The Mixer: The Story of Premier League Tactics, from Route One to False Nines

by Michael Cox

  Too often, however, Spurs pressed too intensely and offered little control. After a 4–2 defeat by Villas-Boas’s former club Chelsea, now with Mourinho back in charge, Villas-Boas admitted ‘the characteristic of the game was the pace of the game. It was frenetic, many balls were lost by both teams … the intensity was a problem, we wanted to calm the game down.’ But in a 2–1 victory over Arsenal, a peculiar game completely defined by both sides pressing aggressively, using high defensive lines and compressing the game into a very small strip 20 yards either side of the halfway line, Spurs were more cohesive and superior at playing through-balls – goals from Bale and Aaron Lennon, darting in behind from wide, sealed the victory.

  Bale’s departure was the major cause of Spurs’ sudden decline the following season – but the secondary problem was their high defensive line. In a 1–0 defeat to Arsenal their back line was repeatedly penetrated by the runs of Theo Walcott, but also the considerably slower Olivier Giroud, while in a 1–1 draw with Chelsea the badly out-of-form Fernando Torres produced his first decent performance for months because he was given so much space to sprint into, although he was dismissed late on for a tangle with Jan Vertonghen.

  But when Villas-Boas’s system failed, it failed spectacularly. There was an absolutely shambolic defeat at Manchester City, when Jesús Navas exploited Spurs’ high line and opened the scoring within 15 seconds. The immobile centre-back partnership of Michael Dawson and Younès Kaboul were absolutely torn apart by the speed of Sergio Agüero, and with Spurs 3–0 down at half-time Villas-Boas exacerbated the problem by chasing a lost cause, switching from 4–2–3–1 to 4–4–2 and allowing City the run of midfield. It finished 6–0.

  Less than a month later Tottenham were thrashed in a similar manner, this time at home by Liverpool. With midfielder Étienne Capoue deployed as a makeshift centre-back alongside Dawson, Spurs again defended extremely high up the pitch but put very little pressure on the opponent in possession. Sure enough, Luis Suárez repeatedly raced in behind and Liverpool won 5–0. This was madness from Villas-Boas: doing the same thing again and again, and expecting different results. He was sacked the next day. Both of his dismissals, from Chelsea and Tottenham, owed much to his obsession with a high defensive line as part of a pressing strategy.

  By this stage, however, Villas-Boas was no longer the posterboy for Premier League pressing. The baton had been passed to Mauricio Pochettino, who became Southampton manager in January 2013. This was a somewhat controversial appointment. After a difficult start to Southampton’s first season back in the Premier League for eight years Nigel Adkins had achieved some impressive results, and it seemed strange to disturb Southampton’s rhythm midway through the campaign. Pochettino’s only previous coaching job with Espanyol had produced some exciting matches, particularly when they went toe-to-toe with city rivals Barcelona by pressing them intensely, but ultimately he’d been dismissed with Espanyol bottom of the league.

  Nevertheless, Pochettino was a highly promising young manager who placed pressing at the forefront of his coaching philosophy. His primary inspiration was one of Guardiola’s idols, Marcelo Bielsa, although Pochettino had a stronger link to his compatriot. Bielsa had been Pochettino’s youth coach during the late 1980s at Argentine side Newell’s Old Boys, and when promoted to become the club’s manager he immediately handed first-team opportunities to Pochettino, who won the Argentine league title at just 19. Bielsa’s sides were renowned for their high-tempo, energetic pressing style, which rubbed off on Pochettino, and they crossed paths again with the Argentine national side, and briefly at Espanyol.

  By the time of Pochettino’s arrival in England, incidentally, Bielsa was coaching Athletic Bilbao, taking them to a hugely impressive 5–3 aggregate Europa League victory over Manchester United, when their intense pressing and rapid one-twos completely overwhelmed Sir Alex Ferguson’s side. Before that game Bielsa outlined his philosophy. ‘Our simple ethos is to win the ball back as quickly as possible, as far up the field as we can – and by that I mean everyone is involved in winning the ball, back from the forwards,’ he explained. ‘Once we have got it, we try to find a way of getting forward as quickly as possible, in a kind of vertical direction.’ When it worked, Bielsa’s side were thrilling, and Pochettino tried to replicate that style at Southampton – who, coincidentally, had provided Athletic Bilbao with their famous red-and-white-striped shirts in the 19th century, thanks to shipworkers travelling between the two ports.

