Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  During the “Seven Days” the Army of the Potomac consisted of 143 regiments of infantry, 55 batteries, and less than 8 regiments of cavalry, all told. The opposing Confederate army consisted of 187 regiments of infantry, 79 batteries, and 14 regiments of cavalry. The losses of the two armies from June 25th to July 2d were:5

  CONFEDERATE BATTERY AT MATHIAS POINT, OR BUDD’S FERRY, ON THE POTOMAC. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN FEBRUARY, 1862.

  The Confederate losses in killed and wounded alone were greater than the total losses of the Army of the Potomac in killed, wounded, and missing.

  No praise can be too great for the officers and men who passed through these seven days of battle, enduring fatigue without a murmur, successfully meeting and repelling every attack made upon them, always in the right place at the right time, and emerging from the fiery ordeal a compact army of veterans, equal to any task that brave and disciplined men can be called upon to undertake. They needed now only a few days of well-earned repose, a renewal of ammunition and supplies, and reënforcements to fill the gaps made in their ranks by so many desperate encounters, to be prepared to advance again, with entire confidence, to meet their worthy antagonists in other battles. It was, however, decided by the authorities at Washington, against my earnest remonstrances, to abandon the position on the James, and the campaign. The Army of the Potomac was accordingly withdrawn, and it was not until two years later that it again found itself under its last commander at substantially the same point on the bank of the James. It was as evident in 1862 as in 1865 that there was the true defense of Washington, and that it was on the banks of the James that the fate of the Union was to be decided.

  * * *

  1 The words quoted are General Beauregard’s.—EDITORS.

  2 First Corps, McDowell—Divisions: Franklin, McCall, and King; Second Corps, Sumner—Divisions: Richardson, Blenker, and Sedgwick; Third Corps, Heintzelman—Divisions: Porter, Hooker, and Hamilton; Fourth Corps, Keyes—Divisions: Couch, Smith, and Casey. The reserve artillery (Henry J. Hunt), the regular infantry (George Sykes), and regular cavalry (Philip St. George Cooke) and engineer troops were attached to headquarters.—EDITORS.

  3 Soon after the appearance of General McClellan’s article the following letter was received from the daughter of General Heintzelman:

  “In ‘The Century’ for May, 1885, General McClellan has an article, ‘The Peninsular Campaign,’ in which there are one or two misstatements in regards to the Third Corps, commanded by General Heintzelman. Fortunately my father’s papers, which are in my possession, contain replies to both allegations,—one in the handwriting of General Heintzelman’s adjutant-general, and the other the rough draft of a letter addressed to General Lorenzo Thomas, then Adjutant-General of the army. General McClellan says [see above]:

  “ ‘All the corps commanders on the south side were on the 26th directed to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare in support of Porter on the next day. All of them thought the enemy so strong in their respective fronts as to require all their force to hold their positions.’

  “Upon the demand for troops General Heintzelman replied as follows:

  “ ‘HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS, 4 P.M., JUNE 26, 1862.

  GENERAL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF:

  “ ‘I think I can hold the intrenchments with four brigades for twenty-four hours; that would leave two (2) brigades available for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and worn out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance.…

  S. P. HEINTZELMAN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL.’

  “This is far from being a statement that all his forces were required to hold his own lines.

  “General McClellan says [see this page]:

  “ ‘Meanwhile, through a misunderstanding of his orders, and being convinced that the troops of Sumner and Franklin at Savage’s Station were ample for the purpose in view, Heintzelman withdrew his troops during the afternoon, crossed the swamp at Brackett’s Ford, and reached the Charles City road with the rear of his column at 10 P.M.’

  “When the same statement was first made in 1863, General Heintzelman wrote the following letter:

  “ ‘HEADQUARTERS DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON, APRIL 11TH, 1863. GENERAL L. THOMAS, ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U.S.A., WASHINGTON.

  GENERAL:

  I find in the “New York Tribune” of the 8th of April a “Preliminary Report of the Operations of the Army of the Potomac, since June 25th, 1862,” made by General G. B. McClellan.…

  “ ‘In a paragraph commencing “On the 28th Porter’s corps was also moved across the White Oak Swamp,” etc., is the following:

  “They were ordered to hold this position until dark, then to fall back across the swamp and rejoin the rest of the army. This order was not fully carried out, nor was the exact position I designated occupied by the different divisions concerned.”

  “ ‘I was furnished with a map marked in red with the positions we should occupy.

