Essays in Science

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by Albert Einstein


  Newton’s fundamental principles were so satisfactory from the logical point of view that the impetus to overhaul them could only spring from the imperious demands of empirical fact. Before I go into this I must insist that Newton himself was better aware of the weaknesses inherent in his intellectual edifice than the generations of scientists which followed him. This fact has always roused my respectful admiration, and I should like therefore to dwell on it for a moment.

  I. In spite of the fact that Newton’s ambition to represent his system as necessarily conditioned by experience and to introduce the smallest possible number of concepts not directly referable to empirical objects is everywhere evident, he sets up the concept of absolute space and absolute time, for which he has often been criticized in recent years. But in this point Newton is particularly consistent. He had realized that observable geometrical magnitudes (distances of material points from one another) and their course in time do not completely characterize motion in its physical aspects. He proved this in the famous experiment with the rotating vessel of water. Therefore, in addition to masses and temporally variable distances, there must be something else that determines motion. That “something” he takes to be relation to “absolute space.” He is aware that space must possess a kind of physical reality if his laws of motion are to have any meaning, a reality of the same sort as material points and the intervals between them.

  The clear realization of this reveals both Newton’s wisdom and also a weak side to his theory. For the logical structure of the latter would undoubtedly be more satisfactory without this shadowy concept; in that case only things whose relations to perception are perfectly clear (mass-points, distances) would enter into the laws.

  II. The introduction of forces acting directly and instantaneously at a distance into the representation of the effects of gravity is not in keeping with the character of most of the processes familiar to us from everyday life. Newton meets this objection by pointing to the fact that his law of reciprocal gravitation is not supposed to be a final explanation but a rule derived by induction from experience.

  III. Newton’s teaching provided no explanation for the highly remarkable fact that the weight and the inertia of a body are determined by the same quantity (its mass). The remarkableness of this fact struck Newton himself.

  None of these three points can rank as a logical objection to the theory. In a sense they merely represent unsatisfied desires of the scientific spirit in its struggle for a complete and unitary penetration of natural events by thought.

  Newton’s doctrine of motion, considered as the key idea of the whole of theoretical physics, received its first shock from Clerk Maxwell’s theory of electricity. It became clear that the reciprocal actions between bodies due to electric and magnetic forces were affected, not by forces operating instantaneously at a distance, but by processes which are propagated through space at a finite speed. Faraday conceived a new sort of real physical entity, namely the “field,” in addition to the mass-point and its motion. At first people tried, clinging to the mechanical mode of thought, to look upon it as a mechanical condition (motion or force) of a hypothetical medium by which space was filled up (the ether). But when this interpretation refused to work in spite of the most obstinate efforts, people gradually got used to the idea of regarding the “electromagnetic field” as the final irreducible constituent of physical reality. We have H. Hertz to thank for definitely freeing the conception of the field from all encumbrances derived from the conceptual armory of mechanics, and H. A. Lorentz for freeing it from a material substratum; according to the latter the only thing left to act as a substratum for the field was physical, empty space (or ether), which even in the mechanics of Newton had not been destitute of all physical functions. By the time this point was reached, nobody any longer believed in immediate momentary action at a distance, not even in the sphere of gravitation, even though no field theory of the latter had been clearly sketched out owing to lack of sufficient factual knowledge. The development of the theory of the electro-magnetic field—once Newton’s hypothesis of forces acting at a distance had been abandoned—led to the attempt to explain the Newtonian law of motion on electro-magnetic lines or alternatively to replace it by a more accurate one based on the field-theory. Even if these efforts did not meet with complete success, still the fundamental concepts of mechanics had ceased to be looked upon as fundamental constituents of the physical cosmos.

  The theory of Clerk Maxwell and Lorentz led inevitably to the special theory of relativity, which ruled out the existence of forces acting at a distance, and resulted in the destruction of the notion of absolute simultaneity. This theory made it clear that mass is not a constant quantity but depends on (indeed it is equivalent to) the amount of energy content. It also showed that Newton’s law of motion was only to be regarded as a limiting law valid for small velocities; in its place it set up a new law of motion in which the speed of light in vacuo figures as the critical velocity.

