British Voices

by William Sheehan

  The training of the IRA was carried out entirely in secret, Company parades often taking place in some isolated spot on Sunday afternoons. On these occasions the surrounding hills would be carefully picquetted with scouts, which made it very difficult for the Crown Forces to approach the ‘parade ground’ unseen.

  The IRA Intelligence Service was, of course, easy owing to the majority of the population being friendly, but nevertheless it reached a very high standard of efficiency, and every movement, and very often every intended movement, of the Crown Forces was known; information was passed about in an uncanny sort of way without any organisation being apparent on the surface.

  In consequence of this, it was essential for the utmost secrecy to be maintained in the preparation of plans for military operation and especially in the arrangements for the movements either of troops or of individuals. I found from personal experience that it was fatal to issue orders for any operation more than an hour or two before the troops were due to start, and then the plan should be known only to one or two necessary officers before the troops actually paraded. It is impossible in work of this kind to prevent soldiers and very often even officers, from prejudicing the chances of success of a whole operation by one or two unguarded remarks.

  Communications

  Owing to the constant searches carried out by the Crown Forces, it was exceedingly difficult for the IRA to issue anything in the way of written orders, but they did succeed, in spite of these difficulties, in an extraordinary way of getting their orders circulated. This they did largely by verbal instructions issued at fixed meeting places – often in selected farmhouses, public houses, etc. and it was these meeting places which it was one of our main objects to find out and surprise.

  Operations were discussed and planned at a meeting of the Brigade Council, which was usually held fortnightly, the meeting place being changed each time. At the meeting battalion commanders were present and received their instructions for forthcoming operation.

  Women were employed largely for carrying messages and orders about, and as these could only be searched by ‘women searchers’, who were not often available when required, it will be seen that the IRA ‘Lines of communications’ were not at all vulnerable.

  The Crown Forces

  I will now attempt to outline briefly the organisation of the Crown Forces during the period under review:

  (a) The RIC

  The Royal Irish Constabulary was organised by ‘Districts’ and‘Counties’ with an officer or Inspector in charge of each. The ‘County’ included a number of ‘Districts’ and a ‘District’ usually consisted of a ‘District Headquaters’, where the DI lived, and a number of outlying barracks, where about eight to twelve policemen lived under a Sergeant. Their duty was primarily the maintenance of law and order in their locality and it is clear that in these isolated posts, which were often eight or ten miles apart, they were not in a position to carry out offensive operations against the rebels. Previous to 1920 their ‘moral’ had been high, but owing to the continuous activities of the IRA against them during that year, and the lack of proper support, their morale, with very few exceptions, gave way and thereafter they were of little assistance except to act as local guides.

  To increase their strength, a number of ex-soldiers were enlisted in England and drafted to the various local Barracks; these were nicknamed the ‘Black and Tans’. They were generally a very fine lot of men, and would have done well under other conditions.

  (b) The Military

  The country was divided up into Divisional Brigade. and Battalion areas, each unit being responsible for the area allotted to it. These areas were usually much too large to control effectively – for instance – my own Battalion at the beginning of 1920 was responsible for an area stretching from Queenstown to Castletownbere, a distance of approximately 100 miles in length, and the Battalion only had strength of about 600 men! These areas were subsequently reduced by the arrival of fresh Battalions, but even at the end our Battalion area stretched from Carrigaline on the east to Ballineen on the west, and from Crookstown on the north to the sea on the south – an area of 400 square miles.

  Our Battalion headquarters was at Kinsale, but in consequence of the large area, it was necessary to form a number of Company Detachments; these were established at Queenstown, Bantry and Bandon, but the two former were handed over to other units early in1920 and other detachments formed as will be seen later.

  The duty of the military at this time was to act in ‘Aid of the Civil Power’, ie, to support the RIC with troops as required, especially when they were attempting to arrest some of the ringleaders of the Sinn Féin movement. The Military at this time had no authority to act alone except in the cases of emergency, but had always to be accompanied by a number of the RIC.

  (c) The Auxiliaries

  This body was formed in the summer of 1920 and, though affiliated to the RIC, they had an independent organisation under their own officers. They consisted entirely of ex-officers and worked by companies, each company being allotted a district to work in where the rebel organisation appeared to be strongest. They eventually came under the Military area commander for tactical purposes, and were of assistance in the taking over responsibilities for the parts of the Military areas, but their independent status did not always make for smooth working, and the old difficulty arose of a force being under one commander for tactical purposes and another for administrative.

  I now come to a description of the struggle between the IRA and the Crown Forces between January 1920 and April 1921, and I will divide this into three periods.