  “ ‘As I had the fortified lines thrown up some time before by the troops in my command, I had no difficulty in knowing where to go, and I did occupy these lines. General Sumner’s were more indefinite, and he occupied a position in advance of the one designated. This left a space of half a mile unoccupied, between his right and Franklin’s left. In the morning I was informed that some rebels were already at or near Dr. Trent’s house, where General McClellan’s headquarters had been; I sent and found this to be the case. General Franklin had also called at my headquarters and told me that the enemy were repairing the bridges of the Chickahominy, and would soon cross in force. About 1 P.M. I saw some of our troops filing into the fields between Dr. Trent’s house and Savage’s Station, and a few moments later Generals Franklin and W. F. Smith came to me and reported the enemy approaching, and urged me to ride to General Sumner and get him to fall back and close this gap. I rode briskly to the front, and on the Williamsburg road, where it passed between my two divisions, met General Sumner’s troops falling back. He wished me to turn back with him to arrange for ulterior operations, but as my right flank was entirely uncovered by these movements, I declined until after I had seen my division commanders and given them orders how to fall back. On my return there was some difficulty in finding General Sumner, and when found he informed me he had made his arrangements. I returned to my command, and on the way found the ground filled with troops, more than could be used to any advantage, and if the enemy planted a few batteries of artillery on the opposite side of the railroad, they would have been cut in pieces.

  “ ‘An aide to General McClellan having reported to me the day before to point out to me a road across the White Oak Swamp, opening from the left flank of my position of the fortified lines, I did not hesitate to retreat by that road, and left at 3 P.M. General Smith, of Franklin’s corps, having sent to the rear all his batteries earlier in the day, I, at his request, let him have two of mine (Osborn’s and Bramhall’s), and they did good service that afternoon in checking and defeating the rebel attack.

  “ ‘My remaining would have been no aid to General Sumner, as he already had more troops than he could defile through the narrow road in his rear, and the road I took covered his left flank.

  “ ‘Before dark the advance of my corps was across the swamp, and by 10 P.M. the rear was over, with but little molestation from the enemy. I immediately sought General McClellan, and reported to him what I had done, and this is the first intimation I have had that my conduct was not entirely satisfactory.

  “ ‘To hold my position till dark, by which time I was to receive orders, would have been impossible. After Generals Franklin and Sumner had fallen back, my right flank and rear were uncovered, and by a road which passed entirely in my rear; and beyond my right flank my only line of retreat would have been cut off, and I would have lost my entire corps. I did not know where General McClellan was, and it was, therefore, impossible to report to him for orders.

  “ ‘When General Birney reached Fishe
r’s Ford, the enemy were there, but not in force; they soon arrived in force, and he had to take another road more to our left. Had we been a little later they would have been in possession, and our retreat by this road cut off.

  S. P. HEINTZELMAN.’

  “I trust that you will be able to find space for these letters.

  —MARY L. HEINTZELMAN.”

  —EDITORS.

  4 General McClellan contributed an article to “The Century” magazine for February, 1884, on “The Princes of the House of Orléans,” in which he spoke as follows of the services of the Comte de Paris and his brother, the Duc de Chartres:

  “In August, 1861, the two brothers, accompanied by the Prince de Joinville, sailed for New York. Toward the close of September they arrived in Washington, and the young Princes at once received authority from the President to enter the army as aides-de-camp, being permitted to serve without taking the oath of allegiance, and without pay; it was also understood that they should be permitted to leave the service should family or political exigencies require it. They were borne on the army register as Louis Philippe d’Orléans and Robert d’Orléans, additional aides-de-camp in the regular army, with the rank of captain, and were assigned to the staff of the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac. The Prince de Joinville accepted no rank, and simply accompanied headquarters, on the invitation of the general commanding, as an amateur and friend. The position held by these “young gentlemen”—as the Prince de Joinville always designated them—was not free from difficulties. Princes who might at any time be called upon to assume their places in the government of a great nation, yet serving in the army of a republic whose cause was not regarded with very friendly eyes by the existing government of their own country, they had many contradictions to reconcile, many embarrassments to overcome. Connected by family ties with so many of the royal families of Europe, always received by them as of royal rank, the elder regarded by so many in France as the rightful heir to the throne, they could never lose sight of the dignity of their position, while it was at the same time necessary for them to perform their duties in a subordinate grade, and to win the confidence and friendship of their new comrades, who were sure to weigh men by their personal qualities and abilities, not by their social position across the Atlantic. Their task was accomplished with complete success, for they gained the full confidence, respect, and regard of their commander and their comrades. From the moment they entered the service, they were called upon to perform precisely the same duties and in precisely the same manner as their companions on the personal staff of their commander.…

  “Their conduct was characterized by an innate love for a soldier’s life, by an intense desire to perfect themselves in the profession of arms by actual experience of war on a large scale, and by unswerving devotion to duty. Not only this, their heads and hearts were with us in our hour of trial, and I believe that, next to their own France, they most loved this country, for which they so freely and so often exposed their lives on the field of battle.

  “Soon after the beginning of the peninsular campaign, the Princes were strongly urged by their friends at home to return at once to England, partly to receive the large numbers of their adherents expected to attend the Exhibition of 1862, and partly because the French expedition to Mexico had greatly strained the relations between this country and France. They persisted in remaining with the army until the close of the Seven Days, and left only when assured that the immediate resumption of the attack on Richmond was improbable. Had the prompt receipt of reënforcements rendered a new advance practicable, it is certain that no considerations would have withdrawn them from the field until the completion of the operations against Richmond. Although warmly attached to them and very unwilling to lose their services, their commander fully recognized the imperative nature of the reasons for their departure, and entirely acquiesced in the propriety of their prompt return to Europe.”