  The general theory of relativity formed the last step in the development of the program of the field-theory. Quantitatively it modified Newton’s theory only slightly, but for that all the more profoundly qualitatively. Inertia, gravitation, and the metrical behavior of bodies and clocks were reduced to a single field quality; this field itself was again placed in dependence on bodies (generalization of Newton’s law of gravity or the field law corresponding to it, as formulated by Poisson). Space and time were thereby divested not of their reality but of their causal absoluteness (absoluteness affecting but not affected) which Newton had been compelled to ascribe to them in order to be able to give expression to the laws then known. The generalized law of inertia takes over the function of Newton’s law of motion. This short account is enough to show how the elements of Newtonian theory passed over into the general theory of relativity, whereby the three defects above mentioned were overcome. It looks as if the law of motion could be deduced from the field law corresponding to the Newtonian law of force. Only when this goal has been completely reached will it be possible to talk about a pure field-theory.

  In a more formal sense also Newton’s mechanics prepared the way for the field-theory. The application of Newton’s mechanics to continuously distributed masses led inevitably to the discovery and application of partial differential equations, which in their turn first provided the language for the laws of the field-theory. In this formal respect Newton’s conception of the differential law constitutes the first decisive step in the development which followed.

  The whole evolution of our ideas about the processes of nature, with which we have been concerned so far, might be regarded as an organic development of Newton’s ideas. But while the process of perfecting the field-theory was still in full swing, the facts of heat-radiation, the spectra, radio-activity, etc., revealed a limit to the serviceableness of the whole intellectual system which today still seems to us absolutely insuperable in spite of immense successes at certain points. Many physicists maintain—and there are weighty arguments in their favor—that in the face of these facts not merely the differential law but the law of causation itself—hitherto the fundamental postulate of all natural science—has collapsed. Even the possibility of a spatio-temporal construction, which can be unambiguously coordinated with physical events, is denied. That a mechanical system is permanently susceptible only of discrete energy-values or states—as experience so to speak directly shows—seems at first sight hardly deducible from a field-theory which operates with differential equations. The de Broglie-Schrödinger method, which has in a certain sense the character of a field-theory, does indeed deduce the existence of only-discrete states, in astonishing agreement with empirical fact, on a basis of differential equations operating with a kind of resonance theory, but it has to do without a localization of the mass-particles and without strictly causal laws. Who would presume today to decide the question whether the law of causation and the differential law, these ultimate premises of the Newtonian view of nature, must d
efinitely be given up?

  1 Today everybody knows what prodigious industry was needed to discover these laws from the empirically ascertained orbits. But few pause to reflect on the brilliant methods by which Kepler deduced the real orbits from the apparent ones—i.e., from the movements as they were observed from the earth.

  Clerk Maxwell’s Influence on the Evolution of the Idea of Physical Reality

  THE BELIEF IN AN external world independent of the perceiving subject is the basis of all natural science. Since, however, sense perception only gives information of this external world or of “physical reality” indirectly, we can only grasp the latter by speculative means. It follows from this that our notions of physical reality can never be final. We must always be ready to change these notions—that is to say, the axiomatic sub-structure of physics—in order to do justice to perceived facts in the most logically perfect way. Actually a glance at the development of physics shows that it has undergone far-reaching changes in the course of time.

  The greatest change in the axiomatic sub-structure of physics—in other words, of our conception of the structure of reality—since Newton laid the foundation of theoretical physics was brought about by Faraday’s and Clerk Maxwell’s work on electromagnetic phenomena. We will try in what follows to make this clearer, keeping both earlier and later developments in sight.

  According to Newton’s system, physical reality is characterized by the concepts of time, space, material point, and force (reciprocal action of material points). Physical events, in Newton’s view, are to be regarded as the motions, governed by fixed laws, of material points in space. The material point is our only mode of representing reality when dealing with changes taking place in it, the solitary representative of the real, in so far as the real is capable of change. Perceptible bodies are obviously responsible for the concept of the material point; people conceived it as an analogue of mobile bodies, stripping these of the characteristics of extension, form, orientation in space, and all “inward” qualities, leaving only inertia and translation and adding the concept of force. The material bodies, which had led psychologically to our formation of the concept of the “material point,” had now themselves to be regarded as systems of material points. It should be noted that this theoretical scheme is in essence an atomistic and mechanistic one. All happenings were to be interpreted purely mechanically—that is to say, simply as motions of material points according to Newton’s law of motion.

  The most unsatisfactory side of this system (apart from the difficulties involved in the concept of “absolute space” which have been raised once more quite recently) lay in its description of light, which Newton also conceived, in accordance with his system, as composed of material points. Even at that time the question, What in that case becomes of the material points of which light is composed, when the light is absorbed? was already a burning one. Moreover, it is unsatisfactory in any case to introduce into the discussion material points of quite a different sort, which had to be postulated for the purpose of representing ponderable matter and light respectively. Later on electrical corpuscles were added to these, making a third kind, again with completely different characteristics. It was, further, a fundamental weakness that the forces of reciprocal action, by which events are determined, had to be assumed hypothetically in a perfectly arbitrary way. Yet this conception of the real accomplished much: how came it that people felt themselves impelled to forsake it?

