After the Sheikhs

by Davidson, Christopher

  There is also usually an emphasis on traditional, pre-oil economy activities such as boat-building, rope-making, basket-weaving, pottery, or glass-blowing. Often these are housed in ‘heritage villages’ which are usually staffed and operated by citizens employed by the responsible government authority. Old forts and watchtowers have been lovingly restored, often at great expense, and many of these look magnificent. Some older looking buildings have, however, been built from scratch—sometimes with breeze blocks behind the façade—including forts on islands, brand new ‘old souqs’, as in Qatar and Kuwait, and dozens of newly built ‘windcatcher’ or barjeel towers, as seen in Dubai’s 2004-built Madinat Jumeirah development. Heritage-focused festivals, competitions, and other events have also been set up in recent years. These have included dategrowing tournaments, $250,000 heritage awards sponsored by rulers,59 falcon-hunting and sword dancing tournaments, the unveiling of world record-breaking 15 metre swords, and the staging of the world’s largest youla Bedouin dances.60 Well-funded camel races also take place across the region, but mostly in Oman and the UAE. Much has been written on these races, often demonstrating that they were never a traditional pursuit, and are instead examples of ‘invented tradition’61—providing a spectacle that can bring together ruling families and their citizens in a pseudo-traditional context, far away from the urban skyscrapers and other evidence of the oil era.

  Together, these developments form part of an entire region-wide industry that seems committed to creating ‘living memories’ of the Gulf monarchies’ crucial early period of state formation.62 Or, as a recent study described of Qatar, they are ‘expensive and widely publicised attempts to showcase Qatari and Islamic culture [which] attest to the concern with the preservation of the image of cultural authenticity’.63 Given that many of the attractions are visited by nationals, expatriates, and tourists alike, the industry is in many ways helping to re-orientalise the region and its population from both inside and out. As discussed, this process has important political benefits for the surviving traditional monarchies. Significantly, the more awkward aspects of the monarchies’ state-formation—namely the relationships between the ruling families and Britain, or the region’s reaction to Arab nationalism in the 1950s and ‘60s—feature rarely in these state-sponsored projects. The massive impact of oil wealth on society and the economy also often remains out of focus, although there are notable exceptions, such as the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Exhibition, which has done much to catalogue that emirate’s transformation. In general, the school and university curricula in the Gulf monarchies also tend to shy away from these topics: in some cases local or regional history is never taught, or if it is it dwells on the pre-oil era and skirts more sensitive issues. There are, however, some exceptions, such as Qatar University, which recently introduced modules in Gulf history and society. It is likely that more of the region’s schools and universities will soon have to follow Qatar’s suit, as demand for the subject will probably grow from both young nationals and expatriates. Bahrain is also an interesting case, given the sectarian tensions discussed later in this book. School and university textbooks have been used to promote an official history of the country, which seems to have little bearing on reality. The ruling Al-Khalifa family is usually portrayed as having liberated Bahrain, rather than conquering it, and earlier periods when the island was ruled by Shia dynasties appear to be glossed over.64

  Co-opting religion

  Viewed as a double-edged sword, religion—and most especially Islam—has been considered both a threat and an opportunity for the Gulf monarchies. As will be discussed later, Islamist movements—both intellectual and militant—have frequently questioned the status quo in these states. Most have highlighted the un-Islamic behaviour of the various ruling families, the slide into autocracy, the reliance on non-Islamic foreign powers for security, and rampant corruption among other matters. As such, these groups have often represented a powerful alternative and sometimes dissenting voice on the Arabian Peninsula, and in some cases have even been joined by establishment figures. Indeed, as has been noted, ‘…because Islam is a transcendent religion that can never be fully co-opted, [even such autocratic] governments must cede some autonomy to state-supported religious institutions or elites, thereby raising the prospect that elements of the religious establishment could defect to the Islamist opposition’.65

  The Saudi ruling family has always been in the tightest position, given its described alliance with the Wahhabi movement, given the presence of two of Islam’s holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina, and given its hosting of millions of Muslim pilgrims each year. Since 1986 the king of Saudi Arabia even changed his official title to ‘Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’66—reviving a pious title formerly used by the caliphs, the Ottoman sultans, and Egypt’s Mamluk sultans. But the smaller Gulf monarchies, even though none claim such specific religious credentials, are also wary. Much like Saudi Arabia, all rely on non-Islamic powers—namely the US—for their security guarantees, with most also physically hosting such troops on their territory. And since 9/11, and the Anglo-American invasions on nearby Muslim countries—Afghanistan and Iraq—their position has clearly become more precarious.

  The strategies for containing and co-opting Islam have varied in each of the monarchies, depending on their circumstances, although there are some common patterns. In a similar manner to the recently deposed leaders of the Arab authoritarian republics, loyal clerics of the Gulf’s ruling families have from time to time invoked certain Koranic passages in order to justify absolute power. As per a late-2011 statement by Al-Azhar University on the Arab Spring, this has usually been done by narrowly interpreting a verse67 which states ‘O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you’. The verse has frequently been cited in isolation, but as the Al-Azhar statement contends, it should never have been cited out of context, and especially without considering the preceding verse,68 which states ‘Indeed Allah commands you to render the trusts to whom they are due and when you judge between people to judge with justice’.69 The Saudi ruling family has probably gone the furthest with this strategy, with the Wahhabi religious establishment and its government representatives claiming that the Al-Saud enjoy ‘rightful leadership’ or wali al-ahd on this very basis.

