In Search of the Promised Land
Page 31
… [the] clear principal danger lying in the field of agriculture. As regards industry there appeared to be no problem since we had accepted that protection must go by the end of the transitional period. While there was difficulty over the question of a common external tariff … he was very pleased that the Taoiseach had given such emphasis to political considerations.123
MacCarthy also commented on the positive reaction of Signor Rosso, Parliamentary Secretary to the Italian Minister for Finance, who ‘saw no difficulty in our becoming a full member’. The Dutch were also favourable to the Irish application, reporting that Lemass’ speech was ‘generally well received’.124
The memorandum prepared for Lemass prior to his departure for his key meeting in Brussels maintained that the fundamental economic emphasis for Ireland remained agriculture, despite the recent commitment to industrial development:
… for Ireland agriculture will always be of major importance. We are, naturally, anxious that, through membership of the European Economic Community, Ireland should be able to look forward to a balanced develop-ment of agriculture and industry.125
Irish officials were aware of the consequence of entry for Irish agriculture. It was assumed that Britain would remain the focus for agricultural exports, though it was recognised that the special relationship would be eroded, if not terminated, by the Common Agricultural Policy. The farming community, as we have seen, had no doubts that after the disappointment of the Anglo-Irish trade agreement, Irish agriculture would boom within the framework of the EEC.
In terms of industrial policy, the Irish aim was to negotiate a protocol or special agreement under which Irish tariffs would be dismantled over an agreed period of time, while some recognition would be obtained for the difficulties that some exposed industries might encounter. Industry and Commerce remained pessimistic about Ireland’s industrial future without long-term support, suggesting that protection should be maintained beyond the proposed 1970 transition date: ‘the protocol should provide for maintaining protection after the end of the transitional period for any industries which might find it too difficult to comply with the general rhythm [of tariff reduction]’.126Industry and Commerce reiterated its customary position that around 100,000 jobs could be threatened unless some form of protection remained in place. This view – while undoubtedly pessimistic – had a basis in reality as the initial CIO reports began to show that Irish industry was ill prepared for competition. As one industrialist commented:
When those reports came out first there was not a great deal of surprise among businessmen. Originally we were not conscious of any sort of competition and once it became known that the Government was serious about pursuing the EEC option we realised that we were hopelessly ill equipped to cope with this new state of affairs.127
The CIO reports opened the eyes of many industrialists, as a professional economist worked closely with the survey teams. According to another industrialist, this ‘was a complete new experience for us in the FII. We quickly got the message that we had to adapt or else go under’.128The CIO had found that, with a few exceptions, Irish industry was ill prepared for such a change in approach. The majority of firms in Ireland were heavily protected and had no experience of international trading conditions. Furthermore, a majority of those employed in the industrial sector were in these protected areas. The Government was working on the assumption that Ireland would enter the EEC early in 1963, and that all the transitional agreements would be completed by 1970. Technical decisions concerning the method by which tariffs might be reduced gave some scope for Ireland and Irish industry, but this in itself would be limited. This meant that Irish industry would have to meet the full force of competition by this latter date. It was in recognition of this threat that the Government had established the CIO to assess the potential of Irish industry in a free trade environment.129
The CIO had a dual function: one was to provide an assessment of Ireland’s likely trading position in a free trade environment, and the other involved incorporating the industrial interest groups into Government structures. This strategy was successful in drawing the trade unions closer to the Government. Lemass urged trade unionists to accept that changes were already underway regarding Ireland’s relationship with the wider world, and that existing preferences with Britain were consequently already weakening. He implied, but did not state directly, that even in the absence of EEC membership, considerable changes in the Irish economy would be necessary. As Donal Nevin points out:
It had become pretty clear to the union movement that we would have an important role to play in the development of the economy, whether we were in a European body or not. Our thinking on the European issue was along the lines of if it was good for workers, Congress would not oppose it.130
Lemass believed that ‘we can avoid the prejudicial effects of having to face a tariff on entry into Britain by ourselves joining the EEC’.131Ironically, he conceded that the negotiating strategy that had previously been adopted in respect of EFTA – insisting that Ireland was underdeveloped, and identifying with Greece and Turkey – could now work to Ireland’s disadvantage. The most significant difference between EFTA and EEC entry was that in the former, agriculture was not in question for Ireland, and it had therefore been Government policy to pursue the effective protection of existing Irish industry. Considering the importance of agriculture within the EEC context, the implication here undoubtedly, even for Lemass, was that the main concern of Irish Government policy was agriculture, with industry being a distant, if increasingly important, second.
