Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  When Mansfield’s corps came on the field, Meade, who succeeded Hooker,6 withdrew the First Corps to the ridge north of Poffenberger’s, where it had bivouacked the night before. It had suffered severely, having lost 2470 in killed and wounded, but it was still further depleted by straggling, so that Meade reported less than 7000 men with the colors that evening. Its organization was preserved, however, and the story that it was utterly dispersed was a mistake.

  SUMNER’S ADVANCE—FRENCH’S DIVISION CLOSING IN UPON ROULETTE’S BARNS AND HOUSE—RICHARDSON’S DIVISION CONTINUING THE LINE FAR TO THE LEFT. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

  Greene’s division, on the left of the Twelfth Corps, profited by the hard fighting of those who had preceded it, and was able to drive the enemy quite out of the East Wood and across the open fields between it and the Dunker Church. Greene even succeeded, about the time of Sumner’s advance, in getting a foothold about the Dunker Church itself, which he held for some time.7 But the fighting of Hooker’s and Mansfield’s men, though lacking unity of force and of purpose, had cost the enemy dear. J. R. Jones, who commanded Jackson’s division, had been wounded; Starke, who succeeded Jones, was killed; Lawton, who followed Starke, was wounded. Ewell’s division, commanded by Early, had suffered hardly less. Hood was sent back into the fight to relieve Lawton, and had been reënforced by the brigades of Ripley, Colquitt, and McRae (Garland’s), from D. H. Hill’s division. When Greene reached the Dunker Church, therefore, the Confederates on that wing had suffered more fearfully than our own men. Nearly half their numbers were killed and wounded, and Jackson’s famous “Stonewall” division was so completely disorganized that only a handful of men under Colonels Grigsby and Stafford remained and attached themselves to Early’s command. Of the division under Early, his own brigade was all that retained much strength, and this, posted among the rocks in the West Wood and vigorously supported by Stuart’s horse artillery on the flank, was all that covered the left of Lee’s army. Could Hooker and Mansfield have attacked together,—or, still better, could Sumner’s Second Corps have marched before day and united with the first onset,—Lee’s left must inevitably have been crushed long before the Confederate divisions of McLaws, Walker, and A. P. Hill could have reached the field. It is this failure to carry out any intelligible plan which the historian must regard as the unpardonable military fault on the National side. To account for the hours between 4 and 8 on that morning, is the most serious responsibility of the National commander.

  MAJOR-GENERAL ISRAEL B. RICHARDSON. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

  Referring in his report to the incidents accompanying General Richardson’s fall, General Caldwell says: “The enemy made one more effort to break my line, and this time the attack was made in the center. Colonel Barlow [General Francis C.], hearing firing to his left, on our old front, immediately moved to the left and formed in line with the rest of the brigade. The whole brigade then moved forward in line, driving the enemy entirely out of the corn-field [see E on the map] and through the orchard beyond, the enemy firing grape and canister from two brass pieces in the orchard to our front, and shell and spherical case-shot from a battery on our right. While leading his men forward under the fire, Colonel Barlow fell dangerously wounded by a grape-shot in the groin. By command of General Richardson I halted the brigade, and, drawing back the line, re-formed it near the edge of the corn-field. It was now 1 o’clock P.M. Here we lay exposed to a heavy artillery fire, by which General Richardson was severely wounded. The fall of General Richardson (General Meagher having been previously borne from the field) left me in command of the division, which I formed in line, awaiting the enemy’s attack. Not long after, I was relieved of the command by General Hancock, who had been assigned to the command of the division by General McClellan.” General Richardson was carried to Pry’s house, McClellan’s headquarters, where he died November 3d.—EDITORS.

  Sumner’s Second Corps was now approaching the scene of action, or rather two divisions of it—Sedgwick’s and French’s—Richardson’s being still delayed8 till his place could be filled by Porter’s troops, the strange tardiness in sending orders being noticeable in regard to every part of the army. Sumner met Hooker, who was being carried from the field, and the few words he could exchange with the wounded general were enough to make him feel the need of haste, but not sufficient to give him any clear idea of the position.

  SCENE AT THE RUINS OF MUMMA’S HOUSE AND BARNS. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

  These buildings were fired early in the morning by D. H. Hill’s men, who feared they would become a point of vantage to the Union forces. The sketch was made after the advance of French to the sunken road. Presumably, the battery firing upon the Confederate line to the right of that road is the First Rhode Island Light Artillery; for Captain John A. Tompkins, of Battery A. says, in his report, that he placed his pieces on a knoll “directly in front of some burning ruins,” and opened fire upon a battery in front. “At 9:30,” he continues, “the enemy appeared upon my right front with a large column, apparently designing to charge the battery. I was not aware of their approach until the head of the column gained the brow of a hill about sixty yards from the right gun of the battery. The pieces were immediately obliqued to the right and a sharp fire of canister opened upon them, causing them to retire in confusion, leaving the ground covered with their dead and wounded, and abandoning one of their battle-flags, which was secured by a regiment which came up on my right after the enemy had retreated. The enemy now opened a fire upon us from a battery in front, and also from one on the right near the white school-house [Dunker Church]. Two guns were directed to reply to the battery on the right, while the fire of the rest was directed upon the guns in front, which were silenced in about twenty minutes, and one of their caissons blown up.” At noon, Tompkins was relieved by Battery G.—EDITORS.

  Both Sedgwick and French marched their divisions by the right flank, in three columns, a brigade in each column, Sedgwick leading. They crossed the Antietam by Hooker’s route, but did not march as far to the north-west as Hooker had done. When the center of the corps was opposite the Dunker Church, and nearly east of it, the change of direction was given; the troops faced to their proper front and advanced in line of battle in three lines, fully deployed, and 60 or 70 yards apart, Sumner himself being in rear of Sedgwick’s first line, and near its left. When they approached the position held by Greene’s division at Dunker Church, French kept on so as to form on Greene’s left, while Sedgwick, under Sumner’s immediate lead, diverged somewhat to the right, passing through the East Wood, crossing the turnpike on the right of Greene and of the Dunker Church, and plunged into the West Wood. At this point there were absolutely no Confederate troops in front of them. Early was farther to the right, opposing Williams’s division of the Twelfth Corps, and now made haste under cover of the woods to pass around Sedgwick’s right and to get in front of him to oppose his progress. This led to a lively skirmishing fight in which Early was making as great a demonstration as possible, but with no chance of solid success. At this very moment, however, McLaws’s and Walker’s divisions came upon the field, marching rapidly from Harper’s Ferry. Walker charged headlong upon the left flank of Sedgwick’s lines, which were soon thrown into confusion, and McLaws, passing by Walker’s left, also threw his division diagonally upon the already broken and retreating lines of Sumner. Taken at such a disadvantage, these had never a chance; and in spite of the heroic bravery of Sumner and Sedgwick, with most of their officers (Sedgwick being severely wounded), the division was driven off to the north with terrible losses, carrying along in the rout part of Williams’s men of the Twelfth Corps, who had been holding Early at bay. All these troops were rallied at the ridge on the Poffenberger farm, where Hooker’s corps had already taken position. Here some thirty batteries of both corps were concentrated, and, supported by the organized parts of all three of the corps which had fought upon this part of the field, easily repulsed all efforts of Jackson and Stuart to resume the aggressive
or to pass between them and the Potomac. Sumner himself did not accompany the routed troops to this position, but as soon as it was plain that the division could not be rallied, he galloped off to put himself in communication with French and with the headquarters of the army and try to retrieve the misfortune. From the flag-station east of the East Wood he signaled to McClellan: “Reënforcements are badly wanted. Our troops are giving way.” It was between 9 and 10 o’clock when Sumner entered the West Wood, and in fifteen minutes, or a little more, the one-sided combat was over.9

  The enemy now concentrated upon Greene at the Dunker Church, and after a stubborn resistance he too was driven back across the turnpike and the open ground to the edge of the East Wood. Here, by the aid of several batteries gallantly handled, he defeated the subsequent effort to dislodge him. French had come up on his left, and both his batteries and the numerous ones on the Poffenberger hill swept the open ground and the corn-field over which Hooker had fought, and he was able to make good his position. The enemy was content to regain the high ground near the church, and French’s attack upon D. H. Hill was now attracting their attention.

  The battle on the extreme right was thus ended before 10 o’clock in the morning, and there was no more serious fighting north of the Dunker Church. French advanced on Greene’s left, over the open farm lands, and after a fierce combat about the Roulette and Clipp farm buildings, drove D. H. Hill’s division from them. Richardson’s division came up on French’s left soon after, and foot by foot, field by field, from hill to hill and from fence to fence, the enemy was pressed back, till after several hours of fighting the sunken road, since known as “Bloody Lane,” was in our hands, piled full of the Confederate dead who had defended it with their lives. Richardson had been mortally wounded, and Hancock had been sent from Franklin’s corps to command the division. Barlow had been conspicuous in the thickest of the fight, and after a series of brilliant actions was carried off desperately wounded. On the Confederate side equal courage had been shown and a magnificent tenacity exhibited. But it is not my purpose to describe the battle in detail. I limit myself to such an outline as may make clear my interpretation of the larger features of the engagement and its essential plan.

  The head of Franklin’s corps (the Sixth) had arrived about 10 o’clock and taken the position near the Sharpsburg Bridge which Sumner had occupied. Before noon Smith’s and Slocum’s divisions were ordered to Sumner’s assistance, and early in the afternoon Irwin and Brooks, of Smith, advanced to the charge and relieved Greene’s division and part of French’s, holding the line from Bloody Lane by the Clipp, Roulette, and Mumma houses to the East Wood and the ridge in front. Here Smith and Slocum remained till Lee retreated, Smith’s division repelling a sharp attack. French and Richardson’s battle may be considered as ended at 1 or 2 o’clock.

