The Mixer: The Story of Premier League Tactics, from Route One to False Nines

by Michael Cox

  Silva was the first of the conquistador assisters to reach England. Although he arrived after Spain’s World Cup success in 2010, it had been a difficult tournament for Silva. Vicente del Bosque’s side lost their opening match 1–0 to Switzerland, when they appeared a one-dimensional, extremely narrow and predictable side. Playing two playmakers out wide wasn’t working. Del Bosque required a player who offered more running in behind – Fernando Torres, Jesús Navas or Pedro Rodríguez at various points – and Silva, another short passer in a team already overloaded with them, was the fall guy, substituted after an hour of the opening match and never reappearing. ‘I feel lucky to be part of this great squad, but I also get the feeling that the coach doesn’t really need me,’ Silva complained the following year. ‘When we lost against Switzerland at the World Cup, I was the only one who felt the consequences.’ Del Bosque, a manager who concentrated upon squad harmony as much as tactics, was noticeably keen to accommodate Silva over the next couple of years, and he played a key role in the Euro 2012 victory, heading in the opener in the 4–0 final victory over Italy.

  Silva had therefore something to prove upon his arrival in England. Before Christmas in his debut campaign he was quiet, managing only one goal – a lovely curled effort following a jinking run against Blackpool – and just three assists. But City’s system, which lacked runners in behind the opposition, didn’t suit Silva’s tendency to play through-balls. He also seemed surprised by the physicality of English football, although he got to grips with things in the second half of the campaign, when he improved significantly.

  By the time City started their title-winning 2011/12 campaign Silva was on a different level to anyone else in English football. Opposition defenders simply couldn’t cope with his elusive drifts inside from wide positions, and when he played against an old-school English full-back it often made for hilarious viewing. In a 3–2 victory over Bolton in City’s second game of the season Silva opened the scoring and completely bamboozled Trotters left-back Paul Robinson, who had absolutely no idea how far inside he should be tracking him. He held his position for too long, only closing down Silva when he received possession, inviting the Spaniard to poke the ball past him for an onrushing teammate.

  Eventually, Silva’s positioning proved so elusive that he received the ultimate compliment from opposition managers – being man-marked. This wasn’t always successful, however. Notably, in a trip to City, Everton manager David Moyes instructed Jack Rodwell to follow him across the pitch, but the midfielder was booked after just 20 minutes for fouling the mazy Silva. Moyes immediately handed that role to Phil Neville instead, who lasted just five minutes before being booked himself, which forced Moyes to turn to Rodwell again. Silva still ran the show and teed up James Milner for City’s second in a 2–0 victory. Silva was voted Player of the Month for September, enjoyed a run of three goals and 12 assists in 16 starts, and produced one of the greatest individual half-seasons the Premier League has witnessed. With a spate of niggling injuries, however, he only managed one goal and two assists in his final 14 games, as City just about lifted the title.

  By this point Silva had been joined in the Premier League by his old Valencia teammate Mata. Whereas Silva initially struggled with English life, Mata adjusted instantly. His sister was living in Brighton and he picked up the language quickly, charming his social media followers with touristy photos of London, his new home city. ‘If you want to be anonymous you can go to Soho or Camden and it’s not a problem,’ he explained. ‘There are a lot of Spanish people. If you go to Piccadilly or Oxford Circus you hear lots of Spanish voices but I’m not recognised much. I like Hyde Park and Regent’s Park where you can take good pictures, and I have found good tapas in the King’s Road.’

  More importantly, he started his Chelsea career with a goal on debut against Norwich, and, at precisely the same period as Silva was in his hot streak, Mata managed two goals and six assists in an eight-game spell. Eventually, Silva and Mata finished 2011/12 as the two players who created the most chances in the Premier League, and were also first and joint-second in the assists table. Mata was seemingly the symbol of the new Chelsea, led by André Villas-Boas – although that era lasted less than half the campaign. Nevertheless, Mata proved hugely successful under Villas-Boas, Roberto Di Matteo and Rafael Benítez, three very different managers with very different systems.

