War Horse

by Louis A. DiMarco

  THE BOER WAR

  At the end of the American Civil War, many observers concluded that the war indicated that cavalry continued to have an important role in warfare despite new weapons, tactics, and technology. The importance of horses and cavalry in the American campaigns against the Indians reinforced the Civil War conclusions, and hinted that under some conditions mounted forces were absolutely decisive. The employment of cavalry in the European wars of the late nineteenth century left a more ambiguous legacy. European thinking was that cavalry was still important, but in a traditional way. Events in South Africa at the end of the century demonstrated that the American cavalry experience was not an isolated event, and that the mounted rifleman was a modern evolution of the cavalry arm that could not be ignored.

  The Boer Wars contested the right to independence of the Boers, the original Dutch settlers of South Africa, from British rule. The first Boer War occurred 1880–81 and was a relatively brief military affair during which the British were decisively defeated on several occasions and, as a result, granted the Boers independence in two regions of South Africa: the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In the late 1890s British speculators used their influence with the British government to obtain British government interference in the internal affairs of the two independent Boer governments, ostensibly to protect the rights of uitlanders. Uitlanders were British citizens living and working in the two African states. The Boers, rather than await British intervention, opened hostilities in October 1899. The war divided into three phases. In phase one, the Boers decisively defeated British offensive operations against the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. In phase two, an extremely large British army, commanded by Field Marshal Frederick Sleigh Roberts, Lord Roberts of Kandahar, systematically captured all of the major Boer cities. At the conclusion of this phase, Roberts declared victory and returned to England, turning over mopping-up operations to his chief of staff, General Horatio Herbert Kitchener, Lord Kitchener of Khartoum. Kitchener’s mopping-up operation turned out to be anything but, as the Boers launched the third phase of the war—the guerrilla war phase. This phase began in June 1900 and continued until the two sides negotiated a peace in May 1902.

  Inept British command, poor tactics, and inadequate troops and organization characterized the first phase of the war. The Boers began this first phase with offensive operations beginning on October 11, 1899. As part of these operations, they forced several large British contingents to retreat into defended towns where the Boers besieged them. In these early operations, the British were still employing linear infantry tactics, often with the troops marching almost shoulder to shoulder.31 Overwhelming numbers, more cavalry, and the beginnings of an understanding by the British command of the importance of mobility and speed all contributed to the success of British conventional operations in the second phase of the war. The handling of the British mounted forces as well as the addition of well-trained mounted Australian and New Zealand colonial units to the fight permitted the British to gain the upper hand in conventional operations. This resulted in several British victories, and the successful British campaign to capture Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State, and Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal.

  After Kitchener replaced Roberts, the new commander quickly realized that the war was far from over. The Boer governments were still active and at large, and the best Boer field forces and commanders were still in the field. Boer raids began to take a toll on isolated columns and detachments until Kitchener put the army back on a complete war alert. He then devised tactics to fix the Boer field forces and destroy them. The war became a war of mobility. The Boer forces kept on the move constantly, living off the population and captured British supplies. The British put out expeditionary columns who coordinated their movement in order to trap the Boer field forces. Though always containing a mounted contingent, the British columns could not match the Boer’s speed because wagon trains and infantry slowed them down. Boer forces were completely mounted and operated throughout the occupied territories as well as in the Cape Colony and Natal. By placing their forces on alert however, the British greatly reduced the number of successful ambushes and raids. The British were unable to pin down the elusive Boers, but the Boers found it difficult to make decisive strikes. The Afrikaner populations of Natal and the Cape Colony, though willing to support the Boer raiders, were unwilling to rise in rebellion. Thus, through the rest of 1900 and into 1901 the war was a stalemate.

  In 1901 Kitchener began to change his strategy. Recognizing that the Boers’ mobility was due to their ability to support themselves through the local population, the British began a policy of population relocation and farm burning. The British forcibly removed the Boer families from their homesteads and relocated them into some of the world’s first “concentration camps.” In many ways, as the British government took responsibility for the families, Boer field forces found themselves with greater operational flexibility.

  The concentration program was not a success, but the British continued their efforts to limit the Boers’ mobility. The second effort, which was somewhat successful, was the blockhouse strategy. This began as a tactic to protect railroad lines and other fixed positions. The British then expanded the program by turning the rail lines into fortified barriers to movement. Prefabricated block houses were positioned along the lines, in some places as close as every 200 yards, and manned with infantry. The intent of cordoning the wide open spaces was to limit the mobility of the Boers. It became impossible for a Boer unit to cross a rail line without a battle. The British then began to extend the system: first to key river fords and mountain passes, and then along lines to further segment the terrain. This program was expensive and extremely manpower intensive. Vigorously administering the strategy required increasing the size of British field forces to 250,000 in late 1901. Eventually the blockhouse lines accounted for 3,700 miles of territory and were manned by 66,000 infantry. Though the system could not stop the Boers, it significantly limited their mobility options at the operational level.

