The Secrets of Station X

by Michael Smith

  Many of the bright young mathematicians who joined GC&CS shortly before the war or once it had started were to distinguish themselves but none more so than Alan Turing. The inevitable interest in Turing as a result of his pioneering role in computing, which had an immeasurable impact on the world today from the small hand-held computers now seen everywhere to the internet, has tended to obscure and distort his role at Bletchley. Turing’s ideas on computing machines were undoubtedly highly influential on Max Newman, his former tutor, who initiated the use of computers to help break the Fish encyphered teleprinter systems. Turing was also involved in the discussions surrounding Newman’s proposals. But contrary to popular belief he was not involved in the Newmanry and the construction of the Colossus computer at all.

  Like Knox, with whom he collaborated very closely in the initial attempts to break Enigma, Turing was a firm believer that it could and would be broken. He took on the far more difficult Naval Enigma system, with its various complex security measures, when no one else dared try, justifying this ambitious move ‘because it would be so interesting to break it’. Hugh Alexander lauded Turing’s leading role in breaking the U-Boat cyphers, a feat that kept the supply convoys going and ensured British survival in the darkest days of 1940 and 1941 when the UK stood virtually alone against the Nazi threat.

  ‘There should be no question in anyone’s mind that Turing’s work was the biggest factor in Hut 8’s success,’ Alexander said.

  In the early days he was the only cryptographer who thought the problem worth tackling and not only was he primarily responsible for the main theoretical work within the Hut but he also shared with Welchman and Keen the chief credit for the invention of the Bombe. It is always difficult to say that anyone is absolutely indispensable but if anyone was indispensable to Hut 8 it was Turing. The pioneer work always tends to be forgotten when experience and routine later make everything seem easy and many of us in Hut 8 felt that the magnitude of Turing’s contribution was never fully realised by the outside world.

  Turing’s 1952 trial on charges of homosexuality, which ended his continued post-war links to GCHQ as a consultant, and his subsequent suicide in 1954 are now well-known. It was a truly tragic and bitter end to a life which produced so much and could have produced much more, giving added meaning to Alexander’s final comments.

  The last of the four leading codebreakers to be singled out here is Hugh Alexander himself. Like Tiltman he continued to work for GCHQ as a codebreaker through the Cold War. At Bletchley, Alexander worked initially in Hut 6, then as Turing’s deputy and successor as head of Hut 8, before moving on to cover other problems as they emerged. When the Americans ran into problems trying to break the Japanese naval attaché machine cypher Coral in the summer of 1943, Hut 8 joined the attack employing procedures used against the Shark Enigma. Led by Alexander, the British codebreakers began to make headway in September 1943 and, in February 1944, he flew to Washington to lead the final break in time for a major Japanese report on the German defences in Normandy to be decyphered ahead of D-Day. At the end of the war, Alexander initially went back to his previous work as Director of Research for the John Lewis Partnership but in mid-1946 decided to join GCHQ, becoming head of the codebreaking division in 1949 and refusing further promotion so as to remain at the coalface. Like Tiltman he was persuaded to stay beyond the standard civil service retirement date, retiring two years after his sixtieth birthday in 1971, and like Tiltman he was then approached by NSA to join them, an offer he declined. He died in Cheltenham in February 1974. Noel Gayler, the then Director of NSA, said Alexander had made a ‘monumental’ contribution to joint Anglo-American codebreaking operations and to ‘the special relationship’ between Britain and the United States. That ‘special relationship’ was in fact founded on the wartime cooperation between Bletchley Park and its US counterparts and the continued and extensive exchange of intelligence between Britain and the United States remains by far the most tangible evidence of its continued existence.

  A list of codebreakers, intelligence officers and administrators who made substantial contributions to the work at Bletchley Park would be bound to omit others who also deserved recognition. Welchman’s invention of the diagonal board for the Bombe, for example, was absolutely vital, Tutte’s unpicking of the Tunny secrets astonishingly brilliant, but to continue the list would risk missing the point.

