Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  12 Heintzelman’s infantry (effectives) numbered 15,011 on the 10th of August, and the full corps, replenished by six new regiments, reported 16,000 for duty September 10th. There are no intermediate reports.—EDITORS.

  13 On the afternoon of August 26th, Longstreet’s corps moved to Hinson’s Mill Ford, six miles above, leaving R. H. Anderson’s division (about 6000 effectives) at Waterloo Bridge.—EDITORS.

  14 This engagement is known as Kettle Run. The Confederate force consisted of Early’s brigade, with two regiments of Forno’s, two of Lawton’s, and Brown’s and Johnson’s batteries. After disputing Hooker’s advance for some hours, Ewell withdrew under fire.—EDITORS.

  15 Porter marched about 3 A.M., instead of at 1, as ordered. The leading brigade lit candles to look for the road. On the Confederate side Colonel Henry Forno, 5th Louisiana, reports: “After 12 o’clock at night of the 27th, the brigade was put in motion with orders to follow General Early, but owing to the darkness I was unable to find him.” Two orders addressed by Pope at Bristoe to McDowell at Gainesville fell into the hands of A. P. Hill, at Centreville. Some of the Confederates (Jackson, Trimble, and Stuart) mention the darkness of the night of the 26th; and General McDowell lost his way from this cause on the night of the 28th.—EDITORS.

  16 General Pope’s orders of the 27th for the movements of the 28th directed his whole army upon Manassas. Full information of these dispositions reached General A. P. Hill early the next morning, through the captured orders.—EDITORS.

  17 At this time Jackson’s command was concentrated near Groveton. General Pope says in his report: “I reached Manassas Junction … about 12 o’clock … less than an hour after Jackson, in person, had retired.” Jackson was, however, on the old “battle-field of Manassas” at 8 A.M., as appears from the order of that date to A. P. Hill, and about noon when he sent orders to Taliaferro to attack the Federal troops (evidently Reynolds), supposed to be marching on Centreville, but actually moving from Gainesville to Manassas under Pope’s first orders. Jackson says: “My command had hardly concentrated north of the turnpike before the enemy’s advance reached the vicinity of Groveton from the direction of Warrenton.” In the sketch on this page, Meade’s brigade and Cooper’s battery are seen deploying for action.—EDITORS.

  18 At 1:20 or 2 P.M. Pope repeated his orders sent “a few minutes ago” to McDowell to march toward Gum Springs, distant 20 miles in the direction of Aldie Gap. The note sent “a few minutes ago,” reached McDowell at 3:15 P.M. The orders to march on Centreville were dated 4:15 P.M., and McDowell appears to have received the second while preparing to execute the first.—EDITORS.

  19 Jackson says: “Dispositions were promptly made to attack the enemy, based upon the idea that he would continue to press forward upon the turnpike toward Alexandria; but as he did not appear to advance in force, and there was reason to believe that his main body was leaving the road and inclining toward Manassas Junction, my command was advanced through the woods, leaving Groveton on the left, until it reached a commanding position near Brawner’s house. By this time it was sunset; but as his column appeared to be moving by, with its flank exposed, I determined to attack at once, which was vigorously done by the divisions of Taliaferro and Ewell.”—EDITORS.

  20 King’s division (which had not been at Gainesville on the night of the 27th, but near Buckland Mills, and was consequently near the Warrenton pike instead of at Manassas, when, by General Pope’s 4:15 P.M. order, the army was directed upon Centreville instead of upon Manassas) encountered Jackson’s forces in position as stated in the preceding note about 5:30 P.M. Gibbon’s brigade, with two regiments of Doubleday’s (the 56th Pennsylvania and 76th New York), contended against Taliaferro’s division and two brigades (Lawton’s and Trimble’s) of Ewell’s division. General Jackson says:

  “The batteries of Wooding, Poague, and Carpenter were placed in position in front of Starke’s brigade, and above the village of Groveton, and, firing over the heads of our skirmishers, poured a heavy fire of shot and shell upon the enemy. This was responded to by a very heavy fire from the enemy, forcing our batteries to select another position. By this time Taliaferro’s command, with Lawton’s and Trimble’s brigades on his left, was advanced from the woods to the open field, and was now moving in gallant style until it reached an orchard on the right of our line and was less than 100 yards from a large force of the enemy. The conflict here was fierce and sanguinary. Although largely reënforced, the Federals did not attempt to advance, but maintained their ground with obstinate determination. Both lines stood exposed to the discharges of musketry and artillery until about 9 o’clock, when the enemy slowly fell back, yielding the field to our troops. The loss on both sides was heavy, and among our wounded were Major-General Ewell and Brigadier-General Taliaferro.”

