Since I wish to discuss what the institutions of the city of Rome were and the circumstances which led to their perfection, let me say that those who have written about republics declare that there are in them three kinds of governments, which they call principality, aristocracy, and democracy; and that those who organize a city most often turn to one of these, depending upon whichever seems more appropriate to them. Others—and wiser men, according to the judgment of many—are of the opinion that there are six types of government: three of these are very bad; three others are good in themselves but are so easily corruptible that they, too, can become pernicious. Those which are good are the three mentioned above; those which are bad are three others which depend upon the first three, and each of them is, in a way, similar to its good counterpart, so that they easily jump from one form to another. For the principality easily becomes tyrannical; aristocrats can very easily produce an oligarchy; democracy is converted into anarchy with no difficulty. So that if c8 founder of a republic organizes one of these three governments in a city, he organizes it there for a brief period of time only, since no precaution can prevent it from slipping into its contrary on account of the similarity, in such a case, of the virtue and the vice.
These variations of government are born among men by chance: for in the beginning of the world, when its inhabitants were few, they lived at one time dispersed and like wild beasts; then, when their numbers multiplied, they gathered together and, in order to defend themselves better, they began to search among themselves for one who was stronger and braver, and they made him their leader and obeyed him. From this sprang the knowledge of what things are good and honorable, as distinct from the pernicious and the evil: for if someone were to harm his benefactor, this aroused hatred and compassion among men, since they cursed the ungrateful and honored those who showed gratitude; and thinking that the same injuries could also be committed against themselves, they made laws to avoid similar evils and instituted punishments for transgressors. Thus, the recognition of justice came about. The result was that, later on, when they had to elect a prince, they did not select the bravest man but rather the one who was most prudent and most just. But when they began to choose the prince by hereditary succession rather than by election, the heirs immediately began to degenerate from the level of their ancestors and, putting aside acts of valor, they thought that princes had nothing to do but to surpass other princes in luxury, lasciviousness, and in every other form of pleasure. So, as the prince came to be hated he became afraid of this hatred and quickly passed from fear to violent deeds, and the immediate result was tyranny.
From this there came next the destructions, the conspiracies, and the plots against princes, carried out not by those who were either timid or weak but by those who surpassed others in generosity, greatness of spirit, wealth, and nobility: these men could not stand the disreputable life of such a prince. The masses, therefore, following the authority of these powerful men, took up arms against the prince, and after he had been eliminated they obeyed those men as their liberators. And since those men hated the very idea of a single ruler, they constituted for themselves a government, and in the beginning, since they remembered the past tyranny, they governed according to the laws instituted by themselves, subordinating their own interests to the common good, and they managed and maintained both their private and public affairs with the greatest of care. When this administration later passed to their sons, who did not understand the changeability of Fortune, had never experienced bad times, and could not be satisfied with equality among citizens, they turned to avarice, ambition, and the violation of other men’s women, and they caused a government of the aristocrats to become a government of the few, with no regard to any civil rights; so that in a short time they experienced the same fate as the tyrant, for as the masses were sick of their rule, they assisted, in any way they could, anyone who might plan to attack these rulers, and thus there soon arose someone who, with the aid of the masses, destroyed them. And since the memory of the prince and of the injuries received from him was still fresh, they turned to a democratic form of government, having destroyed the government ruled by a few men and not wishing to return to that ruled by a prince; and they organized it in such a way that neither the few powerful men nor a prince might have any authority whatsoever in it. And because all governments are, at the outset, respected, this democratic government was maintained awhile, but not for a long time, particularly after the generation that organized it passed away; it immediately turned to anarchy, where neither the individual citizen nor the public official is feared; each individual lived according to his own wishes, so that every day a thousand wrongs were done; and so, constrained by necessity, either because of the suggestion of some good man or in order to flee such anarchy, it returned again to the principality; and from that, step by step, the government moved again in the direction of anarchy, in the manner and for the reasons just given.
And this is the cycle through which all states that have governed themselves or that now govern themselves pass; but rarely do they return to the same forms of government, for virtually no state can possess so much vitality that it can sustain so many changes and remain on its feet. But it may well happen that while a state lacking counsel and strength is in difficulty, it becomes subject to a neighboring state which is better organized; but if this were not the case, then a state might be liable to pass endlessly through the cycle of these governments.
Let me say, therefore, that all the forms of government listed are defective: the three good ones because of the brevity of their lives, the three bad ones because of their inherent harmfulness. Thus, those who were prudent in establishing laws recognized this fact and, avoiding each of these forms in themselves, chose one that combined them all, judging such a government to be steadier and more stable, for when there is in the same city-state a principality, an aristocracy, and a democracy, one form keeps watch over the other.