  It seems to me very clear that about 10 o’clock in the morning was the great crisis in this battle. The sudden and complete rout of Sedgwick’s division was not easily accounted for, and with McClellan’s theory of the enormous superiority of Lee’s numbers, it looked as if the Confederate general had massed overwhelming forces on our right. Sumner’s notion that Hooker’s corps was utterly dispersed was naturally accepted, and McClellan limited his hopes to holding on at the East Wood and the Poffenberger hill where Sedgwick’s batteries were massed and supported by the troops that had been rallied there. Franklin’s corps as it came on the field was detained to support the threatened right center, and McClellan determined to help it further by a demonstration upon the extreme left by the Ninth Corps. At this time, therefore (10 A.M.), he gave his order to Burnside to try to cross the Antietam and attack the enemy, thus creating a diversion in favor of our hard-pressed right.10 Facts within my own recollection strongly sustain this view that the hour was 10 A.M. I have mentioned the hill above the Burnside Bridge where Burnside took his position, and to which I went after the preliminary orders for the day had been issued. There I remained until the order of attack came, anxiously watching what we could see at the right, and noting the effect of the fire of the heavy guns of Benjamin’s battery. From that point we could see nothing that occurred beyond the Dunker Church, for the East and West Woods, with farm-houses and orchards between, made an impenetrable screen. But as the morning wore on we saw lines of troops advancing from our right upon the other side of the Antietam, and engaging the enemy between us and the East Wood. The Confederate lines facing them now rose into view. From our position we looked, as it were, down between the opposing lines as if they had been the sides of a street, and as the fire opened we saw wounded men carried to the rear and stragglers making off. Our lines halted, and we were tortured with anxiety as we speculated whether our men would charge or retreat. The enemy occupied lines of fences and stone-walls, and their batteries made gaps in the National ranks. Our long-range guns were immediately turned in that direction, and we cheered every well-aimed shot. One of our shells blew up a caisson close to the Confederate line. This contest was going on, and it was yet uncertain which would succeed, when one of McClellan’s staff11 rode up with an order to Burnside. The latter turned to me, saying we were ordered to make our attack. I left the hill-top at once to give personal supervision to the movement ordered, and did not return to it, and my knowledge by actual vision of what occurred on the right ceased. The manner in which we had waited, the free discussion of what was occurring under our eyes and of our relation to it, the public receipt of the order by Burnside in the usual and business-like form, all forbid the supposition that this was any reiteration of a former order. It was immediately transmitted to me without delay or discussion, further than to inform us that things were not going altogether well on the right, and that it was hoped our attack would be of assistance to that wing. If then we can determine whose troops we saw engaged, we shall know something of the time of day; for there has been a general agreement reached as to the hours of movement during the forenoon on the right. The official map settles this. No lines of our troops were engaged in the direction of Bloody Lane and the Roulette farm-house, and between the latter and our station on the hill, till French’s division made its attack. We saw them distinctly on the hither side of the farm buildings, upon the open ground, considerably nearer to us than the Dunker Church or the East Wood. In number we took them to be a corps. The place, the circumstances, all fix it beyond controversy that they were French’s men, or French’s and Richardson’s. No others fought on that part of the field until Franklin went to their assistance at noon or later. The incident of their advance and the explosion of the caisson was illustrated by the pencil of the artist, Forbes, on the spot [see this page], and placed by him at the time Franklin’s head of column was approaching from Rohrersville, which was about 10 o’clock.12

  CHARGE OF IRWIN’S BRIGADE (SMITH’S DIVISION) AT THE DUNKER CHURCH. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

  General Wm. F. Smith, commanding the Second Division of Franklin’s corps, went to the assistance of French. On getting into position, for the most part to the right of French, General Smith, in his report, says: “Finding that the enemy were advancing, I ordered forward the Third Brigade (Colonel Irwin’s), who, passing through the regular battery then commanded by Lieutenant Thomas (Fourth Artillery), charged upon the enemy and drove them gallantly until abreast the little church at the point of woods, the possession of which had been so fiercely contested. At this point a severe flank fire from the woods was received.” The brigade rallied behind the crest of a slope, and remained in an advanced position until the next day.—EDITORS.

  GENERAL VIEW OF THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

  This sketch was made on the hill behind McClellan’s headquarters, which is seen in the hollow on the left. Sumner’s corps is seen in line of battle in the middleground, and Franklin’s is advancing in column to his support. The smoke in the left background is from a bursting Confederate caisson. The column of smoke is from the burning house and barn of S. Mumma, who gave the ground on whic
h the Dunker Church stands, and after whom, in the Confederate reports, the church is frequently called “St. Mumma’s.” On the right is the East Wood, in which is seen the smoke of the conflict between Mansfield and Jackson. —EDITORS.

  GENERAL MCCLELLAN RIDING THE LINE OF BATTLE AT ANTIETAM. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

  The troops were Hooker’s and Sedgwick’s, and the time about 11 A.M. of September 17th. General McClellan rode his black horse, “Daniel Webster,” which, on account of the difficulty of keeping pace with him, was better known to the staff as “that devil Dan.” —EDITORS.