Under Siege

by Belinda Neil

  The room I was in was pitch black, no light on. I could feel the anticipation of the forthcoming assault, this was Australia’s elite fighting force and considered one of the best in the world, and I was on the receiving end, holding a fake rifle.

  I did not have to wait for long. There was an almighty bang as the door was kicked open. I aimed my rifle towards two black figures, saw some flashes and I knew I had been shot with paintball. In a few seconds it was all over for my terrorist mate and me.

  A debriefing was held for the SAS operatives before they exited the stronghold and back to the Black Hawks. We were also picked up and transported back to the South Australian Police Academy for a quick debrief and finally a hot shower.

  I found the NATEX a remarkable learning experience for a negotiator, and I would have to be honest and say the high point was the opportunity to watch the SAS at work.

  CHAPTER

  11

  Extortion

  May 1997 started out as a busy month. I had two on-call periods as a negotiator and the committal hearing into the Hagland murder had begun; both Cushman and Martin were committed for trial to the Supreme Court. Aaron Martin was later found guilty of the lesser charge of maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent. He received a sentence of five years in prison, minimum term two years and three months. The Hagland family and Connie Casey were devastated. Sean Cushman was also found guilty to being an accessory. He was given a good behaviour bond for five years. Considering Martin’s previous violent history, including punching and kicking another person under similar circumstances, I was disgusted at the sentence Martin was given.

  On Thursday 22 May my negotiation team leader rang me about an extortion demand at one of Australia’s major food companies, also one of the world’s largest. About 10am I went into the company’s head office in the city and met with investigators from Major Crime Squad South. The investigation had been codenamed Operation Billiat. A two-page typed letter delivered by courier contained a demand for over $4 million, the largest extortion demand ever made in Australia. The ransom was to be paid the following day, otherwise various products in stores throughout Australia would be contaminated. An additional $1 million per week would be required until the ransom was paid or the company had to permanently close in Australia. The extortionist wrote that ‘success in poisoning people was not considered essential’ but ‘turning people away from’ the company’s products was the real issue. The extortionist allowed for police to be contacted if the company so wished but an additional $1 million would be added to the demand if police intervened. If he agreed to payment of the extortion demand, the CEO was told to place an advertisement in the Sydney Morning Herald Lost and Found section, the wording of which was provided in the letter.

  The extortionist had already directed company staff, via a faxed document, to a large retail grocery store where a jar of instant coffee had been contaminated. Company staff were able to quickly take all the coffee jars off the shelf. One had a small puncture mark in the paper membrane, which was proof, the company staff said, that it had been tampered with. This contaminated jar was kept as evidence and retained by police for further analysis. The contaminate was later found to be a form of insecticide which could induce sickness and possibly cause a person to lapse into unconsciousness and even death.

  The company’s crisis management team, comprising senior management, risk-management consultants flown in from Melbourne and police investigators, were pulling out all stops to try and identify the extortionist. The company would sustain significant financial loss, millions of dollars, if all food products needed to be recalled, as well as further financial losses every day the products were not available to the public. Analysis of the coffee and jar was fast tracked, staff at the newsagent from where the fax had been sent were interviewed, as were employees of the courier service. A description of a man was given.

  The extortionist had addressed the mail to the CEO by name and had telephoned his secretary to confirm that the CEO had received the fax. On the premise that the extortionist might get in touch again, my role was to provide simple negotiation strategies for the CEO and his secretary, including the development of suggested dialogue with the extortionist. Even though both were under immense pressure they were very receptive.

  It was decided to place the advertisement in the newspaper as requested. Unfortunately it would not be published until the following day, Friday 23 May. This was the deadline for payment, even though no account details had been provided.

  About 3.25pm one of the company managers came into the meeting room with a two-page fax from the extortionist. This time a twin pack of a particular brand of yoghurt had been contaminated, and the fax gave details of the store and suburb. Store management were immediately contacted and detectives were dispatched. Later that afternoon they returned to the head office with fifteen twin packs of the yoghurt, one tub of which had a small tear in the foil lid. Even so, the presence of a contaminate could not be confirmed.

  The immediate problem was the risk to the general public if the contaminated yoghurt had already been sold. If we couldn’t confirm that we had the tub of contaminated yoghurt, a product recall notice would need to be issued urgently. This was something the company naturally did not want to happen.

  After much discussion, it was decided to open each tub of yoghurt and smell it for the presence of a contaminate. No distinct smell was noticed. The CEO wished to stir the yoghurt with a spoon to see if that would produce a smell. The investigators agreed on condition that a separate spoon was used for each tub of yoghurt, thereby preserving the integrity of the exhibits. A packet of clean plastic spoons was found and a clean spoon placed in each tub. Every tub of yoghurt was stirred then smelled but still no distinctive odour could be detected.