  He was often played on the left under Villas-Boas, on the right by Di Matteo in big games, and centrally under Benítez. But it simply didn’t matter to Mata – ‘I can play in any of the three,’ he said. He continued to assist with alarming regularity, especially at big moments. He created Ramires’s opener in the 2–1 FA Cup victory over Liverpool in 2011, and then Didier Drogba’s crucial headed equaliser against Bayern in the Champions League Final. The following season he provided the assists for Fernando Torres and Branislav Ivanović’s goals in the 2–1 Europa League Final win over Benfica. He won Chelsea’s Player of the Year award in both of his two complete seasons at the club, although he found himself marginalised and then sold to Manchester United after the return of José Mourinho.

  Arsenal, meanwhile, signed Cazorla from Málaga in 2012. Although he would later become renowned in a deeper midfield role, initially he was fielded, like Silva and Mata, as an assister drifting inside from wide in a 4–2–3–1, or playing as the number 10. Cazorla described his role as ‘playing between the lines, between a defence and the midfielders, and taking up a position where you can do damage to the opposition defence … playing a bit behind the forward and giving assists’. The eternally cheerful Cazorla was a stocky figure who lacked speed over long distances, but was tremendously quick at slaloming away from opposition challenges in tight zones. He was superb in his third Premier League match, Arsenal’s controlled 2–0 victory over Liverpool at Anfield, creating the opener for Lukas Podolski and then slamming in the second himself. It was a superb first individual campaign, and in May he managed the extremely rare feat of assisting four goals in the same game, in Arsenal’s 4–1 thrashing of Wigan. Only one player achieved more assists than Cazorla that season – Mata. Meanwhile, if you discount Everton’s set-piece specialist Leighton Baines, it was Silva, Mata and Cazorla who created the most chances in 2012/13.

  Within the next couple of seasons, meanwhile, English football was blessed with the arrival of several more comparable assisters. The players who created the most goals in 2015/16, for example, were Mesut Özil, Christian Eriksen, Dimitri Payet and Dušan Tadić, all in this mould. There was a noticeable shift towards technical playmakers, and the hugely impressive displays of Silva, Mata and Cazorla helped to change what Premier League teams required from attacking midfielders, popularising the concept of the assister.

  A more significant story than attacking midfielders becoming more based around ball retention, however, was a similar development for centre-forwards. The use of the term ‘false nine’ – an unconventional centre-forward being deployed as his side’s most advanced attacker but dropping deep into midfield – would have baffled football fans as recently as 2008. A couple of years later it was an accepted tactic.

  The popularity of the false nine was another of Barcelona’s legacies. Lionel Messi’s rise to become the best player of his generation – and arguably the best of all time – owes much to his repositioning at the centre of Barcelona’s attacking trio. He was naturally a number 10 rather than a number 9, and at times played extraordinarily deep to ensure Barça dominated midfield, while also achieving record-breaking goalscoring figures.

  The term ‘false nine’ has often been misused in English football, however. While it certainly refers to a player not generally considered an out-and-out striker, it’s about the role rather than the individual. For example, at one point an injury crisis meant Liverpool were forced to deploy midfielder Jonjo Shelvey up front for an away trip to West Ham. But Shelvey didn’t drop deep and link play in midfield; he simply played as a makeshift centre-forward. This wasn’t a false nine. Spain�
�s Euro 2012, success, meanwhile, saw Vicente del Bosque struggling to find an appropriate centre-forward. He surprisingly played Cesc Fàbregas for the opening match, and he naturally dropped into his customary midfield role, which meant Spain were playing a false nine. But then, after a spell on the bench, Fàbregas returned to the side for the 4–0 final victory over Italy. Ostensibly he was playing in the same role, but rather than coming short he played on the shoulder of the last defender, making runs in behind. In the first match he was a false nine, in the second he was simply a makeshift striker.

  The false nine in its strictest sense has not become a particularly established role in English football. Nevertheless, the concept has unquestionably changed what managers have come to expect from centre-forwards. The old-fashioned Premier League thesis about a classic centre-forward was a tall, strong number 9 who remained in the penalty box and thrived on crosses. The false nine, then, was very much the antithesis.

