Of all Roman institutions, this one truly deserves to be considered and numbered among those which were the cause of the greatness of so strong an empire: for without such an institution cities find a solution to extraordinary problems only with difficulty. Since the operation of normal institutions in republics is slow (neither a council nor any magistrate can undertake anything alone; in many cases they must consult with one another and, in harmonizing their opinions, time is spent), their remedies are very dangerous when they have to provide solutions to a problem which cannot wait. Republics, therefore, ought to have among their laws one like the following: the Venetian republic, which is among the best modem republics, has delegated authority to a small number of citizens who, in times of urgency, can deliberate among themselves and make a decision without consulting anyone else. When a republic does not have such a procedure, it must either come to ruin by following its laws or ignore the laws in order to avoid ruin; yet in a republic it is not good for something to happen which requires action outside the laws. While extraordinary measures may be beneficial at the moment, the example is nevertheless harmful, for if one forms the habit of breaking laws for a good reason, later on they can be broken for bad reasons under the same pretext of doing good. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect unless its laws make provisions for everything, and set up a remedy for every possibility and establish the means of using it. In conclusion, therefore, let me say that those republics which have not taken refuge, in times of impending danger, either in a dictatorship or in some similar authority have always come to ruin in the midst of serious difficulties. It is to be noted, in connection with this new institution, how wisely the means of choosing a dictator was provided for by the Romans. Since the choosing of a dictatorship would cast some shame upon the consuls—for they would now have to obey like all the other citizens, whereas they formerly had been the rulers of the city—and foreseeing that this would cause resentment toward them among the citizens, the Romans decided that the authority to choose the dictator should rest with the consuls, believing that they would make the selection when events occurred during which Rome required this regal authority; and since it would be they themselves who made the choice, it would pain them less, for the wounds and every other evil that a man inflicts willingly upon himself, by choice, hurt a good deal less than those which are inflicted upon you by others. In later times, moreover, instead of choosing a dictator the Romans would grant dictatorial authority to the consul with these words: “Let the consul see to it that the republic suffers no harm.”
But to return to our subject, I conclude that when Rome’s neighbors sought to conquer her, they forced her to pass not only laws that enabled her to defend herself but also ones which enabled her to counterattack with greater force, counsel, and authority.
CHAPTER XXXV. THE REASON WHY THE CREATION OF THE DECEMVIRATE IN ROME WAS HARMFUL TO THE LIBERTY OF THAT REPUBLIC, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT WAS CREATED BY FREE AND PUBLIC ELECTION
[The election of the decemvirate may seem to negate what was said in the previous chapter about the beneficial results of authority granted by free and public elections, for the decemvirate established a tyranny in the course of time in spite of free elections. But their authority was granted in an unrestricted manner and for a greater period of time than was advisable, and this is always harmful ; furthermore, the creation of a dictator did not abolish the institutions of the consuls, the tribunes, and the senate, all of which restricted his power. On the contrary, the creation of the decemvirate suspended the consuls and the tribunes and gave the decemvirate the power to make laws; without any such restraint, they were, at the urging of Appius, able to become tyrannical. In stating that authority bestowed by a free election never harms a republic, we assume that such authority is given only under certain conditions and for a limited period of time. In the case of such well-ordered states as Sparta or Venice, both the King of Sparta and the Doge of Venice were given authority of long duration, but both were supervised so that they could not misuse this power.]
CHAPTER XXXVI. CITIZENS WHO HAVE HELD THE HIGHEST OFFICES SHOULD NOT DISDAIN LESS IMPORTANT ONES
[Although the Romans prized glory, they never felt it beneath them to take orders from someone whom they had formerly commanded, nor to serve in an army which they had previously led. This custom has been reversed in our own day. Venice, for instance, feels that a citizen should never accept a lower office after holding a higher one. While this practice may be honorable in private life, it is of little use to the body politic, for a republic has more confidence in a citizen who descends from a high office to a lower one than a citizen who rises from a lower to a higher rank, since it cannot rely upon the latter unless he has under his command men of such ability that he can learn from their experience and counsel. Had Rome observed the custom which now prevails in modern republics and kingdoms, she would have faced countless situations threatening her liberty as a result of the inexperience and ambition of men rising up from the ranks—ambition which could have gone unchecked by the virtue of men under their command.]
