The Way of All Soldiers (Gone For Soldiers)

by Jeffry S. Hepple

  Johnny was surprised at Lee’s mention of foreign help because he had, before today, always been dismissive of the idea.

  “We will still march to Sharpsburg,” Lee said. “All of us – as soon as is practicable. But we will look for a battlefield, not a river crossing.”

  September 15, 1862

  Sharpsburg, Maryland

  General George McClellan had gone to bed on the previous night reveling in victory, but he was awakened this morning with a report that the Harpers Ferry garrison had surrendered. He reeled as the impact of it struck him: Nearly thirteen thousand men with all their weapons, ammunition and seventy-three cannons plus warehouses filled with supplies were now in Confederate hands.

  McClellan summoned Buford and sent him to reconnoiter Lee’s position. Just after noon, Buford reported back that Lee had marched from Hagerstown to form a line of battle on the Hagerstown Turnpike, just north of Sharpsburg, at the point where it ran parallel to Antietam Creek.

  When McClellan asked Buford for a troop assessment, Buford replied that Lee’s line was stretched very thin over nearly four miles. McClellan chose to ignore the ‘very thin’ portion of Buford’s assessment and reported to Washington that Lee had consolidated his army and was occupying a line four miles long. He said in his message that he would attack Lee on the 17th when he had regrouped.

  In actuality, Lee was alone on the line with only the fifteen thousand troops that had been with him. Longstreet was on his way, but Jackson had his hands full dealing with his prisoners and his spoils at Harpers Ferry.

  At the same time, McClellan had more than seventy-five thousand at his disposal.

  September 16, 1862

  Sharpsburg, Maryland

  The right of Robert E. Lee’s line, behind the Hagerstown Turnpike and Antietam Creek, was anchored against the rugged landscape south of Sharpsburg at the bend of the Potomac. To his left and north was farmland and rolling hills with patches of woods and rocky terrain. East and to his front, the Hagerstown Turnpike, after bisecting a small, dense wood, led into Sharpsburg from the north.

  Should the battle go badly for his army, Lee’s best line of retreat was west to Blackford’s Ford at Shepherdstown. The ford across the Potomac at Williamsport, which Jackson had used on his march to Harpers Ferry, was ten miles to the northwest.

  At Lee’s front, three stone bridges over the sixty to one hundred foot wide waters of Antietam Creek had the capability of supporting heavy military traffic: Upper Bridge to the north, Middle Bridge, and Rohrbach Bridge to the south. Numerous fords of varying depths could also provide crossing for infantry or cavalry.

  This morning, leaving A.P. Hill’s division behind to see to the details of the surrender of Harpers Ferry, Jackson’s troops began arriving and Jackson himself took command of the Confederate left. This afternoon the two divisions from Maryland Heights reached Sharpsburg and joined Longstreet’s command on the right. Lee’s batteries of about two hundred guns were interspersed along the four-mile-long line. McClellan’s opportunity was now severely diminished.

  The first Union troops had begun arriving to face Lee on the afternoon of 15th and by dawn most were in place. Had McClellan attacked immediately, he would have surely overwhelmed the Confederates, but as had become typical, McClellan was overcautious and sent Buford’s cavalry out to scout the defenses of the three stone bridges in Antietam Creek.

  “Lee has a battery up here on the heights to protect the middle bridge, and another battery on the bluffs overlooking Rohrbach Bridge, but he’s left the upper bridge undefended, sir,” Paul Van Buskirk said.

  “Undefended?” McClellan asked skeptically.

  “Yes, sir,” Paul replied. “Undefended by artillery. Longstreet is up on the ridge with his infantry and I saw John Bell Hood’s guidon above the woods.

  “Why would Lee do that?” McClellan asked. “Leave one of three crucial bridges undefended by artillery?”

  “I wouldn’t know, sir. But I assure you that there are no cannons covering the upper bridge.”

  McClellan turned to General Joseph Hooker. “It sounds like a trap. I need you to send one of your divisions across the creek to probe Lee’s left.” He pointed to the spot on the map.

  “It’s going to be dark in another two hours, sir,” Hooker replied.

  “I know that,” McClellan said. “This is to be only a probing mission. The objective is to test the defenses. You needn’t go any further than these woods here on the east. Van Buskirk can give you terrain details. He’s very good at that.”

  Hooker was clearly unhappy. “If we cross that bridge this evening it won’t be unprotected from artillery in the morning, sir. Lee’s not an idiot. He’ll move a battery up there tonight if we bring it to his attention.”

  “Would you rather march your corps into an ambush tomorrow?” McClellan asked.

  “No, sir,” Hooker replied. “I’ll send Meade across the bridge without delay.”

  September 17, 1862

  Sharpsburg, Maryland

  On the previous evening, George G. Meade’s division had crossed the upper bridge on Lee’s left and had clashed with John Bell Hood’s Texans at the north woods. The skirmishes were ended by darkness, but alerted by Meade’s attack, Lee immediately repositioned a battery to overlook the field and an artillery duel continued into the night.

  This morning Hooker’s objective was a small, whitewashed Baptist church known locally as the Dunker Church because of the baptismal practice of immersion.