Among those who have deserved great praise for having established such constitutions is Lycurgus, who organized his laws in Sparta in such a manner that, assigning to the king, the aristocrats, and the people their respective roles, he created a state which lasted more than eight hundred years, to his everlasting credit, and resulted in the tranquillity of that city. The contrary happened to Solon, who organized the laws in Athens: for in organizing only a democratic state there he made it of such a brief existence that before he died he saw arise the tyranny of Pisistratus; and although forty years later the latter’s heirs were driven away and Athens returned to its freedom, having reestablished the democratic state according to the institutions of Solon, it did not last more than a hundred years. In spite of the fact that many laws which were not foreseen by Solon were established in Athens in order to restrain the insolence of the upper class and the anarchy of the populace, nevertheless Athens lived a very brief time in comparison to Sparta because Solon did not mix democracy with the power of the principality and with that of the aristocrats.
But let us come to Rome. In spite of the fact that she never had a Lycurgus to organize her at the beginning so that she might exist free for a long time, nevertheless, because of the friction between the plebeians and the senate, so many circumstances attended her birth that chance brought about what a lawgiver had not accomplished. If Rome did not receive Fortune’s first gift, she received the second: for her early institutions, although defective, nevertheless did not deviate from the right path that could lead them to perfection. Romulus and all the other kings passed many good laws in accordance with a free government; but since their goal was to found a kingdom and not a republic, when that city became free she lacked many institutions which were necessary to organize her under freedom, institutions which had not been set up by those kings. And when it happened that her kings lost their power for the reasons and in the ways described earlier, nonetheless those who drove them out, having immediately established two consuls in place of the king, drove out only the title of king and not royal pow
er; so that, as there were in that republic the consuls and the senate, it came to be formed by only two of the three above-mentioned elements, that is, the principality and the aristocrats. There remained only to make a place for the democratic part of the government. When the Roman nobility became insolent, for the reasons that will be listed below, the people rose up against them; in order not to lose everything, the nobility was forced to concede to the people their own share; and on the other hand, the senate and the consuls retained enough authority so that they could maintain their rank in that republic. And thus there came about the creation of the tribunes of the plebeians, after which the government of the republic became more stable, since each of the three elements of government had its share. And Fortune was so favorable to Rome that even though she passed from a government by kings and aristocrats to one by the people, through those same steps and because of those same reasons which were discussed above, nevertheless the kingly authority was never entirely abolished to give authority to the aristocrats, nor was the authority of the aristocrats diminished completely to give it to the people; but since these elements remained mixed, Rome was a perfect state; and this perfection was produced through the friction between the plebeians and the senate, as the two following chapters will demonstrate at greater length.
CHAPTER III. WHICH EVENTS CAUSED THE CREATION OF THE TRIBUNES OF THE PLEBEIANS IN ROME, MAKING THE REPUBLIC MORE PERFECT
As is demonstrated by all those who discuss civic life (and as history is full of such examples), it is necessary for anyone who organizes a republic and institutes laws to take for granted that all men are evil and that they will always express the wickedness of their spirit whenever they have the opportunity; and when such wickedness remains hidden for a time, this is due to a hidden cause that is not recognized by those without experience of its contrary; but then time, which is said to be the father of every truth, will uncover it.
It seemed that there was the greatest of harmony in Rome between the plebeians and the senate after the Tarquins had been expelled, and that the nobles had set aside their pride and had become more like the people in spirit and were tolerated by all, even the lowest of citizens. This misunderstanding remained concealed, nor was the reason for it evident as long as the Tarquins were alive; for the nobility feared them and were afraid that if they mistreated the plebeians the latter would ally themselves with the Tarquins, and so they treated that class humanely. But when the Tarquins were dead and the fears of the nobility had been lessened, they began to vent upon the plebeians all that poison which they had held within their breasts, and they insulted them in every way they could. Such a thing testifies to what I said above, that men never do good except out of necessity; but when they have the freedom to choose and can do as they please, everything immediately becomes confused and disorderly. Hence it is said that hunger and poverty make men industrious and laws make them good. And where, without laws, something works well by itself, then laws are not necessary; but when this good custom is lacking, laws are immediately necessary. Therefore, when the Tarquins were gone and the fear of them no longer held the nobility in check, it was necessary to consider a new institution which might produce the same effect that the Tarquins produced while they were alive. So, after much uproar and confusion, and when the danger of scandal had been caused by the conflicts between the plebeians and the nobility, the creation of the tribunes came about for the security of the plebeians: and these tribunes were granted such prerogatives and such respect that they could, henceforth, always act as mediators between the plebeians and the senate and could check the insolence of the nobles.
CHAPTER IV. HOW THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PLEBEIANS AND THE ROMAN SENATE MADE THAT REPUBLIC FREE AND POWERFUL
I would not wish to fail to discuss those disturbances which erupted in Rome from the time of the death of the Tarquins to the creation of the tribunes; then I shall bring up other things to argue against the opinion of many who say that Rome was a turbulent republic, full of so much confusion that if good fortune and military ability had not made up for her defects she would have been inferior to any other republic. I cannot deny that Fortune and military organization were reasons for Roman power; but it seems clear to me that these thinkers fail to realize that where there is a good military organization there must also be good institutions, and only rarely does it occur that there is not good fortune as well. But let us go on to other details about this city.