  January – September 1920

  The object of Sinn Féin at this time, as has been pointed out, was to take over all administrative control of the country and to overthrow all British authority. To enable them to do this, it was necessary to prevent the Crown Forces from interfering with their courts, Local Government meetings, etc. The Activities of the IRA were, therefore, directed at that time against the RIC as being the representatives of the British Government and the only force which knew sufficient about the local activities of Sinn Féin to be able to take action against them. At this time the IRA leaders undoubtedly wished to avoid contact with the military. Their activities took the form of attacks on RIC Barracks at night, murder of policemen and a boycott of the RIC, ie, all shopkeepers were warned not to supply them with goods under penalty of death.

  The government retaliated during the early part of this period by the arrest of a selected number of the IRA leaders; these arrests were carried out at night by the police assisted by military, the greatest care had to be exercised in approaching the houses of the wanted men, as they immediately made off if they got warning of the approach of Crown Forces. Troops usually proceeded out in lorries, which were left a mile or so from the house to be raided.

  In May 1920 the morale of the RIC was badly shaken by the release of all the men who had been arrested, as these men immediately returned to their homes and organised the murder of those members of the RIC who had been instrumental in effecting their arrests. Attacks on the RIC Barracks increased and were of almost nightly occurrence. It, therefore, became the chief duty of the Military to protect the police by sending out relief parties in lorries whenever news was received that a police barracks was being attacked. To enable this news to be received in time wireless sets were erected on all RIC Barracks and were of great value in transmitting information.

  When organising an attack on a Barracks, however, the IRA invariably blocked all approaches by felling trees across the road, this work being carried out by labour impressed locally, and it was therefore practically impossible for the military parties to arrive in time to attack the IRA before they had made off. On the other hand they were not often successful in capturing a barracks except when they managed to get an explosive charge under the wall and blow them up.

  In consequence of these continual attacks and the powerlessness of the few RIC in each barracks for offensive operat
ions, a change of policy was decided on, and a number of the smaller barracks wereclosed down the men being concentrated on the larger barracks and, to assist them in their offensive operations, Military Detachments, usually of one or two platoons, were formed in the vicinity of each RIC barracks. The commander of these detachments had a considerable responsibility and also scope for initiative. It was during this period that the really systematic collection of military intelligence was commenced, which proved to be invaluable for the operations carried out the following year. All officers were instructed to patrol their district freely and to get to know the country and the inhabitants thoroughly.

  The following is a good example of the sort of thing which happened during this period.

  On Sunday 25 July, Sgt. Mulhern, the Crime Special Sergeant of the RIC at Bandon, was entering the Catholic Church for Mass, when two men stopped him in the porch and shot him dead. They then quietly walked off, and though a large part of the congregation had seen and no doubt recognised them, they one and all refused to give evidence as to their identity.

  The following night, I took a picked man and proceeded to the house of the local IRA leader, which was situated only about 500 yards from our barracks, with a view to watching it; on entering the garden a shot rang out and the man with me fell dead, shot through the head by a fellow armed with a shot-gun loaded with slugs; we had walked on to the top of an IRA picquet which was protecting the house.

  At dawn the following morning we carried out a raid on the house of one of the local IRA leaders, hoping to find some of the gunmen there, but without success. The same evening, however, we again raided the same house and on this occasion we were met in the farmyard by two well-dressed men, who said they were on holiday from Dublin. After we had been talking to them for some time. I was informed by the Cpl. in charge of my patrol that he had noticed the man I was talking to slipping pieces of paper from his pocket into the hedgebehind. On investigation we found papers, which proved that this man was an important officer in the IRA and further search disclosed a box hidden in a bank, which contained most valuable information about the local IRA organisation. The two men were subsequently proved to be the commandant of the local IRA battalion and his quartermaster, the two men who had doubtless organised the murder on the previous day.

  During this period the troops carried out a great number of searches for arms, but usually without result. It is so easy in a country of this nature to hide arms and ammunition that it is almost impossible to find them and I am of the opinion that it is in reality a waste of time to carry out too many searches unless very definite information has been obtained.

  Bloodhounds were used in the endeavour to track down the culprits after a police murder, but although they gave several very good ‘runs’, there was seldom a kill.The difficulty was to get the dog on the ground soon enough after the murder had been committed.

  October-December, 1920

  About the commencement of October 1920, the IRA decided that they could no longer ignore the military, but must include them in their operations. With this end in view they decided to strengthen their forces by the formation of Flying Columns. These columns were composed of those men who were permanently ‘on the run’, ie, these who could not live at their homes for fear of being arrested and included, therefore, all the most desperate men in the IRA. A column consisted of about 25 men and moved about the country billetting on different farms – usually those occupied by Loyalist farmers. They were well armed and very mobile, travelling on bicycles or in light country carts, and used entirely for offensive operations. It was about this time that they first began to ambush military lorries, and I will describe to you one of the first of these ambushes that took place, in which I happened to be concerned.