The concern expressed about industry should not obscure the main objective for Irish policy-makers and for the Government, which was to obtain favourable entry terms to the Community and to secure, if possible, continuing access to the British market for agricultural exports. The decision by Britain to apply for membership was the most important stimulus to Ireland’s application. In addition, the decision to apply for full membership was inevitable, as the loss of Britain’s markets for Irish exports was threatened if the British entered and Ireland did not.
Our philosophy and national background
Shortly before he went to Brussels, Lemass addressed the Fianna Fáil ard-fheis. He had a number of objectives. The first was to assure the party membership of the significance and value of what the Government was trying to achieve. This was important because one of the main effects of entry would be the dismantling of the entire economic nationalist superstructure that had been established over the previous thirty years, since Fianna Fáil first took office in 1932. It was necessary to frame entry in a ‘nationalist’ or patriotic fashion. Some Fianna Fáil supporters were worried about the application on the grounds of sovereignty. As Aodogan O’Rahilly pointed out:
There were some of us, close to Lemass, who had our doubts about the approach he was taking. I was totally opposed. I did not believe that any EEC was going to help Ireland economically or otherwise and I told him that straight up.132
Lemass, however, was determined to push on and bring ‘nationalist’ Fianna Fáil with him. He wished to assure foreign observers of the conference that the Government was fully committed to entry. Finally, he used the opportunity to develop a momentum of support for entry. The commitment to the Community was overt, and the statement in favour of entry was as clearly composed as was possible under the circumstances:
Membership of the Common Market is open to those nations which accept the political aims which inspired it. A movement to political confederation in some form, is indeed a natural and logical development of economic integration. Henceforth our national aims must conform to the emergence, in a political as well as in an economic sense, of a union of Western European states, not as a vague prospect of the distant future but as a living reality of our own times.133
As part of this reality, Lemass maintained that the multilateral arrange-ments within the EEC would be more to the advantage of Ireland than existing bilateral arrangements. In addition, he reflect
ed on the possibility that economic integration would remove the basis for the partition of the country. This argument was based on the theory that co-operation at transnational level would bring about the objective previously sought by economic nationalism; namely that an independent united Ireland co-existing in the EEC with the British would be able to provide a healthy future for all the citizens on the island, thus nullifying any economic arguments relating to partition. This can be seen as an attempt to appeal to nationalist sentiment, and a way of bringing the national aim of unification into line with European integration. Lemass also used the opportunity effectively to dismantle the ideological commitment to economic nationalism. The end of protectionism could also be presented in nationalist terms; economic efficiency could thus be presented in terms of patriotic endeavour: ‘in the economic sphere, the task before the country can be defined simply as that of becoming fully competitive in every respect. It is a condition essential to our national survival.’134O’Rahilly was not convinced:
The way I saw it the Europeans wanted us in to get control of our fishing and other stuff. How wrong can you be? While I was very strongly in favour of bringing in foreign capital I just could not picture us getting anything out of it. As for partition I was of the opinion that we would be losing more control of our own actions if we joined. If anything I saw entry putting the national question back.135
While Lemass had not been able to convert every one of his colleagues to the idea of entry, he went to Brussels with the ard-fheis and the majority of his party united behind him. A motion passed recording the ‘approval of the manner in which the Government is handling the negotiations for Ireland’s entry into the EEC and on its approach to international affairs in general’ summed up the mood of the Fianna Fáil party.136Not all commentators were convinced. The Sunday Independent reported the following month that there was a ‘Cabinet split on Common Market issues’.137Lemass, however, was quick to deny any such division, maintaining: ‘The person who invented that should be able to make a fortune writing fairy tales. I advise him to take it up. Hans Christian Andersen would only be trotting after him.’138
Lemass’ visit to Brussels and his presentation to the EEC went off well as far as the Irish delegation was concerned. Some commentators did not agree. An article by Jock Bruce-Gardyne in The Statist, entitled ‘The unwanted suitor’, claimed that the Irish application had received a ‘frigid reception’, and was being treated like a ‘cold douche for a keen convert’.139The Government was appalled by the slant Bruce-Gardyne – a notorious cynic regarding the EEC – had taken, and considered the article important enough to lodge a protest with the publication. There had been a number of inter-journal conflicts between Bruce-Gardyne and Desmond Fisher, who had written enthusiastically about Ireland’s place in Europe. In essence, it seemed that Bruce-Gardyne was echoing French Government sources, who continued to be dubious about the Irish application.140For them, as for pretty much everyone else, the Irish application was inextricably tied up with the British one. The US was as convinced about this as the Europeans. John R. Burke, State Department officer in charge of Irish affairs at the bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, wrote to Edward Prince, first secretary at the embassy in Dublin, to this effect in April 1962:
