The following conclusion can be drawn: whenever one finds foreign forces being called in by one faction of men living in a city, it may be taken for granted that the bad ordinances of that city are the cause, for it does not have an institution that provides an outlet for the malignant humors which are born among men to express themselves without their resorting to illegal means; adequate provision for this is made by making a number of judges available before whom public indictments may be made; and these accusations must be given proper importance. These means were so well organized in Rome that during the many conflicts between the plebeians and the senate neither the senate nor the plebeians nor any private citizen ever attempted to use outside forces; for they had a remedy at home and there was no need to search for it outside. And although the above examples are more than sufficient to prove this, I nevertheless wish to use another taken from Livy’s history: there he relates how in Chiusi, a city which in those times was one of the most noble in Tuscany, a certain Lucumones raped the sister of Aruntes; unable to revenge himself because of the power of the rapist, Aruntes went to meet with the Gauls, who at that time ruled in the area which is now called Lombardy, and persuaded them to come with troops to Chiusi, showing them how they would profit by avenging the injustice he had suffered; Livy further explains how Aruntes would not have sought barbarian troops if he had seen a way to avenge himself through the city’s institutions. But just as public accusations are useful in a republic, so false accusations are useless and harmful, as the discussion in the next chapter will show.
CHAPTER VIII. FALSE ACCUSATIONS ARE AS HARMFUL TO REPUBLICS AS THE BRINGING OF PUBLIC CHARGES IS USEFUL
In spite of the fact that the ability of Furius Camillus, who had freed Rome from the domination of the Gauls, made all of the Roman citizens grant him prestige without feeling that they had thereby lost reputation or rank—in spite of this, Manlius Capitolinus could not stand the fact that so much honor and glory was attributed to him, for he felt that insofar as the salvation of Rome was concerned, he deserved as much as Camillus because he had saved the Capitol, and that he was not inferior to him in other praiseworthy military achievements. Therefore, so full of envy was he because of the other’s glory that he could not remain quiet, and when he found he was not able to sow discord among the senators, he turned to the plebeians, spreading among them various dangerous rumors. And among the things he said was that the treasure collected to be given to the Gauls had not been given to them but had, instead, been appropriated by private citizens, and that if it could be recovered it could be used to the public advantage, either in lightening the tax burdens of the plebeians or in resolving some private debts. These words caused a great stir among the plebeians, so much so that they began to hold meetings and cause a number of disturbances in the city; this displeased the senate, which, considering the matter momentous and dangerous, created a dictator to take charge of the case and to check the impetuosity of Manlius. Whereupon the dictator immediately cited him and had him appear in public in a direct confrontation—the dictator among the nobles and Manlius in the midst of the plebeians. Manlius was told to reveal who it was that had this treasure about which he spoke, for it was something that interested the senate as much as it did the plebeians. Manlius did not answer in detail but evaded the question by saying that it was not necessary to tell them who had it, for they already knew; so the dictator had him put in prison.
This example shows how detestable false accusations are in free cities, as well as in every other form of government, and how no institution which controls such accusations should be overlooked. Nor is there a better means of removing the possibility of false accusations than by establishing many outlets for them; for public charges benefit republics as much as false accusations harm them; and there is this difference between the one and the other: false accusations have no need either of witnesses or of any other particular corroboration to prove them, so that anyone can be slandered by anyone else, but no one can be publicly charged in this manner since such accusations require true corroboration and circumstances which demonstrate the truth of the charges. Men are publicly accused before magistrates, before the people, and before governmental councils; they are slandered in the squares and among the colonnades of the loggias. These false accusations are used more where public charges are less frequent and wherever cities are less organized to provide for them. Therefore, an organizer of a republic-should arrange things in such a way that public charges can be made against any citizen without fear or hesitation; and when a charge has been made and thoroughly examined, he must severely punish false accusers, who have no right to complain of this since they had the chance to make accusations publicly and chose to make false accusations in the loggias. And wherever this function of government has not been well organized, great disorders always follow, for slander irritates but does not punish citizens, and those who are irritated will think about avenging themselves, hating rather than fearing the things that are said against them.
This function, as has been mentioned, was well organized in Rome, and it has always been poorly organized in our city of Florence. And as in Rome this institution produced much good, in Florence this lack of order created much harm. And anyone who reads the histories of this latter city will see how many slanders there were used against those of its citizens involved in its important affairs. Of one it was said that he had stolen funds from the public; of another, that he had not carried out some undertaking because he had been bribed; and of a third, that because of his ambition he had done such and such a bad action. As a result of this, hatred arose on every side, from which came divisions; from divisions came parties, and from parties ruin. And if there had been in Florence an institution for publicly bringing charges against its citizens and for punishing slanderers, the countless disturbances which ensued would not have occurred: for those citizens, both the condemned and those who were absolved, would not have been able to do harm to the city, and there would have been fewer men publicly charged than were falsely accused, for as I have said, one cannot accuse anyone publicly as easily as one can accuse him falsely.
