In Search of the Promised Land
Page 24
The NFA was unlikely to be placated by this argument. It did indeed want to expand its markets by entering the EEC, but until this became a reality, it was looking to the Government to subsidise it through increased price support. Lemass, however, explicitly warned the NFA that if in pursuit of its aims it intended to disrupt public services, the Government would take appropriate action:
If the NFA had in mind the staging of a political strike designed by economic pressure on the public, to secure concessions from the Government, they could take it that the Government would feel obliged, in the public interest, to take strong measures. Apart from the question whether the NFA case had merits or not, it would be contrary to the public interest that political strikes, which had not hitherto been resorted to in this country, should be tolerated.134
This harked back to recent reports in the media, and specifically an interview with Deasy in The Irish Times two days earlier, where he floated the idea that the NFA might have to look to new forms of protest in its disputes with the Government.135Lemass’ warning can be interpreted as a sign of deep dissatisfaction within the Government as a whole with the threats emanating from the NFA. There was a feeling within the Government at this time that the agricultural lobby could not be pleased on any issue of policy. Lemass echoed this when he wrote to Paddy Smith about the NFA’s demand for greater price support:
There is a question whether any decision on which the Government may decide for the further assistance of agriculture should be announced and brought into effect separately or altogether. I suppose this will depend to some extent on the character of our decisions, but rather than appear to relate our decisions to the impractical totals of the NFA proposals, I think it would be preferable to announce and apply them separately. We will get no credit from the NFA no matter what we do.136
The Government had since September 1961 accepted the principle that the farmers, as well as other sections of society, should share equitably in increases in the national income. Throughout 1962, however, the NFA saw no sign of its members gaining such an increase, and increased its attacks on Government agricultural policy. Lemass, for his part, was of the opinion that the agricultural lobby would never be satisfied. He made reference to state support for agriculture, stating:
The various aids and services provided for Irish agriculture already cost a great deal of money. In relation to national income, the Irish state supports its agriculture to a much greater extent than other European countries, even though the support rests on a smaller industrial base. Nevertheless it is unlikely that our taxpayers will not wish to support intelligent measures to raise small farm productivity and, in that way, to make them less dependent on public support. The problem of the small farm areas is one which has to be resolved before all our aims of national development are secured.137
Equating the ailments of the small farm sector with the aims of national development was quintessential Fianna Fáil. Yet it was the rhetoric of the Fianna Fáil of de Valera, not the rhetoric of Lemass the industrialiser. Whatever the merits of Lemass’ sympathies regarding agricultural concerns, there is little doubt that he was acutely aware of the electoral support given to Fianna Fáil by this sector, and would seek to assuage the fears of those within in when addressing them. It is doubtful, however, if he believed his own oratory on this occasion. For the Government, entry into the EEC would harness Ireland’s national development in the long run by offering its industries and productive agriculture greater opportunities in an enlarged market, once industry had adapted to free trade conditions. While both indigenous and foreign-owned export industry was very weak at this stage, and seemed unlikely to gain much from EEC entry in the short term, for the Government entry was part of a long-term strategy within which industry would have to adapt.138Although a key element of EEC policy was the protection of small family farms throughout Western Europe, Lemass knew, as indeed did the NFA itself, that entry into the Community would not immediately alleviate the social and economic problems associated with the Irish small farm.
The NFA, however, was in no doubt that agricultural incomes still lagged well behind those of other sectors, and continued to predict that farmer unrest would grow unless the Government took meaningful action to alleviate the plight of farmers. The association’s general secretary, Seán Healy, asserted:
Average incomes in Irish agriculture had consistently been below incomes in other occupations for at least half a century and at the present time farmers the world over – a few excepted – had lower incomes than their non-farming counterparts.139
To Rickard Deasy, there were four main reasons for farmer unrest: the increasing rates burden, a persistent decline in farm incomes, a bleak future and, most importantly, a general lack of attention to the fundamental task of planning agricultural development more coherently:
Successive Governments have dealt with industrial development with vigour and enthusiasm. Although we can expect to face in a few years, in conditions of free competition, the highly developed agricultural systems of continental countries as well as the United Kingdom we have as yet not begun to assess and plan our agriculture. These plans must be comprehensive and embrace production, processing, marketing and trade policy. Farmers have been conscious of these planning deficiencies. They have for years been clamouring without avail for a fresh approach to the agricultural problem. It is precisely because nothing so far has been achieved and because there is little time left to achieve anything, that they have decided to make these deficiencies a major issue.140
Paddy Smith refuted Deasy’s charges that the Government was inactive in relation to farmers, and claimed that the adverse farm-income trends were, in large measure, due to international protectionist policies and artificially depressed prices in Britain – developments over which he had no control. The Irish Independent attempted to find the middle ground between the two, and concluded that both could do better:
The Common Market may provide a remedy to this problem by opening continental markets to Irish farm produce. But if this brightened prospect is to be adequately availed of, much more than at present will need to be done as regards research, particularly in marketing, and in improving quality standards. A more energetic approach to these aspects of farm policy is long overdue. Money spent this way will provide a real long term improvement rather than a temporary stop gap to the erosion of farm incomes.141
There was a perception within the farming community as a whole that the Government was placing industrial development at the top of its economic agenda, and that farmers were being left in a policy vacuum. It was within this context that they were campaigning for a redistribution of incomes. At a meeting with the Government in April 1962, Greene told Lemass that small farmers were putting pressure on the leadership over what they perceived to be a declining standard of living. He added that there was no political motivation behind any campaign that might develop, and agreed that it would be undesirable that political strikes should be introduced. He did not, however, rule this course of action out:
Feelings of frustration and injustice were being built up and unless some concessions were made in the budget there might be local disturbances which the NFA might not be able to control … apart from the merits of the case for some concessions to the farmers, it would be in the national interest to prevent anything which would tend to destroy the country’s name abroad for political stability.142
Whether Lemass perceived what might be called Greene’s ‘advice’ as anything other than a threat is not clear. Yet there can be little doubt that that is what it was. The subtext of the demand for concessions to farmers in the budget was that the NFA would use its considerable power to ensure that none of its members would strike. With the Government’s application to join the EEC still on the European Commission’s table, the last thing it would need would be a farmers’ strike. Ever since Lemass had outlined the Government’s position to the Commission at a meeting in Brussels on 18 January 1962, the Government had been att
empting to ascertain the situation with regard to the application. A meeting was scheduled to take place in May 1962 between an Irish delegation and the permanent representatives of the member states, which the Government hoped would open the way for the formal discussion of the Irish application later in the summer. Thus, any strike could have ramifications for the Government’s European strategy. Yet Greene’s logic is somewhat confusing. A strike by farmers, though it might hurt the Government as regards its position with the European Commission, would thereby damage the main lobbying group for EEC membership for Ireland – the farmers themselves.
Whatever the implications of Greene’s comments, what is clear is that the budget delivered four days later contained some concessions in rates and the abandonment of the proposed penny levy on milk delivered at creameries. The Irish Press reported the reaction of the NFA: ‘the budget was a victory in principle for the case presented by the NFA on behalf of organised farmers’.143By late summer 1962 the Connacht Tribune was able to proclaim that relations between the Government and the NFA had improved considerably, with the Government being able to look upon the position of the farmers as ‘reasonably satisfactory’.144
To ride two horses at once
Failure to enter the EEC in the early 1960s brought bitter disappoint-ment to the Irish farming community, as its hopes of increasing prosperity in the larger Common Market were dashed. Once the Government failed in 1963 to get inside protected continental markets through the EEC, the 1960s would become a period of increased farmer militancy as farmers protested at what they perceived to be their increasingly disadvantaged situation.145Relations with the Government soon deteriorated to their previous level. Serious differences between the Government and the NFA also arose in late 1963 over the withholding of rates in Kilkenny by a proportion of farmers who had the support of the NFA. For Lemass, if the NFA was involved in illegal activities, the Government would be compelled to take whatever measures the situation required. He told Deasy that the NFA could not expect ‘to ride two horses at once and that a wish for closer co-operation with the Department of Agriculture could not be reconciled with a course of action which would make conflict with the Government inevitable’.146
In many ways, the withholding of rates in Kilkenny mirrored events of less than three decades earlier. Kilkenny was a strong farmer county, and had been one of the Blueshirts’ strongholds in the 1930s; indeed, the emblematic ‘blue shirt’ made its first appearance in Kilkenny, in April 1933.147Moreover, Kilkenny was at the heart of an anti-rates campaign in the summer and autumn of 1934. The county council had a strong anti-Fianna Fáil majority, and refused to co-operate fully in the collection of rates. This resulted in the county council being dissolved by order of the Minister for Local Government.148Lemass and Smith, in all probability, would not have forgotten such incidents; thus, Lemass declared that a campaign of this kind struck at the very roots of representative Government:
If agitation of this kind could succeed in any degree whatever, or even seem to succeed, or even so develop as being capable of being represented as having succeeded, it could bring the whole administration of local and central Government into disorder. This is the road to anarchy and I want to make the Government’s position in this regard clear beyond any possibility of misunderstanding. We will not allow it to happen.149
Entering 1964, the Kilkenny rates controversy had still to be resolved. Yet by this time, the Government was in the process of redefining its relations with the agricultural lobby. The NFA was to receive formal Government recognition whereby, in future, the Government would welcome regular and full discussions and consultation with the NFA for the purpose of formulating agricultural policy, both broad and specific. For Paddy Smith, the Government’s difficulty had been in finding:
… [a] basis for fruitful co-operation while the NFA reserve the right to be destructively critical of every move made by me to help farmers, and to use meetings with me and my officials as the basis of biased attacks on us and on Government policy.150