For the moment, Departmental attention is riveted, as you can appreciate, on the UK negotiations with the six at Brussels. Like a Cape Hatteras barometer the prognosis for the negotiation seems to shift daily from fair to stormy and though everyone continues to maintain that ultimate membership is the only possible result, there are those who consciously cross their fingers and touch wood as they say it … The Department has not yet felt called upon to take a firm position on the Irish application. This is due to two factors: (1) the aforementioned preoccupation with the progress of the UK bid and (2) the many statements indicating that the Irish application was tied with that of the UK, and that it would probably be withdrawn should the UK negotiation fail.141
The following month, a meeting was held in Brussels between the permanent representatives of the member states and a delegation from the Irish Government. Questions concerning agriculture, horticulture, industry and tariffs were raised and discussed. While Ireland gave a commitment to abolish all quantitative and tariff restrictions, it also made the case that some sectors would warrant special attention but that these would not conflict with European regulations. In addition, a full commitment to dismantling all tariffs on industrial goods within the time span agreed by negotiation was given. In this area, the only exception requested was for those industries that encountered difficulties during the transition, particularly in manufacturing, but had the capability to compete and whose difficulties were of a temporary nature. Ireland also sought assurances on dumping in the light of the small Irish market and the damage that such action could do if the response was not quick enough.142
While this meeting was largely of a technical nature, the Irish delegation believed that it had made its economic case succinctly and effectively. By early July, it appeared that the permanent representatives would decide favourably for Ireland, allowing the Irish application to be discussed at the meeting scheduled for 23 July. This may go some way to explaining Lemass’ most outspoken remarks on NATO, when in the same month he told the New York Times:
We recognise that a military commitment will be an inevitable con-sequence of our joining the Common Market and ultimately we would be prepared to yield even the technical label of neutrality. We are prepared to go into this integrated Europe without any reservations as to how far this will take us in the field of foreign policy and defence.143
Here was evidence that with the Government convinced it was making a reasonable economic case, Lemass needed to reassure the Community that membership of NATO was not a problem for Ireland. Yet by September, Whitaker was forced to admit that the ‘status of our application is as yet undetermined’.144In the Dáil two months later, Lemass – under hostile questioning from James Dillon of Fine Gael and Brendan Corish of Labour regarding the status of the application – was putting on a brave face, insisting that ‘our application presents no great difficulty’.145Lemass reaffirmed to the second Fianna Fáil ard-fheis of 1962 – in November – the importance of the application for both party and country. He was again careful to frame the application in terms of the history of Fianna Fáil and the country, maintaining that there was no contradiction between previous Fianna Fáil economic policy and entry into the Community:
We were always keenly conscious of the fact that winning of political independence would not mean that we had acquired economic independence in the same degree. We saw in the EEC a door opening to new economic opportunities not previously available to us and the prospect of a much more secure foundation for our future prosperity. For a party with our philosophy and national background no other course was possible. The alternative course would condemn us in perpetuity to a position of economic inferiority, leave us a beggar amongst the nations, seeking to maintain a dying economy on the crumbs of charity from our wealthy neighbours … Membership of the EEC is, however, something very much more than a condition necessary to maintain our present level of economic activity: it is an opportunity for expansion greater than we have heretofore enjoyed.146
For Lemass, entry into the EEC was but a natural progression of Fianna Fáil policy in both economic and national policies. For him – and, in essence, the party – the political consequences of the application were welcome because ‘we saw in this prospect a new source of national strength, an extension of our freedom, and a better opportunity of fulfilling our cultural, economic and social aims’. To Lemass, the goals remained the same: he still wanted to see ‘full employment’, which also meant ‘the elimination of all economic causes of emigration … a realistic objective in the early future’.147The new generation of Fianna Fáil politicians were impressed with this policy. Patrick Hillery – who, as his official biographer, John Walsh, points out, had never displayed mu
ch sympathy for the traditional Sinn Féin virtues of protectionism and self-sufficiency – enthusiastically embraced the new orthodoxy of export-led investment, tariff reduction and preparation for EEC membership.148Another rising star of the party, George Colley, even went so far as to table a motion calling for the party to ‘consider and, if possible, to decide on the question of our representatives joining one of the European Groups or parties represented in the Council of Europe and the European Parliament’. Lemass, however, intervened to say that it would probably be better not to take an early decision on this matter ‘pending a decision on our application for membership of the EEC’.149While the motion was then unanimously withdrawn, it is still indicative of the support that Lemass had managed to garner within the party.
Ireland’s application eventually failed not on any economic or political matter but because of the intransigence of Charles de Gaulle towards the British.150Once de Gaulle vetoed the British application on 14 January 1963, the Irish Government suspended its application. A Finance memorandum outlined the dangers the suspension might bring: