Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  Whether Lincoln’s censure of Meade (which the general never saw) was justified continues to be a matter of debate among historians—just as it was in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. In any event, foremost among the “other late successes” to which the president referred was the capture of Vicksburg and the army that had held it. After a siege of almost seven weeks, the starving defenders surrendered to Grant on the Fourth of July, the same day the Army of Northern Virginia began its weary retreat from Gettysburg. On receiving word of Vicksburg’s surrender, the Confederate garrison of 7,000 men at Port Hudson, which had experienced a similar siege of seven weeks, also capitulated. The Mississippi River was now under complete Union control and the Confederacy was split in twain. President Lincoln, having recovered from his disappointment, praised General Grant for his success at Vicksburg and declared, “The Father of Waters goes unvexed to the sea.”

  Despite the vicious antidraft riots in New York City during the third week of July, the twin victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg caused Northern spirits to soar. “Copperheads are palsied and dumb for the moment at least,” wrote a New York Republican. “Government is strengthened four-fold at home and abroad.” Southern morale sank in proportion to the rise in Northern confidence. “Events have succeeded one another with disastrous rapidity,” wrote Josiah Gorgas, chief of ordnance for Confederate armies. “One brief month ago we were apparently at the point of success. Lee was in Pennsylvania … Vicksburg seemed to laugh all Grant’s efforts to scorn.… Now the picture is just as sober as it was bright then.”

  The other principal Union army, General William S. Rosecrans’s Army of the Cumberland, also sprang into action at the end of June. In a brief and almost bloodless campaign, Rosecrans maneuvered General Braxton Bragg’s Confederate Army of Tennessee out of its namesake state and occupied Chattanooga on September 9. But then Bragg turned on Rosecrans. Reinforced by parts of two divisions from the Army of Northern Virginia under General James Longstreet, Bragg counterattacked at Chickamauga Creek, ten miles south of Chattanooga, on September 19. In one of the hardest-fought battles of the war, whose casualties of 35,000 to both sides were second only to Gettysburg’s 48,000, the Confederates scored a breakthrough on the Union right on September 20 and sent part of the Army of the Cumberland reeling back to Chattanooga. Only a determined stand by the rest of the army under General George Thomas saved Union forces from a rout. For his leadership, Thomas was known ever after as the Rock of Chickamauga.

  This battle temporarily reversed the summer’s momentum of Union success. Bragg laid siege to the crippled Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga. Confederate war clerk John B. Jones wrote exultantly in his diary that “the effects of this great victory will be electrical. The whole South will be filled again with patriotic fervor, and in the North there will be a corresponding depression.”

  But Lincoln and Stanton moved quickly to redeem the situation. They ordered two small corps from the Army of the Potomac to Chattanooga to reinforce Union troops there, now under the command of Thomas. The president also sent Grant to Chattanooga to take command of the combined forces, which soon included four divisions from the Army of the Tennessee under Sherman. Grant welded these troops from three armies into a unit and attacked the Confederate besiegers at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge on November 24–25. In the most successful frontal assault of the war—successful beyond Grant’s expectations—divisions from the Army of the Cumberland that had been humiliated at Chickamauga two months earlier now stormed up Missionary Ridge and routed the enemy. Union forces stood poised in northern Georgia as winter came on, ready to launch an offensive against Atlanta in the spring.

  When he heard the news from Chattanooga, John B. Jones, recently so elated by the outcome at Chickamauga, now lamented this “incalculable disaster.” Another Southern official wrote of “calamity … defeat … utter ruin.” And a third wrote a discouraged diary entry: “I have never actually despaired of the cause [but now] steadfastness is yielding to a sense of hopelessness.”

  In Washington, by contrast, President Lincoln’s annual message to Congress on December 8 noted that although the year had begun with “dark and doubtful days,” now “the crisis which threatened to divide the friends of the Union is past.” This optimistic statement turned out to be premature. More dark and doubtful days lay ahead before the victorious end at Appomattox. But the great battles of 1863, and particularly the Union victories at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, proved to be crucial turning points in the war. As Lincoln said in his dedicatory address at the cemetery for Union soldiers in Gettysburg on November 19, 1863, those brave men had given “the last full measure of devotion” so that “this nation, under God … shall not perish from the earth” but instead “shall have a new birth of freedom.”

