The Mixer: The Story of Premier League Tactics, from Route One to False Nines

by Michael Cox

  By this point, a knee injury had ruled out Bosingwa for the remainder of the season, and while he was the least celebrated member of Chelsea’s starting XI, he was crucial for providing right-sided width. In his absence Ancelotti deployed Branislav Ivanović, who would later become comfortable at right-back but at this point was an awkward converted centre-back who contributed little in possession. At Stamford Bridge, Ferguson’s tactics exposed this weakness; right-winger Antonio Valencia pinned back Cole, but left-sided Ryan Giggs drifted inside to become a fourth central midfielder, matching Chelsea’s diamond in the engine room. Chelsea’s quartet of midfielders continually came extremely deep to collect possession, discovered there were limited forward passing options, so reluctantly knocked out-balls to the hapless Ivanović, prompting audible moans from around Stamford Bridge. United, on the other hand, attacked dangerously by pushing their full-backs forward to overload their opposite numbers. Ferguson’s side dominated possession – which shouldn’t be considered a victory in itself, but was significant considering Ancelotti’s promise about identity – and led 12–8 in terms of shots and 7–0 on corners. United couldn’t find the breakthrough, however, and against the run of play Terry nodded home the only goal from a controversially awarded free-kick. Chelsea won the season’s first title showdown – but despite their system, rather than because of it.

  Ferguson’s approach set the template for playing against Ancelotti’s diamond, because Chelsea struggled badly when teams exposed their lack of width throughout December. They lost to Manchester City and dropped points to Everton, West Ham and Birmingham, only recording unconvincing 2–1 victories over Portsmouth and Fulham. January, meanwhile, offered an entirely different challenge, because Chelsea were without Drogba, away at the Africa Cup of Nations. However, as Ancelotti had acknowledged about his Milan system overloaded with playmakers, ‘the best ideas often come from constraints.’ Without Drogba, Chelsea played their best football.

  Chelsea’s first game of 2010 – and their first without Drogba – was an astonishing 7–2 thrashing of Sunderland. They were 4–0 up after 35 minutes and so comfortable that Ancelotti substituted both Terry and Ashley Cole at half-time. Ancelotti had, typically, changed his formation and created something entirely new to reflect the individuals at his disposal, playing Anelka up front alone, and asking Malouda and Joe Cole to drift inside from the flanks, in a hybrid between 4–3–3 and 4–3–2–1. Anelka – who preferred linking play rather than sprinting in behind – came short and created space, exploited not simply by Malouda and Cole, but also by Ballack and Lampard, who both scored headed goals following trademark late runs of the sort they’d rarely made in the diamond system with two strikers in the box. Lampard had been particularly below-par in the first half of the campaign, managing only one goal from open play. Here, he managed two in one match. Chelsea were slick, cohesive and ruthless.

  Ancelotti continued with this formation for Chelsea’s next two fixtures, defeating Birmingham and Burnley. But then Drogba returned, and Ancelotti opted for an awkward compromise between old and new systems, with Anelka shifted into Cole’s right-sided roaming role. Drogba was individually magnificent, scoring ten goals in an eight-game spell, but Chelsea’s attacking play was predictable and they collected just 13 points from those matches, short of title-winning form.

  Next, there was a significant incident ahead of the home fixture against Aston Villa towards the end of March – Drogba was left on the bench, which was initially blamed upon a groin strain. Six years later, however, Ancelotti revealed it was actually because Drogba had turned up late for a team meeting. ‘Drogba arrived 30 minutes late, so for this reason he didn’t play,’ the Italian explained. ‘Not because I was upset, but because he needed to be present at the meeting, as I had presented the tactical plan for the game, explaining it all to the players, and I couldn’t allow Drogba special consideration.’ Drogba was therefore not simply making Chelsea’s approach less cohesive, but – unwittingly or otherwise – not involving himself in Ancelotti’s tactical plans. Incredibly, for the second time in 2010 – and for the second time without Drogba – Chelsea smashed in seven goals. Lampard scored four times, Malouda managed two, and Anelka was again magnificent as the elusive lone striker. ‘Anelka didn’t score, but he played a fantastic game, he killed Aston Villa with movement,’ raved Ancelotti. Again, Chelsea looked better without Drogba.

