The Mixer: The Story of Premier League Tactics, from Route One to False Nines
Page 27
Manchester United were unquestionably the Premier League’s best side; in this three-year period they won the title every season as Sir Alex Ferguson created his greatest team. The defensive quartet of Gary Neville, Rio Ferdinand, Nemanja Vidić and Patrice Evra was so cohesive that all four were voted into the PFA Team of the Year for 2006/07, the only time this has happened in the Premier League, while Edwin van der Sar was United’s best goalkeeper since Peter Schmeichel, keeping an incredible, record-breaking 14 consecutive clean sheets midway through 2008/09. The midfield was boosted by the addition of Michael Carrick and Owen Hargreaves, while Paul Scholes played an increasingly withdrawn role and became an outstanding deep-lying playmaker.
More than anything, however, this side was defined by its attacking flair and versatility. The interchanging of positions between Wayne Rooney, Carlos Tevez and Cristiano Ronaldo was spectacular at times, with the latter producing arguably the best-ever individual Premier League campaign in 2007/08 with 31 goals in 31 starts, realising his ambition of becoming the world’s best by winning that year’s Ballon d’Or. He represented an entirely new type of Manchester United team, because Ferguson – and assistant Carlos Queiroz – created Europe’s most complete side by playing without a genuine striker.
Not since Blackburn’s Ray Harford had an assistant exerted such influence upon the tactical approach of the title winners. This was Queiroz’s second stint at United – he was Ferguson’s assistant in 2002/03 but left to become Real Madrid’s manager, before being dismissed after a year and returning to his old job at Old Trafford. The fact that United’s assistant was considered talented enough to manage Real – one of the few clubs in Europe deemed bigger than United and a club who regularly poached United’s stars – spoke volumes about his reputation. His four-year spell from 2004 to 2008 helped United revolutionise attacking football.
Ferguson described Queiroz as ‘brilliant, just brilliant – outstanding, an intelligent, meticulous man’ and deferred to him in terms of tactics. While the process of moving from 4–4–2 to 4–5–1 had started upon Ruud van Nistelrooy’s arrival in 2001, with mixed results, this was still a controversial formation for United’s supporters. The reputation of José Mourinho’s Chelsea meant one-striker systems were considered a sure-fire sign of defensive football, and Queiroz became a target for some fans, who blamed him for the shift away from United’s ‘traditional’ way of playing, even chanting ‘four–four–two!’ in protest at the new system. Queiroz hit back, somewhat unwisely, midway through 2005/06. ‘People have been crying out for us to use a 4–4–2 formation but in the Blackburn game we tried the system and we lost,’ he complained. ‘That’s why football is a game in which imagination and, on many occasions, stupidity has no limits.’ He remained convinced that United needed to move away from immobile central strikers. As coach of Portugal’s ‘golden generation’ at both youth and full international level in the early 1990s he created the style of football that country became renowned for: a solid defence, plenty of possession, brilliantly tricky wingers, creative playmakers – and a centre-forward based around movement rather than goals.
United’s era of success, notably, started immediately after the departure of Ruud van Nistelrooy in 2006. For all the Dutchman’s goals, he simply wasn’t appropriate for the type of side Ferguson and Queiroz wanted. Van Nistelrooy, as we’ve established, was nothing more than a penalty-box poacher, whereas this new United team was based around movement, selflessness, cohesion and counter-attacking. After United won the title in 2006/07, Ferguson was asked whether he’d made two big decisions the previous year, sanctioning the departures of Van Nistelrooy and Roy Keane. ‘Well … Roy was, certainly, because he was such an influence on the club,’ Ferguson replied. ‘But I’m not sure about Van Nistelrooy being a big decision at all.’ That spoke volumes. Now it was all about Ronaldo and Rooney – although Ferguson’s intention of building the team around them nearly proved fatal after an incident at the 2006 World Cup.