  The History of Hut 6, one of the internal GCHQ histories of the work at Bletchley that were written after the war, begins appropriately with the so-called ‘Dodo Bird Verdict’ from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, a quote that would no doubt have delighted the devoted Carrollian Dilly Knox: ‘Everybody has won and all must have prizes.’ This is perhaps particularly true of Bletchley Park where the work of the brilliant few was only possible because of the hard, often mind-numbing labour of very many others whose names were always less likely to go down in history. More than 10,000 people were working for GC&CS at the highest point in the war, at the beginning of 1945. This included the 2,000 Wrens and mechanics working on the Bombes at the out-stations at Adstock and Gayhurst Manor, in Buckinghamshire, and Stanmore and Eastcote in Middlesex, but not the thousands of intercept operators based at ninety locations in the UK and others around the world. Every one of these people played their part.

  Counter-factual history is a very risky undertaking but few could argue that the work at Bletchley did not help to ensure the war ended quicker than it would otherwise have done, saving countless lives on both sides of the conflict. Harry Hinsley, who went on to write the official history of British intelligence in the Second World War, argued that the intelligence produced at Bletchley Park cut at least two years, if not three, off the length of the war. ‘The U-Boats would not have done us in, but they would have got us into serious shortages and put another year on the war,’ Hinsley said. ‘Operation Overlord would certainly not have been launched in June 1944 without Ultra. Or at least, if it had been launched, it would probably not have been successful.’ It was still possible that the Russians might have gone on to capture Berlin in 1945 or that Britain might have been so badly hit by Hitler’s V-weapons that the Allies might have responded by using the atomic bomb, he said. ‘But my own belief is that the war, instead of finishing in 1945, would have ended in 1948 had GC&CS not been able to read the Enigma cyphers and produce the Ultra intelligence.’

  George Steiner’s judgement on the work of Bletchley Park reflects that achievement but it cannot just be pinned to the organisation itself. The success of Bletchley Park was the result of a lot of hard work by all of the people who worked there or at the many GC&CS outstations or intercept sites around the world. The recruitment difficulties which provoked the letter to Churchill written by Welchman, Turing, Alexander and Milner-Barry meant that there was no room for passengers at Bletchley Park.

  In his history of the work on German Naval Enigma, Alexander said:

  The graphs and figures in the appendices give a statistical estimate of our work; it is harder to give a real impression of what we felt about it. Even the people who had the dullest and hardest work (and a great deal of the routine work was very dull and still more of it extremely exhausting) felt that it was worthwhile to an extent that few jobs in peace-time can be and they did not spare themselves in any way – through staff shortage they frequently had far more to cope with than they should ever have been asked to do; they always got it done somehow and I am sure that a number of the breakdowns in health that occurred were caused chiefly by overwork. As for these of us who did the skilled technical work, I think we all felt that it was impossible that we should ever again have a job which would give us in the same way a sense of the greatest importance and urgency combined with the fascination of a highly ingenious and complicated game – we all thought ourselves extremely fortunate to have had the chance to do it.

  Although Alexander was talking specifically about Hut 8, it was the same across ‘the Park’. The opinion of an American who worked at Bletchley mi
ght be seen as providing as close as we can come to a genuinely unbiased inside view of this truly great British institution.

  Bill Bundy, who was in his mid-twenties when he led the US codebreakers working in Hut 6, went on to be a key foreign affairs adviser for both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, ending his government service as Assistant Secretary of State. Bundy said he never worked with ‘a group of people that was more thoroughly dedicated and with a range of skills, insight and imagination’ than those he worked with at Bletchley.

  It was a terrific human experience and I’ve never matched it since. I had other jobs with superb people, important and worthwhile pursuits but certainly for me personally this was the high point. This was a totally dedicated group working together in absolutely remarkable teamwork. Their whole structure was one where you might readily find a major working under a lieutenant or under a civilian, somewhat younger. Whoever was in charge was the person who had been judged to be more effective at doing it. It was an extraordinary group, and that was true right across the board in BP, whatever system of selection they used, and I’ve heard lots of narratives and lots of colourful stories about it, the result was an extraordinary group of people in an extraordinary organisation.

  ENDNOTES

  Pages 1–2 Bletchley beginnings: The National Archives, Public Record Office (hereafter TNA PRO) HD 3/15. Mystery of its future use: Bletchley District Gazette, 28 May 1938.