  Pochettino’s vision was obvious from the outset. In his opening game against Everton his attackers started the pressure, the midfielders pushed forward onto their opposite numbers and the defence held a high line. In the first half Southampton won possession quickly and created clear chances, but they couldn’t quite translate their dominance into goals. The pressing meant they tired in the second half and the game finished goalless, but overall Pochettino was delighted. ‘It was a very good example because we put in a very good effort,’ he said. ‘We were focusing on the high pressure, which is one of our main goals, so we’ve established the basic foundations of how we want to carry on.’

  Pochettino’s approach proved particularly effective against strong opposition, when Southampton could disrupt teams who wanted to play out from the back. His first three Premier League victories, significantly, were against Manchester City, Liverpool and Chelsea, but during this period Southampton failed to beat Wigan, Norwich and Queens Park Rangers.

  In Pochettino’s only full campaign at St Mary’s, 2013/14, Southampton’s style was best summed up by the contrast in two statistics. First, they achieved the highest average possession share in the Premier League. Second, they achieved just the ninth-highest pass-completion rate in the Premier League. That’s a remarkable imbalance, considering a side’s level of possession is generally considered to be about how effectively they retain the ball. How did Southampton manage to dominate possession so regularly when their ball retention was so average? Simple – because possession share is also determined by how quickly the ball is regained. Southampton pressed relentlessly from the front, backed up by the powerful duo of Morgan Schneiderlin and Victor Wanyama patrolling midfield. At turnovers they attempted ambitious, vertical passes that often went awry. But if possession was conceded, Southampton would simply press again and restart the process. They were the purest pressing side the Premier League has witnessed.

  Schneiderlin offered an excellent summary of Pochettino’s style: ‘When I press, I always concentrate on leaving the opponents with the worst possible pass, and Pochettino asks us not to leave the opponent with several options. This means an enormous collective effort, but after six or seven months working according to his ideas, it’s possible to harass and completely destabilise teams. We couldn’t do this immediately, because it’s a huge job in training. He wants to get the ball back as high as possible, so it’s normally an attacker who triggers the pressing and we must all follow.’

  Pochettino’s approach worked well at Southampton, whose tremendous success with bringing intelligent footballers through their academy meant he could call upon a young, energetic squad willing to learn new methods. It proved useful for the national team, too; Adam Lallana, Rickie Lambert, Jay Rodriguez, Nathaniel Clyne and Luke Shaw all received England call-ups. Shortly after one squad announcement Southampton fans spent the first half of the 4–1 victory over Hull in November 2013 singing, ‘Come on England!’ and ‘It’s just like watching England!’ in celebration of their contribution to Roy Hodgson’s squad.

  Pochettino transformed his team into a genuine top-half side with occasionally enthralling football, but he never denied his ambition, considering the Saints a springboard to bigger clubs. This potentially explains why his pressing style was so extreme with Southampton – it was, from his perspective, about attracting the attention of other clubs. They finished eighth in 2013/14, a respectable finish, but it was Southampton’s style rather than their results that encouraged Tottenham to appoint Pochettino that summe
r.

  This was essentially an attempt to continue Villas-Boas’s philosophy; here were two managers fixated on pressing and a high defensive line. Between these two spells, Spurs were managed by Tim Sherwood, Blackburn Rovers’ title-winning captain from 1994/95. He was a back-to-basics throwback of a manager who seemingly overlooked every tactical development that had been made during the Premier League era. Sherwood played 4–4–2, said that ‘players only call themselves number 10s because they can’t score goals’ and claimed that he didn’t understand the point of defensive midfielders. Bafflingly, he achieved the highest win percentage of any Tottenham manager in the Premier League era, as he constantly reminded the media. But while Sherwood proved a useful short-term manager, he lacked the vision to oversee a new era.