  A final tactic the British employed was improving their intelligence system. Employing Boers as scouts greatly enhanced British intelligence efforts. These scouts knew the terrain, knew how the commandos operated, and could match the Boers’ mobility and horsemanship. Mobile columns continued to operate, and more and more of the British forces were mounted. British mounted forces now consisted of regular cavalry, Afrikaners, other colonial troops from New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, large numbers of mounted infantry (MI), and Imperial Yeomanry (reserves) from England. The columns continued to operate, moving men and horses by rail and then dismounting from the trains at strategic locations.

  The new blockhouse lines, the vast number of troops, the war weariness of the Boer people, and the increasing effectiveness of the mounted columns began to take a toll on the Boers. The British had several significant successes including capturing the entire Free State government and all of its records. However, the elaborate British system was not capable of stopping the Boers entirely. Boer forces achieved several notable successes into 1902, including the destruction of one of the most capable British columns and its commander Colonel G. E. Benson in October 1901; and the destruction of a major column under General Methuen and the capture of the general and 600 of his troops in March 1902.

  The Boers

  The Boer states did not have standing armies. Instead, they organized the citizenry into militia units called commandos which mobilized in times of emergency. The Boer states provided only weapons and ammunition. But, despite a lack of professional military training and experience, the commandos preformed superbly against one of the most professional armies of the nineteenth century.

  Organization and Equipment

  The Boers began the war by mobilizing a field strength of 50,000 troops. The Boers organized their forces in regional burgher commandos of mounted riflemen. Commandos varied in size from as small as 60 from the most isolated rural areas, to as man
y as 3,000. The average command size was 300 to 400 men. The commando subdivided into field-cornets of 150 to 200 men. These were further divided into corporalships of about 25 men each. The members of the units elected all leaders from the commando to the corporalship.

  Each Boer brought his own horse, personal equipment, and rifle upon mobilization. Boers were not paid. The most common rifle among the Boers was the German 7-mm M1895 Mauser. The Boer states bought 40,000 of these weapons as well as large stocks of ammunition before the war. They then sold the weapons to citizens at a nominal fee or issued them to the commandos as they formed upon mobilization in 1899. The Mauser was an extremely effective magazine-fed bolt-action rifle. The Mauser ammunition used smokeless powder and had a maximum range of 2,000 yards. A good marksman, and the average Boer was an excellent marksman, was very effective with it, using open sights, at 700 to 800 yards. The Mauser had a five-round magazine which was loaded from clips. The clips made reloading extremely quick. The Boers carried the five-round clips in a 12-pouch ammunition bandolier, making the basic load of the Boer mounted rifleman 60 rounds.32 Virtually all photos show the typical Boer rifleman with his bandolier worn over the shoulder; often he wore two bandoliers.

  The Boers wore no uniforms but generally fought in utilitarian earth tone farm clothes. Almost all wore wide-brimmed hats. These hats were common among all forces on both sides except the British regulars. The British regulars began to adopt wide-brimmed slouch hats in 1901. Both sides followed the custom of turning up one side of the hat brim.

  Tactics

  The Boers fought the first phase of the war conventionally. They had their own artillery and employed it in conventional warfare with the British. The Boer experience in this phase was that they were more than able to defend against the British, but that they did not have an ability to overcome prepared British defenses. After the initial maneuvers of the war, the Boers found themselves unable to sustain large-scale offensive operations.

  In the second phase of the war the Boers found that improved British leadership, the large number of British reinforcements, and increasing numbers of British mounted units made even a conventional defense impossible. The British cavalry cut off Boer defensive positions, subjected them to intense artillery fire, and then assaulted the position with disciplined British infantry. Under these circumstances, the Boers were able to inflict significant casualties on the British but could not stop the British assaults. Thus, in the second phase of the war the Boers were systematically defeated in their defensive positions.

  The Boers abandoned conventional operations in the third phase of the war. They determined to fight a war designed to cause as much damage to the British military and its interests as possible, while avoiding decisive defeat. The strategic goal in this portion of the war was to make the war so militarily and politically costly that the British would negotiate for an end on terms favorable to the Boers.

  For this phase of the war, the Boer military forces broke up into commandos and prosecuted a war of raids and ambushes. Military operations divided into two types. The first type was operations against the British forces occupying the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The Boers considered these strategic defensive operations designed to make the occupation as costly as possible. The second type of operations were strategic offensive operations into the British Cape and Natal colonies. These operations demonstrated the continued offensive capability of the Boers and attempted to rally the colonial populations to the Boer cause.

  In practice, the two types of operations were similar. The Boer commandos attacked the British rail-based logistics system. They also ambushed isolated British patrols and outposts. The key to success was to inflict damage without sustaining losses themselves. Thus, the Boer attacks were sudden, swift, and included a detailed plan to elude pursuit and escape. In frustration, Kitchener described how the Boers fought in the third phase of the war: “Divided up into small parties of three to four hundred men, they are scattered all over the country without plans . . . and on the approach of our troops they disperse, to reassemble in the same neighbourhood when our men pass on. In this way they continue an obstinate resistance without retaining anything or defending the smallest portion of this vast country.”33 The key to the successful Boer tactics was the mobility provided by the horse. All Boer combatants were mounted and were excellent riders.