And first among the means which a citizen has used to become great is to accuse falsely. When used against powerful citizens who are opposed to his desire for power, such means are very effective, for through them he can take the side of the people and can make them his friend by confirming their low opinion of his opponents. And although one could cite many examples of this, I shall be content with only one: the Florentine army was besieging Lucca under the command of its commissioner, Messer Giovanni Guicciardini.24 Either because of his poor leadership or because of his bad fortune the capture of that city did not take place. At any rate, whatever the case was, Messer Giovanni was blamed for it, for it was rumored that he had been bribed by the Luccans; since this false accusation was supported by his enemies, it drove Messer Giovanni almost to complete desperation. And although he wished to be placed in the hands of the captain to clear himself, he was nonetheless never able to do so, since there was no means of doing this in that republic. This event caused much indignation among Messer Giovanni’s friends, who were for the most part powerful men; among them were those who desired to make changes in Florence. Because of this affair, and for other reasons, the problem grew to such an extent that it led to the ruin of that republic.25
Manlius Capitolinus was, then, a slanderer and not a true accuser; and the Romans demonstrated in this instance exactly how slanderers ought to be punished. For false accusations must be turned into public accusations, and when the accusation is legitimate, either reward it or do not punish it; but when it proves to be false, punish it as Manlius was punished.
CHAPTER IX. HOW A MAN MUST BE ALONE IN ORDER TO FOUND A NEW REPUBLIC OR TO REFORM COMPLETELY ITS ANCIENT INSTITUTIONS
It may appear to some that I have gone too far along in Roman history without mentioning the founders of that republic or those institutions which are concerned with her religion and her militia; t
herefore, no longer wishing to keep the minds that wish to hear about this matter in suspense, let me say that many will perhaps judge it to be a bad example for a founder of a constitutional state, as Romulus was, to have first murdered his brother and then to have consented to the death of Titus Tatius, the Sabine, whom he had elected as his companion in his rule. Judging from this, the citizens might, out of ambition and a desire to rule, follow the example of their prince and oppress those who are opposed to their authority. This opinion might be correct, were we not to consider the goal that led Romulus to commit such a murder.
And this should be taken as a general rule: it rarely or never happens that a republic or kingdom is well organized from the beginning, or completely reformed, with no respect for its ancient institutions, unless it is done by one man alone; moreover, it is necessary that one man provide the means and be the only one from whose mind any such organization originates; therefore, a prudent founder of a republic, one whose intention it is to govern for the common good and not in his own interest, not for his heirs but for the sake of the fatherland, should try to have the authority all to himself; nor will a wise mind ever reproach anyone for some extraordinary action performed in order to found a kingdom or to institute a republic. It is, indeed, fitting that while the action accuses him, the result excuses him; and when this result is good, as it was with Romulus, it will always excuse him: for one should reproach a man who is violent in order to destroy, not one who is violent in order to mend things.26
The founder should be so prudent and able-minded as not to bequeath the authority he has taken to his heir, for, since men are more apt to do evil than good, his successor might use for ambitious ends what the founder had employed virtuously. Besides this, though one man alone is fit for founding a government, what he has founded will not last long if it rests upon his shoulders alone; it is lasting when it is left in the care of many and when many desire to maintain it. As the many are not fit to organize a government, for they cannot recognize the best means of doing so because of the diversity of opinion among them, just so, when they have realized that they have it they will not agree to abandon it. And that Romulus was among those who deserve to be pardoned for the death of his brother and his companion, and that what he did was for the common good and not for private ambition, is demonstrated by the fact that he immediately organized a senate with whom he would consult and whose opinions he deliberated; and anyone who would examine carefully the authority that Romulus reserved for himself will see that all he kept for himself was the power to command the army during wartime and to convoke the senate. Later, when Rome became free as a result of the expulsion of the Tarquins, we can see that the city was not given any new institutions by the Romans besides their ancient ones, except that in place of a permanent king there were two yearly consuls: this testifies. to the fact that all the original institutions were more suitable to a free, self-governing state than to one which was absolutist and tyrannical.