  Pochettino’s Tottenham didn’t press as aggressively as his Southampton side, but they still focused on pushing forward and shutting down opponents quickly. They were also more intelligent in the manner they pressed laterally, with the wide midfielders moving into central positions when opponents had the ball on the opposite flank, boxing in opponents towards the touchlines. The Argentine’s first campaign with Tottenham, 2014/15, produced mixed results; sometimes Tottenham pressed excellently to force turnovers and launched quick attacks, exemplified by their opener in September’s north London derby. Mathieu Flamini was tentative in possession deep inside his own half, Christian Eriksen charged towards him, stole the ball and slipped it to Erik Lamela, who played in Nacer Chadli to finish smartly. That was precisely what Pochettino wanted – an aggressive press in an advanced position, and a quick, direct attack. But on other occasions Spurs’ pressing left their defence exposed, the youthful midfield combination of Ryan Mason and Nabil Bentaleb lacking the requisite positional discipline.

  Things improved significantly during 2015/16, when Spurs briefly launched a serious title charge. As Schneiderlin had outlined at Southampton, it takes time on the training ground to perfect a pressing approach, and Tottenham were more fluent in Pochettino’s philosophy. An improvement in the calibre of individuals also proved significant; the athletic and skilful central midfielder Dembélé regained his place as a regular, the physical defender Eric Dier was redeployed as a central midfielder with great success, the boundless energy of new signing Dele Alli proved crucial, while the outstanding centre-back Toby Alderweireld arrived following a successful season at Pochettino’s former club Southampton, who were also pressing effectively under his successor Ronald Koeman. Alderweireld formed a formidable centre-back partnership with fellow Belgian Jan Vertonghen, both having been raised in the Ajax youth academy, which puts great emphasis upon pressing. ‘We train pretty tactically,’ said Alderweireld. ‘We play pressing football, where everyone works for each other, from the striker to the goalkeeper. We are a hungry team, without real superstars; I have never worked so hard in my life as under Pochettino.’

  Fitness levels, too, were clearly superior in the second season, partly thanks to Pochettino’s extremely intense training sessions. ‘There’s not been a good moment in pre-season, if I’m honest,’ sighed striker Harry Kane, the major beneficiary of Pochettino’s regime. ‘There were double sessions, times when you were pushing yourself to the limit.’ The improvement of Spurs’ two attacking full-backs, Danny Rose and Kyle Walker, was remarkable, and their continual running defined Spurs’ shape. Tottenham regularly covered greater distances than any other side in the Premier League, and were sometimes amazingly dominant, recording a 4–1 victory over Manchester City and a 3–0 win against Manchester United. Some suggested Tottenham depended too much upon pressing, but the approach proved effective in both an attacking and a defensive sense. In Pochettino’s second campaign Spurs recorded the most shots on target (6.6 per game, some way clear of the next-best-placed side, Arsenal, who managed 5.6) and also conceded the fewest goals.

  In terms of pressing, Tottenham’s most notable match in 2015/16 was their goalless draw at home to Liverpool in mid-October. The match itself was uneventful, but the occasion was significant, because it was Liverpool’s first game under the regime of Jürgen Klopp.

  Klopp had established himself as a top-class manager at Borussia Dortmund, where he won consecutive Bundesliga titles in 2011 and 2012, and reached the Champions League Final the following season, being defeated by Bayern Munich at Wembley – a complete German takeover of England’s national stadium. Dortmund, meanwhile, had become extremely popular in England, at one point attracting over 1,000 English fans per match. The Westfalenstadion offered a raucous atmosphere, cheap tickets, plus standing and drinking on the terraces – everything the Premier League had seemingly lost. There was also Dortmund’s exhilarating, high-tempo football featuring speedy transitions and direct running. More than anything, however, Klopp’s game was based around pressing.

  To be more specific, Klopp’s system was based around gegenpressing, a German word that effectively translates as ‘counter-pressing’. This was different from the pressing favoured by Villas-Boas and Pochettino, which was about constantly harassing the opponents in advanced zones. Klopp’s Dortmund sometimes played in that manner, but their press was largely about the timing rather than the positioning; counter-pressing involves pressuring immediately after possession was lost.