  Horses and Horsemanship

  For the first two years of the war the Boers were well mounted on their own Afrikaner horses. This was a type horse that was brought to South Africa by the Boer settlers and bred indigenously by them. Though relatively small, its chief advantage was its adaptation to the environment, its hardiness, and the fact that it was an “easy keeper,” able to sustain itself on the available forage. After a successful action against a British force, Boer Francis Reitz described his horses and his evaluation of the British cavalry horses which he took as booty:

  My brother brought my roan and his own two riding-horses down the ravine, and we took two more horses from the English lines, where many stood picketed. Searching out saddles and wallets to match, we loaded our caravan with spoil. . . . We were refitted from head to heel, we carried a Lee-Metford rifle apiece, in lieu of our discarded Mausers, and above all we were well found in horse-flesh. My gentle loyal old roan was as flourishing as ever, and I had a fine little chestnut pony, which I had chosen in preference to the large but less reliable chargers in the English camp. I gave the other horses away in order to reduce our stable to manageable proportions; my brother had the two horses which he had brought with him from the North. One was a toll-free chestnut and the other was the strangest horse I have ever known. . . . Well-mounted as we were, my brother and I felt that we could ride anywhere and be ready for anything.34

  Reitz’s own riding horses eventually gave out, after 10 months of hard campaigning his roan was severely foundered. Still, the loyal horse gave him one last gallop into action in a famous raid on a squadron of the 17th Lancers. There he reequipped himself with “a cavalry-tunic, riding-breeches . . . a sporting Lee-Metford, full bandoliers and a superb mount, a little grey Arab. . . . [He] also selected a strong riding-mule in preference to another horse, for experience during the past fortnight had taught me that a good mule for long marches and a light nimble pony for use in action, were the ideal combination.” Reitz’s red roan of which he was quite proud “was so exhausted that when I tried to lead her away she could scarcely put one foot before the other, so I unsaddled her, throwing the saddle aside . . . removing the bridle and halter, I turned her loose in the hope that some neighbouring farmer would look after her, for she too had shown the mettle of her Free State pasture, and the marvellous endurance of the South African horse.”35

  The effect of the British tactics was hard on men and horses, and both died from exposure and exhaustion. Normally, horses are very tolerant of weather conditions, but in an underfed and fatigued state, the horses succumbed to the sometimes dramatic changes of weather. Reitz reported that in one night, freezing rain and cold killed 60 of slightly more than 200 horses. The solution to losing Boer horses was capturing British mounts. The same mounts that Reitz and his companions ignored early in the war became valuable prizes worth fighting for in the last months of the war.36

  The Boers were natural horsemen, and their horsemanship gave them a tactical advantage over pursuing British mounted forces, many of whom never rode until after their arrival in theater. British officers who underestimated Boer horsemanship did so to their detriment. In the fall of 1901, the British were sure that their columns had trapped the raiding commando of Boer General Jan Smuts.37 The British had relentlessly pursued the commando for days and kept it continuously on the move for 40 hours. The Boer riders and horses were exhausted. The British, using trains to quickly move mounted forces ahead of the Boers, finally trapped them on a plateau. Taking their time, the British carefully positioned machine guns to cover all the exits off the escarpment but refrained from attacking. They le
ft the Boers no choice but to surrender or risk a suicidal charge against the machine guns. The Boers chose neither option. The British left an almost vertical precipice unguarded. Under the cover of darkness, Smuts led his 200 men and horses over the edge, sliding and falling down the slope but staying in the saddle, and then riding out of the trap. Reitz described the experience:

  We now began to descend what was probably the nearest approach to the vertical attempted by any mounted force during the war. I doubt whether we could have accomplished it by day, but horses are more tractable and surer-footed in the dark, so we pulled them over the edge and went slithering down. At times whole batches of men and horses came glissading past, knocking against all in their course, but luckily the surface was free of rock, and covered with a thick matting of grass which served to break the impact, and after a terrible scramble we got down without serious damage. For the time being we had shaken free of the enemy once more.38

  The horsemanship of the Boers gave Boer commanders tactical options that they would otherwise not have had and was a decisive factor in the Boer’s ability to continue to execute successful mounted operations against a numerically superior enemy into the last months of the war.

  British Cavalry

  Elements of 21 regular British cavalry regiments served in the war.39 At the war’s height, almost a third of the 250,000 British troops in South Africa were mounted. The regular establishment, however, did not come anywhere near meeting the mounted requirements of the war. In order to field the almost 80,000 mounted troops it needed, the British army relied on three additional sources: colonial forces, mounted infantry, and yeomanry.