th of April and the 10th of May two or three of the mortar-boats were towed down the river and moored near Craighead’s Point, with a gun-boat to protect them. They were employed in throwing 13-inch bombs across the point into Fort Pillow, two miles distant. The enemy returned our bombardment with vigor, but not with much accuracy or effect. Several of their bombs fell near the gun-boats when we were three miles from the fort.

  The Confederate fleet called the “River Defense” having been reënforced, they determined upon capturing the mortar-boats or giving us battle. On the 8th three of their vessels came to the point from which the mortar-boats had thrown their bombs, but, finding none, returned. Foote had given special orders to keep up steam and be ready for battle any moment, day or night. There was so much illness at that time in the flotilla that about a third of the officers and men were under medical treatment, and a great many were unfit for duty. On the 9th of May, at his own request, our distinguished commander-in-chief, Foote, was relieved from his arduous duties. He had become very much enfeebled from the wounds received at Fort Donelson and from illness. He carried with him the sympathy and regrets of all his command. He was succeeded by Flag-Officer Charles Henry Davis, a most excellent officer.

  This paper would not be complete without some account of the naval battles fought by the flotilla immediately after the retirement of Flag-Officer Foote, under whose supervision and amid the greatest embarrassments it had been built, organized, and equipped. On the morning of the 10th of May a mortar-boat was towed down the river, as usual, at 5 A.M., to bombard Fort Pillow. The Cincinnati soon followed to protect her. At 6:35 eight Confederate rams came up the river at full speed.7 The Carondelet at once prepared for action, and slipped her hawser to the “bare end,” ready for orders to “go ahead.” No officer was on the deck of the Benton (flag-steamer) except the pilot, Mr. Birch, who informed the flag-officer of the situation, and passed the order to the Carondelet and Pittsburgh to proceed without waiting for the flag-steamer. General signal was also made to the fleet to get under way, but it was not visible on account of the light fog.

  The Carondelet started immediately after the first verbal order; the others, for want of steam or some other cause, were not ready, except the Mound City, which put off soon after we were fairly on our way to the rescue of the Cincinnati. We had proceeded about a mile before our other gun-boats left their moorings. The rams were advancing rapidly, and we steered for the leading vessel, General Bragg, a brig-rigged, side-wheel steam ram, far in advance of the others, and apparently intent on striking the Cincinnati. When about three-quarters of a mile from the General Bragg, the Carondelet and Mound City fired on her with their bow-guns, until she struck the Cincinnati on the starboard quarter, making a great hole in the shell-room, through which the water poured with resistless force. The Cincinnati then retreat
ed up the river and the General Bragg drifted down, evidently disabled. The General Price, following the example of her consort, also rammed the Cincinnati. We fired our bow-guns into the General Price, and she backed off, disabled also. The Cincinnati was again struck by one of the enemy’s rams, the General Sumter. Having pushed on with all speed to the rescue of the Cincinnati, the Carondelet passed her in a sinking condition, and, rounding to, we fired our bow and starboard broadside guns into the retreating General Bragg and the advancing rams, General Jeff. Thompson, General Beauregard, and General Lovell. Heading up-stream, close to a shoal, the Carondelet brought her port broadside guns to bear on the Sumter and Price, which were dropping down-stream. At this crisis the Van Dorn and Little Rebel had run above the Carondelet; the Bragg, Jeff. Thompson, Beauregard, and Lovell were below her. The last three, coming up, fired into the Carondelet; she returned their fire with her stern-guns; and, while in this position, I ordered the port rifled 50-pounder Dahlgren gun to be leveled and fired at the center of the Sumter. The shot struck the vessel just forward of her wheel-house, and the steam instantly poured out from her ports and all parts of her casemates, and we saw her men running out of them and falling or lying down on her deck. None of our gun-boats had yet come to the assistance of the Carondelet. The Benton and Pittsburgh had probably gone to aid the Cincinnati, and the St. Louis to relieve the Mound City, which had been badly rammed by the Van Dorn. The smoke at this time was so dense that we could hardly distinguish the gun-boats above us. The upper deck of the Carondelet was swept with grape-shot and fragments of broken shell; some of the latter were picked up by one of the sharp-shooters, who told me they were obliged to lie down under shelter to save themselves from the grape and other shot of the Pittsburgh above us, and from the shot and broken shell of the enemy below us. Why some of our gun-boats did not fire into the Van Dorn and Little Rebel while they were above the Carondelet, and prevent their escape, if possible, I never could make out.8