  Counter-pressing attempted to redefine the accepted nature of the simple, cyclical four-part flow chart used in coaching manuals to explain ‘phases of play’. Traditionally, a team is either in possession or out of possession. To move between these two phases there’s the transition – the concept Mourinho popularised during his first stint at Chelsea. So the flow is simple: in possession, defensive transition, out of possession, attacking transition. And repeat. You’re always in one of these four stages. But Klopp’s counter-pressing changed that – a successful counter-press replaced the ‘defensive transition’ and allowed the side to immediately return to ‘in possession’.

  This proved extremely effective in the Bundesliga, a division based heavily around transitions. Klopp’s Dortmund side would often counter-press and regain possession when the opposition were launching their attacking transition and pushing their full-backs forward, making it easy to penetrate the defence and create goalscoring chances. ‘Think about the passes you have to make to get a number 10 in a position where he can play the genius pass,’ Klopp explained. ‘Counter-pressing lets you win back the ball nearer to the goal, and it’s only one pass away from a really good opportunity. No playmaker in the world can be as good as a good counter-pressing situation.’

  Much like Guardiola at Barcelona, Klopp’s Dortmund methods proved so effective that his philosophy was partly popularised in the Premier League before he’d arrived himself. But Klopp’s appointment, as Brendan Rodgers’ replacement, nevertheless sparked Liverpool into life after a disappointing 18 months following their narrow title failure in 2013/14. ‘I believe in a playing philosophy that is very emotional, very fast and very strong,’ Klopp outlined at his first press conference. ‘My teams must play at full throttle and take it to the limit every single game – tactical, of course, but tactical with a big heart.’

  From that first match at Tottenham, despite Klopp only having a couple of days on the training ground with Liverpool’s full squad, the effects were clear. Liverpool played a 4–3–2–1 that dominated the centre, and they counter-pressed immediately when possession was lost – which was often, considering Tottenham’s own aggressive press. This created an extremely fast-paced, scrappy match all about disrupting the opposition and shutting down passing options quickly, and the goalless draw wasn’t surprising, as both sides were spoiling the other’s approach play. Klopp was pleased with Liverpool’s work rate – and they became the first team to outrun Pochettino’s Tottenham – but the German explained that ‘the problem was when we had the ball – we weren’t good enough, we didn’t use our skills, we were too hectic, we didn’t see the right option.’ This was reminiscent of Villas-Boas’s complaints. While Liverpool’s possession play would impr
ove considerably, matches between two pressing sides often became disjointed. Later, Klopp frequently praised his side when they were frantic without possession, but calm in possession.

  That was also very much the case with Manchester United at this point, under the reign of Louis van Gaal. They didn’t press as intensely as Liverpool or Tottenham, and initially used a surprisingly simple press that involved midfielders man-marking their opposite numbers and inevitably being dragged out shape. But their medium block was eventually compact and cohesive, and Van Gaal didn’t receive enough credit for United’s organisation during this period – no Premier League side conceded fewer goals during his two-year Premier League spell. United were rather too calm in possession, however, which didn’t please a fanbase accustomed to more purposeful football.

  It was Pochettino and Klopp, though, who were effectively leading the pressing revolution in English football, with the former keen to point out the differences in their approaches. ‘I think it’s a different pressing,’ Pochettino explained. ‘If you analyse Dortmund, it’s not similar to how we played at Southampton because our pressing was high up to the opponent’s goalkeeper, but Dortmund played a medium block. It’s very strange to compare those two styles, Klopp’s style to mine.’ Klopp’s Liverpool, however, increasingly combined counter-pressing with standard pressing in advanced positions. A 4–1 thrashing of Manchester City at the Etihad, after Klopp had been in charge for just a month, showed the possibilities of his high-energy system, with the counter-pressing and pressing combined with slick interplay from Roberto Firmino, Coutinho and Adam Lallana producing a truly dominant victory. Liverpool reached the League Cup and Europa League finals in his first season, although they were beaten on both occasions.