Midway through England and Portugal’s quarter-final – which England went on to lose on penalties – Rooney battled Ricardo Carvalho for the ball. Both fell to the ground and, upon getting to his feet, Rooney stepped backwards and stamped on Carvalho. Ronaldo immediately raced over to referee Horacio Elizondo, gesturing wildly towards the prostrate Carvalho to draw attention to Rooney’s misdemeanor. Rooney reacted by grabbing Ronaldo and pushing him away. Elizondo showed Rooney the red card for his stamp, and England never recovered. Worse was to follow. TV footage caught Ronaldo winking, seemingly towards the Portugal dugout, in the aftermath of the incident, while a pre-match clip showed Ronaldo approaching Rooney from behind, sticking his head into Rooney’s, whispering something and then gently headbutting him. These three clips created a narrative that Ronaldo had got Rooney dismissed, which somewhat ignored the fact that Rooney had stamped on an opponent’s groin entirely through his own volition. The recently retired Alan Shearer, now a pundit for the BBC, led the fury. ‘I think there’s every chance Rooney could go back to the Manchester United training ground and stick one on Ronaldo,’ he said. This was disastrous for United – their two star players were seemingly at war.
Ultimately, there was little resentment. ‘I bear no ill feeling to Cristiano but I am disappointed he chose to get involved,’ Rooney said afterwards. Handily, they bumped into one another after the match and agreed to put the incident behind them, and Rooney texted Ronaldo to further clear the air. ‘The things that have been said regarding me and my teammate and friend Rooney are incredible,’ said Ronaldo. ‘He wished me the best of luck in the World Cup. He wasn’t angry and told me to completely ignore what the English press has said, that all they wanted was to create confusion, but we are already used to that.’ Rooney was even intelligent enough to realise Ronaldo’s antics worked in his favour. ‘I was happy I didn’t get the stick Becks got [in 1998] and even Phil Neville did after Euro 2000,’ he admitted. ‘I didn’t really get any stick – Ronaldo took a lot of it and I’m pleased with that.’
Upon Ronaldo and Rooney’s return to training, Ferguson sat them down together for a pep talk but both agreed there was no need – they’d sorted things out themselves. There was, disappointingly, no call for the boxing gloves a teammate had brought into training. It would have been a good fight; what Rooney gave away in height and reach he made up in experience, having trained in his uncle’s boxing gym throughout his early teenage years. No wonder Ronaldo spent his summer bulking up and improving his upper body, arriving back in Manchester a completely different beast.
Crucially, Ferguson flew to Portugal in the aftermath of the World Cup to dissuade Ronaldo from his rumoured switch to Real Madrid, assuring him United’s post-Van Nistelrooy side would be based primarily around him. Although this seems an obvious move in hindsight, with Ronaldo’s ludicrous goalscoring figures and multiple Ballons d’Or, it’s worth remembering that he was briefly considered something of a laughing stock in English football. Although sensational on a memorable debut against Bolton Wanderers in 2003, Ronaldo struggled badly at points during his first couple of seasons, and his tendency to make multiple stepovers prompted considerable derision. On more than one occasion opponents got sick of his showboating and simply kicked him off the park – although he gradually become accustomed to this treatment, as something similar happened in training. ‘We all saw the huge potential he had,’ said Rio Ferdinand. ‘When he came over here, his first thought was to entertain. We wanted to win. We knew that if we had an end product, we had a far better chance of being successful. For want of a better word, we were kicking it out of him, the entertainment factor, to get goals and assists.’ Ronaldo became a different type of player, about efficiency and directness rather than skills, and United’s other attackers – including Rooney – played a backseat role.
United didn’t suffer from Ronaldo and Rooney’s squabble. In their opening game of 2006/07, they were 4–0 up against Fulham within 19 minutes when Rooney crossed for a fine Ronaldo half
-volley. United eventually won 5–1. ‘With Ruud gone, the manager wants us to work on a style of football that will blow everyone away,’ outlined Rooney. ‘He sets up the team to have bags of pace with myself, Ronaldo and Louis Saha up front. We’re being told to counter-attack at speed. He reckons teams will find it impossible to play against us.’
