115. Llewellyn, supra note so, at 1227 n.18.
116. W. TWINING, supra note 7, at 93 (quoting K. Llewellyn, Non-Conformist Puzzles over Education (1924) (unpublished manuscript in Llewellyn Papers)).
117. Id. at 88 (quoting K. Llewellyn, supra note 116).
i 8. Id.
119. Id. at 94 (quoting HISTORY OF THE [YALE] CLASS OF NINETEEN-FIFTEEN 246-47 (n.p. n.d.)).
120. Id. at 95.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 96.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 97. Twining mistakenly treats Hohfeld as a representative of Classical Legal Thought. See id. at 34-37.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 125.
128. Id. at loo.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 114.
131. Id.
132. See id at 102, 109-110, 112.
133. Id. at 9o, 116 (quoting K. Llewellyn, Law in Our Society (unpublished course materials in Llewellyn Papers)).
134. Id. at 117 (emphasis retained).
135. Id. at 116 (quoting transcripts of Llewellyn's Jurisprudence Lectures of 1956, S 1, at 5-7).
136. On Dewey, see works cited supra note sos. On Morris Cohen, see D. HoLLINGER, MORRIS R. COHEN AND THE SCIENTIFIC IDEAL (MIT Press 1975). For Felix Cohen, see The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L. J. 201 (1931). See generally R. J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM (Univ. of Pennsylvania Press 1983).
137. Id. at 120.
138. Id. at 521 (quoting a letter from Llewellyn to C. B. J. Hughes (August 1o, 1954) (Llewellyn Papers)).
139. Id. at 518 (quoting K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 87).
140. Id. at 93 (quoting K. Llewellyn, supra note 116).
141. Id. at 423 n.133 (quoting K. Llewellyn, Position re Religion (1943) (Llewellyn Papers)) (emphasis retained).
142. Id. at loo.
143. Llewellyn, supra note 10, at 1226 n. 18.
144. Along with Frederick Jackson Turner and Charles Beard, the Progressive historiographical current as a whole should be mentioned in this context, for in their social critical project, the Progressive historians provide an important parallel to the sociological and critical side of American jurisprudence. Horwitz, Progressive Legal Historiography, 63 OR. L. REV. 679 (1984). Among their important works, see C. BEARD, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF POLITICS (Knopf 1922); C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Macmillan 1913); C. BEARD & M. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (2 VOLS., Macmillan 1927); V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (3 vols., Harcourt, Brace 1927-30); J. A. SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (Macmillan 1907); F. J. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (H. Holt 1920); F. J. TURNER, RISE OF THE NEW WEST (Harper 1906); F. J. TURNER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SECTIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (H. Holt 1932); F. J. TURNER, THE UNITED STATES, 1830-1850 (H. Holt 1935).
The central book on the Progressive historiographical tradition remains R. HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS (Knopf 1968); see also R. A. BILLINGTON, FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER (Oxford Univ. Press, 1973); E. GOLDMAN, supra note 95, at 149-55; H. MAY, THE END OF AMERICAN INNOCENCE (Knopf 1959); P. NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 86-so8 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1988); C. STROUT, THE PRAGMATIC REVOLT IN AMERICAN HISTORY: CARL BECKER AND CHARLES BEARD (Yale Univ. Press 1958); Goldman, The Origins of Beard's Economic Interpetation of the Constitution, 13 J. HIST. IDEAS 234 (1952); Hofstadter, Beard and the Constitution: The History of an Idea, 2 AM. Q. 195 (1950).
145. See, e.g., Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought (pts. 1 & 2), 27 HARV. L. REV. 605 (1914), 3o HARV. L. REV. 201 (1917); Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195 (1914); Pound, Justice According to Law (pts. 1-3), 13 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1913), 14 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 103 (1914).
146. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
147. The term "revolt against formalism" comes from M. WHITE, supra note rot. White places Holmes's legal revolt against formalism alongside discussions of John Dewey, Thorstein Veblen, James Harvey Robinson, and Charles-Beard. And Edward Purcell discusses the development of a "scientific naturalism" in E. PURCELL, supra note 5, at 3-12; see also P. Nov1CK, supra note 144, at 133-67.
148. See infra ch. 7, text accompanying notes 85-104.
149. See Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1. (1983).
15o. See W. HOHFELD, supra note 92.
15 1. For a discussion of both Cardozo's and Traynor's significance in the development of private-law doctrine, especially the expansion of the realm of strict liability, see G. E. WHITE, TORT LAW, supra note 91, at 114-38, 180-210.
152. B. CARDOZO, supra note 91, at 65-66. The Nature of the Judicial Process sold 24,795 copies in hard cover and 147,000 paperback copies through 1989. See Letter from John Covell, Yale University Press, to Morton J. Horwitz (January 5, 199o) (in the possession of the recipient).