  That 7–1 victory came just a week before Chelsea’s crucial trip to Old Trafford in April, which was inevitably billed as a title decider with Chelsea just one point behind United. Ancelotti had a major decision to make: would he omit the Premier League’s top goalscorer Drogba, in the belief his attacking midfielders were performing better with Anelka upfront alone? The answer was yes, with Drogba left on the bench. ‘This time it wasn’t because he was late, but because Anelka played so brilliantly against Aston Villa,’ Ancelotti recalled.

  While Chelsea had been outpassed by United at Stamford Bridge, at Old Trafford they were magnificent, with Anelka coming short to link play and allowing Malouda and Joe Cole forward. That duo combined for the opener when Malouda drove to the byline and crossed into the six-yard box, prompting Cole’s marvellous backheeled finish. Ferguson tried to replicate the lopsided system he’d successfully used in the reverse fixture, but Chelsea’s 4–3–2–1 approach proved superior; Malouda and Cole dragged the United full-backs out of position, while it was crucial that Ancelotti used Paulo Ferreira, a natural attacking right-back, rather than Ivanović. Now, Chelsea could exploit Giggs’s narrowness, and Ferreira was outstanding, nearly putting Chelsea 2–0 ahead when running in behind. It was significant that Ferguson eventually switched Giggs with Park Ji-sung, who specialised in nullifying dangerous attacking full-backs.

  Drogba’s contribution should not be overlooked, however. When United rallied in the second half, Ancelotti introduced him in place of the tired Anelka, and the Ivorian scored the crucial second goal, albeit from an offside position. Nevertheless, it was significant that in Chelsea’s biggest game of the season, Drogba was only a Plan B, despite being the division’s top goalscorer, because Ancelotti had stumbled upon a more cohesive system without him. Indeed, other Chelsea managers often found themselves building without Drogba. He only started half the matches in Mourinho’s 2004/05 campaign because Eidur Gudjohnsen linked play better, while Scolari primarily used him as a substitute, and later André Villas-Boas built around Fernando Torres. The Ivorian is arguably the greatest ‘big game’ player in English football history, scoring four times in FA Cup finals, four times in League Cup finals and, most crucially, the late equaliser for Chelsea in the 2012 Champions League Final. But in pure Premier League terms, he was either sensational or frustrating – he won two Golden Boots with 20 goals in 2006/07 and 29 in this 2009/10 campaign, but tallies of 10, 12, 8, 5, 11 and 5 in his other six campaigns illustrate his inconsistency.

  Drogba regained his place for the run-in. While his link-up play was noticeably poor, he made crucial contributions to Chelsea’s final three victories, including a hugely dominant 7–0 win against Stoke, a nervy 2–0 win at Anfield and then the title celebration, the relentless 8–0 thrashing of Wigan, the joint second-biggest Premier League victory. In a very peculiar match, however, Chelsea spent the opening period chasing shadows, overrun by Wigan’s unusual 3–3–1–3 formation, and only dominated after their opponents went down to ten men.

  Chelsea completed the double the following weekend, with a 1–0 victory over Portsmouth, who had finished bottom of the Premier League. This game was most significant for Ancelotti’s laissez-faire tactical approach; he allowed his players complete responsibility for devising Chelsea’s strategy, with assistant manager Paul Clement standing at the front of a team meeting and writing their suggestions on the whiteboard. This stream of contributions served as the team talk, and was the perfect illustration of Ancelotti’s managerial approach.

  The postscript to Chelsea’s 2009/10 campaign involves the aftermath of
their opening match of 2010/11, when Ancelotti was summoned to Abramovich’s house, given a dressing-down and asked to explain his side’s poor performance. The extraordinary aspect of this tale, however, is that Chelsea had just defeated Roberto Di Matteo’s West Bromwich Albion 6–0.