Two games in early autumn away at north-west rivals showed United’s quality. First, they battered Bolton 4–0 with a quite wonderful display, featuring a Rooney hat-trick and one for Ronaldo, assisted by a selfless square pass from Saha. There was movement, interplay and unpredictability. ‘The best we have played for years,’ marvelled Ferguson. At Blackburn they only won 1–0, but it was another hugely impressive attacking performance, with Ronaldo so brilliant that although the Blackburn Rovers fans started the match by booing him for his World Cup transgression, they ended the night giving him a standing ovation when he was substituted in the 90th minute. The highlight came when he was flattened by an awful tackle from Blackburn winger Sergio Peter – whereas once he would have rolled around for ages, Ronaldo simply got up and carried on. He, Rooney, Giggs and Saha buzzed around almost uncontrollably. ‘It’s as good as I’ve seen United for a good few seasons,’ said Blackburn manager Mark Hughes, who likened them to the United title-winners of 1992/93, when he played up front. ‘The angles of their passing, their rotation of movement, the interchanging, they just pick you off … This side, without Van Nistelrooy, is more dynamic.’ United were top after 37 of the Premier League’s 38 matchdays, on their way to their first title in four years.
Manchester United were not quite strikerless yet, however. Van Nistelrooy had departed, but Saha, Ole Gunnar Solskjær and Alan Smith remained. All three found themselves compromised by injury but played important roles in 2006/07, while United also benefited from Henrik Larsson’s brief mid-season loan spell. In the vast majority of matches, therefore, United used a conventional striker – but all four contributed heavily to interplay: Saha’s movement was sensational, Solskjær always linked well, Smith held up the ball effectively, while Larsson was an intelligent all-round forward. Nevertheless, United’s joint-top goalscorers that season were Ronaldo and Rooney, both managing 23 in all competitions. United generally used a proper striker, but he wasn’t the major goal threat.
United’s most significant encounter that season was a two-legged Champions League tie against Roma. The second leg, an outstanding 7–1 victory Ferguson described as United’s greatest European performance during his tenure, was notable for brilliant performances from Carrick in his deep-lying playmaking role and Smith as an old-fashioned battering ram up front. But the first leg, a 2–1 defeat in Rome, was surprisingly more significant. Ferguson always learned his greatest lessons from European competition, and Roma boss Luciano Spalletti defeated United with an unusual system often described as 4–6–0. Their most advanced player was legendary captain Francesco Totti, considerably more of a number 10 than a number 9. He dropped deep, peeling off into midfield and creating space for teammates to exploit. While Ferguson had ditched the pure goalpoacher, Spalletti had ditched strikers entirely. Ferguson, as always, would adjust his side to keep pace with tactical innovations.
That summer Solskjær retired and Smith moved to Newcastle, while Saha’s injury problems restricted him to just six league starts in 2007/08. Meanwhile, Ferguson signed Carlos Tevez, a surprising move considering the Argentine was, like Rooney, considered a second striker rather than a pure goalscorer. But the Scot had a plan. ‘I’ve read all these opinions about the two of them being identical,’ he said. ‘I don’t think they are at all. What you can say is they both have a similar physique, they are both two-footed, they are both quick-ish, they can both beat a man. I don’t think it’s a bad thing in terms of the similarities. When they get playing with each other they will hopefully get an understanding about where they are playing.’ It’s an intriguing quote. Ferguson didn’t suggest one would permanently play behind the other, or that one would be shifted wide. He instead envisaged them working out positional responsibilities naturally, gradually developing the understanding to dovetail and rotate. That’s precisely what happened.
Initially things weren’t promising. United stumbled to a goalless draw at home to Reading on the opening weekend; the lack of a penalty-box threat was so obvious that Ferguson deployed substitute John O’Shea as an emergency centre-forward. The Irishman was renowned for his versatility, but a striking role was somewhat out of his comfort zone. After a 1–1 draw at Portsmouth and a 1–0 defeat at Manchester City there were serious questions about United’s approach, with just two points from three matches. But injuries and suspensions meant United hadn’t yet fielded their three attackers in tandem, and when Rooney, Ronaldo and Tevez started together for the first time, against Chelsea, United won 2–0. This, incidentally, was Chelsea’s first game after Mourinho’s sudden departure, and it felt poetic that the debut of United’s revolutionary new system came immediately after the Premier League’s previous innovator had left. It was the start of something special, and United’s reward would eventually come eight months later, after another meeting with Avram Grant’s Chelsea.
