CHAPTER XXIX. WHICH IS MORE UNGRATEFUL, A PEOPLE OR A PRINCE?
In connection with the matters treated above, here seems the proper place to discuss whether a people or a prince displays more striking examples of such ingratitude. And in order to argue this question better, let me say that this vice of ingratitude arises either from avarice or from suspicion. For when a people or a prince sends one of its generals abroad on an important expedition, and he acquires through his victory a good deal of glory, that prince or people is bound to reward him upon his return; but if, motivated by avarice, instead of rewarding him it dishonors or injures him—for its own greediness restrains it from giving him his due—it commits an error which has no excuse and which, moreover, brings it eternal infamy. Yet there are many princes who sin in this respect. Cornelius Tacitus gives the reason in this sentence: “It is easier to take revenge for an injustice than to repay a service, for gratitude is considered a burden and revenge a profit.”32 But when a people or a prince gives no reward or, rather, gives injury motivated not by avarice but by suspicion, then either the people or the prince deserves some excuse. We read about many such acts of ingratitude resulting from such a cause: a general who has ably conquered an empire for his lord, by overcoming his enemies and winning glory for himself and riches for his soldiers, of necessity acquires, with his soldiers, his enemies, and among the very subjects of that prince, such a reputation that his victory cannot be completely enjoyed by the lord who sent him forth. And because it is man’s nature to be ambitious, suspicious, and incapable of setting limits to his own fortunes, it is impossible for this suspicion, arising immediately in the prince after the victory of his general, not to be increased by some arrogant action or display of words on the part of the general. And so, the prince is unable to think of anything other than making himself secure, and to accomplish this he considers either having the general killed or diminishing the reputation he earned with his army or among the people; and with all possible means he points out how the general’s victory came about not through his ability but rather because of Fortune or through the cowardice of the enemy or because of the prudence of the other officers who were with him in battle.
While Vespasian was in Judea, he was proclaimed emperor by his army, and Antonius Primus, who found himself with another army in Illyria, took his side and came into Italy against Vitellius, who was reigning in Rome, and destroyed most effectively two of Vitellius’s armies and occupied Rome. Mucianus, sent there by Vespasian, discovered that through Antonius’s ability everything had been won and every difficulty overcome. The reward Antonius received for this was that Mucianus immediately took away his command of the army and, little by little, reduced him to a state of no authority in Rome; when Antonius went to see Vespasian, who was then in Asia, he was received by him in such a manner that, in a short time, he was reduced to no rank at all and died in despair. Our histories are full of such examples. In our own times every living soul knows how industriously and ably Gonsalvo Ferrante,33 fighting against the French in the Kingdom of Naples for King Ferdinand of Aragon, conquered that kingdom; and that the reward he received for his victory was that, when Ferdinand left Aragon and came to Naples, he first took away Gonsalvo’s command of the army, then his fortresses, and finally he took him away with him to Spain, where a short time later he died in obscurity.,
This suspicion, therefore, is so natural to princes that it cannot be avoided, and it is impossible for them to show gratitude to those whose victories have effected great conquests under their flags. And since a prince cannot avoid ingratitude, it should not be surprising or noteworthy if a people too cannot avoid it. A city which lives in freedom has two goals: first, to enlarge its territories and, second, to maintain its freedom; in both one and the other of these she will most likely err through excessive love. A city’s errors in enlarging her territories will be discussed in the proper place; as for the errors in maintaining freedom, there are, among others, the following: offending those citizens who