Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN M. CORSE, WHO “HELD THE FORT” AT ALLATOONA. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

  Hood had been threatening for some time to break Sherman’s long line of communication and supply. Sherman could not divine where the blow would fall. He was already arranging for a campaign southward; but he wanted Grant’s formal sanction, and he wished to make proper provision for Hood.

  At last, on the 2d of October, Hood had passed on his way back beyond the Chattahoochee. Sherman had waited for this till he was sure that the first attempt against his line would be south of the Etowah. Now, leaving one corps, Slocum’s, at Atlanta, he followed Hood with the remainder of his force. Hood stopped near Dallas, and sent French’s division to take the garrison of Allatoona and the depots there. From the top of Kenesaw, Sherman communicated with Corse,7 who had joined Tourtellotte at Allatoona, and taken command. The popular hymn, “Hold the Fort,” was based upon the messages between these chiefs and the noble defense that the garrison successfully made against a whole Confederate division. Sherman was coming, and French, several times repulsed with great loss, withdrew and joined Hood at New Hope Church.

  ALLATOONA PASS, LOOKING NORTH—CORSE’S FORT ON THE LEFT. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

  Taking up his northward march, Hood avoided Rome and aimed for Resaca. Schofield was warned, and got ready to defend Chattanooga, while Sherman now made forced marches so as to overtake his enemy and force him to battle. Finding us on his heels, Hood, picking up two or three small garrisons, but leaving untouched those that showed great pluck, like that of the resolute Colonel Clark R. Wever at Resaca,8 rushed through Sugar Valley and Snake Creek Gap, choking it behind him with trees. My command, following rapidly through the pass (October 16th), cut away or threw the gap obstructions to the right and left, and camped close up to Hood’s rear-guard. He again refused battle, and we pursued him beyond Gaylesville, Alabama. Between Rome and Gaylesville, General Ransom, the gallant and promising young officer before mentioned, died from over-work and exposure due to our forced marches. Taking advantage of a rich country, Sherman recuperated his men and moved slowly back to the Chattahoochee. Now, with the full consent of Grant, he hastened his preparations for his grand march to the sea.

  THE BATTLE OF ALLATOONA, OCTOBER 5, 1864. FROM “THE MOUNTAIN CAMPAIGNS IN GEORGIA, OR WAR SCENES ON THE W.&A.,” PUBLISHED BY THE WESTERN & ATLANTIC R.R. CO.

  BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL T.E.G. RANSOM. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

  * * *

  1 General John M. Schofield succeeded General John G. Foster in the command of the Department, and Army, of the Ohio, February 9th, 1864.—EDITORS.

  2 General George H. Thomas succeeded General W. S. Rosecrans in command of the Department, and Army, of the Cumberland, October 19th, 1863.—EDITORS.

  3 Lieutenant James Oates wrote to the editors on July 8th, 1887, from Cincinnati, Ark., as follows:

  “General Howard is in error in the above statement. On May 1st the 9th Illinois Mounted Infantry broke camp at Decatur, Alabama, to take part in the Atlanta campaign. On the afternoon of May 8th the regiment came up with General McPherson at Villanow. Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Phillips, who was in command, received orders to take the advance of the Army of the Tennessee, and did so at once, Company ‘K,’ Lieutenant James Oates in command, taking the lead through Snake Creek Gap. We advanced down into the open country of Sugar Valley on the evening of May 8th. No part of General Kilpatrick’s command was there when we passed through Snake Creek Gap. On the morning of the 9th of May our regiment took the advance without any other cavalry support. The infantry was a considerable distance in the rear. Very early in the morning we engaged the Confederate cavalry, losing several men in killed and wounded—among the latter, Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips. The infantry came up at double-quick to our support and ended the fight. Our regiment followed up the retreating Confederates ‘with dash and persistency.’ It was during the advance that day that we came in contact with the Georgia Cadets from the Military Institute at Marietta, who had come out from the woods at Resaca and formed their line behind a rail fence. After a volley from the Cadets, which killed several of our men, our regiment charged them and did not give up the chase until it ran against the works at Resaca.”

  4 One of these days was Sunday. My friend E. P. Smith, of the Christian Commission, afterward Commissioner of Indian Affairs, was ringing the church bell at Kingston, when Sherman, being disturbed by the ringing, sent a guard to arrest the supposed “bummer.”