  Clearly, Abramovich was being entirely unreasonable. That said, the display hadn’t been particularly impressive – the BBC’s match report, for example, described it as ‘far from a complete performance by Chelsea, who at times seemed to be going through the motions before suddenly raising the tempo’, which neatly summarises a couple of heavy victories towards the end of the title-winning season, particularly the Wigan game on the final day. It’s remarkable that poor performances often produced such dominant victories, but Abramovich was still concerned about the team’s style: Chelsea, particularly when Drogba played, were still a predominantly physical side based around individual power rather than collective interplay. Ancelotti hadn’t given Chelsea the identity Abramovich desperately wanted, which probably explains why he was sacked the following summer, despite a perfectly respectable second-place finish.

  Six months after Ancelotti’s appointment at Chelsea, Manchester City appointed Roberto Mancini. The two had played together for Italy and regularly faced one another as coaches in the Milan derby; their relationship was warm and cordial, but they were very different managers. Ancelotti was the master man-manager and permanently relaxed, whereas Mancini was a spikey character, with his City tenure defined by fallouts with two star strikers, Carlos Tevez and Mario Balotelli.

  Mancini dearly loved English football. Even prior to his appointment shortly before Christmas 2009 he spoke warmly about his fascination with the English game, the birthplace of football, explaining why he’d surprisingly elected to come out of retirement at 37 to play four matches for Peter Taylor’s Leicester in 2001. After his dismissal from Inter in 2008, Mancini spent a ‘gap year’ learning English and watching Premier League football, and was linked with every half-decent job that emerged – including, almost inevitably, Chelsea. But Abramovich chose Ancelotti, and therefore Mancini needed to wait for Mark Hughes’s dismissal at Manchester City before realising his dream of managing in the Premier League.

  City had undergone two high-profile takeovers in the preceding years, bought first by Thaksin Shinawatra, then by Sheikh Mansour; both had invested significant sums of money, although the latter had the greater long-term ambitions. Upon Mancini’s arrival, City were essentially a halfway house between mid-table also-rans and title challengers. His first game in charge, on Boxing Day 2009, featured Robinho and Carlos Tevez up front, but the likes of Stephen Ireland and Martin Petrov in midfield. He needed time – and further signings – to turn City into serious contenders.

  Whereas Ancelotti promised possession play at Chelsea, Mancini unashamedly focused upon the defence. In addition to plenty of work on the training ground with his back four, he often protected them with no fewer than three defensive midfielders. He signed Patrick Vieira from his old club Inter, and often fielded the now-immobile Frenchman alongside two other holding midfielders, the tough-tackling Nigel de Jong and the ultra-reliable Gareth Barry. Unsurprisingly, City had an infuriating habit of playing out goalless draws in big matches. In Mancini’s first half-season there were 0–0s at home to Liverpool and away at Arsenal, and by the time he’d been in charge for just over a year, there had been four more, against Tottenham, Manchester United, Birmingham and Arsenal, with City recording no shots in target in a particularly negative display at the Emirates. It wasn’t simply that City recorded plenty of 0–0s, more that Mancini often seemed absolutely delighted with them. In that goalless draw at home to Birmingham, he stunned supporters by making a bizarre substitution with ten minutes remaining – Barry replaced Tevez, a holding midfielder for a forward. Mancini seemed content with a home goalless draw against a side who were eventually relegated. It felt like a parody of an Italian manager.

  Things improved ahead of 2010/11 – David Silva was recruited to create from between the lines, Balotelli provided unpredictability up front, while Yaya Touré was signed from Barcelona. However, at this point the Ivorian was considered a defensive midfielder, and Mancini’s use of him at the top of midfield was considered another sign of his defensiveness. City boasted the joint-best defensive record alongside Chelsea and controlled matches through possession, with Silva drifting infield and Tevez dropping deep, but offered little penetration. Nevertheless, they achieved a landmark FA Cup semi-final victory over Manchester United at Wembley, courtesy of an aggressive, physical and high-tempo approach, with Balotelli and Touré as the attacking partnership. Touré scored the only goal, which felt typical of the tactical battle – he intercepted a wayward sideways pass from Michael Carrick intended for Paul Scholes, roared forward and crashed the ball home. It was power over precision. Touré also netted the winner in the 1–0 final victory against Stoke City, when City’s pressing disrupted Stoke’s long-ball tactics – although this success was overshadowed by Manchester United clinching the league title on the same day, their fierce rivals somehow always managing to upstage them.