  The synthesis between the two models was the type of centre-forward who dominated between 2011 and 2016. Premier League Golden Boot winners Carlos Tevez, Robin van Persie, Luis Suárez and Sergio Agüero became prolific goalscorers as their club’s most advanced forward, despite all arriving in English football as second strikers who played behind a teammate. The fact that they became top-class number 9s rather than number 10s demonstrated the shifting requirements for centre-forwards. Of course, this wasn’t the first time Premier League sides had played without conventional strikers – Arsenal’s Thierry Henry and Manchester United’s Cristiano Ronaldo had done similar things – but their positioning was primarily about allowing themselves more space to break into. Now, it was all about link-up play.

  Wayne Rooney was, if not a false nine, certainly a dubious nine. Manchester United’s record goalscorer arguably never discovered his optimum position, having often been shifted wide during the Ronaldo era, then alternating between a number 9 and number 10 position in subsequent years, and later being deployed in midfield. In 2009/10, however, Rooney produced his first genuinely sensational spell of goalscoring form and was often fielded up front alone in a 4–3–3. While improving his ability to score classic centre-forward goals, netting many with his head, Rooney sometimes played much deeper, without a strike partner running in behind. The counter-attacking goal he rounded off in a 3–1 victory over Arsenal in 2010 was the classic false nine goal; he came short to drag the opposition centre-backs up the pitch and received a pass from Park Ji-sung midway inside his own half. Then, after laying the ball right to Nani, who dribbled forward 50 yards in possession, and finding space because Park’s decoy run distracted Arsenal’s defenders, Rooney powered into the box to sweep home the return pass. It was, tactically speaking, one of the Premier League’s all-time finest goals, a perfect demonstration of how centre-forwards were expected to both link play and score.

  Nicolas Anelka, while always considered a number 9 – much to his disgust – provided the most important false nine Premier League performance in Chelsea’s aforementioned 2–1 victory over Manchester United in 2010, but he was rarely fielded in that role because of Didier Drogba. Therefore, the most important false nine in English football is Tevez. As previously outlined, his signing for Manchester United prompted speculation about whether he and Wayne Rooney could play together because both were considered the same sort of player: number 10s. They played backseat roles in Manchester United’s sometimes-strikerless Champions League-winning side, but Tevez’s controversial transfer to Manchester City ensured he finally became his side’s main man.

  Initially he was deployed behind Emmanuel Adebayor, a traditional target man, but during 2010/11 – the season when Messi particularly underlined the value of a false nine by taking Barcelona to the treble – Tevez spent long periods isolated as Manchester City’s lone striker, and constantly dropped deep into midfield roles and linked play. Of course, Tevez was fundamentally comparable to Messi, and there were many debates in Argentina about whether they could co-exist for the national side. While not quite in Messi’s class, Tevez largely replicated his compatriot’s role for Manchester City that season, linking play smartly while also finishing as the Premier League’s joint-top goalscorer alongside his ex-teammate, Manchester United’s Dimitar Berbatov.

  Berbatov’s experience was also significant. After Ronaldo and Tevez had departed in 2009, Berbatov was generally deployed as United’s main striker, just ahead of Rooney – but later occasionally played more of a withdrawn role, with Rooney higher up against the opposition defence. Both were comfortable in either role, underlining how top-class centre-forwards were now somewhere between a number 9 and a number 10. The most fascinating aspect of Berbatov’s 2010/11 campaign wasn’t him finishing as joint-top Premier League scorer, however, but the fact that this status didn’t even earn him a place in Sir Alex Ferguson’s 18-man Champions League Final squad, with Rooney starting behind Javier Hernández and Michael Owen preferred on the bench. This came as a stark reminder that scoring goals wasn’t enough.