  Smith, in spite of his indignant protest, was marched to Sherman’s anteroom and kept under guard for an hour. Then he was taken to Sherman, who looked up from his writing and asked abruptly:

  “What were you ringing that bell for?”

  “For service. It is Sunday, General,” Smith replied.

  “Oh! is it?” answered Sherman. “Didn’t know it was Sunday. Let him go.”—O.O.H.

  5 General Hooker signaled to General Sherman, on the evening of June 22d, that he [Hooker] was uneasy about his right flank, which Schofield had been ordered to protect.—EDITORS.

  6 General Loring remained with his division in the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana until the Atlanta campaign was fairly opened by Sherman’s advance, when all the infantry in Mississippi was ordered to Johnston. Polk, with Loring’s division, reached Resaca May 11th. June 14th, Polk having been killed, Loring succeeded temporarily to the command of the corps.—EDITORS.

  7 On the 4th of October General John M. Corse, commanding the Fourth Division, Fifteenth Corps, stationed in observation at Rome, Georgia, was ordered by General Sherman to move by railway to Allatoona to assist the garrison at that point against a heavy force of Hood’s army, which was moving north from Kenesaw Mountain. With a part of his command Corse reached Allatoona at 1 A.M. on the 5th. The battle which took place that day is described in his report as follows:

  “The ammunition being unloaded, and the train sent back [to Rome] for reënforcements, accompanied by Colonel Tourtellotte, the post commandant. I rode around and inspected the ground and made such disposition of the troops as, in my judgment, was necessary to hold the place until daylight. I then learned from Colonel Tourtellotte that the garrison embraced the 4th Minnesota infantry, 450 men, Major J. C. Edson commanding; 93d Illinois infantry, 230 men, Major Fisher commanding; seven companies 18th Wisconsin infantry, 150 men, Lieutenant-Colonel Jackson commanding; 12th Wisconsin battery, six guns, Lieutenant Amaden commanding—furnishing a force of 890 men, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. Tourtellotte, 4th Minnesota Volunteer infantry. I took with me, of Rowett’s brigade of this division, eight companies 39th Iowa infantry, 290 men, Lieutenant-Colonel James Redfield commanding; nine companies 7th Illinois infantry, 291 men, Lieutenant-Colonel Hector Perrin commanding; eight companies 50th Illinois infantry, 267 men, Lieut.-Colonel Wm. Hanna commanding; two companies 57th Illinois infantry, 61 men, Captain Vanstienburg commanding; detachment 12th Illinois, Adams brigade, 150 men, Capt. Koehler commanding; total, 1054—making an aggregate of 1944…. Under a brisk cannonade, kept up for near two hours, with sharp skirmishing on our south front and our west flank, the enemy pushed a brigade of infantry around north of us, cut the railroad and telegraph, severing our communications with Cartersville and Rome. The cannonading and musketry had not ceased when, at half-past 8 A.M., I received by flag of truce, which came from the north on the Cartersville road, the following summons to surrender:

  “ ‘AROUND ALLATOONA, OCTOBER 5TH, 1864.

  “ ‘COMMANDING OFFICER UNITED STATES FORCES, Allatoona.

  “ ‘SIR: I have placed the forces under my command in such positions that you are surrounded, and to avoid a needless effusion of blood I call on you to surrender your forces at once and unconditionally. Five minutes will be allowed you to decide. Should you accede to this you will be treated in the most honorable manner as prisoners of war. I have the honor to be, very respectfully yours,

  “ ‘S. G. FRENCH, “ ‘Major-General Commanding Forces, Confederate Sta
tes.’

  “To which I made the following reply:

  “ ‘HEADQUARTERS, FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, ALLATOONA, GEORGIA, 8:30 A.M., OCTOBER 5TH, 1864.

  “ ‘MAJOR-GENERAL S. G. FRENCH, Confederate States Army, etc.:

  “ ‘Your communication demanding surrender of my command I acknowledge receipt of, and respectfully reply that we are prepared for the “needless effusion of blood” whenever it is agreeable to you. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  “ ‘JOHN M. CORSE, “ ‘Brigadier-General Commanding Forces, United States.’