  The smaller Gulf monarchies, notably Qatar and the UAE have instead concentrated on using their resources to police and fund their mosques and domestic religious establishments. Almost all clerics are government employees, and these are quite closely monitored. Most have to carry photo identification cards, and their sermons usually have to be chosen from an official list of approved topics, drawn up by the relevant government body each week. A 2006 cable from the US embassy in Abu Dhabi confirms this practice, describing how ‘UAE officials publicly and strongly condemn extremism and terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has been the focus of government-approved Friday sermons in the mosques’.70 As well as providing generous salaries to clerics, thus slotting them into the rentier state’s giant public sector, wealth in these monarchies has also been used to build large and often lavish mosques, religious schools, and other institutions. Unsurprisingly some of the biggest mosques in the world are now in the Gulf monarchies—such as Abu Dhabi’s Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque, which was built by the government and can accommodate 40,000 worshippers. Taking several years to complete, it cost more than $540 million and is the burial place of the late Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan. Although there are some exceptions—such as Qatar’s largest mosque, which is simply called ‘Qatar Mosque’ or ‘Fanar’,71 and the proposed new Al-Farooq Mosque in Dubai—most of the largest mosques in the Gulf monarchies usually carry the name of a key ruling family member, despite invariably having been built using state funds. There are of course countless other projects connecting Islam to the largesse of the ruling families or the state, some of them highly innovative and often winning positive headlines for the sponsors. In the UAE, for example, the Dubai International Holy Koran Award
Committee has begun planning and designing a holy book collection or mushaf named after Abu Dhabi’s ruler—the ‘Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan Mushaf’. The aim is to produce a million of these volumes which will then be freely distributed ‘under orders of the prime minister’.72 Set on its own island and designed by the same architect as the contemporary section of the Paris Louvre, Qatar’s enormous Islamic Arts Museum is another powerful example; one closely associated with the ruler and his high-profile wife Moza bint Nasser Al-Misnad. It opened in late 2008 and has been featured in dozens of international newspapers and magazines.

  Also providing ruling families with religious legitimacy, or more accurately allowing rulers to portray themselves as tolerant, benevolent monarchs, there has been much support for other religions in some Gulf monarchies. With the exception of Saudi Arabia—where all other religions are banned—Christianity is booming in the Gulf monarchies, courtesy of substantial Indian and Filipino expatriate populations. Churches for almost all denominations exist in the five smaller Gulf states, including even evangelical chapels. Prime land, usually donated by a ruling family member, continues to be gifted to these churches to aid in their expansion. In Abu Dhabi, an ancient Nestorian Christian monastery which had been discovered on one of the emirate’s outlying islands was even opened to the public in 2010 by the government’s Tourism and Development Investment Company73—thus acknowledging and celebrating the country’s pre-Islamic past. Hindu and Sikh temples also exist in some of these states, as does a Zoroastrian tower of silence in Dubai, which has on occasion been the location of Zoroastrian world congresses. Although, as discussed in the following chapter, there remains a nominal boycott on Israel by the Gulf monarchies and synagogues are not permitted in any of these states, there are nonetheless some pockets of tolerance for Jews. In Bahrain for example, there exists a tiny community of Bahraini Jews. Although their number has dwindled from several hundred to just a few dozen, they are reportedly well respected and have served in the upper house of the parliament. In 2008 the king even appointed a Jew as Bahrain’s joint ambassador to the US, Canada, and Brazil.74

  Environmental credentials

  The Gulf monarchies rarely conjure an image of being environmentally friendly, given the centrality of hydrocarbons to the region and the various associated heavy industries, most of which rely on abundant fossil fuel. Moreover, the generous public sector salaries, the extensive welfare benefits, and the other trappings of the rentier state also lead to expectations of high consumption lifestyles for many Gulf nationals, including multiple vehicles per household and a heavy reliance on air-conditioning. According to the US Department of Energy’s Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, the Gulf monarchies now suffer from some of world’s highest per capita carbon dioxide emissions. In 2008 Qatar was the worst ranked country in the world, with 53.5 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per capita. The UAE was the third worst, with 34.6 metric tonnes, while Bahrain was ranked fifth, with 29 metric tonnes. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman were all not far behind, being ranked seventh, thirteenth and fourteenth respectively.75 Given the rapid development in the region since 2008, especially in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, it is likely that they remain among the world’s worst offenders—perhaps having increased their lead. Waste per capita is also believed to be very high in the Gulf monarchies, with a recent study concluding that Abu Dhabi had one of the highest waste per capita rates in the world—some six times greater than Western European countries.76 Improvements have been made across the region, but most waste is still thought to be dumped in desert landfill sites. Although vehicles per capita is a less useful measure for the Gulf monarchies, given that the rate for citizens is likely to be much higher than that for expatriates, it is noteworthy that Qatar is now firmly in the world top ten according to World Bank figures, with 724 vehicles per thousand residents, while Bahrain and Kuwait are close behind.77