  After Tevez and Berbatov shared the honour in 2010/11, the Premier League’s Golden Boot winner for the next two campaigns was Dutchman Robin van Persie, who produced a magnificent individual campaign in 2011/12 to drag a struggling Arsenal side into the top four, before he moved to Manchester United and fired them to the title. Van Persie was, like Tevez, considered a number 10 upon his arrival in English football in 2004 and coincidentally also played just behind Adebayor. The Togo striker’s transfer to Manchester City in 2009 meant Arsène Wenger, typically, adjusted the role of an existing player rather than recruiting a direct replacement, with Van Persie now leading the line. He was sensational at the start of 2009/10, offering a perfect balance of creativity and finishing – seven assists and seven goals in 12 matches. But a serious ankle ligament injury ruled him out for five months.

  During Van Persie’s absence Wenger generally fielded Russian Andrey Arshavin as his most advanced forward. Arshavin was a confusing player; naturally a talented playmaker, he was deployed on the left of Arsenal’s attack and offered sporadic brilliance, before badly losing his way and suffering a significant loss of confidence. He was purely creative and technical, providing little in terms of work rate or physicality, and was never a prolific goalscorer. He was the falsest of false nines during this period, but his poor performances rarely promoted the role. Arsenal desperately missed Van Persie.

  After his long injury lay-off, the Dutchman was transformed from a talented but injury-prone second striker who scored great goals into a ruthless centre-forward who was a great goalscorer. Generally fielded upfront alone in a 4–3–3, he was an intelligent, eloquent footballer who appreciated how his role had changed. ‘I don’t really see it as a main striker position,’ he explained. ‘In Holland we call positions by their numbers – number 9 is the main striker and number 10 is the one just behind. I prefer to call myself “9 and a half” – I like to drop off sometimes and be part of the game. I’m still a bit of a behind-the-striker player when possible … The boss told me, ‘“Don’t focus on scoring goals, because they will come, and play your game as you always used to play. Don’t try to change your game and think of yourself as a striker only. You are more than that.”’ That summarised it neatly; just because Van Persie was playing upfront, he wasn’t supposed to lose his creative edge, and he provided plenty of goals for Theo Walcott, who balanced Van Persie’s movement towards the ball with sprints in behind.

  At Manchester United Van Persie formed a prolific strike partnership with Rooney, who played the withdrawn role in a 4–4–1–1, and the Dutchman increasingly became a pure number 9, although he returned to a familiar theme when describing Rooney and him as ‘both 9 and a halves’. They boasted a fine relationship, and Ferguson’s final title was sealed after a 3–0 victory over Aston Villa, with Van Persie scoring a hat-trick including a trademark volley from Rooney’s floated ball over the top. That United team were somewhat shambolic at times, particularly in midfield, but both Rooney and Van Persi
e were outstanding.

  After Van Persie had won two Golden Boots – presumably both left boots – the winner in 2013/14 was Liverpool’s Luis Suárez. This campaign will be analysed in greater depth later, but the Uruguayan’s level of performance was truly outstanding, with 31 goals in 33 matches at a rate of 0.94 goals per game, the best in Premier League history. Again, there’s a familiar pattern here; Suárez wasn’t considered a pure striker upon his arrival in English football in January 2011, having starred for Ajax on the right. This was underlined by the fact that when Liverpool did brilliantly to get £50m from Chelsea for the misfiring Fernando Torres the same day, they insisted upon immediately spending 70 per cent of the fee on Newcastle’s unproven target man Andy Carroll, such was their desperation for a proper number 9. The fact they’d already signed the perfect Torres replacement two hours earlier went unnoticed.

  Indeed, a major feature of Suárez’s early Liverpool days was his relative lack of goals, despite his ability to dominate games and wreak havoc with his speed, movement and bustling past defenders. He managed just nine goals in his first year, partly because his position was frequently changed and he was often forced to flit around behind Carroll. But when fielded regularly in a proper centre-forward role he developed into the Premier League’s most prolific striker, and continued to assist too.

  The next two Golden Boot winners, Sergio Agüero and Harry Kane, are both generally considered pure strikers. Once again, this wasn’t entirely the case from the outset. Agüero spent the majority of his first three campaigns in English football in his favoured position alongside a more traditional centre-forward. ‘For most of my career I’ve played behind a striker, but close enough to form a partnership with them,’ he outlined. ‘That’s where I think I play best.’ But Agüero was eventually pushed forward to lead the line, and registered the two best goalscoring campaigns of his career.