  Pages 3–4 Bletchley purchase: interview with former MI6 officer who managed the service’s archives, 17 October 1995. The official MI6 history cites evidence in the Land Registry files that ‘strongly suggests’ Sinclair was reimbursed, but these documents, the details of which were already known, do not in fact strongly suggest anything. They show that Sinclair left the Park to his sister Evelyn who signed it over to MI6. If he had been reimbursed it would be unlikely that he would have left it to his sister; he could have signed it over to MI6 himself. It may have been of course that she was reimbursed after her brother’s death but there is certainly no evidence of this. The only money exchanged when she signed the Park over was a 10-shilling legal fee. The Sinclair family wealth was such at the time that Evelyn did not need the money and having spent the last years of his life with her brother she would certainly have known what he wanted done with the Park before he left it to her. Without any further evidence, and there is none in the MI6 archives, it is unlikely that the truth will ever be known. The words of the MI6 archivist, reflecting the absence of any evidence of repayment in the MI6 archives, are the closest we can come to an answer: ‘We know he paid for it, we’re not even sure if he was ever repaid. He died soon afterwards, so he probably wasn’t.’

  Page 5 Evelyn Sinclair worked at GC&CS: TNA PRO HW 14/147, Temporary Staff, 5 March 1941, p.5.

  Page 6 Move of various sections to Bletchley: TNA PRO HW 62/21, Move of Service Sections to War Station, 15 August 1939, dated 2 August 1939.

  Page 7 Walsingham: TNA PRO HD 3/15.

  Page 8 Secret Man and Secret Decyphering Branch: TNA PRO HD 3/14; HD 3/15; HD 3/16; HD 3/17; HD 3/22; HD 3/35.

  Pages 9–10 Gill and Christmas message: TNA PRO WO 32/10776, History of Military Intelligence Directorate 1920–21.

  Pages 11–12 Members of Room 40: TNA PRO HW 3/182, Records of W. F. Clarke of Room 40 and Head of Naval Section, Government Code and Cypher School.

  Page 13 Zimmermann telegram: TNA PRO HW 3/177, Nigel de Grey account of decyphering of the Zimmermann telegram, January 1917.

  Page 14 Denniston on rivalry: A. G. Denniston, ‘The Government Code and Cypher School Between the Wars’, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 1 (January 1986), pp.58–9.

  Page 15 Post-war amalgamation: TNA PRO HW 3/33, Record of Conference held at the Admiralty on 5 August 1919 on amalgamation of MI1b and NID25; HW 3/33, Nigel de Grey, Notes on Formation and Evolution of GC&CS, p.1.

  Page 16 Public and private roles: Denniston, ‘The Government Code and Cypher School Between the Wars’, pp.58–9.

  Page 17 Curzon on need for secrecy: Keith Jeffery (ed.), ‘The Government Code and Cypher School: A Memorandum by Lord Curzon’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 1, No. 3 (October 1986).

  Page 18 Supply of material: J. Johnson, The Evolution of British Sigint 1653–1939, HMSO, Cheltenham, 1997, pp.45,50.

  Pages 19–20 Sinclair takeover and lack of funds: TNA PRO HW 3/182, Records of W. F. Clarke of Room 40 and Head of Naval Section, Government Code and Cypher School.

  Pages 21–22 Cooper recruitment: TNA PRO HW 3/83, J. E. S. Cooper, Personal Notes on GC&CS 1925–39, p.1.

  Pages 23–24 ‘Devotee of his art’: TNA PRO HW 3/12, translation of German newspaper article by former Russian codebreaker.

  Page 25 Role in capture of the Magdeburg codebook: Christopher Andrew, Secret Service, The Making of the British Intelligence Community, Sceptre, London, 1992, pp.143, 376.

  Page 26 Details of Fetterlein’s flight from Russia: P. William Filby, ‘Bletchley Park and Berkeley Street’, Intelligence and National Security 3(2) (1988), p.272.

  Page 27 Fetterlein’s wartime work: TNA PRO HW 3/35, Work Done by Staff of ID25 During the War, Summary, 15/5/1919.

  Page 28 Fetterlein’s working practice: Filby, ‘Bletchley Park and Berkeley Street’.