Numerous examples could be cited in support of what I have written above, such as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders of kingdoms and republics who were able to form laws for the common good because they had taken sole authority upon themselves, but I shall omit them since they are well known; instead, I shall present only one example, not so well known but worthy of examination by those who wish to be the organizers of good laws, and the example is: Agis, King of Sparta, who wished to return the Spartans to the bounds within which the laws of Lycurgus had enclosed them, for he felt that, having departed from them, his city had lost much of its former ability and, as a result, much of its strength and empire; but at the start of his efforts he was assassinated by the Spartan Ephors27 as a man who wanted to become a tyrant. But when Cleomenes succeeded him on the throne, the same desire, after a time, arose in him as a result of reading the memoirs and writings of Agis which he had discovered, wherein he saw what his real intentions were, and he realized that he could not do this good for his country if he did not possess sole authority; for it seemed impossible, on account of man’s ambition, for him to be able to help the many against the wishes of the few; so, when the right occasion arose he had all the Ephors killed and anyone else who might oppose him; then he completely restored the laws of Lycurgus. This action might have been enough to revive Sparta and to give Cleomenes the same reputation that Lycurgus had if it had not been for the power of the Macedonians and the weakness of the other Greek republics; for, after such institutions had been established, Cleomenes was attacked by the Macedonians, and when he discovered he was weaker in numbers and had nowhere to go for help, he was defeated. This plan of his, no matter how just and praiseworthy it might have been, was not carried out.
Considering all these matters, then, I conclude that it is necessary to be alone in establishing a republic; and that, concerning the death of Remus and Titus Tatius, Romulus deserves to be excused, not blamed.
CHAPTER X. THOSE WHO FOUND A REPUBLIC OR A KINGDOM DESERVE AS MUCH PRAISE AS THOSE WHO FOUND A TYRANNY DESERVE BLAME
Among all praiseworthy men, the most praiseworthy are those who were leaders and founders of religions; next come those who founded either republics or kingdoms; after these the most celebrated men are those who, commanding armies, have increased either their own kingdom or that of their native land; next to these may be placed men of letters, who, since they are of various types, are each praised according to their merits. To other men, whose number is infinite, some portion of praise may be attributed according to the skill they possess in their art or profession. On the other hand, men who have destroyed religions, wasted kingdoms and republics, and have been enemies of virtue, letters, and every sort of profession that brings gain and honor to the human race—such as the impious, the violent, the ignorant, the useless, the lazy, and the wicked—are considered infamous and detestable; and no one will ever be so mad or so wise, so sorry or so good that, given the choice between the two kinds of men, he will not praise those who merit praise and blame those who deserve blame.
Nevertheless, in the end nearly all men, deceived by a false appearance of good and a false sense of glory, allow themselves, either by their own choice or through their ignorance, to join the ranks of those who deserve more blame than praise; and while they have the possibility of establishing, to their perpetual honor, either a republic or a kingdom, they turn instead to tyranny, not realizing how much fame, glory, honor, security, tranquillity, and peace of mind they are losing by such a decision, and, on the other hand, how much infamy, vituperation, blame, danger, and unrest they incur.
And if they read histories and make use of the records of ancient affairs, it is impossible for those who have lived as private citizens in a republic or who have become princes either because of Fortune or ability not to wish to live, if they are private citizens, in their native land like Scipio rather than like Caesar and, if they are princes, to live like Agesilaus, Timoleon, and Dion rather than like Nabis, Phalaris, and Dionysius; for they would see how the latter are soundly condemned while the former are praised most highly; they would also see how Timoleon and the others had no less authority in their native lands than Dionysius and Phalaris had, and that they enjoyed, by far, greater security for a longer time.
Nor should anyone be deceived by Caesar’s glory, so very celebrated by historians, for those who praised him were corrupted by his good fortune and amazed by the duration of the empire which, ruled in his name,28 did not allow writers to speak freely about him. But anyone who wishes to know what free historians would say about him should examine what they say about Catiline. And Caesar is even more blameworthy, just as a man who has committed an evil deed is more to be blamed than one who has only wished to do so; moreover, let the reader see how Brutus is so highly praised, as though, unable to criticize Caesar because of his power, they praise his enemy instead.
Furthermore, let any man who has become a prince in a republic consider how much more praise those emperors deserved who lived under the laws and as
good princes after Rome had become an empire than those who lived the opposite way, and he will see how Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus, and Marcus had no need of Praetorian guards nor a multitude of legions to defend themselves, for their customs, the goodwill of the people, and the love of the senate protected them; the prince will also see how the Eastern and Western armies were not sufficient for Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, and other evil emperors to save themselves from the enemies that their wicked customs and evil lives had created for them. And if the history of these men were studied carefully, it would serve as an excellent lesson to show any prince the path to glory or to censure, to his security or to his peril, for of the twenty-six emperors between Caesar and Maximinus, sixteen were murdered and ten died a natural death; and if among those who were murdered there were several good men, like Galba and Pertinax, they were killed by the corruption which their predecessors had left behind in their soldiers; and if among those who died a natural death there was a wicked man, like Severus, this was the result of his very great fortune and ability—a combination of two things which few men enjoy. A prince will also observe, through the lesson of this history, how one can organize a good kingdom: for all the emperors who assumed the imperial throne by birth, except for Titus, were bad, and those who became emperors by adoption were all good, as were the five from Nerva to Marcus; and when the empire fell into hereditary succession, it returned again to its ruin.
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