should be rewarded and being suspicious of those in whom trust should be placed. Although these methods in a republic given over to corruption are the cause of great evils and very often lead to tyranny—as occurred in Rome with Caesar, who seized by force what ingratitude had denied him—nevertheless they bring great benefits to a republic that is not corrupt and they allow her to live in freedom longer, since the fear of punishment keeps men better and less ambitious. It is true that of all peoples who ever possessed an empire, Rome was the least ungrateful for the reasons discussed above; for it can be said that there is no example of her ingratitude other than the case of Scipio, for Coriolanus and Camillus were exiled because of the harm that they both inflicted upon the plebeians. The former was never pardoned, for he always harbored a hostile spirit against the people, but the latter was not only recalled but also esteemed for the rest of his life as if he were a prince. But the ingratitude shown to Scipio was born of a suspicion which the citizens began to have of him and which they did not feel toward others—a suspicion which arose from the greatness of the enemy Scipio had defeated, the fame which the victory in such a long and dangerous war had given him, the quickness of this victory, and the favors which his youth, prudence, and other memorable virtues were gaining for him. All this was so great that even the magistrates of Rome were afraid of his authority, an affair which was displeasing to wise men, who thought it an unheard-of thing in Rome. And his way of living seemed so astonishing that Cato the Elder, considered a holy man, was the first to bring him to account for it and to say that a city could not call itself free when there was a citizen living there who was feared by the magistrates. Therefore, if in this instance the people of Rome followed the opinion of Cato, then they deserve the excuse (as I stated above) that those peoples and princes deserve who are ungrateful because of suspicion. In concluding this discourse, then, let me say that the vice of ingratitude is a result either of avarice or supicion, and it should be clear that the people never resort to it out of avarice; and they resort to it out of suspicion much less frequently than princes do since they have fewer reasons for suspicion, as will be explained further on.
CHAPTER XXX. WHAT MEANS A PRINCE OR A REPUBLIC MAY EMPLOY TO AVOID THE VICE OF INGRATITUDE, AND WHAT MEANS A COMMANDER OR A CITIZEN MAY EMPLOY SO AS NOT TO BE HARMED BY IT
[To avoid feeling a sense of ingratitude toward a victorious commander, a prince should lead his forces personally ; and if he wins a victory, the glory will be his alone. If victorious, a commander should leave the army immediately after the victory so as to give the prince no reason for suspicion; if he cannot do this, he should proceed in precisely the opposite manner, attempting to win the favor of his soldiers, the prince’s subjects, and nearby powers. There is no other course of action open to him, but men rarely know how to be perfectly good or bad and usually hesitate to follow exclusively one course or another. A republic has a more difficult problem, since it must delegate power of command to one of its citizens. The answer is to do as Rome did in delegating power to as many citizens as possible, the result being the creation of so many able men responsible for so many victories that no one man had any reason to suspect single individuals of excessive ambition; as a consequence, the city had no grounds for ingratitude toward its subjects.]
CHAPTER XXXI. ROMAN COMMANDERS WERE NEVER EXCESSIVELY PUNISHED FOR ERRORS THEY COMMITTED; NOR WERE THEY EVER PUNISHED WHEN THEIR IGNORANCE OR POOR JUDGMENT RESULTED IN HARM TO THE REPUBLIC
[The Romans acted in this manner in order to free the minds of their commanders from concern over possible failure and its consequences; a commander’s legitimate concern over the outcome of a battle was thus not to be complicated by his fear of failure. The loss of a battle itself was felt to be sufficient punishment. Even Varro, returning from Cannae after the crushing defeat of his army by Hannibal, was not punished for his failure but was instead greeted by senators and citizens who praised him for returning to Rome and thus showing that he still had faith in the Roman caus
e.]