CHAPTER XXXVII. WHAT DISTURBANCES AROSE FROM THE AGRARIAN LAWS; AND HOW VERY HARMFUL IT IS FOR A REPUBLIC TO PASS A RETROACTIVE LAW WHICH IS CONTRARY TO AN ANCIENT CUSTOM OF THE CITY
[Ancient writers used to remark that men usually inflict evil upon themselves and become bored with good, and that both of these attitudes produce the same effects. “The reason is that Nature has created men in such a way that they can desire everything but are unable to obtain everything; thus, since their desire is always greater than their power of acquisition, discontent with what they possess and lack of satisfaction are the result. From this arise the variations in their fortunes, for since some desire to possess more and others fear to lose what they have acquired, enmities and war arise, and from them come the ruin of one province and the exaltation of another.”34 This discussion sheds light on the Roman experience, for the Roman plebeians were not happy after they had secured themselves against the power of the nobility through the creation of tribunes; they continued to quarrel with the nobility out of ambition, and this quarrel poisoned the body politic and led to disputes over the Agrarian Law and to the eventual destruction of the republic. The law had two provisions: first, no citizen was allowed more than a certain amount of land; second, all lands taken from an enemy would be divided equally among the people. This offended the nobility since they already possessed most of the land and would lose all land beyond the legal limit; moreover, equal division of newly acquired lands meant that they would be limited in future acquisitions. Discussion over the Agrarian Law ceased until the time of the Gracchi, when renewed conflict over the law caused the downfall of the republic. When the plebeians supported Marius by making him consul four times, the nobility backed Sulla. Civil war broke out, during which the nobility gained the upper hand. This conflict continued when Caesar became the leader of the Marian faction and Pompey led Sulla’s faction. With Caesar’s victory Rome acquired its first tyrant and the city never recovered its freedom. Elsewhere it was demonstrated how the conflict between the senate and the people preserved Roman liberty, and yet the effects of this Agrarian Law may seem to contradict this. Nevertheless, I shall not alter my opinion on this matter, for the ambition of the nobility is so great that it must be checked in various ways if a city is not to come to ruin. Rome would have been reduced to slavery much sooner than the three hundred years it took for the Agrarian Law to produce that effect if the plebeians had not checked the ambition of the nobility. This shows how men value their property more than positions of honor, for the Roman nobility yielded to the demands of the people in such questions, but they were more tenacious concerning property, and this tenacity caused the people to employ extraordinary measures themselves.]
CHAPTER XXXVIII. WEAK REPUBLICS ARE INDECISIVE AND DO NOT KNOW HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS; IF THEY EVER DO ADOPT A POLICY, THEY DO SO MORE FROM NECESSITY THAN FROM CHOICE
There was a very serious plague in
Rome, and this seemed to the Volsci and the Aequi the right time to crush the city; after gathering together a large army, these two peoples attacked and laid waste the lands of the Latins and the Hernici, who were forced to inform Rome of this and to beg the Romans to defend them. Since the Romans were afflicted by the plague, they replied that their allies must take measures to defend themselves with their own soldiers, for the Romans could not help them. The generosity and the prudence of the senate are revealed here, for although it always wanted, under any circumstances, to be the master of decisions that its subjects had to make, it was never ashamed to adopt a policy contrary to its usual procedure or to other decisions it had made when necessity demanded it.