  By 2011/12 Mancini had no excuses for not attacking. Edin Džeko had arrived the previous January and, after half a season adjusting to the pace of the Premier League, started City’s title-winning campaign in great form, while Samir Nasri was signed from Arsenal to provide ball-retention skills. Most crucially, Sergio Agüero arrived from Atlético Madrid to play upfront. With Tevez and Balotelli in reserve, Touré developing his attacking game and James Milner providing balance out wide, City had the most impressive offensive options in the Premier League.

  Mancini’s system was peculiar. Agüero preferred playing just behind a classic number 9 like Džeko or Balotelli, but continually sprinted in behind rather than drifting between the lines. This meant that City’s system often looked like 4–4–2, but with Silva and Nasri moving inside there was plenty of creativity. Touré broke forward from his partnership with Barry, although in big matches Mancini would beef up his midfield, introducing De Jong and moving Touré higher. There were similarities with Ancelotti’s Chelsea: a solid defence, dominance of the centre thanks to the wide players coming inside – Italian coaches rarely trust natural wingers – but an uncertainty about the best attacking combination. It was surprising Mancini didn’t install Džeko and Agüero as his permanent centre-forward duo; they boasted a fine relationship, and Džeko hit six goals in the first three games of 2011/12, including four in a 5–1 victory at Tottenham. On the same day, Manchester United demolished Arsenal 8–2. Clearly, the two Manchester clubs were going head to head for the title.

  Džeko was in and out of the side, however. Mancini handed plenty of opportunities to the volatile Balotelli, who was highly inconsistent, and Tevez, who vanished for the majority of the season. The Argentine had a blazing row with Mancini during a 2–0 Champions League defeat at Bayern Munich, when Tevez refused to warm up. Mancini supposedly told Tevez to ‘go back to Argentina’; his striker followed those orders, seemingly spent a few months playing golf, and didn’t reappear for several months. Džeko was fit for the entire campaign but started only 16 times, becoming regarded as a Plan B.

  At times Mancini’s tremendous faith in Balotelli, whom he had brought through at Inter, was justified – most obviously in the historic 6–1 victory over Manchester United at Old Trafford in October, although Balotelli prepared for this game in typically unprofessional fashion. In the early hours of Saturday morning he was forced to escape from a ‘substantial fire’ in his house after he and his friends had tried to let off fireworks from inside the house through the bathroom window, with predictable consequences. Yet the Italian reported for training as normal, and started the following day’s Manchester derby. He opened the scoring with a precise finish from Milner’s low cross, before brilliantly turning to the TV camera and revealing a T-shirt that simply read: ‘Why always me?’ After that morning’s headlines, it was another genuinely laugh-out-loud mo
ment from a player who had previously refused to celebrate goals.

  Balotelli’s speed subsequently got United centre-back Jonny Evans dismissed shortly after half-time, before the Italian doubled City’s lead from another Milner assist. Tactically, City relied on the movement of Silva and Milner, who drifted towards the opposite flank in turn, creating overloads and playing one-twos before looking for cut-backs. In a City side otherwise lacking dependable partnerships, Milner and Silva were always on the same wavelength.

  Agüero put City 3–0 ahead, before Darren Fletcher scored a magnificent goal with ten minutes remaining, prompting United to pile forward in desperate search of another famous comeback. In doing so they left themselves understaffed at the back, and City counter-attacked to extend the scoring through Džeko in the 89th minute and Silva in the 91st, before Silva’s outrageous volleyed assist allowed Džeko to slam home the sixth. ‘It’s the biggest defeat of my career,’ said a shocked Ferguson afterwards. 6–1 was an exaggerated reflection of the contest, but City had unquestionably been superior. They’d tactically outclassed United, recorded a historic victory, and went five points clear at the top.