  Pages 29–30 Cooper recollections of Fetterlein: TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Personal Notes on GC&CS 1925–39, paras 2–3.

  Page 31 Cooper on lack of training. TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Personal Notes on GC&CS 1925–39, para 6.

  Pages 32–33 Intercept sites: Johnson, The Evolution of British Sigint, pp.50–53; TNA PRO HW 3/81, H. C. Kenworthy, A Brief History of Events Relating to the Growth of the Wire Service; HW 3/33, de Grey, Notes on Formation and Evolution of GC&CS, pp.1–2; C. L. Sinclair-Williams, H. C. Kenworthy (unpublished paper kindly provided by Mrs Hazel Sinclair-Williams).

  Page 34 Cooper on lack of work on German cyphers: TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Personal Notes on GC&CS 1925–39, paras 25–6.

  Page 35 Germans begin using machine cyphers: Denniston, ‘The Government Code and Cypher School Between the Wars’, p.54.

  Page 36 Foss asked to test Enigma machine for British use: TNA PRO HW 25/10, H. R. Foss, Reminiscences on the Enigma, p.2.

  Pages 37–38 Working of Enigma and results of Foss test: ibid; Johnson, The Evolution of British Sigint, p.55.

  Page 39 Wehrmacht starts using Enigma: TNA PRO HW 25/10, de Grey, Enigma History, p.2.

  Page 40 Knox success against Italian machine: ibid; TNA PRO HW 25/10, Cooper handwritten memo on de Grey’s Enigma History.

  Page 41 Knox knowledge of Stecker-board: Robin Denniston, Thirty Secret Years: A. G. Denniston’s Work in Signals Intelligence 1914–44, Polperro Heritage Press, Clifton-upon-Terne, Worcestershire, 2007, p.107; TNA PRO 62/21, Tiltman memo dated 9 September 1938.

  Page 42 Move to Bletchley Park for ‘rehearsal’: TNA PRO HW 43/1, F. L. Birch, History of Sigint, p.49.

  Page 43 Atmosphere at GC&CS: TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Reminiscences on GC&CS at Bletchley Park, para 5.

  Pages 44–45 Barbara Abernethy recruitment: interview with Barbara Eachus, 23 March 1998.

  Page 46 Timings of rehearsal: TNA PRO HW 43/1, Birch, History of Sigint, p.49.

  Pages 47–48 Clarke memories: TNA PRO HW 3/16, W. F. Clarke, History of GCCS and its Naval Section, 1919–45, BP Reminiscences, pp.49–51.

  Page 49 Cooper memories: TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Air Section GC&CS and the Approach to War 1935–39, pp.12–13.

  Page 50 Meeting with Bertrand: TNA PRO HW 25/12, AGD to the Director, 2 November 1938.

  Page 51 Hans Thilo Schmidt: Mavis Batey, Dilly: The Man Who Broke Enigmas, Dialogue, London, 2009, p.64.

  Pages 52–53 Denniston on main reason for liaison with French: TNA PRO HW 25/12, AGD to the Director, 2 November 1938.

  Page 54 Cooper memories: ibid; TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Air Section GC&CS and the Approach to War 1935–39, pp.16–17.

  Pages 55–2 January 1939 meeting in
Paris: TNA PRO HW 25/10, H. R. Foss, Reminiscences on the Enigma, p.3.

  Pages 56–3 Turing and Twinn recruitment: interviews with Twinn, April 1998.

  Pages 57–4 Dilly eccentricities: Batey, Dilly. Vincent memories: Corpus Christi Archives, Cambridge, Professor E. R. P. Vincent, Unpublished Memoirs, p.107.

  Page 58 Peter Twinn: interviews with Twinn, April 1998; F. H. Hinsley & A. Stripp, Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, pp.125–7.

  Pages 59–6 Polish work on Enigma: Ralph Erskine & Michael Smith (eds), The Bletchley Park Codebreakers, Biteback, London, 2011, p.42; Batey, Dilly, pp.74–9.

  Pages 60–6 Mayer quoted in J. Stengers, ‘Enigma, the French, the Poles and the British’, in C. M. Andrew & D. N. Dilks (eds), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, Macmillan, London, 1984, pp.130–32.