CHAPTER XXXII. A REPUBLIC OR A PRINCE SHOULD NOT DEFER REWARDING MEN UNTIL THEY ARE IN DANGER
The Romans were fortunately generous to the people even when danger arose; for when Porsenna attacked Rome in order to restore the Tarquins, the senate, fearing at the time that the people would prefer to accept the king rather than endure a war, removed the tax on salt and other taxes in order to secure their support, declaring that the poor did enough for the public welfare by bringing up their children; and because of this benefit the people allowed themselves to undergo siege, hunger, and war. But no one, relying on this example, should put off gaining the people’s support until times of danger. What the Romans succeeded in doing will never work for another, for the masses will think that they do not owe this benefit to you, but rather to your enemies, and since they will fear that once the emergency has passed you will take away from them what you have been forced to concede to them, they will feel no obligation to you. And the reason why this policy succeeded for the Romans was that their government was new and not yet stable; the people had earlier seen how laws were passed for their benefit—such as the right to appeal to the plebeians—and they could therefore persuade themselves that this benefit was not the result of the enemy’s arrival but was passed because of the inclination of the senate to help them. Besides this, the memory of the kings by whom they had been despised and mistreated in many ways was still fresh in their minds. And since such circumstances only rarely occur, only rarely are such remedies of any use. Any form of government, therefore, whether it be a republic or a monarchy, should consider in advance what kinds of adverse times are likely to befall it and the people upon whom it may have to rely in times of difficulty; and it should then treat them in just the manner it thinks it would have to treat them in case an emergency should occur. A government which acts otherwise—be it a monarchy or a republic, but especially the former—a government which believes it can win men over again with benefits the moment danger arises deceives itself; for not only will it not win them over, but it will accelerate its own ruin.
CHAPTER XXXIII. WHEN A PROBLEM HAS ARISEN EITHER WITHIN A STATE OR OUTSIDE IT, IT IS SAFER TO DELAY DEALING WITH IT THAN TO ATTACK IT
As the Roman republic grew in reputation, strength, and size, its neighbors, who at first had not considered the damage this new republic could do them, began too late to recognize their error; and in order to remedy what they had not cured earlier, forty peoples united against Rome; whereupon, from among the remedies which they usually employed during times of urgent danger, the Romans chose to create a dictator, that is, they gave to one man the power to decide on a course of action without any consultation and to execute his decision without any right of appeal. This remedy was useful at the time and was the reason why the Romans overcame imminent dangers; and it was always very useful in all those circumstances which arose at any time to hinder the growth of the republic’s empire.
Concerning this matter, there is this to be said: first, when a problem arises either from within a republic or outside it, one brought about either by internal or external reasons, one that has become so great that it begins to make everyone afraid, the safest policy is to delay dealing with it rather than trying to do away with it, because those who try to do away with it almost always increase its strength and accelerate the harm which they feared might come from it. And such emergencies as these arise in a republic more often through internal than through external causes. It often happens that a citizen is allowed to acquire more power than is reasonably safe, or the administration of a law which is the nerve and life of a free government begins to be corrupted, and such an error is allowed to continue until it becomes a more dangerous policy to attempt to remedy the situation than to allow it to continue. And it is even more difficult to recognize these problems when they arise, inasmuch as it always seems more natural for men to approve the beginnings of things: such approval is most likely to be granted, above all else, to those deeds which appear to reflect in themselves some manly ability and which are carried out by young men. So if in a republic a young nobleman appears who possesses some extraordinary ability, all the citizens turn their eyes toward him and agree to honor him without reservation; thus, if in that young man there is some ambition, through a combination of the favors which Nature grants him and existing circumstances he suddenly achieves such a position that when the citizens realize their error they have few remedies to correct it; and if they attempt to make use of the remedies they have, they achieve nothing and accelerate his rise to power.
One could cite many instances of this, but I shall give only one from our own city. Cosimo de’ Medici, from whom the Medici family gained the beginnings of its greatness in our city, acquired so much renown as a consequence of the favor that his prudence and the ignorance of the other citizens had won him that he began to arouse the fear of the government, to the extent that the other citizens judged it dangerous to attack him and even more dangerous to allow him to go on as he was. But in those days there lived a certain Niccolò Uzzano, a man who was considered most able in civic affairs, and while he committed the first mistake of not recognizing the dangers that could arise from Cosimo’s reputation, as long as he lived he never permitted himself the second mistake, that is, to try to do away with Cosimo, for such an attempt would have meant the complete loss of control by his own faction. And this is precisely what happened after his death, for the citizens who were left did not follow his advice, banded together against Cosimo, and drove him out of Florence. The result was that Cosimo’s faction, resenting this injury, later recalled him and made him prince of the republic, a rank he never would have obtained without this overt opposition.