  CORPS BADGES OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC UNDER HOOKER.

  CHAPTER 1

  THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN.1

  Darius N. Couch, Major-General, U.S.V.

  In the latter part of January, 1863, the Army of the Potomac under Burnside was still occupying its old camps on the left bank of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg. After the failures under Burnside it was evident that the army must have a new commander. For some days there had been a rumor that Hooker had been fixed upon for the place, and on the 26th of January it was confirmed. This appointment, undoubtedly, gave very general satisfaction to the army, except perhaps to a few, mostly superior officers, who had grown up with it, and had had abundant opportunities to study Hooker’s military character; these believed that Mr. Lincoln had committed a grave error in his selection. The army, from its former reverses, had become quite disheartened and almost sulky; but the quick, vigorous measures now adopted and carried out with a firm hand had a magical effect in toning up where there had been demoralization and inspiring confidence where there had been mistrust. Few changes were made in the heads of the general staff departments, but for his chief-of-staff Hooker applied for Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone, who, through some untoward influence at Washington, was not given to him. This was a mistake of the war dignitaries, although the officer finally appointed to the office, Major-General Daniel Butterfield, proved himself very efficient. Burnside’s system of dividing the army into three grand divisions was set aside, and the novelty was introduced of giving to each army corps a distinct badge, an idea which was very popular with officers and men.2

  OUTLINE MAP OF THE CHANCELLORSVILLE CAMPAIGN.

  Some few days after Mr. Lincoln’s visit to the army in April I was again thrown with the President, and it happened in this wise. My pickets along the river were not only on speaking terms with those of the enemy on the other side of the river, but covertly carried on quite a trade in exchanging coffee for tobacco, etc. This morning it was hallooed over to our side: “You have taken Charleston,” which news was sent to headquarters. Mr. Lincoln hearing of it wished me to come up and talk the matter over. I went and was ushered into a side tent, occupied only by himself and Hooker. My entrance apparently interrupted a weighty conversation, for both were looking grave. The President’s manner was kindly, while the general, usually so courteous, forgot to be conventionally polite. The Charleston rumor having been briefly discussed, Mr. Lincoln remarked that it was time for him to leave. As he stepped toward the general, who had risen from his seat, as well as myself, he said: “I want to impress upon you two gentlemen in your next fight,”—and turning to me he completed the sentence,—“put in all of your men”—in the long run a good military maxim.

  The weather growing favorable for military operations, on April 12th were commenced those suggestive preliminaries to all great battles, clearing out the hospitals, inspecting arms, looking after ammunition, shoeing animals, issuing provisions, and making every preparation necessary to an advance. The next day, the 13th, Stoneman was put in motion at the head of ten thousand finely equipped and well organized cavalry to ascend the Rappahannock and, swinging around, to attack the Confederate cavalry
wherever it might be found, and “Fight! fight! fight!” At the end of two days’ march Stoneman found the river so swollen by heavy rains that he was constrained to hold up, upon which Hooker suspended his advance until the 27th. This unexpected delay of the cavalry seemingly deranged Hooker’s original plan of campaign. He had hoped that Stoneman would have been able to place his horsemen on the railroad between Fredericksburg and Richmond, by which Lee received his supplies, and make a wreck of the whole structure, compelling that general to evacuate his stronghold at Fredericksburg and vicinity and fall back toward Richmond.

