Comm Lab Testing (WG4) From Right: Rh Dietz and Boris Nikitin
In the June ‘71 meeting, Professor Bushuyev and I were appointed as Technical Directors. Since the number “one” was already assigned to a working group, we designated our group as WG0. There were lots of snickers about that number. The brief summary of the agenda above captures the issues that were on the front end of our work. Some of our preliminary ideas were presented in the technical proposal for the project. The proposal was sent early to the Soviets before the meeting so they had a chance to see our overall view of what the test mission might look like. This still allowed for significant changes if we found them useful during our discussions.
Working Group 5
Between the end of 1971 and before the June 1972 meeting, there were two more working group changes. We split the work of WG2 into two working groups. The designated WG2 would continue the work on the guidance equipment, GNC for all phases, closing velocities for the docking system and other related items. A new group WG4 was established for radios, communications, TV and related subjects. The chairmen were RH Dietz for NASA and Boris V. Nikitin on the Soviet side. It was also necessary to form another group, WG5, which was created to address all the subjects of life support, cabin atmospheres, airlock, flammability and other related life support subjects. The chairmen were Ed Smylie for us and Ilya Lavrov for the Soviets.
This final configuration of working groups through number five and, as of the first part of 1972, was the arrangement that continued for the rest of the project. Some chairmen were changed over time on both sides and for reasons internal to each side. As of the close of 1971, the major open issues or choices were:
WG0 – the management plan which addressed the methods and frequency of communications, written, oral and telex. It also addressed the logistics of the meetings and document support in both languages. We also made arrangements to accommodate management overview of the project by more senior levels in NASA and in the Academy of Sciences. The need for accurate and timely exchange of information and documents was a continuing challenge.
WG1 – the rendezvous mission sequence, rules and procedures, training and simulations (the sequence of launches was still unsettled and needed to be resolved).
WG2 – the use of the GNC systems, and all the provisions for locating them in the spacecraft.
WG3 – a significant new docking system design that moves beyond probes and drogues (not universal) and is more of an androgynous system, structural rings, guides, seals, latches and hatches.
WG4 – use of existing radios and communication equipment, exchange of hardware, any new equipment required.
WG5 – use of an airlock, design functions, reduction of the complexity of flight crew transfers because of the different atmospheres and flammability.
When the cabin pressure difference exceeds a certain level, Soyuz near fifteen pounds per square inch and Apollo near five pounds per square inch, crew transfer when moving from the higher pressure of Soyuz to the lower pressure in Apollo requires a period of special precautions. To avoid the bends, pre-breathing pure oxygen purges the blood stream of nitrogen bubbles. In the case of scuba divers, slowing the rate of ascent – even holding at certain depths – serves as the mechanism for avoiding the risk of bends. Pre-breathing oxygen gets complicated in equipment, procedures, time and it introduces some constraints. So, we wanted to avoid it. Based on their experience and abilities, Ed Smylie and Ilya Lavrov were perfectly matched for this task. Lavrov did not stay with the WG very long, but his initiative on his side provided the solution in 1972. From then on, Lavrov had made his contribution, moved on and Dolgopolov was named the chairman.
Not Understanding Their Organization
We always had difficulty fathoming their organization and methods. Partially this was because, by contrast, our organization had worked for a long time in the Apollo mode and we were comfortable with it. I know it had some kinks during its early time. But by my time, all of the resources at MSC, the other NASA Centers and at our contractor plants were operating at a very high level of cooperation and performance. I was lucky to be in such a focused and well-oiled system. By contrast, we could hardly ever determine where individual Soviet participants worked. It seemed that they were all in different bureaus or institutes throughout Moscow. It also seemed like they did not see each other except at our meetings. MSC was all on one campus. Of course, the rest of the needed U.S. infrastructure (other Centers, contractors) was scattered across the country and we learned how to work that with travel and mostly telecons.
Also, it was clear they were all part of a government system. Therefore, all parties were more or less equal with no hard authority over other units. It was more of a “we need this, will you do it for us.” Bureaucracies have every incentive to say no to peer bureaucracies. Or they try to extract some kind of compensation for compliance. At one time, later in ASTP, when comments were becoming more frank, the Professor was explaining his difficulties with one of our requests. He observed that when I wanted something, I simply called the contractor (or a government employee) and made my request. They were most impressed with the Rockwell response and he assumed that I controlled their profit in some way. He wished that his country had some equivalent system of incentives.
Chapter Twenty-five: 1972: Year of U.S./U.S.S.R. Summit
After returning to Houston in December, I prepared a very top-level outline of what had to be done for long term compatibility and the Apollo/Soyuz mission for the next two, three, four and six months. This was useful but I did not anticipate a higher-level event that would cause some new and accelerated milestones to be necessary. In the meantime, OMSF at NASA HQ worked on the assignments of CSM vehicles to ASTP and Skylab rescue and what to do with CSM 115 and 115A which both had the J mission SIM bay provisions.