During 2007/08 it was impossible to define Manchester United’s system. The rotation between the attackers – generally including Ronaldo, Rooney and Tevez but sometimes one of Nani, Park Ji-sung and Ryan Giggs too – was exceptional. At times United’s basic shape looked like a 4–3–3, on other occasions it was 4–4–2, but ultimately it was fluid, flexible and fantastic to watch. In some matches, particularly at home to weaker sides, the attackers had no set positions and simply had responsibility to cover the wide areas between them when possession was lost. Tevez and Rooney struck up a fine relationship, helped by the fact that Rooney drove the Argentine into training most mornings, despite admitting that they rarely talked because Tevez spoke such little English. They sacrificed their own abilities to get the best from Ronaldo, and while they were among the Premier League’s most talented footballers, they received most praise for their energy and work rate.
At this stage such attacking fluidity was extremely rare in the Premier League, with the division still based around the structured systems that became popular when Mourinho and Rafael Benítez joined the league in 2004. Chelsea still played a Mourinho-esque system under Grant, who changed little. Benítez still asked his wide players to play linear roles, not allowing his attackers any freedom of movement. Even Arsène Wenger’s Arsenal were at their most structured during this period; for their two away Champions League knockout matches at AC Milan and Liverpool in 2007/08, Wenger used an amazingly defensive-minded wide midfield combination: box-to-box midfielder Abou Diaby and natural right-back Emmanuel Eboué. That – considering Wenger had used Robert Pirès and Freddie Ljungberg a couple of seasons earlier – was quite remarkable. Of course, Ferguson’s continued use of Park was almost exclusively because the Korean was hard-working defensively and nullified opposition full-backs, but United’s level of attacking rotation was nevertheless completely different to anything else in the Premier League and effectively marked the return of exciting, free-flowing attacking play after a period of defensive, cautious football. It’s worth remembering the age of United’s attackers, too; at the start of 2007/08 Rooney and Ronaldo were 22, Tevez 23. This felt like something genuinely new.
Ronaldo thrived with this freedom. He’d play on the right, the left and through the middle at different points in the same match, with the likes of Rooney, Tevez and Park expected to fill in wherever necessary. Ronaldo was absolutely ruthless, simply positioning himself in the appropriate position to get goals. ‘He sniffs blood, he will find the weakness in the back four,’ Gary Neville recalled a few years later. ‘If he’s not getting the left-back in the first 15 minutes, he’ll switch to the right-back. If he’s not getting the right-back, he’ll switch to the left-centre-back. He’ll find someone in your back four who is weak and doesn’t like defending one on one, and against pace and power.’
Or was he? Ferguson used United’s attacking versatility in a more clinical manner for big matches, particularly in Europe. His attackers stuck to positions with greater discipline within games – but not always the same positions from game to game. For example, in United’s 2–0 victory away against old foes Roma in the Champions League quarter-final first leg, Ronaldo was deployed up front, with Park and Rooney playing functional, hard-working roles on the flanks in a 4–3–3 that became 4–5–1 for long periods. Ferguson wanted Ronaldo to use his searing pace in behind, and he showed traditional centre-forward qualities too, with a towering header to put United ahead. But Ronaldo spent long periods drifting to the flanks and leaving the Roma centre-backs without anyone to mark; the most significant aspect of his header was that he started his run-up from extremely deep – he was only United’s sixth most-advanced player as the attack developed. For most of the game he played as a false nine, the most advanced players being Park or Rooney. United were strikerless, yet had a towering aerial threat and the Premier League’s top goalscorer as their most advanced attacker.