153. B. CARDOZO, supra note 91, at 115. See also Cohen, The Process of Judicial Legislation, 48 AM. L. REV. 161 (1914), reprinted in M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 112 (Harcourt, Brace 1933).
154. B. CARDOZO, supra note 91, at 119.
155. Id. at 161.
156. Id. at 66.
157. Id. at 67-
158. Id. at 73, 77-78, 98-141.
159. Id. at 66; see also id. at 98-141.
16o. Id. at 103-
161. Id. at 102.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 133-34.
164. H. MAY, supra note 5, at 18.
165. Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L. J. 201 (1931).
166. B. CARDOZO, supra note 91, at 28.
167. Id. at 34.
168. Id. at at 114-115, 137.
169. Id. at 173.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 115.
172. Id. at 116.
173. Id. at Io.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 14.
176. Id. at 162.
177. Id. at 136.
Chapter 7
1. S. LEVINSON, The Constitution as American Civil Religion, in CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9 (Princeton Univ. Press 1988).
z. On the desire to produce an autonomous legal realm separate from politics, see M. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 253-66 (Harvard Univ. Press 1977).
3. See Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985) [hereafter Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models]; Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379 (1988); Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850 1940, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 2 (1980); Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy Over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984); Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 475-82 (1988); Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975 [hereafter singer, Legal Rights Debate]; Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
4. See Horwitz, The Legacy of 1776 in Legal and Economic Thought, 19 J. L. & EcoN. 621. (1976).
5. 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915).
6. See supra ch. 2.
7. See C. PEIRCE, The Metaphysical Club and the Birth of Pragmatism, in 3 WRITINGS OF CHARLES S. PEIRCE xxix (C. Kloesel & M. Fisch eds., Indiana Univ. Press 1986). Any effort to assess the basic thrust of pragmatist thought should begin with William James's classic statement, W. JAMES, PRAGMATISM (Longmans, Green 1907). The literature on pragmatism is immense, but among the works most useful for understanding those aspects of pragmatism finding resonances in Legal Realism, see R. HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (rev. ed., Beacon Press 1955); J. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920 (Oxford Univ. Press 1986); B. KUKLICK, THE RISE OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY: CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, 1
860-1930 (Yale Univ. Press 1977); H. SCHNEIDER, A HisTORY OF AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY (2d ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1963); M. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM (Viking 1949); R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (Princeton Univ. Press 1979).
8. See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
9. See D. Ross, ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 174, 419-20 (Cambridge Univ. Press 199o); A. SCHLESINGER JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER, 1919-1933 (Houghton Mifflin 1957).
10. The thought and political orientation of the Progressive economic tradition in America, as well as its successes and influence, have been well documented. See J. DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (5 volS., Viking Press 1946-1959); J. DORFMAN, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: VEBLEN, COMMONS AND MITCHELL RECONSIDERED (Univ. of Calif Press 1963); J. DORFMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN AND His AMERICA (Viking Press 1934); D. RIESMAN, THORSTEIN VEBLEN: A CRITICAL INTERPRETATION (Scribner's 1953); B. SELIGMAN, MAIN CURRENTS IN MODERN ECONOMICS (2 vols., Free Press, 1962). For a more recent treatment contrasting the political orientation of Progressive economists in the United States to those in Britain, see Ross, Socialism and American Liberalism: Academic Social Thought in the i88o's, 11 PERSP AM. HIST. 7 (1977-78).
1 1. See Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939 (1985).
12. Robert Hale (1884-1969), who brought much of the Progressive economic frame, work into the field of law, began his career as a professional economist working on rate regulation. He was teaching economics at Columbia when Harlan Fiske Stone, then dean of the Columbia Law School, asked him to teach in the law school in 1922. As Warren Samuels has told us, Hale not only contributed a great deal to the developing law of public utilities, but he also produced a sophisticated economic analysis of legal relationships. See Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and Its Legal Bases: The Legal Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261 (1973). For a comparison of Hale's theory of compulsion with themes in Legal Realism and critical legal studies, see N. Duxbury, Robert Hale and the Economy of Legal Force (1989) (unpublished manuscript).
13. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 Pol.. Sc1. Q. 470 (1923).
14. Id. at 474 (emphasis retained).
15. Id. Note the similarity to Chief Justice White's opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), in which he established the balancing test in antitrust doctrine under the rule of reason. Undermining the populist-literalist reading of "all contracts in restraint of trade" in the Sherman Act, he showed instead that since all contracts are in restraint of trade, we must distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable restraints. White's underlying point was that all contracts are inherently coercive.
16. Hale, supra note 13, at 474-75.
IT See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253 (1947).
18. Id. at 266.
i Id.
zo. Hale, supra note 13, at 474.
21. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
22. The question of whether news could be considered property arose in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), which specifically answered the question of whether the news published by the Associated Press on the East coast could be protected from its use by the International News Service on the West coast. See discussion supra ch. 5 and infra text accompanying notes 54-61. The debate over whether certain economic combinations were to be considered basically unfair or, alternatively, legitimate forms of competition emerged in an important trilogy of British cases: Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Cow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889), aff'd., [1892] A.C. 25; Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1; and Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A.C. 495. Charles Gregory has analyzed these three cases in LABOR AND LAW (3d ed., W. W. Norton 1979). Holmes set up a framework to discuss this issue, anticipating the three British cases, in Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894). See discussion of Holmes and competition supra ch. 4. Basically, Holmes argued that the harm caused by economic combination must find its justification in policy. In his passionate dissent in Vegelahn v. Gunt- ncr, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896), Holmes expressed little doubt as to the policy justification for competition:
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for the least possible return. Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the other side is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way.
Id. at 108, 44 N. E. at 1o81 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
23. See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING (W. Cook ed., Yale Univ Press 1919); Cook, The Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27 YALE L. J. 779 (1918); Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NoMOS XXII 69 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., New York Univ. Press 198o).
24. "Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although exchangeable-a matter of fact." International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., concurring).
25. In his opinion for the court in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 26o U.S. 393, 415 (1922), Holmes insisted that although "property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." In his dissent, Brandeis recognized the Pennsylvania law at issue as an exercise of the police power. In that case, restrictions on property were justified: "The restriction upon the use of this property can not, of course, be lawfully imposed, unless its purpose is to protect the public." Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
26. See the discussion of rate making supra ch. 5.
27. See Siegel, supra note 3, at 243-47.
28. See ). LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 283 (P. Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1st ed. 169o); C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (Oxford Univ. Press 1962); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (Basic Books 1974); W. SCOTT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Indiana Univ. Press 1977); 1. SHAPIRO, THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY 8o-148 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1986); Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J. L. & EcON. 467 (1976).
29. See supra ch. 3.
30. Hale himself later challenged the act-omission distinction in Prima Facie Torts, Combination and Non-Feasance, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 196 (1946). See also Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L. J. 247 (1980).
31. See Holmes, supra note 22 at 7.
32. See Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 383 (1979). Duncan Kennedy has coined the term "power absolute within its sphere." Kennedy, supra note 3, at 8-9.
33. See discussion supra ch. I.
34. See W. B. MICHAELS, THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE LOGIC OF NATURALISM: AMERICAN LITERATURE AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY (Univ. of Calif. Press 1987).
35. See G. HIMMELFARB, VICTORIAN MINDS (Knopf 1968); Ross, Historical Conscious- nesss in Nineteenth-Century America, 89 AM. HIST. REV. 909 (1984).
36. The attacks on essentialism and formalism in law never really adopted the historicist mode that was so powerful an influence in turning the social sciences toward relational thinking. See Ross, supra note 35. The closest approximation in law was the anthropological mode of Sir Henry Maine, which Holmes finally rejected in "The Path of the Law." See supra ch. 4.
37. See P. NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY Q
UESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 157, 282 (Cambridge Univ./ Press 1988), on "cognitive relativism" and "value relativism."
38. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
39• See Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L. J. 201 (1931); Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L. Q. 17 (1924).
40. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM, L. REV. 809 (1935); Cohen's reference is to VON JEHRING, IM JURISTISCHEN BERGRIFFSHIMMEL, IN SCHERZ UND ERNST IN DER JURISPRUDENZ 245 (11th ed. 1912).
41. On scientific jurisprudence and the Benthamite and Austinian legal traditions, see E. HALEVY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM (MacMillan 1928). See also H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS ON BF.NTHAM (Oxford Univ. Press 1982); W. TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (Stanford Univ. Press 1985); Gordon, Holmes' Common Law as Legal and Social Science, to HOFSTRA L. REV. 719 (1982); Pound, The Progress of the Law: Analytical Jurisprudence, 1914-1927, 41 HARV. L. REV. 174 (1927); Singer, Legal Rights Debate, supra note 3.
42. See discussion of Hohfeld, supra ch. 5.
43. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913); Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710 (1917).
44. See Cook, Introduction to W. HOHFELD, supra note 23; Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L. J. 163 (1919)-
45. Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 751 (1980).
46. Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 25 (1980); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1157-58 (1985).
47. Cohen, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 CoLUM. L. REV. 352, 363 (1931) (emphasis retained).
48. Jerome Frank is responsible for the distinction between "nine-skepticism" and "factskepticism." See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND X-Xi (Brentano's 1930).
49• See Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970) (written by Lewis D. Sargentich).
50. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 443 (1934).
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