  As Abner Doubleday’s division, which was leading Hooker’s right, broke from the north woods into the tall cornstalks of a field belonging to David R. Miller, Stuart’s horse artillery batteries commenced firing. Almost immediately, Stuart’s cannonade was joined by four batteries of Colonel Stephen D. Lee, which were positioned on the high ground across the Pike from Hooker’s objective.

  Nine Union batteries on the ridge behind the north woods and four batteries of 20-pounder Parrott rifles that were positioned two miles east of Antietam Creek promptly returned fire.

  When Doubleday’s skirmishers reported a large Rebel force to their front, Doubleday called a halt and requested direct artillery support. In response, Hooker sent four batteries forward to fire shell and canister over the heads of Doubleday’s infantry. Rather than retreat from the barrage, the Confederates charged and soon a fierce hand-to-hand battle broke out.

  James B. Ricketts’s division, which had the left of Hooker’s line, emerged from the east woods into Miller’s cornfield where they were met by withering fire from Rebel forces. Ricketts’s men bravely stood their ground and returned fire.

  The artillery bombardment continued while both sides threw reinforcements into the battle. Although the 12th Massachusetts had lost sixty-seven percent of its troops, the surviving one hundred ten men stubbornly battled the Louisiana Tigers brigade from New Orleans. When the New Orleans brigade finally withdrew, all five regimental commanders and sixty-one percent of its forces were dead or wounded.

  Doubleday’s division at last emerged from Miller’s cornfield onto the Hagerstown Turnpike where Doubleday began to close up his three brigades. Across from the cornfield, Confederate General William E. Starke’s brigade rose up from their concealed position to deliver a volley at nearly point-blank range. The 6th Wisconsin, closest to Starke, took the volley and charged. The Confederates began to break, but General Starke rallied them and personally led a counterattack that failed when he was mortally wounded.

  Observing that McClellan had not reinforced Hooker and that there were no Federal troops attacking his right, Lee shifted three of Longstreet’s brigades and General John Bell Hood’s Texans into Jackson’s command. A short time later, when Generals Lafayette McLaws and Richard Anderson’s divisions at last arrived from Maryland Heights, Lee pushed them into action and sent an urgent message to A.P. Hill at Harpers Ferry to march to Sharpsburg at best possible speed. Jackson immediately sent Hood to form a line of battle from the Hagerstown Turnpike to the e
ast woods.

  Hooker responded with the last of his reserves, but Hood’s attack reached all the way to the north side of the cornfield before he was finally repulsed by Federal batteries firing double charges of canister.

  Union General Joseph King Mansfield, who had been appointed as commander of XII Corps just two days ago, begged McClellan to send his corps to reinforce Hooker’s nearly decimated corps. Mansfield, with thin white hair and white beard, had been in the army for forty years holding numerous staff positions but had never led troops in combat, yet Mansfield’s requests were so vigorous that McClellan agreed.

  Like Mansfield, most of his corps had never seen combat and they became confused as they advanced into the smoky, blood-soaked cornfield. Mansfield himself came forward to personally move the new recruits on line and was mortally wounded. His officers and sergeants were able to stabilize the lines and fired a ragged volley into a line of Confederate D.H. Hill’s force. Moments later, Joe Hooker was wounded and retired from the field. XII Corps, now under the leadership of Alpheus Williams, stayed in the fight and the 2nd Division, commanded by George Sears Greene, broke through near the Dunker Church.

  The threat from Greene forced the Rebel batteries to withdraw. Robert E. Lee responded by sending Lafayette McLaws’s division forward to reinforce D.H. Hill in the center.

  At his headquarters, McClellan received a message from General Williams: “General Mansfield is dangerously wounded. General Hooker wounded severely in foot. Please give us all the aid you can.” McClellan read it twice, then sent a message by waiting runner to order Edwin Sumner’s II Corps into the fight. After sending the message, McClellan changed his mind and sent another message ordering Israel Richardson’s division of II Corps to hold where they were as defense against any counterattacks.

  When Sumner received McClellan’s message, he marched out promptly with General John Sedgwick’s division in the lead. General William French’s division, which was to have followed General Richardson, was confused when Richardson didn’t move. The delay caused French to lose sight of Sedgwick’s division and he moved forward cautiously toward the sound of battle hoping to find Sedgwick somewhere on the smoldering battlefield.

  As General Sumner approached the front, he sent Sedgwick’s three brigades west in three long lines with the men side-by-side, intending to cross the West Woods and then wheel left to flank the Rebels. He may have been expecting to employ French’s division to defend Sedgwick’s flanks, but unknown to him, French was lost.

  Confederate General Lafayette McLaws, who was just coming onto the field, found himself in perfect position to turn Sedgwick’s exposed left flank and attacked violently. Completely unprepared, Sedgwick’s division was rolled up in minutes with forty percent casualties. The survivors were driven to the north and scattered.

  At midmorning, General William French’s division of the II Corps, still searching for Sumner or Sedgwick, stumbled upon a sunken road that Confederate D. H. Hill’s troops had fortified with sod and fence rails. When French realized what he had at his front, it was too late to retreat and he ordered a charge. Seven of the regiments in French’s division were untrained recruits, yet they managed to put up a ferocious fight.