I say this because at other times this very senate prohibited those same peoples from arming and defending themselves, and a less prudent senate than this one would have considered its dignity lost by conceding them the right of self-defense. But that body always judged things as they ought to be judged and always chose the policy that was less bad as the best one: it was grieved at not being able to defend its subjects and at allowing them to take up arms without its support, for the reasons mentioned as well as for many others that are understandable; nevertheless, realizing that out of necessity the subjects, with the enemy upon them, would have armed themselves in any case, it chose the honorable policy and decided that what had to be done would be better done with its permission, so that they should not, in disobeying out of necessity, become used to disobeying by choice. And although it would seem that this policy is the one that every republic should adopt, nonetheless, weak and poorly advised republics do not know enough to do so, nor do they understand how to gain honor from such conditions of necessity. Duke Valentino had taken Faenza and had forced Bologna to agree to his terms; then, wishing to return to Rome by way of Tuscany, he sent one of his men to Florence to request passage for himself and his army. A consultation took place in Florence over what to do in this matter, but no one ever counseled that he be granted this permission. In this instance the Roman procedure was not followed. Since the duke was very heavily armed and the Florentines were not sufficiently armed to prevent his passage, it would have been more honorable for them to make it appear that he passed with their permission rather than by force; if they had managed the matter differently—instead of the entire incident resulting in their complete shame—their disgrace would have appeared less severe. But the worst thing that a weak republic can do is to be indecisive, so that all the decisions it makes are made out of necessity, and if any benefit results from them, it is necessity, not the republic’s prudence, that has brought it about.
I should like to give two other examples of this which occurred in our own times in the government of our city. In 1500, after King Louis XII of France had taken Milan, he was anxious to turn Pisa over to the Florentines to collect the fifty thousand ducats they had promised him after such return, and he sent his armies to Pisa under the command of Monsignor de Beaumont, who, although French, was a man in whom the Florentines had a great deal of confidence. The army and its general maneuvered between Cascina and Pisa so that they might assault the walls of the city; and as they remained there for several days to organize the expedition, Pisan envoys came to Beaumont and offered to surrender the city to the French army on condition that he promise in the king’s name not to place it in the hands of the Florentines before four months’ time had elapsed. This plan was refused by the Florentines, and as a result they besieged the city and departed in shame. The offer was refused solely because of their mistrust for the word of the king, into whose hands they had, at any rate, been forced to place themselves as a result of their weak planning; moreover, in not trusting him they did not see how much easier it would have been for the king to restore Pisa to them once he was inside the city, or, if he did not restore it, to reveal to them his intentions rather than to promise it to them when he did not yet have it and force them to pay for his promises. Thus, it would have been much more profitable for them to have agreed to allow Beaumont to take the city under whatever conditions, as later became evident when, in 1502, after Arezzo rebelled, Monsignor Imbault, sent by the King of France with a French army, came to the assistance of the Florentines; when he neared Arezzo, after a short time he began to discuss terms with the Aretines, who wished to surrender the city under certain conditions, like the Pisans. This offer was refused by Florence. Monsignor Imbault observed this and felt that the Florentines had understood very little of the matter, he began to hold negotiations for the surrender without the participation of the Florentine commissioners. He was successful in this maneuver and concluded an agreement on his own terms, according to which he and his soldiers entered Arezzo, giving the Florentines to understand that he considered them to be mad and without any comprehension of the ways of the world; for if they wanted Arezzo, they should let the king know about it since he could give it to them much more easily with his soldiers inside the city than outside it. There was no end in Florence to the cutting remarks and curses directed at this said Imbault; they did not stop until the Florentines finally realized that if Beaumont had acted in the same manner they would have taken Pisa as they had Arezzo.
Now, to return to our topic, indecisive republics never choose beneficial policies except through force, for when there is doubt their weakness never allows them to arrive at a decision; and if that doubt is not removed by some form of violence which drives them on, they remain forever suspended in a state of indecision.
CHAPTER XXXIX. THE SAME EVENTS OFTEN OCCUR AMONG DIFFERENT PEOPLES
Anyone who studies present and ancient affairs will easily see how in all cities and all peoples there still exist, and have always existed, the same desires and passions. Thus, it is an easy matter for him who carefully examines past events to foresee future events in a republic and to apply the remedies employed by the ancients, or, if old remedies cannot be found, to devise new ones based upon the similarity of the events. But since these matters are neglected or not understood by those who read, or, if understood, remain unknown to those who govern, the result is that the same problems always exist in every era.