  Nevertheless, despite the region’s poor track record, protection of the environment has recently become a high profile policy in some Gulf monarchies. The UAE and Qatar governments in particular have transformed what was previously a liability for their regional and international reputations into something of a strength. A plethora of projects, institutions, new government departments, and other initiatives have been announced—most of which aim not only to remedy their domestic environmental crises, but also to promote international research and development into cleaner energy and other environmental clauses.78 In much the same way that wealth distribution strategies to citizens and funding of religious establishments have been closely associated with key members of the ruling families, the same has often been true with these environmental projects. The state-backed media have provided extensive coverage, often publicly linking a specific ruling family member to a development, thus winning him or her favourable domestic headlines. It has also been a policy area which has largely attracted favourable international coverage, with many of the articles being republished for domestic readers.

  The new Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute for example falls directly under the umbrella of the ruler’s wife. Aiming to ‘mitigate climate change and contaminants harmful to the environment’ and focusing on ‘Qatar’s desert and marine ecologies, plant and animal life, and air quality’, it is well financed and has thus far been lauded by the domestic media79 and further afield. A recent RAND Corporation publication focusing on the institute, for example, begins by stating that ‘Qatar’s leadership has created a vision of sustainability for the country’.80 More extensively, Abu Dhabi has set up the new Environmental Agency Abu Dhabi (EAD) and recently commissioned the Stockholm Environmental Institute in Sweden to formulate a rigorous climate policy for the emirate.81 Since 2009 there has also been the Zayed Future Energy Prize which now presents winning companies or government departments with prizes of over $4 million.82 All photographs displayed on the prize’s official website feature the crown prince in the centre of groups of high profile international dignitaries, while all text descriptions of the prize refer to the ‘legacy of Sheikh Zayed’.83 But by far the most high profile environment-related initiative in the region has been Abu Dhabi’s Masdar City. Being built by the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (ADFEC), which is a subsidiary of the crown prince’s Mubadala Development Company, the plan has been to create a large carbon-neutral development in the emirate’s hinterland. The broader aim is for Masdar to provide the infrastructure for a free zone that will allow up to 1,500 renewable energy and other environment-related international companies to base themselves in Abu Dhabi, or at least have their regional headquarters there. Some of these will be focused on carbon capture technologies and it is expected that they will export their services to nearby countries still relying on outdated hydrocarbon extraction technologies.84 ADFEC is also hoping to attract research and development focused companies to Masdar in an effort to make Abu Dhabi the region’s capital for green technologies.85 Similarly, Mubadala’s investment in the Finnish company WinWinD is likely to lead to a wind power joint venture in Masdar.86 In support of all these companies is a new research centre—the Masdar Institute—and several leading international research bodies are already operating there.87 Again, there has been extensive coverage by the domestic media, and although there has been some criticism of Masdar in the international media, Mubadala and the crown prince have generally benefited from ADFEC’s overall aims.

  3

  EXPLAINING SURVIVAL—EXTERNAL MATTERS

  In parallel to their domestic ruling bargains, there also exist several strategies aimed at securing the survival and raising the status of the Gulf monarchies in the region and internationally. For many years the priority was building strong links with the rest of the Arab world, especially Palestine and those Arab states that refused to acknowledge Israel. This had the twin aims of satisfying pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli sentiments in their own populations while also allowing the ruling families to sit more comfortably alongside Arab nationalist
governments. More recently, and especially since Kuwait’s invasion by Iraq and subsequent liberation by a US-led force in 1991, the priority has been gaining influence and good standing in those states perceived as the most reliable security guarantors—namely the Western powers. Rising tensions with Iran, and a seeming impasse over its developing nuclear programme, have meant that such Western-centric efforts have continued to intensify. But there is now also the added dimension of seeking improved relations with the Eastern powers, including China, which have not only become key trading partners but may also soon offer alternative security guarantees. A third, but interconnected priority for the Gulf monarchies has been the need to forge good relations with other Muslim states and communities, including those far beyond the Arab world. Complimenting their efforts at boosting Islamic credentials and heading off domestic Islamist opposition, this strategy is also intended to deflect and counter external Islamist extremist aggression—a threat which became particularly acute following 9/11 and the subsequent al-Qaeda campaign in Saudi Arabia.1

  To some extent, the Gulf monarchies have employed conventional strategies to achieve these aims: building up military defensive capabilities with equipment primarily sourced from the West; joining regional organisations such as the Arab League; and attempts to build collective security arrangements between themselves—most notably the Gulf Cooperation Council. As will be discussed later, despite much scholarly attention having been paid to these strategies, they have been fraught with risks and their successes remain limited. Instead a number of other, subtler, policies perhaps better explain the external survival of the Gulf monarchies.