  Gibbon’s brigade lost 133 killed, 539 wounded, 79 missing, total, 751, “or considerably over one-third of the command.” King held his ground until 1 A.M. on the 29th, when, being without support, without communication with either of the generals in command over him, and without orders since those of 4:15 P.M., he marched to Manassas Junction.—EDITORS.

  21 Reynolds, ordered to march en échelon on King’s right, was moving toward Manassas (see note to picture, this page), when, at 5 P.M., he received McDowell’s order, based on Pope’s of 4:15, to march on Centreville. He turned off at Bethlehem Church and took the Sudley Springs road toward the Warrenton pike. General Reynolds says:

  “About this time heavy cannonading was heard both to our front and left, the former supposed to be from Sigel’s corps, and the latter from King’s division, which had taken the Warrenton pike from Gainesville. I sent word to the column to hasten its march, and proceeded to the left at once myself in the direction of the firing, arriving on the field just before dark, and found that Gibbon’s brigade, of King’s division, was engaged with the enemy, with Doubleday’s and Patrick’s brigades in the vicinity. After the firing ceased I saw General King, who, determining to maintain his position, I left about 9 o’clock P.M. to return to my division, promising to bring it up early in the morning to his support. Before leaving, however, I heard the division moving off, and I learned from General Hatch that it was moving by Gainesville toward Manassas. I then returned to my own division, which I reached at daylight.”

  —EDITORS.

  22 Sigel was ordered to move at 2:45 A.M. and to march en échelon on Reynolds’s right. His advance appears to have reached Manassas about noon. He states that during the afternoon he was ordered by General Pope to march by New Market on Centreville, and arrived on the field of the First Bull Run, near the Henry house (see this page), too late to take part in King’s engagement.—EDITORS.

  23 According to General McDowell, this was “after putting these divisions in motion (under the 4:15 P.M. order) and going with Reynolds’s division to near Manassas”; and in compliance with General Pope’s request of 1:20 or 2 P.M., viz., “Give me your views fully; you know the country much better than I do.” General McDowell found Reynolds at daybreak on the 29th.—EDITORS.

  24 In the exercise of his discretion McDowell, then commanding two corps, sent Ricketts to Thoroughfare Gap on the morning of the 28th, to delay Longstreet’s advance, notwithstanding General Pope’s orders to move on Manassas with his whole command. But for this, the movement on Manassas as ordered in the morning, as well as the movement on Centreville as ordered in the afternoon, would have left no troops except Buford’s broken-down cavalry between Longstreet and Jackson, or between Longstreet and Pope’s left.—EDITORS.

  25 Reno appears not to have been at Centreville at this time, since General Pope’s headquarters “near Bull Run” were between him and Centreville at 3 A.M. on the 30th.—EDITORS.

  26 These orders to Sigel are not found in the “Official Records,” but they correspond with the orders given to Kearny and Heintzelman at 9:50 and 10 P.M., on the 28th. General Sigel says he received them during the night, made his preparations at night, and “formed in order
of battle at daybreak.” Such of the subordinate reports as mention the time, as well as the reports of Generals McDowell and Reynolds, tend to confirm General Sigel’s statement.—EDITORS.

  27 These orders to Heintzelman are dated 10 P.M., August 28th; similar orders to Kearny direct are dated 9:50 P.M.—EDITORS.

  28 At 3 A.M. on the 29th, General Pope ordered Porter, then at Bristoe, to “move upon Centreville at the first dawn of day.” In the order of the 29th to Porter, “Push forward with your corps and King’s division, which you will take with you upon Gainesville,” the hour is not noted, but General Pope testified on the Porter court-martial that he sent it between 8 and 9 A.M. Porter appears to have received it about 9:30. —EDITORS.

  29 This joint order refers to the one just cited as having been sent “an hour and a half ago,” under which Porter was marching toward Gainesville when McDowell joined him near Manassas Junction. After receiving the joint order, General McDowell again joined Porter, at the front, and showed him a dispatch just received from Buford, dated 9:30 A.M., and addressed to Ricketts. It appears to have escaped notice that this dispatch was forwarded by Ricketts to McDowell at 11:30 A.M., which fixes the time of the meeting between Generals McDowell and Porter at the front as after 11:30.—EDITORS.

  30 Not mentioned by Jackson or any of the subordinate commanders of either army. Jackson appears to have received the attack in position as stated by General Pope in the next sentence.—EDITORS.

  31 According to General Longstreet’s and other Confederate reports, their troops withdrew at night to their line of battle of the day, occupying the same positions and in the same order. General Pope’s orders for the 30th directed that the corps of McDowell, Heintzelman, and Porter, with the necessary cavalry, should move “forward in pursuit of the enemy,” and “press him vigorously all day.” The command of the pursuit was assigned to General McDowell.—EDITORS.

  32 Griffin’s brigade. Griffin testified that he was ordered by General Morell to follow Sykes, who was supposed to have gone to Centreville. Griffin moved thence toward the battle-field about 5 P.M. He found the road blocked, and the bridge over Cub Run broken.—EDITORS.

  33 Captain William H. Powell, of the 4th Regular Infantry, in a letter to “The Century,” dated Fort Omaha, Nebraska, March 12th, 1885, thus describes the retreat upon Washington and McClellan’s reception by his old army:

  “The last volley had been fired, and as night fell upon us the division of regulars of Porter’s corps was ordered to retire to Centreville. It had fought hard on the extreme left to preserve the line of retreat by the turnpike and the stone bridge. We were gloomy, despondent, and about ‘tired out’; we had not had a change of clothing from the 14th to the 31st of August, and had been living, in the words of the men, on ‘salt horse,’ ‘hard-tack,’ and ‘chicory juice.’ As we filed from the battle-field into the turnpike leading over the stone bridge, we came upon a group of mounted officers, one of whom wore a peculiar style of hat which had been seen on the field that day, and which had been the occasion of a great deal of comment in the ranks. As we passed these officers, the one with the peculiar hat called out in a loud voice:

  “ ‘What troops are these?’

  “ ‘The regulars,’ answered somebody.

  “ ‘Second Division, Fifth Corps,’ replied another.

  “ ‘God bless them! they saved the army,’ added the officer, solemnly. We learned that he was General Irvin McDowell.

  “As we neared the bridge we came upon confusion. Men singly and in detachments were mingled with sutlers’ wagons, artillery, caissons, supply wagons, and ambulances, each striving to get ahead of the other. Vehicles rushed through organized bodies, and broke the columns into fragments. Little detachments gathered by the roadside, after crossing the bridge, crying out the numbers of their regiments as a guide to scattered comrades.

  “And what a night it was! Dark, gloomy, and beclouded by the volumes of smoke which had risen from the battle-field. To our disgust with the situation was added the discomfort of a steady rain setting in after nightfall. With many threats to reckless drivers, and through the untiring efforts of our officers,—not knowing how, when, or where we should meet the enemy again,—we managed to preserve our organization intact, keeping out of the road as much as possible, in order to avoid mingling with others. In this way we arrived at Centreville some time before midnight, and on the morning of the 31st of August we were placed in the old Confederate earth-works surrounding that village to await developments.

  “It was Sunday. The morning was cold and rainy; everything bore a look of sadness in unison with our feelings. All about were the disjecta membra of a shattered army; here were stragglers plodding through the mud, inquiring for their regiments; little squads, just issuing from their shelterless bivouac on the wet ground; wagons wrecked and forlorn; half-formed regiments, part of the men with guns and part without; wanderers driven in by the patrols; while every one you met had an unwashed, sleepy, downcast aspect, and looked as if he would like to hide his head somewhere from all the world.

  “During the afternoon of Sept. 1st, a council of war was held in the bivouac of the regular division, at which I noticed all the prominent generals of that army. It was a long one, and apparently not over-pleasant, if one might judge of it by the expressions on the faces of the officers when they separated. The information it developed, however, was that the enemy was between the Army of the Potomac and Washington; that Kearny was then engaged with him at Chantilly, and that we must fall back toward the defenses of the city. Dejection disappeared, activity took the place of immobility, and we were ready again to renew the contest. But who was to be our leader? and where were we to fight? Those were the questions that sprang to our lips. We had been ordered to keep our camp-fires burning brightly until ‘tattoo’; and then, after the rolls had been called, we stole away—out into a gloomy night, made more desolate by the glare of dying embers. Nothing occurred to disturb our march; we arrived at Fairfax Court House early on the morning of the 2d of September. At this point we were turned off on the road to Washington, and went into bivouac. Here all sorts of rumors reached us; but, tired out from the weary night march, our blankets were soon spread on the ground, and we enjoyed an afternoon and night of comparative repose.

  “About 4 o’clock on the next afternoon, from a prominent point, we descried in the distance the dome of the Capitol. We would be there at least in time to defend it! Darkness came upon us and still we marched. As the night wore on, we found at each halt that it was more and more difficult to arouse the men from the sleep into which they would fall apparently as soon as they touched the ground. During one of these halts, while Colonel Buchanan, the brigade commander, was resting a little off the road, some distance in advance of the head of the column, it being starlight, two horsemen came down the road toward us. I thought I observed a familiar form, and, turning to Colonel Buchanan, said:

  “ ‘Colonel, if I did not know that General McClellan had been relieved of all command, I should say that he was one of that party,’ adding immediately, ‘I do really believe it is he!’

  “ ‘Nonsense,’ said the colonel; ‘what would General McClellan be doing out in this lonely place, at this time of night, without an escort?’

  “The two horsemen passed on to where the men of the column were lying, standing, or sitting, and were soon lost in the shadowy gloom. But a few moments had elapsed, however, when Captain John D. Wilkins, of the 3d Infantry (now colonel of the 5th) came running toward Colonel Buchanan, crying out:

  “ ‘Colonel! Colonel! General McClellan is here!’

  “The enlisted men caught the sound! Whoever was awake aroused his neighbor. Eyes were rubbed, and those tired fellows, as the news passed down the column, jumped to their feet, and sent up such a hurrah as the Army of the Potomac had never heard before. Shout upon shout went out into the stillness of the night; and as it was taken up along the road and repeated by regiment, brigade, division, and corps, we could h
ear the roar dying away in the distance. The effect of this man’s presence upon the Army of the Potomac—in sunshine or rain, in darkness or in daylight, in victory or defeat—was electrical, and too wonderful to make it worth while attempting to give a reason for it. Just two weeks from this time this defeated army, under the leadership of McClellan, won the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, having marched ten days out of the two weeks in order to do it.”

  CHAPTER 14

  THE INVASION OF MARYLAND.

  James Longstreet, Lieutenant-General, C.S.A.

  When the Second Bull Run campaign closed we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared attack. With such a splendid victory behind us, and such bright prospects ahead, the question arose as to whether or not we should go into Maryland. General Lee, on account of our short supplies, hesitated a little, but I reminded him of my experience in Mexico, where sometimes we were obliged to live two or three days on green corn. I told him we could not starve at that season of the year so long as the fields were loaded with “roasting ears.” Finally he determined to go on, and accordingly crossed the river and went to Frederick City. On the 6th of September some of our cavalry, moving toward Harper’s Ferry, became engaged with some of the Federal artillery near there. General Lee proposed that I should organize a force, and surround the garrison and capture it. I objected, and urged that our troops were worn with marching and were on short rations, and that it would be a bad idea to divide our forces while we were in the enemy’s country, where he could get information, in six or eight hours, of any movement we might make. The Federal army, though beaten at the Second Manassas, was not disorganized, and it would certainly come out to look for us, and we should guard against being caught in such a condition. Our army consisted of a superior quality of soldiers, but it was in no condition to divide in the enemy’s country. I urged that we should keep it well in hand, recruit our strength, and get up supplies, and then we could do anything we pleased. General Lee made no reply to this, and I supposed the Harper’s Ferry scheme was abandoned. A day or two after we had reached Frederick City, I went up to General Lee’s tent and found the front walls closed. I inquired for the general, and he, recognizing my voice, asked me to come in. I went in and found Jackson there. The two were discussing the move against Harper’s Ferry, both heartily approving it. They had gone so far that it seemed useless for me to offer any further opposition, and I only suggested that Lee should use his entire army in the move instead of sending off a large portion of it to Hagerstown as he intended to do. General Lee so far changed the wording of his order as to require me to halt at Boonsboro’ with General D. H. Hill; Jackson being ordered to Harper’s Ferry via Bolivar Heights, on the south side; McLaws by the Maryland Heights on the north, and Walker, via Loudoun Heights, from the south-east. This was afterward changed, and I was sent on to Hagerstown, leaving D. H. Hill alone at South Mountain.