  Lee, seeing that D.H. Hill was in danger, committed General Richard Anderson’s Georgia division, the last of his reserves, and sent Anderson toward the Sunken Road. Anderson was wounded almost immediately and without him, his division had little or no impact on the fight.

  McClellan, who was about a mile away with Fitz John Porter, sent Israel Richardson’s division into the battle and a short time later Lee’s center collapsed. Richardson raced after the retreating Rebels and was shot dead. Winfield Scott Hancock assumed division command, but Richardson’s death and the change of commanders broke the momentum of the pursuit.

  Hancock was reorganizing with the intent to exploit the breakthrough in Lee’s center and General William B. Franklin of the VI Corps was ready to join him. Sumner, however, who was the senior corps commander, ordered them to hold where they were. Franklin appealed to McClellan but McClellan agreed with Sumner and ordered Franklin and Hancock to hold their positions.

  McClellan’s battle plan at the start of the day had been to draw the Confederates away from Hooker’s attack on Lee’s left by launching a diversionary attack on Rohrbach’s Bridge with General Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps. Burnside’s plan of attack opened with an assault on the bridge by Colonel George Crook’s Ohio Brigade while General Isaac Rodman’s division crossed Antietam Creek at a ford a half mile downstream in an attempt to flank the Confederates. However, when Rodman’s division located the ford that had been plotted by McClellan’s engineers they found the banks were too steep to climb and continued downstream, looking for another ford.

  At this same time, skirmishers from the 11th Connecticut were attempting to clear the bridge for Crook’s main body, but they were immediately pinned down. After losing a third of their force, including their commanding officer, Colonel Henry W. Kingsbury, they withdrew leaving Crook’s main force in a firefight about a quarter mile upstream.

  Burnside, unaware that Rodman’s division was still looking for a passable ford, launched another attack on the bridge to be led by the 6th New Hampshire and 2nd Maryland. The results were the same as those suffered by the 11th Connecticut.

  Sometime around noon, McClellan began sending heated messages to Burnside, ordering him to hurry. At about 12:30 PM, Burnside ordered a third attempt, this time led by the 51st New York and the 51st Pennsylvania, commanded by General Edward Ferrero. Ferrero launched his attack from behind a captured galloper gun firing canister. By 1:00 PM they were within a few yards of the Rebel defenders and the Confederates withdrew.

  While Burnside struggled to move men and materiel across the newly captured bridge, Lee reinforced his right flank.

  At about 2:00 PM, Lee received word that A.P. Hill’s division had arrived from Harpers Ferry and were now deployed to defend Boteler’s Ford, where Lee must cross to return to Virginia.

  At 3:00 PM, Burnside, who was unaware of A.P. Hill’s arrival, advanced to move against General David R. Jones, intending to cut off Lee’s army from their only escape route across the Potomac at Boteler’s Ford. The attack by the 79th New York pushed Jones back to the outskirts of Sharpsburg, spreading panic and confusion through the civilian population. To the left of the 79th New York, Rodman’s division, commanded by Colonel Harrison Fairchild, moved toward Harpers Ferry Road under heavy fire from Lee’s guns mounted on a ridge to their front.

  At about 3:30 PM. A.P. Hill launched a vicious counterattack on Burnside’s left flank. Many of Hill’s troops were wearing Federal uniforms that they had looted from the warehouses at Harpers Ferry and the Union defenders failed to fire on them until it was too late. When his flank collapsed, Burnside ordered his men back to the west bank of the Antietam and requested more men and artillery from McClellan. He received one battery of artillery and a note from McClellan saying: “I can do nothing more. I have no infantry.”

  At 5:30 PM, the battle was over. The Union butcher bill was over twelve thousand and the Confederate’s was over ten thousand.

  The following morning Lee and McClellan agreed to a temporary truce to recover and exchange their wounded. That evening Lee began withdrawing across the Potomac to Virginia.

  President Lincoln, and many others, believed that McClellan’s actions had squandered an opportunity to defeat the Confederate army, but publicly Lincoln treated it as a victory.

  September 22, 1862

  Washington, D.C.

  The Federal blockade of Southern ports in America was crippling the textile industries in both Britain and France. Some eighty thousand textile workers in England were out of work with nearly a half million reduced to part-time. The cotton famine in France had become so severe that Napoleon III proposed sending a French/Anglo fleet up the Mississippi to reopen trade by force.

  Napoleon’s plan was a bit too belligerent for British P
rime Minister Lord Palmerston, but upon learning that Lee had crossed the Potomac, he had suggested that if the South should win a major victory in the north it might be time to “address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation.”

  With the marginal success at Antietam Creek and the stroke of his pen, Abraham Lincoln ended all such thoughts and ideas forever.

  By the President of the United States of America.

  A PROCLAMATION.

  I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation between the United States, and each of the States, and the people thereof, in which States that relation is, or may be, suspended or disturbed.

  That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all slave States, so called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent, or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the Governments existing there, will be continued.

  That on the first day of January in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.