British Voices

by William Sheehan

  (iii) Topography of the Country

  Under this heading comes information as to the most covered approach to each farm or house: the existence of any lanes or ‘borheens’ down which any of the enemy might escape and which should be ‘blocked’ before the house was approached; good view points from which observation could be kept on the surrounding country during operations; and the state of roads, tracks, etc.

  1. Methods of Obtaining Information

  Owing to the secret nature of the hostile forces and the strict oath taken by then, bribes were of little use, and, although a limited amount of money was available for this purpose, I only on one occasion found any opportunity of using it. The most profitable methods were as follows:

  (i) Most important of all, an IO must move about the country and hunt for information. It will not come to him if he sits in his office all day.

  (ii) He must keep in close touch with the Loyalists – especially those who are not afraid to tell him what they know.

  This is not always an easy thing to do, as if the IRA suspected a Loyalist of giving information or being too friendly with the Crown Forces, it meant certain death to him. It was our usual practice therefore to approach their houses after dark, and very long night journeys often had to be made in order to do this.

  Captured documents were often of great value. Notebooks often contained the rolls of the local Company, list of arms and ammunition in possession, etc. The well known Lord Mayor of Cork, Terence MacSwiney, was captured as the result of a letter ordering a litigant to appear at a Sinn Féin Court which fell into our hands.

  Information obtained direct from members of the IRA. This was very rare, but I had in my area an officer of one of the local Companies whom I had had convicted of some small offence and sentenced to six months imprisonment. As he was the owner of a farm, he found it very inconvenient to go to prison, and so suggested that, if I would get his sentence postponed, he would give me weekly reports of the state of his Company. This I agreed to, but threatened to enforce the sentence if the reports did not come in regularly. He proved very useful.

  Anonymous letters. These were very numerous and had to be treated with a good deal of suspicion. It was often the case of one family trying to get a bit of its own back on a neighbouring family.

  2. Functions of the Battalion Intelligence Officers

  The main duties of the Battalion IO in warfare of this nature are, I think the following:

  (i) To obtain Intelligence of the nature I have indicated above.

  (ii) To submit to his CO plans for suggested operations based on the nature of intelligence in his possession.

  (iii) Identify prisoners when captured. This was one of the most difficult things in the whole campaign. The hostile leaders were seldom known by sight and they invariably gave false names. A number of them thus slipped through our hands after being actually captured.

  Picture 50 to 60 civilians lined up in front of you, out of which you have to pick any of the IRA leaders. At first it seems almost impossible, but after a little practice one becomes able to select a few likely ‘types’. It then becomes a question of getting these few men identified and here the IOs’ knowledge of the local civilians comes in.

  A successful method which I practised for some time was to ask any of the old inhabitants for the names of the suspected men. If the names they gave did not agree with those given themselves, you knew you had got a ‘wrong un’.

  Of course, we could not keep a man indefinitely if we could not identify him, and we frequently had to release men whom we were convinced were rebel leaders, from sheer inability to find out who they were.

  I think it will be clear from what I have said that the duties of the Battalion IO are very important ones: in fact, the whole success of the conduct of operations in any given area really depends on him. I am of the opinion, therefore, that this position should be filled by a fairly senior officer, who has sufficient standing in the Battalion to enable him to carry out the duties I have described.

  That the Intelligence officers did not escape the attention of the IRA is shown by the followings instructions, dated the 16th February, 1921 – ‘it has been decided by the IRA headquarters to compile a list of “aggressive” Intelligence Officers as soon as possible. In determining what IOs would come under the heading of “aggressive”, the following points would be a deciding factor in any decision arrived at:

  ‘Do they accompany the Military in raids?

  Were they concerned in the arrest of Volunteers?

  Were they concerned in giving evidence against Volunteers?

  Were they concerned in the death of any Volunteers?

  Were they concerned in having to go “on the run?”

  Do they spy on Volunteers or Volunteers’ Houses?

  Do they take part in reprisals?

  You will also give their full names and addresses with a footnote showing what you think they are worth.’

  It would be very interesting to see what sort of a report one got!

  3. Training of the Troops

  A guerrilla war of this nature demands a very high state of training on the part of troops.The majority of the operations are carried out in small parties and a great many of them at night. Individuality in the NCO and Private Soldier is, therefore, of great value. In this regard the whole Army was seriously handicapped in 1920-21, as a very large proportion of the men in the ranks were youngsters of two or three years’ service, or even less.The work from the Private Soldier’s point of view was very arduous, as escorts were constantly being called for. In addition, it was necessary to put restrictions on the area in which the soldiers could ‘walk out’, for fear of their being kidnapped.

  A large number of the raids and searches carried out were naturally unsuccessful, and in these conditions, there was great danger of the troops becoming tired and slack. To avoid this, we decided to try and make them interested in the proceedings which we did by means of lectures and talks on local IRA celebrities, etc. We also encouraged them to bring in any information they might pick up. The result was extremely good, as the troops, almost without exception, became very keen on the work and took a great interest in everything that was done.

  Of course, the work there was excellent training for young troops, as they always had to be very much on the alert to prevent being surprised – especially when they were on sentry duty.

  Their chief failing was in the lack of Musketry training they had received. In this type of warfare targets are few and fleeting. I think those who have tried it will agree that it is no easy matter to hit a single man running fast and across country, especially when you have often run some distance yourself. Troops taking part in such warfare should have very thorough musketry training as each individual man really becomes a sniper.

  4.Use of Arms other than Infantry

  Artillery

  Permission was not given for the use of Artillery till the summer of 1922, at Belleck, and therefore we had no experience of it. I do not consider, however, that there is any scope for the use of artillery in warfare of this nature, unless the rebels form themselves into larger bodies than they did in Ireland. As it was, there were really no targets upon which artillery could fire.

  Tanks

  These were too slow moving and too noisy to be of much use in the very open warfare of the South of Ireland. They might, perhaps, be useful in large cities for clearing streets, or taking on rebel strongholds, such as the Four Courts in Dublin.

  Armoured Cars

  Two types of armoured car were used – the heavy and slow Peerless, and the fast Rolls Royce. Both were very useful.

  (i) The Peerless. This was used chiefly to economise manpower in escorts, etc. It was suitable to accompany three-ton lorry convoys, and also for local work, e.g., mail escort to the station, escort for officers drawing pay, ration parties, etc. It was a mistake to send Crossley cars with the Peerless AC, as the reduced speed of the latter caused a heavy strain on the axles of th
e Crossleys.

  (ii) The Rolls Royce. The chief uses of this were:

  (a) To escort Crossley cars or Sunbeam touring cars. In this way they were usually employed when Brigade commanders or staff officers wanted to make a tour of the Brigade area.

  (b) For offensive operations. They were used with great success for sudden descents on given areas in towns, or on outlying country villages, when the state of the road permitted. Owing to their speed and quiet running they were particularly suitable for this work. They carried a crew of four and were armed with a Vickers Gun. A Hotchkiss gun was often carried also, as a reserve and for use if the AC broke down.

  Aeroplanes

  Owing to the shortage of landing grounds these were little used. It is doubtful whether an airman can see much in a country of this nature, but he should, I think, be able to reconnoitre roads and report whether they are trenched or blocked. Also if an ambush is reported in a definite locality the RAF could be asked to make a reconnaissance of that locality. This I did on one occasion, sending the request by wireless, and having a message with the report dropped in our Barrack Square at Kinsale about a couple of hours later. Where landing grounds were available, aeroplanes would be of great assistance as a quick means of transport for Commanders and Staff Officers.

  5. Staff Duties

  The Brigades in the South had very large areas to control, and their duties, especially after the declaration of Martial Law, became very arduous.

  The Cork Brigade at one time had as many as nine Battalions besides a large amount of MT etc. The question, which then arose was whether it was better to maintain the existing Brigade and increase the staff, or form a new Brigade and divide the area. The former alternative was adopted, the argument in favour of it being that it would take a new Brigade staff some weeks or even months to pick up the threads of a vary intricate situation. The existing Brigade staff was, therefore, increased until it consisted of:

  1 BM

  1 Assistant BM

  3 Staff Captains (one of whom dealt entirely with legal matters)

  2 Intelligence Officers

  1 Signal Officer

  1 MT Officer.

  Even then the work was found to be too much for one staff and after the Truce, the area was actually divided into two in view of possible further trouble. The duties of the ‘G’ Staff are to co-ordinate the work of other units, to arrange for the maintenance of communications between units, and Brigade HQ, and to disseminate information. The majority of the actual operations must be left to the initiative of the unit commanders, but the work of the Mobile Columns should be contained by Brigade headquarters.

  6. General

  Ruses – All ranks must always be on the alert to avoid being taken in by the enemy ruses. Reports were frequently received of the IRA ambushes in outlying districts, these reports having been spread by the IRA themselves with a view to inducing us to send out a party to clear the road. This party would then be attacked on the way out.

  The people who wage guerrilla warfare are usually adepts in the art of ‘bluff ’. On one occasion, the secretary of the Demobilized Soldiers and Sailors Federation asked for an interview with me. On being admitted he offered to help us. We had several interviews until I discovered one day that he also held the position of Battalion commandant in the IRA and that his visits were designed to gain first-hand information of the interior of our Barracks!

  Ruses were also employed on our side quite frequently. One of the most successful was what was known as the ‘Q’ lorry. This was an ordinary three-ton lorry, armour plated inside and loaded with a number of blankets. Inside was a crew with a couple of MGs. The idea was to send this lorry out into a desolate part of the country, where it would break down and be ostensibly left on the side of the road. The enemy would then come along to burn it, which gave the occupants the opportunity of some very good shooting.

  Routine Movements. These were sometimes necessary, but should be, wherever possible, avoided. The Macroom Ambush of Auxiliaries and a great many other successful IRA operations were made possible by quite unnecessary routine movements. When routine movements are unavoidable, those making them should be accompanied by an escort capable of dealing with any situation that may arise.

  The enemy, in a struggle of this nature, disregards all the ordinary rules of war. It is the duty of all ranks, therefore, to avoid any risk of being kidnapped. A good rule is to always ask yourself, before proceeding anywhere either on business or pleasure, ‘can the enemy possibly expect that I should make this journey?’ If there is any chance of him doing so, then adequate precautions should be taken.

  Every civilian should be looked upon as a potential enemy. It was clearly laid down in instructions issued that the safety of the soldiers is the first consideration. A favourite trick of the IRA was to mix with the crowd in a busy thoroughfare and suddenly make an assault on any military or police patrol that might be passing.

  7. Suggested Future Tactics

  As far as I know, no official book has been published on the subject of guerrilla warfare, such as we had in Ireland, but I will give my own ideas on the best tactics to be pursued should such conditions recur.

  The question appears to resolve itself into the rival claims of the Block-House system, such as was adopted in South Africa, and the Mobile Column system.

  The possibility of building block-houses was often discussed in 1921, but we reckoned then that to work any block-house system, we should require a great many more troops than there were at the time in the whole of Ireland. The country is so thick and intricate that it would be impossible to stop small parties of men getting through unless the block-houses were very close together.

  On the other hand, if sufficient men were available, a line of temporary post or ‘stops’ along the edge of the area being worked by the Mobile Column, would, I think, be of great assistance, as they would restrict the area of manoeuvres at the disposal of the enemy. In our area, for example, these might have been placed along the lines of the Bandon River while the mobile columns were working to the south of it.

  In either case, whether block-houses are established or not, offensive action must be taken and this can be best done with a number of mobile columns moving about the country and mutually co-operating with each other. The composition of a column of this sort, of course, depends on the strength of the opposition likely to be encountered, but the basis in which it should be worked out is as follows:

  Required:

  A. Infantry

  (i) Escort for horse transport

  (ii) A bicycle patrol for long distance action

  (iii) A foot patrol for short distance action

  B. Cavalry or MTs: A small body to work in conjunction with the Infantry.

  Their role would be to ride on ahead by lanes or country tracks and occupy a position from which they could observe anybody trying to escape from the Infantry. They would then be in a position to ride them down and capture them.

  A number of mounted gunners had arrived in Ireland at the time of the Truce, and this was the way in which it was intended to employ them.

  On the above lines, a suitable organisation for a mobile Column during the Operations under review would have been:

  Infantry: two strong platoons – say 60 OR of which two section would be mounted on bicycles.

  MI: One Troop.

  Each of these columns should be supplied with some form of WT, to enable them to be controlled from a central position. This was a deficiency from which we suffered considerably in 1921, as we foundthat very often the best information was obtained by Brigade headquarters in Cork and they had no means of transmitting it quickly to the column in the field.

  Another difficulty, which handicapped us severely, was the system by which the meat and bread rations for the Mobile Columns had to be obtained from the local towns. This meant that the butcher and baker in these towns had to be warned a day or so beforehand to have these rations ready, which was practically equivalent
to publishing the directions of our next move. The element of surprise was practically forfeited. It is important that the Columns employed on work of this nature should be as self contained as far as their supplies are concerned. They should either carry them with them in the form of preserved rations or be accompanied by a butcher and purchase directly from the farms.

  It is interesting to note that Sir John Moore, when he was stationed at Bandon in 1798, was confronted with a very similar problem to that which faced us in 1920-21 and that he also adopted the Mobile Column system, working it in much the same way as we did in 1921, ie, several columns co-operating and all working towards one given point.

  Conclusion

  The importance of the strict observance of the Principles of War as laid down in FSR is perhaps more clearly seen in this type of warfare than in any other:

  (i) Every operation or small raid must have an objective

  (ii) Offensive action is essential to success

  (iii) Surprise must be aimed at in every operation, closely allied to this is Security, ie, safety from surprise

  (iv) The Crown Forces had to be concentrated before offensive action could be taken. It was only thus that Economy of Force could be effected and the required number of troops made availablefor active operations

  (v) Mobile Columns are useless unless they have real mobility, and finally

  (vi) Close co-operation between neighbouring area commanders is essential. Otherwise quiet districts will be left into which the enemy can retire and rest when heavily pressed.

  CHAPTER 9

  Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery

  Details

  This letter is part of a collection of personal papers of Montgomery’s stored in the Imperial War Museum. Montgomery’s military career began as a second lieutenant in the Royal Warwickshire Regiment in 1908; he was promoted Lieutenant in 1910, and Captain in 1914. He served as a Brigade Major in France from 1915 to 1917, as a General Staff Officer, Grade 2 (Temporary Major) from 1917 to 1918, and as a General Staff Officer, Grade 1 (Temporary Lieutenant Colonel) from 1918 to 1919. During 1919, he served with the British Army of the Rhine for several months, as a General Staff Officer, Grade 2. He returned to the role of Brigade Major with the 17th Infantry Brigade in Cork, from 5 January 1921 to 23 May 1922. Montgomery left Ireland to serve in the United Kingdom, in the Southern and later the Northern Commands. He served at the Staff College, Camberley, from 1926 to 1929, as a Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, and was an Instructor at the Indian Army Staff College at Quetta from 1934 to 1937. Montgomery returned to England as a Brigade Commander with Southern Command. In 1938, he was appointed a Major General, and given command of a division in Palestine and Transjordan. Hecommanded the Third Division in France in 1939, and in 1942 he was given command of the Eighth Army, winning the Battle of El Alamein. He was the Allied assault leader at Normandy. Later he was given command of the Twenty-First Army Group and promoted to Field Marshal. Montgomery was Commander in Chief of the British Army of Occupation in Germany. In 1946, he was made Chief of the Imperial General Staff. From 1951 to 1958 he was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. He retired from military service in 1958.