  Due to the very serious possibility that an unsuspecting customer might have purchased the product, the company quickly issued a press release advising that the particular yoghurt from that store was not fit for consumption and should be returned. The next day was the day the extortionist had demanded payment. I arrived at the company head office about 7am. After being briefed by the police investigation team I sat down with the CEO and later his secretary to go through negotiation strategies should the extortionist ring them personally. During the day I was involved in a number of meetings with the crisis management team and the police investigators to discuss various long- and short-term strategies should the extortion continue, otherwise it was a waiting game.

  About 3pm the extortionist sent another fax to the CEO, this time from a newsagent in Victoria. The extortionist had obviously seen the advertisement and the fax was headed ‘Agreement noted’ with instructions about payment, including bank account details. The extortionist added ‘as a courtesy you will be spared the third treasure hunt’. The hunt now escalated, with further meetings, enquiries about the newsagent and further conversations about negotiation with the CEO and his secretary. I finished about eleven that night with no further word from the extortionist.

  Over the weekend a team of NSW police investigators travelled to Victoria to work with the Victorian Police Special Response Group. A special fraud alert was placed on the bank account, a business account opened at a Victorian branch the previous week. All documents relevant to the account were seized. Information was taken from the bank tellers who had set up this bank account, which was in the name of Greg Butcher. This man had told one of the tellers that he was an ex-policeman. Inquiries were made about the birth certificate and company documents he presented, including personal references.

  The following week, from Monday 26 to Friday 30 May, one team of investigators worked from Melbourne and the other team and I remained with the company’s head office in case of further contact with the extortionist. By this stage the company’s crisis-management team had flown out a risk consultant from their insurance company in London. Every morning I spoke with the CEO and his secretary about negotiating strategies and contingencies, then
had to leave as I was running a drug trial at the Sydney District Court. Every afternoon I would check back to see how the extortion investigation was progressing. I also had a number of discussions with my negotiation team leader in Melbourne. The combined NSW/Victoria investigators in Melbourne were starting to close in on the extortionist – we just needed some additional evidence.

  It was interesting being involved with the company’s crisis-management team at this stage. At one point the insurance company representative from London wanted the bank teller to be given a list of instructions and questions to ask the extortionist when he came in to the branch – he had not finalised all paperwork when he opened the account, and needed to do so before he could make a withdrawal. This idea had merit but there were some rudimentary problems. We told the insurance man that things were better kept simple. It was a small branch of the bank, we didn’t know whether the extortionist knew the inner workings of the branch and the staff; the bank teller was already under pressure and being told to use a police listening device and a lawful telephone intercept. We advised it would be better if the teller only asked some very basic things about which she was confident rather than have her become nervous and alert the extortionist. We did not want to risk him getting wind of the police operation and we couldn’t use undercover police officers.

  On Monday 26 May the combined police investigation team in Victoria had a breakthrough. A man had gone to a branch in Victoria and tried to withdraw $10,000 from the business account without providing any identification. He told the branch manager that his wallet had just been stolen at the markets. He also said he was expecting four million dollars to be paid into the account. The branch manager had told him that most third-party deposits were not processed immediately and he should check with the company to see when they made the deposit and where. The man had left the bank saying he would go and make those inquiries. The bank teller recognised the business account as the same one she and her branch manager had dealt with on the previous Friday afternoon.

  On Monday 26 May a man rang the bank’s customer service centre and asked for a balance on the business account. When he was asked for a password he said he didn’t have one. The customer service officer noted that the account appeared to show warnings about possible fraud, but no telephone number for their fraud department appeared and the man was told how to go about getting a password on his account. He asked the customer service officer whether any money had been paid into the account, saying he was setting up a small business. The customer service officer told him the information on the account was confidential.

  About 2pm the following day a man telephoned the original bank, identified himself as Greg Butcher and spoke with the bank teller, who quickly activated the telephone intercept. He asked about withdrawing money from other branches and whether any money had been deposited into the account, and was told that it now had a substantial balance. The bank teller said she needed to see his original birth certificate to verify his identification, and Greg Butcher said he would provide that soon.

  Police surveillance continued to be carried out on this branch of the bank while other investigators were checking birth certificates and business records. They examined a great number of documents.

  On the Thursday came the breakthrough evidence we needed; a telephone number that seemed to be unintentionally written on two separate business registration documents. The description of the person lodging these documents was also similar to those given by the other witnesses. This telephone number could have been a red herring but luck and some very good police work by the joint NSW/Victorian teams gave us this lead.