The same thing happened to Caesar in Rome, for his ability won him the support of Pompey and the others, and yet a short time later that support turned into fear; as Cicero testified, when Pompey began to fear Caesar it was too late. This fear caused them to seek remedies, and the results then accelerated the ruin of their republic.
Let me say, therefore, that since it is difficult to recognize these evils when they arise—this difficulty being the result of how deceptive such things can be at their beginnings—it is a wiser policy to delay dealing with them until they are recognized rather than to oppose them, because, given time, either they disappear by themselves or at least the evil is deferred for a longer time. In all such cases, rulers who plan on removing these evils or impetuously opposing them by force should keep their eyes open and not magnify their problems or bring the latter upon themselves while thinking that they are diminishing them or driving them further away—as one might drown a plant by watering it too much. The strength of the disease should be well estimated, and if you see you are able to cure it, set yourself to doing so without reservation; otherwise leave it alone and attempt nothing, for what happened to Rome’s neighbors (as was mentioned above) could also happen to you. Since Rome had grown so powerful, it would have been safer for them to try to placate her and hold her back by peaceful means rather than to force her to think of new methods and new defenses by means of war. For that conspiracy of theirs did nothing but make the Romans more united, braver, and intent on finding new ways to increase their power in a very short time. One of these new ways was the creation of a dictator, a new institution which not only enabled the Romans to overcome their present dangers but also helped them avoid countless evils which that republic would have incurred without this remedy.
CHAPTER XXXIV. DICTATORIAL AUTHORITY DID GOOD, NOT HARM, TO THE ROMAN REPUBLIC; AND HOW AUTHORITY THAT CITIZENS TAKE FOR THEMSELVES, NOT THAT WHICH IS GRANTED THEM BY FREE SUFFRAGE, IS HARMFUL TO CIVIC LIFE
Those Romans who found a means of creating a dictator in their city have been condemned by some writers as having created, with the passage of time, a reason for tyranny in Rome; they point out how the first tyrant in that city ruled it under the title of dictator, stating that if this office has not existed Caesar would not have been able to disguise his tyranny und
er some public title. Anyone, however, who holds this opinion has not considered the matter well and is accepting it without any reasonable cause; for it was neither the title nor the rank of dictator which enslaved Rome but rather the authority taken from the citizens as a result of the length of the dictator’s rule; if Rome had not had the title of dictator, the dictator would have taken another title, for power easily acquires a title but titles do not acquire power. And we can observe that the dictatorship always benefited the city as long as it was created in accord with public institutions and not by the dictator’s own private authority. For the creation of magistrates and the granting of power by extraordinary means harm republics, which is not the case for those which arise through normal means: it is clear that for a long period of time in Rome a dictator never did anything that did not benefit the republic.
There are obvious reasons for this. First, if a citizen is to cause harm and to seize for himself unlawful authority, he must possess many qualities which, in an uncorrupted city, he can never have: for he must be very rich and have many followers and partisans, which cannot occur where laws are observed; and even if he does have them, men like this are so dangerous that free elections never favor them. Besides this, the dictator was created for a circumscribed period of time, and only in order to deal with the problem for which he was chosen. His authority encompassed the power to decide for himself the way in which to deal with this urgent danger, to do everything without consultation, and to punish anyone without appeal; but he could do nothing which would alter the form of government, as would have been the case had he taken authority from the senate or the people, or had he abolished the city’s old institutions and established new ones. And so, considering the brief time of his dictatorship, the limited authority he possessed, and the fact that the Roman people were uncorrupted, it was impossible for the dictator to overstep his limitations and do harm to the city; and experience demonstrates that the city always benefited from this institution.
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