Helping to clarify, NASA also ruled out a Soyuz to Skylab option, because Skylab had not flown yet but did fly in less than eighteen months. Looking forward, it would have been very difficult to accommodate a Soyuz visit to Skylab because it flew in the second half of 1973. That would have been a very tight schedule and, when it actually launched, the NASA Skylab program was severely tested when the first launch of the Skylab vehicle itself resulted in tearing away one of two sides of the solar panels. This left the Skylab damaged and underpowered and with a loss of its thermal protection so that inside it was overheating. This condition would have resulted in a very poor condition for most of its six months of flying. If we tried to schedule a Soyuz visit, it would have been a nightmare and probably would have been cancelled in the end.
The other issue was the procurement process to buy the new hardware, primarily the docking module. The options, of course, were sole source to the existing CSM contractor, Rockwell, or a competitive procurement. Wrapped around this question was another possibly complexifying (my meaning is “to make a situation or condition more complicated than it needs to be for no good reason”) decision as to which Center (MSC or MSFC) would oversee the docking module project. This particular option of dividing up a relatively simple job with new people at the MSFC and their fabrication contractor is typical of an agency with too many people for its mission. And the prospect of another group of people intimately involved in all the preparations and negotiations sounded like a recipe for unnecessary complexity.
Dale Meyers, the head of OMSF at headquarters, made several decisions in February ‘72. He capped the cost of the near term test project at two hundred fifty million dollars and he ruled out the use of 115 or 115A CSMs. He approved the plan of using CSM111 for ASTP and CSM119 as a backup after it is released from Skylab as a rescue ship. Meyers also capped the funding for the experiments, which would be flown on either the CSM, or the DM. He also decided that MSC would manage the development of any new hardware (DM, DS, et cetera). The other major management change was the appointment of Chris Kraft as the new Center Director, replacing Dr. Gilruth. Dr. Gilruth would take an advisory position for NASA. This had been
planned since Chris Kraft moved in as the deputy to Dr. Gilruth after Apollo XII. Sig Sjoberg who was Chris’ long time deputy in flight operations, became the chief of that (my) Directorate and was in place for Apollo XIII. All in all, this was a good month for Dale Myers and us.
Our first teleconference occurred on March second, resulting from a January twenty-seventh letter to my counterpart, Professor Bushuyev. Note that that is more than a full month between “we need to do this” and doing it. I was in Washington and Caldwell Johnson spoke for us. The subjects were the agenda for the March meeting of WG3 in Houston and the WG2 meeting in Moscow in June. There were delays hooking up the telephone, about forty minutes, and the Soviets were using two phone handsets to pass between them. We had a conference hookup with voice available over speakers to the room. This whole telecom process was long used in our programs and we knew it could be made to work. The Soviets were not used to it and apparently did not use this as a communication method in their internal procedure for doing business. We were very surprised at that. But we were determined to make it work: we did not see any alternative. On the substance of the meeting, Syromyatnikov and Legostayev were constructive and helpful in gaining sufficient understanding for the next step.
Vladimir Syromyatnikov arrived with three other specialists on March twenty-seventh and quickly got down to the details, which was the MO we came to expect from him every time. Bill Creasy was our action leader to drive the work to resolution. They produced minutes and four engineering drawings. Both sides worked together on the same drawing board to analyze and finalize agreements. Their drawings endured as a faithful record of their progress with only minor changes over the next few years. They also provided a technical basis for entering into a contract for the new hardware.
President and Premier Consider
Early in 1972, NASA HQ proposed putting the Apollo/Salyut mission on the agenda of the May summit between President Nixon and Premier Kosygin. That possibility was not communicated to us until the White House approved and set a deadline for a NASA recommendation by April fifteenth. When we were informed of this development by HQ, this deadline was just about a month away. We had a lot to learn about Salyut, compared to Soyuz. And it recently took little over one month to request and conduct a telecon with our partners. That would not cut it.
In response, I outlined the three documents needed to capture the necessary joint agreements in order to be able to make a firm recommendation to the White House. They were: a project technical proposal, an organization plan and a project schedule. They were ready for transmittal by the end of March. Much of this was already discussed, especially the need for rapid and effective communications. But we felt that the agreements on how to manage the effort needed clarification and firm commitments. The very recent telecon experience was a real measure of the challenge.
This would take another face-to-face meeting. Dr. Fletcher and George Low decided to avoid any publicity so as not to create any political pressure on the subject of a test flight before the Summit. As a result, I went on a regular working trip to Washington and Low had our tickets (Low, Frutkin and Lunney) for an Easter Sunday departure to Moscow. This whole effort to keep this activity a secret exposed to us how open our everyday efforts really were.