  It was the home number belonging to the ex-wife of a man named Matthew Mills. She told police that their marriage had broken down some months earlier and Matthew had been made redundant from his job in April. Her description of Matthew tallied with the one the bank tellers had given. She also gave police his current Melbourne address. A few days later when she was formally interviewed she added that Matthew had told her he was going to Sydney for a few days as he wanted time away to think about things. She said that a few years previously both she and Matthew had decided to boycott the company’s products, taking a moral stand because of negative publicity about the company’s business practices.

  The following day Victorian investigators interviewed Matthew Mills at his home address. This conversation was lawfully recorded. Matthew Mills’s voice on tape appeared to be the same as that of Greg Butcher, recorded when he was talking to the teller. Mills was put under twenty-four-hour surveillance.

  On Sunday 1 June my negotiation team leader told me the investigators needed more assistance in Melbourne. Being familiar with the case, I flew down the next day to change roles from negotiator to investigator.

  On Monday 2 June a police officer came forward and said he knew Matthew Mills. He had met him some years earlier through a mutual friend and saw him socially. He knew Mills had travelled to Sydney and believed he returned on 23 May. He had been told Mills had made the trip to ‘clear his mind’ because he was getting a divorce and had been retrenched. This police officer said the previous year Mills had asked whether the record of his fingerprints taken when he was a police officer could be returned to him. He had told Mills he could write in to the Police Department to have the record destroyed. This police officer confirmed that the voice of Greg Butcher and Matthew Mills were one and the same. Victorian police confirmed that Mills was indeed a former police officer and had requested his fingerprints be destroyed as recently as the previous month.

  Police were closing in on Matthew Mills and a search warrant for his home was issued. He was arrested just before 6pm on the evening of 2 June.

  Mills gave police a number of folders from his backpack – the total of his assistance in the investigation. They contained information about the business bank account he had opened.

  Of the documents he gave to police, one was a letter that read:

  [The name of the company in Sydney] have been chosen because of

  1. As a large distributor of food items they are extremely vulnerable

  2. They are large enough to extort significant moneys from

  3. They already have a significant proportion of disillusioned customers due to the two previous [company name] boycotts by impact which would be readily mobilised against them in an anti-media campaign.

  The next heading of the letter was ‘Essentially the crime works like this’ followed by:

  1. some food stocks are poisoned;

  2. a letter is sent advising them of the poisoning, demanding money

  3. if [company name] pay then poisoning stops

  4. if [company name] don’t pay then the poisonings continue and increase demands until they give in.

  The next heading ‘To do’:

  Develop an extortion letter

  Find out details

  Leave a message in the personal section of designated paper

  Sort out safe laundry details

  Get the name and number of the CEO’s secretary

  Get details of Sydney delivery service

  Do a letter and do initial fax

  Get Melbourne, Sydney and Adelaide paper details for lodgement times

  The next heading ‘Notes’:

  Don’t leave fingerprints on anything, whether a caravan, rubbish, letter, poison stock, etcetera

  Chosen items are (Company brand) coffee jars, tube of condensed milk

  Don’t use alcohol wipe cloths

  Use a reverse suction on tube to stop leakage

  Four tins of [company product]

  Five [Company brand] chocolate bars

  Under ‘Detailed plan’:

  Finish items

  Go to Sydney

  Take computers, printer, and printer paper

  Go to designated store in Sydney area

  Check out caravan park near city

  Go and scout store to be used as target

  Go to different store and buy item


  Back to caravan park

  Fill in letter, details, print and disguise myself

  Numerous other exhibits were located in the home, particularly in the bedroom, including various documents pertaining to the bank account and information about obtaining fake identifications. There were also syringes with needles, a Sydney tourist guide, rubber gloves, a list of the company’s products on a pamphlet about boycotting it and an itemised list involving the preparation of a disguise.

  Mills was then taken back to the St Kilda Road police complex where he was interviewed and formally charged with demanding money with menaces. Bail was refused. The following day he took part in an identification parade and the bank teller officially identified him. He was then extradited to Sydney to face the charges.

  The whole episode, from the beginning of the investigation to Mills’s arrest, had taken fourteen days. Not only was the food company extremely relieved, but two major food retailers expressed their appreciation and congratulated the police.

  In November 1997 Mills pleaded guilty. He told the court that he had first contemplated this crime as the scenario for a novel he wished to write. He was sentenced to five years’ gaol with a non-parole period of two years.

  CHAPTER

  12

  Risk assessments

  No two negotiations are the same.

  In every case, the team needs to assess the risks involved to decide how the negotiation will be carried out. Each method has advantages and disadvantages. The deciding factors are the risks involved for the negotiator, any hostages and, of course, the general public. Taken into consideration are issues such as whether the subject has a weapon, if so, what type; whether the negotiator could become a target or a hostage; how the negotiator will liaise with other team members and how the question of the negotiator’s personal safety can be addressed. Such issues need to be weighed up in deciding how advisable a face-to-face negotiation might be.