  In order to put his system into mathematical form at all, Newton had to devise the concept of differential quotients and propound the laws of motion in the form of total differential equations—perhaps the greatest advance in thought that a single individual was ever privileged to make. Partial differential equations were not necessary for this purpose, nor did Newton make any systematic use of them; but they were necessary for the formulation of the mechanics of deformable bodies; this is connected with the fact that in these problems the question of how bodies are supposed to be constructed out of material points was of no importance to begin with.

  Thus the partial differential equation entered theoretical physics as a handmaid, but has gradually become mistress. This began in the nineteenth century when the wave-theory of light established itself under the pressure of observed fact. Light in empty space was explained as a matter of vibrations of the ether, and it seemed idle at that stage, of course, to look upon the latter as a conglomeration of material points. Here for the first time the partial differential equation appeared as the natural expression of the primary realities of physics. In a particular department of theoretical physics the continuous field thus appeared side by side with the material point as the representative of physical reality. This dualism remains even today, disturbing as it must be to every orderly mind.

  If the idea of physical reality had ceased to be purely atomic, it still remained for the time being purely mechanistic; people still tried to explain all events as the motion of inert masses; indeed no other way of looking at things seemed conceivable. Then came the great change, which will be associated for all time with the names of Faraday, Clerk Maxwell, and Hertz. The lion’s share in this revolution fell to Clerk Maxwell. He showed that the whole of what was then known about light and electro-magnetic phenomena was expressed in his well known double system of differential equations, in which the electric and the magnetic fields appear as the dependent variables. Maxwell did, indeed, try to explain, or justify, these equations by intellectual constructions.

  But he made use of several such constructions at the same time and took none of them really seriously, so that the equations alone appeared as the essential thing and the strength of the fields as the ultimate entities, not to be reduced to anything else. By the turn of the century the conception of the electromagnetic field as an ultimate entity had been generally accepted and serious thinkers had abandoned the belief in the justification, or the possibility, of a mechanical explanation of Clerk Maxwell’s equations. Before long they were, on the contrary, actually trying to explain material points and their inertia on field theory lines with the help of Maxwell’s theory, an attempt which did not, however, meet with complete success.

  Neglecting the important individual results which Clerk Maxwell’s life-work produced in important departments of physics, and concentrating on the changes wrought by him in our conception of the nature of physical reality, we may say this:—Before Clerk Maxwell people conceived of physical reality—in so far as it is supposed to represent events in nature—as material points, whose changes consist exclusively of motions, which are subject to partial differential equations. After Maxwell they conceived physical reality as represented by continuous fields, not mechanically explicable, which are subject to partial differential equations. This change in the conception of reality is the most profound and fruitful one that has come to physics since Newton; but it has at the same time to be admitted that the program has by no means been completely carried out yet. The successful systems of physics which have been evolved since rather represent compromises between these two schemes, which for that very reason bear a provisional, logically incomplete character, although they may have achieved great advances in certain particulars.

  The first of these that calls for mention is Lorentz’s theory of electrons, in which the field and the electrical corpuscles appear side by side as elements of equal value for the comprehension of reality. Next come the special and general theories of relativity, which, though based entirely on ideas connected with the field-theory, have so far been unable to avoid the independent introduction of material points and total differential equations.

  The last and most successful creation of theoretical physics, namely quantum-mechanics, differs fundamentally from both the schemes which we will for the sake of brevity call the Newtonian and the Maxwellian. For the quantities which figure in its laws make no claim to describe physical reality itself, but only the probabilities of the occurrence of a physical reality that we have in view. Dirac, to whom, in my opin
ion, we owe the most logically complete exposition of this theory, rightly points out that it would probably be difficult, for example, to give a theoretical description of a photon such as would give enough information to enable one to decide whether it will pass a polarizer placed (obliquely) in its way or not.

  I am still inclined to the view that physicists will not in the long run content themselves with that sort of indirect description of the real, even if the theory can eventually be adapted to the postulate of general relativity in a satisfactory manner. We shall then, I feel sure, have to return to the attempt to carry out the program which may properly be described as the Maxwellian—namely, the description of physical reality in terms of fields which satisfy partial differential equations without singularities.

 

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