  I estimate the grand total of Hooker’s seven corps at about 113,000 men ready for duty, although the data from which the conclusion is arrived at are not strictly official. This estimate does not include the cavalry corps of not less than 11,000 duty men, nor the reserve artillery, the whole number of guns in the army being 400. Lee’s strength in and around Fredericksburg was placed at between 55,000 and 60,000, not including cavalry. It is not known if Hooker’s information concerning the Confederate force was reliable, but Peck, operating in front of Norfolk, notified him that two of Lee’s divisions under Longstreet were on the south side of the James. The hour was, therefore, auspicious for Hooker to assume the offensive, and he seized it with a boldness which argued well for his fitness to command. The aim was to transfer his army to the south side of the river, where it would have a manœuvring footing not confronted by intrenched positions. On the 27th of April the Eleventh and Twelfth corps were set in motion for Kelly’s Ford, twenty-five miles up the Rappahannock, where they concentrated on the evening of the 28th, the Fifth, by reason of its shorter marching distance, moving on the 28th. The object of the expedition was unknown to the corps commanders until communicated to them after their arrival at the ford by the commanding general in person.3 The Eleventh Corps crossed the Rappahannock, followed in the morning by the Twelfth and Fifth corps—the two former striking for Germanna Ford, a crossing of the Rapidan, the latter for Ely’s Ford, lower down the same stream. Both columns, successfully effecting crossings with little opposition from the enemy’s pickets, arrived that evening, April 30th, at the point of concentration, Chancellorsville. It had been a brilliantly conceived and executed movement.

  THE RIGHT WING OF HOOKER’S ARMY CROSSING THE RAPPAHANNOCK AT KELLY’S FORD. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

  In order to confound Lee, orders were issued to assemble the Sixth, Third, and First corps under Sedgwick at Franklin’s Crossing and Pollock’s Mill, some three miles below Fredericksburg, on the left, before daylight of the morning of the 29th, and throw two bridges across and hold them. This was done under a severe fire of sharp-shooters. The Second Corps, two divisions, marched on the 28th for Banks’s Ford, four miles to the right; the other division, Gibbon’s, occupying Falmouth, near the river-bank, was directed to remain in its tents, as they were in full view of the enemy, who would readily observe their withdrawal. On the 29th the two divisions of the Second Corps reached United States Ford, held by the enemy; but the advance of the right wing down the river uncovered it, whereupon a bridge of pontoons was thrown across and the corps reached Chancellorsville the same night as the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth. The same day, the 30th, Sedgwick was instructed to place a corps across the river and make a demonstration upon the enemy’s right, below Fredericksburg, and the Third Corps received orders to join the right wing at Chancellorsville, where the commanding general arrived the same evening, establishing his headquarters at the Chancellor House, which, with the adjacent grounds, is Chancellorsville. All of the army lying there that night were in exuberant spirits at the success of their general in getting “on the other side” without fighting for a position. As I rode into Chancellorsville that night the general hilarity pervading the camps was particularly noticeable; the soldiers, while chopping wood and lighting fires, were singing merry songs and indulging in peppery camp jokes.

  The position at Chancellorsville not only took in reverse the entire system of the enemy’s river defenses, but there were roads leading from it directly to his line of communication. [See map, this page.] But in order to gain the advantages now in the commanding general’s grasp he had divided his army into two wings, and the enemy, no ordinary enemy, lay between them. The line of communication connecting the wings was by way of United States Ford and twenty miles long. It was of vital importance that the line be shortened in order to place the wings within easy support of each other. The possession of Banks’s Ford, foreshadowed in the instructions given to Slocum, would accomplish all that at present could be wished.