He therefore considered that the Government would be as well dealing with the NFA on a formal footing in the future. He was of the opinion that a well-organised farmers’ organisation had a really valuable job to do, and that it was in his own interests to work with it and give a fair hearing to any proposal of a constructive nature that it might put before him. On 28 January 1964 Lemass sent a memorandum to the NFA stating that while the Government was concerned at the lack of unity and cohesion amongst farmers’ organisations, it did recognise that:
… the NFA are interested in all branches of agriculture, and they welcome the prospect of regular and comprehensive discussions with the NFA in connection with the formulation of agricultural policy in the broadest sense, as well as their practical co-operation in respect of specific areas of agriculture … It will be the ordinary practice of the Minister for Agriculture to inform the NFA about pending changes in his Department, proposed new schemes … and to consider any representations they may wish to make to him in this regard.151
While the NFA received formal Government recognition, Smith was disturbed at the whole thrust of Lemass’ economic policies. When Lemass took over as Taoiseach in 1959, Smith found it increasingly difficult to accommodate himself to Lemass’ economic and social viewpoints. Smith – the archetypal countryman – had shared de Valera’s conservative vision of Ireland as a largely pastoral society based on traditional values that would withstand socialist notions likely to promote a more dependent and less harmonious society.152Fundamental to Lemass’ approach, however, was the development of an important industrial segment, a questioning of the efficiency and merits of existing industries, and a closer relationship between the Government and the trade unions in the interests of economic progress. Indeed, Lemass’ co-opting of the farmers into a formal negotiating stance with the Government is mirrored in his attitudes to the unions. Smith, however, saw the courting of the unions as sacrificing rural to urban interest; thus, on 7 October 1964 he offered his resignation, the first Fianna Fáil minister to do so on a policy issue.153His resignation was the source of much controversy. The US embassy originally reported that Smith’s resignation had caught his colleagues and the public by surprise, and was principled and courageous.154The following week, however, it was reporting a different story to Washington, maintaining:
There are indications that Smith’s action … may not have been as principled as was initially indicated. Various reports from generally reliable sources echo the theme that a cabinet reshuffle was contemplated and that Smith, along with one or two of his older colleagues, was to make way for the appointment of younger ministers.155
This was something that the newspapers of the time were widely reporting, with ‘Backbencher’ in The Irish Times noting ‘the young men were preparing to take over with the blessing of Mr Lemass. The berths were all but allocated’, while a later editorial in the same paper maintained that ‘it is widely believed that he [Smith] anticipated only by a short time the end of his ministerial existence’.156Lemass was reported to have had up to seventeen resignation statements from Smith in his drawer, and it was only when he learned that Smith was attempting to get the press to announce his resignation that Lemass acted in accepting the resignation and appointing Charles Haughey to succeed Smith.157Despite the acrimonious relationship between Smith and the NFA, it expressed regret at his resignation from a position of influence that could have benefited the farming community.158
Ironically, for all his disputes with the NFA, Smith’s views were those of the farming community in general. Once the trade union movement began to move to centre stage in the new debates on Irish economic and social development, it seemed to many farmers that they were in danger of being relegated if not exactly to the margins of Irish politics, at least to a more secondary role than they had traditionally enjoyed. Predictably, they felt threatened, and resolved to remind the Lemass Government that they were still a formidable power in the land.159Moreover, the NFA
and the farming community in general were extremely wary of the urban Lemass. Essentially, as Todd Andrews points out of Lemass:
He had little real rapport with rural Ireland and, considering the amount of travelling he did when building up the Fianna Fáil organisation, he had surprisingly little intimate knowledge of the countryside and its people. He was essentially the Dublin Jackeen with the ready wit and derisive humour so common in the city.160
Thus, one can see the protests of the NFA in the light of the growing strength of the unions’ influence on the Lemass Government. While the NFA welcomed the Government’s endeavours with regard to the EEC, it was deeply worried by Lemass’ courtship of the unions, as ultimately it saw them as a threat to agricultural interests and feared that the agricultural community would be left behind in a rising tide of prosperity. Yet this period also saw the formal recognition by Government of the role of farmer organisations in the formulation of policy. It was perhaps naive of Lemass to expect that, having invited the farmers to sit at the policy table, they should abandon the confrontational approach that had, in their estimation, earned them that position.
For all its Blueshirt antecedents, by the early 1960s the NFA had come to be seen by Fianna Fáil ministers as a troublesome but essentially apolitical grouping: ten years earlier, it would have regarded it as no more than Fine Gael on tractors. Once inside the charmed circle of power, the NFA continued its aggressive championing of the cause of farmers. The road to the negotiating table had been a rocky one, but once there, the NFA remained steadfast in its goal of improving the position of its members.
Exposed to the emerging realities of European integration, the farming community did not simply view entry into the EEC in terms of prices and markets, but was able to comprehend the wider economic and social picture. Farm leaders were only too well aware of the social consequences of underemployment, poverty and mass emigration. Despite a continually fractious relationship with Government, and a view of themselves as poor relations vis-à-vis the trade unions and the employers, farmers rightly surmised that it was better to be inside the tent than outside.