  One night early in October, I took out a party in two Crossley lorries (about sixteen men all told) to raid a village called Castletown, which lies to the northwest of Bandon. On the way we had to pass through another village called Newcestown, where we arrived about 10.15pm. Seeing the local ‘pub’ full of men, I stopped the cars and had it surrounded, but as we did so a man, who pretended to be drunk, got past the sentry at the back door, and slipped away. After searching the remainder who all gave false names, but who, I knew well, were really just the local Company returned from parade, and after finding no arms or documents on them, we continued out journey, but had not gone more than 300 or 400 yards when a heavy fire was opened on both cars from behind the hedge on the side of the road. The cars were, of course, silhouetted in the light made by the head-lamps and were an excellent target. After passing through the ambush I stopped the cars and counter-attacked the enemy, who, by this time, had retired across the next field, and of course, could not be seen in the dark. The result of this small action was that we had two officers killed and three men wounded, while we had probably inflicted no damage on the enemy. It subsequently transpired that the man who escaped out of the back-door of the ‘pub’, was the commandant of the local Flying Column which had just been formed, and which was at the time billetted at a farm just outside the village. He had just time to get them into position while we were busy in the ‘pub’. This man’s name was John Hales, who subsequently became a Deputy of the Free State Parliament, and was himself murdered in Dublin about a year ago.

  In November 1920 took place the murder of fifteen officers in Dublin in their bedrooms on a Sunday morning.

  During this period the Military had no powers of retaliation and were entirely on the defensive. In the bad areas lorry convoys escorted by armoured cars had to be organised, to take supplies to the various detachments and this was practically the only means of communication between one detachment and another. In fact, the whole of thestrength of the Army was taken up with defensive and protective measures; the Army was forced, by the role imposed upon it, to entirely violate the principle of ‘offensive action’, and ‘Economy of Force’. Lorry convoy tactics became quite a little problem in itself. It soon became evident that lorry convoys must consist of not less than six lorries with a suitable escort. To avoid all being ambushed simultaneously, these lorries were divided into two or more groups, which moved at 300 or 400 yds interval. Part of the escort was placed in each group, the idea being that, if ambushed, the other group would stop and the escort counter-atack the ambushers.

  Very strict discipline was required to prevent lorries closing up too near to each other, or individual lorries becoming detached owing to breakdowns, etc. Experiments were made with armour plating on lorries, but though useful for town work, it was found that the lorries became too heavy for work on the country roads. Most of the lorries were, however, provided with plating to protect the drivers. Armoured cars (heavy pattern) if available accompanied the conveys.

  The effect of the defensive attitude of the Government was to greatly raise the ‘morale’ of the IRA which increased in strength and efficiency and so bad did conditions become that Martial Law had to be declared in the most disturbed parts of Southern Ireland – Cork – Kerry – etc., on 10 December 1920.

  January-March 1921

  The main results of the declaration of Martial Law were:-

  Operations assumed a military aspect, the military henceforth were able to function by themselves and it was not necessary for the military to be accompanied by the RIC.

  The RIC practically ceased to function except for ordinary routine business, e.g., granting of licences, etc., individually, they were of assistance for supplying local intelligence.

  The military authorities took over the complete control of thecounty as far as the restoration of law and order was concerned. The principal steps taken by the GOC 6th Division to this were:

  (i) The setting up of summary courts in the Bn. areas which were presided over by officers specially detailed for this duty. These officers were empowered to pass a sentence of six months imprisonment or to award a fine up to £50.

  (ii) A standing Courts-Martial sat at Cork consisting entirely of special Courts-M
artial officers. This Court dealt with the more serious cases.

  (iii) Drum-head Courts-Martial for dealing with Rebels caught with arms in their hands.

  (iv) Penalties for harbouring rebels, or for failing to report ambushes, etc., or giving a wrong name.

  (v) A restriction was put on the holding of Fairs and Markets in the more disturbed areas, as these provided opportunities for the IRA leaders to meet together and discuss plans.

  (vi) To hamper the communication of the IRA, the use of motor cars, except by specially authorised persons, e.g. Doctors, etc. was forbidden. The use of bicycles was similarly prohibited.

  (vii) A curfew was declared in certain bad areas. This was later extended to cover the whole of the Martial Law area and was of great assistance to the Military, as it meant that anybody out after the curfew was automatically a law-breaker.

  In addition to the above, the policy of internment was introduced about this time, by which any man, who was known to be a leader in the IRA, could be interned without trial.

  It was realised now that the only chance of success was to take offensive action against the IRA. To enable this to be done, it was necessary to economise forces by reducing the number of small detachments in existence and accordingly the detachments at Ballineenand Timoleague were withdrawn, those at Bandon and Clonakilty being retained to provide bases for operations, this not only made available a number of men for active operations, but also reduced the amount of mechanical transport required for the supply of these detachments, which about this time became a matter of considerable difficulty.