  There were three roads over which the right wing could move upon Fredericksburg: the Orange turnpike, from the west, passed through Chancellorsville, and was the most direct; the United States Ford road, crossing the former at Chancellorsville, became the Plank road, bent to the left and united with the turnpike five miles or so from Chancellorsville; the third road fell back from Chancellorsville toward the Rappahannock, passed along by Banks’s Ford, six miles distant, and continued to Fredericksburg. That wing was ready for the advance at an early hour in the morning of May 1st, but somehow things dragged; the order defining the movement, instead of being issued the previous night, was not received by the corps commanders, at least by me, until hours after light. Meade was finally pushed out on the left over the Banks’s Ford and turnpike roads, Slocum and Howard on the right along the Plank road, the left to be near Banks’s Ford by 2 P.M., the right at the junction of its line of movement with the turnpike at 12 M. No opposition was met, excepting that the division marching over the turnpike came upon the enemy two or three miles out, when the sound of their guns was heard at Chancellorsville, and General Hooker ordered me to take Hancock’s division and proceed to the support of those engaged. After marching a mile and a half or so I came upon Sykes, who commanded, engaged at the time in drawing back his advance to the position he then occupied. Shortly after Hancock’s troops had got into a line in front, an order was received from the commanding general “to withdraw both divisions to Chancellorsville.” Turning to the officers around me, Hancock, Sykes, Warren, and others, I told them what the order was, upon which they all agreed with me that the ground should not be abandoned, because of the open country in front and the commanding position. An aide, Major J. B. Burt, dispatched to General Hooker to this effect, came back in half an hour with positive orders to return. Nothing was to be done but carry out the command, though Warren suggested that I should disobey, and then he rode back to see the general. In the meantime Slocum, on the Plank road to my right, had been ordered in, and the enemy’s advance was between that road and my right flank. Sykes was first to move back, then followed by Hancock’s regiments over the same road. When all but two of the latter had withdrawn, a third order came to me, brought by one of the general’s staff: “Hold on until 5 o’clock.” It was then perhaps 2 P.M. Disgusted at the general’s vacillation and vexed at receiving an order of such tenor, I replied with warmth unbecoming in a subordinate: “Tell General Hooker he is too late, the enemy are already on my right and rear. I am in full retreat.”

  FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

  The position thus abandoned was high ground, more or less open in front, over which an army might move and artillery be used advantageously; moreover, were it left in the hands of an enemy, his batteries, established on its crest and slopes, would command the position at Chancellorsville. Everything on the whole front was ordered in. General Hooker knew that Lee was apprised of his presence on the south side of the river, and must have expected that his enemy would be at least on the lookout for an advance upon Fredericksburg. But it was of the utmost importance that Banks’s Ford should fall into our hands, therefore the enemy ought to have been pressed until their strength or weakness was developed; it would then have been time enough to run away.

  Mott’s Run, with a considerable brushy ravine, cuts the turnpike three-fourths of a mile east of Chancellorsville. Two of Hancock’s regiments, under Colonel Nelson A. Miles, subsequentl
y the Indian fighter, were directed to occupy the ravine. Continuing my way through the woods toward Chancellorsville, I came upon some of the Fifth Corps under arms. Inquiring for their commanding officer, I told him that in fifteen minutes he would be attacked. Before finishing the sentence a volley of musketry was fired into us from the direction of the Plank road. This was the beginning of the battle of Chancellorsville. Troops were hurried into position, but the observer required no wizard to tell him, as they marched past, that the high expectations which had animated them only a few hours ago had given place to disappointment. Proceeding to the Chancellor House, I narrated my operations in front to Hooker, which were seemingly satisfactory, as he said: “It is all right, Couch, I have got Lee just where I want him; he must fight me on my own ground.” The retrograde movement had prepared me for something of the kind, but to hear from his own lips that the advantages gained by the successful marches of his lieutenants were to culminate in fighting a defensive battle in that nest of thickets was too much, and I retired from his presence with the belief that my commanding general was a whipped man. The army was directed to intrench itself. At 2 A.M. the corps commanders reported to General Hooker that their positions could be held; at least so said Couch, Slocum, and Howard.

  Until after dark on May 1st the enemy confined his demonstrations to finding out the position of our left with his skirmishers. Then he got some guns upon the high ground which we had abandoned as before mentioned, and cannonaded the left of our line. There were not many casualties, but that day a shell severely wounded the adjutant-general of the Second Corps, now General F. A. Walker. Chancellorsville was a strategic point to an offensive or retreating army, as roads diverged from it into every part of Virginia; but for a defensive position it was bad, particularly for such an army as Hooker had under him, which prided itself upon its artillery, which was perhaps equal to any in the world. There were no commanding positions for artillery, and but little open country to operate over; in fact, the advantages of ground for this arm were mainly with the attacking party.