  Soon after the termination of the war, the Comte de Paris began his extensive “History of the Civil War in America,” the first volume of the American edition being issued in 1875.—EDITORS.

  5 Tables of the “Opposing Forces” of the “Seven Days,” made from the fullest revised data of the War Records office, will show that the Army of the Potomac consisted of 150 regiments of infantry; 2 regiments and 1 battalion of engineers; 1 regiment of heavy or siege artillery; 58 batteries; and 10 regiments of cavalry. The Confederate forces consisted of 173 regiments and 12 battalions of infantry; 71 batteries; and 12 regiments of cavalry. General McClellan correctly estimates the Union loss, but the Confederate loss, according to the revised returns, was: killed, 3286; wounded, 15,909; missing, 940. Total, 20,135.—EDITORS.

  CHAPTER 13

  THE SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN.1

  John Pope, Major-General, U.S.A.

  Early in June, 1862, I was in command of the army corps known as the “Army of the Mississippi,” which formed the left wing of the army engaged in operations against Corinth, Miss., commanded by General Halleck. A few days after Corinth was evacuated I went to St. Louis on a short leave of absence from my command, and while there I received a telegram from Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, requesting me to come to Washington immediately. I at once communicated the fact to General Halleck by telegraph, and received a reply from him strongly objecting to my leaving the army which was under his command. I quite concurred with him both as to his objections to my going to Washington for public reasons and as to the unadvisability of such a step on personal considerations. I was obliged, however, to go, and I went accordingly, but with great reluctance and against the urgent protests of my friends in St. Louis, and subsequently of many friends in the Army of the West.

  When I reached Washington the President was absent at West Point, but I reported in person to Secretary Stanton. I had never seen him before, and his peculiar appearance and manners made a vivid impression on me. He was short and stout. His long beard, which hung over his breast, was slightly tinged with gray even at that time, and he had the appearance of a man who had lost much sleep and was tired both in body and mind. Certainly, with his large eye-glasses and rather disheveled appearance, his presence was not imposing. Although he was very kind and civil to me, his manner was abrupt and his speech short and rather dictatorial. He entered at once on the business in hand, seemingly without the least idea that any one should object to, or be reluctant to agree to, his views and purposes. He was surprised, and, it seemed to me, not well pleased, that I did not assent to his plans with effusion; but went on to unfold them in the seeming certainty that they must be submitted to. He informed me that the purpose was to unite the armies under McDowell, Frémont, and Banks, all three of whom were my seniors in rank, and to place me in general command. These armies were scattered over the northern part of Virginia, with little or no communication or concert of action with one another; Frémont and Banks being at Middletown, in the Shenandoah Valley, and McDowell’s corps widely separated, King’s division at Fredericksburg, and Ricketts’s at and beyond Manassas Junction.

  PICKETING THE RAPIDAN.

  The general purpose at that time was to demonstrate with the army toward Gordonsville and Charlottesville and draw off as much as possible of the force in front of General McClellan, who then occupied the line of the Chickahominy, and to distract the attention of the enemy in his front so as to reduce as far as practicable the resistance opposed to his advance on Richmond.

  OUTLINE MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN.

  It became apparent to me at once that the duty to be assigned to me was in the nature of a forlorn-hope, and my position was still further embarrassed by the fact that I was called from another army and a different field of duty to command an army of which the corps commanders were all my seniors in rank. I therefore strongly urged that I be not placed in such a position, but be permitted to return to my command in the West, to which I was greatly attached and with which I had been closely identified in several successful operations on the Mississippi. It was no
t difficult to forecast the delicate and embarrassing position in which I should be placed, nor the almost certainly disagreeable, if not unfortunate, issue of such organization for such a purpose.

  VIEW IN CULPEPER DURING THE OCCUPATION BY POPE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

  The building with the ball and vane is the Court House, in which Confederate prisoners were confined.

  It would be tedious to relate the conversations between the President, the Secretary of War, and myself on this subject. Sufficient to say that I was finally informed that the public interests required my assignment to this command, and that it was my duty to submit cheerfully. An order from the War Department was accordingly issued organizing the Army of Virginia, to consist of the army corps of McDowell, Banks, and Frémont, and placing me in command.

  One result of this order was the very natural protest of General Frémont against being placed under the command of his junior in rank, and his request to be relieved from the command of his corps.2

  It was equally natural that the subordinate officers and the enlisted men of those corps should have been ill-pleased at the seeming affront to their own officers, involved in calling an officer strange to them and to the country in which they were operating, and to the character of the service in which they were engaged, to supersede well-known and trusted officers who had been with them from the beginning, and whose reputation was so closely identified with their own. How far this feeling prevailed among them, and how it influenced their actions, if it did so at all, I am not able to tell; but it is only proper for me to say (and it is a pleasure as well as a duty to say it) that Generals McDowell and Banks never exhibited to me the slightest feeling on the subject either in their conversation or acts. Indeed, I think it would be hard to find officers more faithful to their duty or more deeply interested in the success of the army. To General McDowell especially is due my gratitude for his zeal and fidelity in what was and ought to have been considered a common cause, the success of the Union Army.