It seems to me that those who criticize the conflicts between the nobles and the plebeians condemn those very things which were the primary cause of Roman liberty, and that they pay more attention to the noises and cries raised by such quarrels than to the good effects that they brought forth; nor do they consider that in every republic there are two different inclinations: that of the people and that of the upper class, and that all the laws which are made in favor of liberty are born of the conflict between the two, as one can easily see from what happened in Rome. From the time of the Tarquins to that of the Gracchi, a period of more than three hundred years, the quarrels of Rome rarely led to exile and very rarely to bloodshed. Thus, one cannot judge these dissensions harmful or such a republic as divided, for in so much time its conflicts sent no more than eight or ten citizens into exile, executed very few of them, and condemned not many more to pay monetary fines. Nor can one reasonably in any way call a republic disordered where such outstanding examples of ability appear, since good examples are born from good education, good education from good laws, and good laws from those quarrels which many condemn without due consideration; for anyone studying carefully the goal of these laws will find that they did not result in any exile or violence out of harmony with the common good, but rather that they gave rise to laws and institutions which benefited public liberty. And if anyone should say that the means were unlawful and almost savage, for the people were crying out against the senate, and the senate against the people; the population was running wildly through the streets, closing their shops, and leaving the city in droves—events which frighten even those who read about them—I reply that every city must have a means by which the people can express their ambition, and especially those cities that wish to make use of the people in important affairs: the city of Rome was among those possessing such means, for when the people wished to obtain a law they either did some of the things mentioned above or they refused to enlist for the wars, so that in order to placate them it was necessary to satisfy them in some measure. And the desires of free peoples are very rarely pernicious to liberty, for they arise from being oppressed or from the suspicion of future oppression. And should these opinions prove to be mistaken, there is the remedy of public meetings, in which some good man of influence may rise up and make a speech showing them that they are mistaken. And, as Cicero says,23 although the populace may be ignorant, it is capable of understanding the truth and yields at once when it is told the truth by a man worthy of its trust.
Therefore, one should be more moderate in criticizing the Roman government and should consider that all the many good effects which came from that republic were produced only from the best causes. And if the quarrels were the reason for the creation of the tribunes, these quarrels merit the highest praise; for besides giving to the people its share of control in the administration, the tribunes were set up as the caretakers of Roman liberty, as will be shown in the following chapter.
CHAPTER V. WHETHER THE PROTECTION OF LIBERTY MAY BE MORE SECURELY PLACED IN THE PEOPLE OR IN THE UPPER CLASSES; AND WHICH HAS THE STRONGEST CAUSE FOR CREATING UPRISINGS, THOSE WHO WISH TO ACQUIRE OR THOSE WHO WISH TO MAINTAIN
Those who have prudently constituted a republic have considered, among the most necessary things to organize, the protection of liberty, and according to whether this is well done or not, that self-governing state will last for a longer or a shorter time. And because in every republic there are powerful men and men of the people, the question has been debated: into whose hands this protection may best be placed. It was placed
in the hands of the nobles by the Spartans and, in our own time, by the Venetians; but it was placed in the hands of the plebeians by the Romans.
Therefore, it is necessary to examine which of these republics made the best choice. And if we look to the causes, there is something to be said for both sides; but if we consider the results, one might choose the side of the nobles since the liberty of Sparta and of Venice lasted longer than that of Rome. And coming to the causes, let me say, taking the side of the Romans first, that those should be put in charge of a thing who have the least desire to usurp it. And without a doubt, if we consider the goal of the nobles and the commoners, we shall see that in the former there is a great desire to dominate and in the latter only a desire not to be dominated, and, as a result, a greater will to live in liberty since they have less hope of acquiring it than the powerful: so, if the common people are set up as the caretakers of liberty, it is reasonable that they will have a greater concern for it, and since they cannot seize it themselves, they will not permit others to do so. On the other hand, those who defend the Spartan and the Venetian constitutions say that those who make powerful men the caretakers of liberty accomplish two good things: first, they more fully satisfy their ambition, and since they have a greater role in the republic, holding the reins of power in their hands, they have more reason to be content; second, they prohibit the restless minds of the plebeians from acquiring a sense of authority, a cause of infinite conflicts and scandals in a republic likely to drive the nobility to some kind of desperate act that will produce bad effects in the course of time. And those who hold this view cite as an example the same Roman republic, for while the tribunes of the people held this authority in their hands, one plebeian consul was not enough for them and they wanted to have them both. After this, they wanted the censorship, the praetorship, and all the other ranks of power in the city; nor did this suffice, for, driven by this same madness, they then began, in the course of time, to worship those men whom they saw ready to beat down the nobility. From this was born the power of Marius and the ruin of Rome. And truly, anyone who would argue well the case for one opinion and the other might remain in doubt as to which of the two ought to be chosen as the caretaker of such liberty, not knowing which type of man was more harmful to a republic: either the one who desires to maintain an honor already acquired or the one who desires to acquire what he does not possess.
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