We learned that Academician Keldysh had been hospitalized and Vladimir Kotelnikov was now acting as the Academy President. He would meet with us on Tuesday afternoon. The ambassador invited George to a lunch later in the week. But the ambassador’s son Robert Kaiser was a Washington Post reporter and in town (i.e. Moscow). More concern for a leak. But the lunch went off without causing a problem to our clandestine purpose. We met with Kotelnikov, Petrov, Vereshchetin, Bushuyev and Rumyantsev for two hours on Tuesday and then with Petrov until well into the evening. In opening remarks, George Low said that the joint mission, in his judgment, was technically feasible but NASA was not sure about the management terms that were not yet agreed upon and in place. This was the issue for NASA.
To confirm George’s point and almost on cue to demonstrate that we were not yet together, Kotelnikov told us that they had reevaluated the technical proposal and it would NOT be feasible (technically or economically) to use the Salyut. They proposed to use the Soyuz and would conform to all the present requirements. It was obvious that a discussion as to why Salyut could not be used was academic at this point. I wondered what their plan was to reveal this change to us before we initiated this unscheduled meeting. My reaction to the change was to consider whether the use of Soyuz would compromise our purpose for the test mission. Our thinking about a test project had started there, with Soyuz. Turning it over, it did not appear that we would be compromising anything. In fact, it might be more assured because they had much more experience with the Soyuz.
We would still have a live demonstration that we could test and verify our ideas for the joint compatibility of rendezvous and docking techniques. We would also demonstrate that we could indeed work together to achieve a substantive mission. We would also have the same astronaut/cosmonaut interaction for all the world to see. We continued to think about the implications and the conclusion remained positive without any real downside emerging. When George asked me for a formal response, my position was that the change was acceptable and we should proceed.
The next step was to review, explain and reach agreement on the document describing the organization and management plan. As I briefed the document, our discussion degenerated into picky word-smithing of each paragraph. It was apparent that this was not going to work. George Low took a time-out for our side to discuss how to go forward. When we resumed, George again took this opportunity to emphasize that we needed documented agreement on how to manage this project. And if in the end, he was not comfortable that we could make it work, he would recommend NOT going forward. He was smooth and polite but very firm. Honesty and clarity carried the day. They got the message.
I used the draft summary of results that I had prepared and took what went into the management plan and reduced it to a list of the major principles governing the “how we will work together.” There were seventeen of these major principles, separated into preflight and flight. After discussion with Low and Frutkin, I prepared a new draft using these principles with all seventeen listed on one page. The Soviets caucused and came back with only editorial comments and a position that this new draft of principles was completely acceptable to them. There was some discussion about crews and public affairs issues and again Low made clear that we would not compromise on our standard policy of full public disclosure.
On return from Moscow, George Low remained satisfied that the management plan agreements would work. And he gave a positive recommendation to the execution of what was now the Apollo/Soyuz test project (ASTP).
Back in Houston, we had a telecon with Professor Bushuyev on the WG2 meeting in May. There was no joy on tying me in on the phone at KSC but Don Cheatham, our WG2 chairman, picked it up and moved the discussion so that both sides were ready for the meeting in Moscow on May fifteenth to the twentieth. WG2 had a lot of ground to cover in this meeting. Afterwards, Cheatham felt that there were no irreconcilable differences and he could proceed. Low helped the State Department with the language for the May ‘72 summit. Ultimately, it was approved and signed by Nixon and Kosygin. The Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty was the most significant step and there were others, including some NASA science agreements. Now the action was back in our court. I was looking forward to engaging Professor Bushuyev, all the working groups, staffs and contractors in executing this test project. I felt confident.
We Had Leverage
Sometime during 1972 and after the Summit, Nicholson and I began to focus on a number of indicators, which, when added up, spelled leverage. The George Low discussion in the April meeting with the Soviet leadership emphasized that Low needed to be convinced that the Soviet side was willing to do what was necessary to improve our joint communications to an acceptable level. He was satisfied with the prog
ress of the technicals, but it still took too long to get communications, understanding and/or documents in some cases. The perfect example was the internal Soviet decision that they would NOT use Salyut for our proposed mission. That was decided by them before our meeting in the first week of April. Why didn’t somebody call us? What were they waiting for? What would they have done if we did not schedule the quick trip to Moscow in April to confirm the management plan?
Low was clear. If he was not satisfied, he would recommend not doing the project. That certainly got their attention. He did not think that he was obliged to say yes. On the contrary, his superiors expected an honest assessment from him.
On the other hand, Leonard’s impression (and mine) was that the people in our meetings could not or would not say no. They seemed bound to it as something their bosses wanted or even demanded. No discussion. They did have a way of referring to “decisions made at the highest level.” Said another way, we felt empowered to blow a whistle if we were not satisfied. We felt that we could go back up our chain of command, but our story would have to be good. Fair enough. We began to believe that our counterparts had no such freedom and would not even try. In football terms, we could blitz and they could not – Leverage.
Highways Into Space: A first-hand account of the beginnings of the human space program Page 27