  “I then hastened to my different commands, informing them of the object of the flag, etc., my answer, and the importance and necessity of their preparing for hard fighting.… I had hardly issued the incipient orders when the storm broke in all its fury.… The fighting up to … about 11 A.M. was of the most extraordinary character.… About 1 P.M. I was wounded by a rifle-ball, which rendered me insensible for some thirty or forty minutes, but managed to rally on hearing some person or persons cry, ‘Cease firing,’ which conveyed to me the impression that they were trying to surrender the fort. Again I urged my staff, the few officers left unhurt, and the men around me to renewed exertions, assuring them that Sherman would soon be there with reënforcements. The gallant fellows struggled to keep their heads above the ditch and parapet, had the advantage of the enemy, and maintained it with such success that they [the Confederates] were driven from every position, and finally fled in confusion, leaving the dead and wounded and our little garrison in possession of the field.”…

  Corse’s entire loss, officially reported, was:

  General Sherman, in his “Memoirs,” says:

  “We crossed the Chattahoochee River during the 3d and 4th of October, rendezvoused at the old battle-field of Smyrna Camp, and the next day reached Marietta and Kenesaw. The telegraph wires had been cut above Marietta, and learning that heavy masses of infantry, artillery, and cavalry had been seen from Kenesaw (marching north), I inferred that Allatoona was their objective point; and on the 4th of October I signaled from Vining’s Station to Kenesaw, and from Kenesaw to Allatoona, over the heads of the enemy, a message for General Corse at Rome, to hurry back to the assistance of the garrison at Allatoona.… Reaching Kenesaw Mountain about 8 A.M. of October 5th (a beautiful day), I had a superb view of the vast panorama to the north and west. To the south-west, about Dallas, could be seen the smoke of camp-fires, indicating the presence of a large force of the enemy, and the whole line of railroad, from Big Shanty up to Allatoona (full fifteen miles), was marked by the fires of the burning railroad. We could plainly see the smoke of battle about Allatoona, and hear the faint reverberation of the cannon. From Kenesaw I ordered the Twenty-third Corps (General Cox) to march due west on the Burnt Hickory road, and to burn houses or piles of brush as it progressed, to indicate the head of column, hoping to interpose this corps between Hood’s main army at Dallas and the detachment then assailing Allatoona. The rest of the army was directed straight for Allatoona, north-west, distant eighteen miles. The signal-officer on Kenesaw reported that since daylight he had failed to obtain any answer to his call for Allatoona; but, while I was with him, he caught a faint glimpse of the tell-tale flag through an embrasure, and after much time he made out these letters: ‘C,’ ‘R,’ ‘S,’ ‘E,’ ‘H,’ ‘E,’ ‘R,’ and translated the message, ‘Corse is here.’ It was a source of great relief, for it gave me the first assurance that General Corse had received his orders, and that the place was adequately garrisoned. I watched with painful suspense the indications of the battle raging there, and was dreadfully impatient at the slow progress of the relieving column, whose advance was marked by the smokes which were made according to orders, but about 2 P.M. I noticed with satisfaction that the smoke of battle about Allatoona grew less and less, and ceased altogether about 4 P.M. For a time I attributed this result to the effect of General Cox’s march, but later in the afternoon the signal-flag announced the welcome tidings that the attack had been fairly repulsed, but that General Corse was wounded. The next day my aide, Colonel Dayton, received this characteristic dispatch:

  “ ‘ALLATOONA, GEORGIA, OCTOBER 6TH, 1864, 2 P.M.

  “ ‘CAPTAIN L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp:

  “ ‘I am short a cheek-bone and an ear, but am able to whip all h——l yet! My losses are very heavy. A force moving from Stilesboro’ to Kingston gives me some anxiety. Tell me where Sherman is.

  “ ‘JOHN M. CORSE, Brigadier-General.

  “Inasmuch as the enemy had retreated south-west, and would probably next appear at Rome, I answered General Corse with orders to get back to Rome with his troops as quickly as possible.…

  “I esteemed this defense of Allatoona so handsome and important that I made it the subject of a general order, viz., No. 86, of October 7th, 1864:

  “ ‘The general commanding avails himself of the opportunity, in the handsome defense made at Allatoona, to illustrate the most important principle in war, that fortified posts should be defended to the last, regardless of the relative numbers of the party attacking and attacked.… The thanks of this army are due and are hereby accorded to General Corse, Colonel Tourtellotte, Colonel Rowett, officers, and men, for their determined and gallant defense of Allatoona, and it is made an example to illustrate the importance of preparing in time, and meeting the danger, when present, boldly, manfully, and well.