When, after 1494, the city of Florence had lost part of its empire (Pisa and other towns), it was forced to wage war against those who had possession of them; and since those who occupied them were powerful, the consequence was that a great deal of money was spent in the war with no results: a heavy taxation followed the great expenditures, and endless disputes among the people followed the heavy taxation. And because this war was administered by a magistracy often citizens, called the Ten of War, the masses started hating them (as if they were the cause both of the war and the war’s expenses) and gradually persuaded themselves that if this magistracy were removed, the war would be ended; thus, when it was time to reappoint them, they allowed the office to come to an end by not replacing the members, and they entrusted their duties to the Signoria. This decision was so damaging that not only did it fail to end the war, as the masses had convinced themselves it would, but when those men who had governed with prudence had been removed, so much disorder followed that, in addition to losing Pisa, Florence lost Arezzo and many other towns. Hence, after the people had realized their error and saw that the cause of the disease was the fever and not the physician, they reestablished the magistracy of the Ten. This same passion was aroused in Rome against the institution of the consuls, for when that people saw one war lead to another, allowing them no rest, they should have realized that this sprang from the ambition of their neighbors, who wanted to oppress them; instead, they thought that it came about as a result of the ambition of the nobles, who wished to lead the people outside Rome under the consuls, to oppress them where they had no one at all to defend them, since inside the city of Rome the nobles were not able to punish the plebeians, who were defended there by the authority of the tribunes. And because of this, the people thought it was necessary either to abolish the consuls or regulate their power in such a way that they would have n
o authority over the people either inside or outside the city. The first man to propose this law was a certain Terentillus, a tribune who suggested that five men be appointed to study and limit the consuls’ powers. This greatly angered the nobles, who felt that the majesty of their authority had declined to the extent that they no longer held any authority at all in the republic; nevertheless, the persistence of the tribunes was such that the title of consul was abolished, and after some other laws were passed the people were finally satisfied to appoint tribunes with consular powers rather than consuls—so much greater was the people’s hatred of the consuls’ titles than of their actual authority. And so, they followed this system for a long time until they finally realized their error, and just as the Florentines returned to the Ten, so the Romans reappointed their consuls.
CHAPTER XL. ON THE CREATION OF THE DECEMVIRATE IN ROME AND WHAT IS NOTEWORTHY ABOUT IT; WHEREIN, AMONG MANY OTHER MATTERS, HOW THE SAME EVENT MAY EITHER SAVE OR OPPRESS A REPUBLIC IS CONSIDERED
As I wish to discuss in detail what took place in Rome up to the creation of the decemvirate, it does not seem superfluous to recount, first, everything which followed that creation and, then, to discuss those things which are noteworthy in it; they are numerous and of considerable importance, both for those who desire to maintain a free republic and for those who are planning to seize one. And such a discussion will reveal the many errors committed by the senate and by the plebeians to the detriment of liberty, as well as the many errors committed by Appius, head of the decemvirate, which were detrimental to the tyranny he had hoped to establish in Rome. After the many disputes and struggles which took place between the populace and the nobility over the establishment of new laws in Rome, by means of which the liberty of that government might be more firmly established, the two sides agreed to send Spurius Postumius and two other citizens to Athens to obtain copies of the laws Solon gave to that city in order that they might base the Roman laws upon them. After these men had returned, they chose men to examine and establish the said laws; they appointed ten citizens for a period of one year, among whom was Appius Claudius, a shrewd but restless man. And in order that they might establish such laws without any restraint, all the other magistrates, and especially the tribunes and consuls, were done away with, as was the people’s right of appeal, so that this new magistracy came to be the absolute power in Rome. The collective authority of his other colleagues was now assumed by Appius, since he had the favor of the people; he had made himself so popular with the people that it was amazing how he had so quickly acquired a new character and a new disposition, for he had been considered a cruel persecutor of the people until that time.
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