  “ ‘Commanders and garrisons of the posts along our railroad are hereby instructed that they must hold their posts to the last minute, sure that the time gained is valuable and necessary to their comrades at the front. By order of

  “ ‘MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.

  “ ‘L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-camp.’ ”

  —EDITORS.

  8 Hood had partly invested Resaca, and on the 12th of October he demanded the unconditional surrender of the garrison, which the commander, Colonel Wever, refused, saying, “In my opinion I can hold the post. If you want it, come and take it.”—EDITORS.

  CHAPTER 10

  FARRAGUT AT MOBILE BAY.1

  John Coddington Kinney, First Lieutenant, 13th Connecticut Infantry, and Acting Signal Officer, U.S.A.

  After the Mississippi was opened in July, 1863, by the capture of Vicksburg and the consequent surrender of Port Hudson, Admiral Farragut devoted a large share of his attention to the operations against Mobile Bay. He was aware that the Confederates were actively engaged in the construction of rams and iron-clads at Mobile and above, and it was his earnest desire to force the entrance into Mobile Bay and capture the forts that guarded it, before the more powerful of the new vessels could be finished and brought down to aid in the defense. In January, 1864, he made a reconnoissance of Forts Gaines and Morgan, at which time no Confederate vessels were in the lower bay, except one transport. In letters to the Navy Department he urged that at least one iron-clad be sent to help his wooden fleet, and asked for the coöperation of a brigade of five thousand soldiers to enable him, after running into the bay, to reduce the forts at his leisure. It is easy to see now the wisdom of his plan. Had the operations against Mobile been undertaken promptly, as he desired, the entrance into the bay would have been effected with much less cost of men and materials, Mobile would have been captured a year earlier than it was, and the Union cause would have been saved the disaster of the Red River campaign of 1864. At this late day it is but justice to Farragut to admit the truth.

  His position at the time was one of great anxiety. He saw the ease with which the forts could be captured if a few thousand troops could be obtained to coöperate with his fleet. He knew that the Confederates were bending all their energies to the construction of three or more powerful rams, to meet which he had until late in the summer nothing but wooden vessels. Every day was strengthening the Confederate situation and making his own position more perilous. With the necessary coöperation he would run inside the bay, prevent any iron-clads from crossing Dog River bar (over which they had to be floated with �
�camels”), put a stop to the planting of torpedoes, effectually prevent blockade-running, and easily capture the garrisons of the forts.

  THE “BROOKLYN” AFTER THE BATTLE OF MOBILE. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

  But, much to his regret, the army under General Banks started up the Red River, and he was left alone with his little fleet to watch the operations he could not prevent. At last, about May 20th, the great ram Tennessee made her appearance in the lower bay. Just before she arrived, and when it was known that Admiral Buchanan was engaged in efforts to float the ram over the bar, eight miles up the bay, Farragut wrote to Secretary Welles:

  “I fully understand and appreciate my situation. The experience I had of the fight between the Arkansas and Admiral Davis’s vessels on the Mississippi showed plainly how unequal the contest is between iron-clads and wooden vessels, in loss of life, unless you succeed in destroying the iron-clad. I therefore deeply regret that the department has not been able to give me one of the many iron-clads that are off Charleston and in the Mississippi. I have always looked for the latter, but it appears that it takes us twice as long to build an iron-clad as any one else. It looks as if the contractors and the fates were against us. While the rebels are bending their whole energies to the war our people are expecting the war to close by default; and if they do not awake to a sense of their danger soon it will be so. But be assured, sir, that the navy will do its duty, let the issue come when it may, or I am greatly deceived.”

  A few days later the Tennessee came down and anchored near Fort Morgan. From that time until the battle was fought, Farragut never left the Hartford except when making inspections. It was expected that the rebel admiral would attack the blockading fleet before the iron-clads arrived, and Farragut made his preparations accordingly, even arranging extemporized torpedoes to place himself in this respect on a par with the enemy. This he did very reluctantly, writing on May 25th: