Each experience building opportunity reinforced our assessment that we had it right. Still, we did not want to use it in “bully fashion.” But, the understanding helped when it came to pressing a matter of principle, for example, our concern for crew safety because of the unknowns of the Soyuz 11 accident. Paired with Stafford later, I pressed the issue of more complete disclosure as a showstopper for us. And it was.
As of March 1972, I had been reassigned to the Apollo Spacecraft program office (ASPO), reporting to Owen Morris. Jim McDivitt had left NASA earlier and Owen Morris became the program manager for the last two Apollo flights XVI and XVII. Owen was responsible for all the CSM and LM work and for the follow on Apollo spacecraft for Skylab and ATSP. I would continue the ASTP efforts for Owen. I had a big assist from Jess Goree in helping in my early transition to program office work. He did all he could to prepare me for what was coming.
As another organizational matter, René Berglund suggested that I be given full control of the Rockwell contract. René’s specialty was in the early phase A of a contracted activity. He did not manage things past the early conceptual phase. I should say here clearly that it is often difficult when there are two parties doing almost overlapping work like René and I were doing. We were connected by the work, but not at all on the organization chart. I thought René and Clarke Covington, as the project engineer for René’s study work, were very helpful and always constructive. We had no problem and I appreciated their help securing funding and managing early activities. We were at the point where the whole job had to be consolidated. As another indicator of the growing scope of ASTP, Dave Scott, recently of Apollo XV, joined the office to assist with crew relations, management subjects and the expected surge in crew training and other associated activities.
Time for the ASTP Team to Implement
In a way, the meeting scheduled for July 1972 in Houston was the start – it was the first meeting since the May summit approved the test mission with the Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft – there was agreement on a mid-1975 launch date – there had been two previous plenary meetings in 1971 and two splinter meetings of WG3 and WG2 in 1972 – this meeting would include all of the six working groups. Leonard Nicholson had prepared a proposed operating plan for the meeting for each working group, including the scope, agendas and milestones and a draft Summary of Results. The logistics for facilities, documentation, interpreters, translations, transportation, social plans, et cetera were also in place.
We were T-minus three years from launch.
WG0 approved the three documents – technical proposal, organization plan and project schedule – as adjusted for using the Soyuz. It went much easier than the first time I introduced these subjects in our pre-summit meeting in April. And we settled on July as the launch month and, soon, on July 15, 1975.
WG1 was struggling with the question of which vehicle to launch first in the rendezvous sequence. Clarke Covington came across some reference in the Soviet documents that helped to resolve the matter. Their side was very insistent on wanting to launch Soyuz first. We could not understand their position because the stay time on orbit for the Soyuz was four days and Apollo could do up to two weeks, giving much more opportunity to get a second launch off. Somewhat inadvertently, Clarke discovered that they were committing a second Soyuz and launch vehicle. If the first Soyuz came down without the Apollo launched, they would launch another Soyuz to be the target for the Apollo rendezvous. We never knew that before and it explained why they were taking their position. It was very sensible once the availability of the second vehicle became known. As a matter of fact, it was a sign of their level of commitment to the project in funding two full vehicles. Once the sequence was resolved, Pete Frank moved the mission plan to specific features of timing, content and reserve time for further experiment exercises after the undocking from Soyuz.
ASTP Mission Sequence
The attitude control mode during the dock phase was not yet settled but was in work. Mandatory joint crew training was defined. A crew activity plan (timeline of all the activities) and a “detailed ops procedure” (checklist for operating individual sequences) were adopted.
There was still a transition in process on the newly chartered WG5 for the life support area. So, this was still covered in WG1. It was not working well because Lavrov was not in attendance. Dolgopolov was the acting leader and did not know the entire life support subject like Lavrov did. Confusion prevailed on the subject of whether the Soyuz carried stores of gas to replenish the cabin pressure. Dolgopolov had a schematic depicting gas storage, but he did not know if that was truly the case. I am not sure we got to a firm answer in the meeting but there were indications that there were no other cabin gas provisions onboard. That explained why they were interested in zero leak rates and not happy about our specifications for cabin tightness that were ten times more liberal than theirs. The number one open question of how to do crew transfer was not advanced at all. Our team did not have anyone to work the problem with.
Some of these things (no onboard gas and a second Soyuz and launch vehicle) just showed up at times. We needed to be alert for these kinds of situations because something important could be revealed that would help to understand the “why” of some of their positions. And they did not necessarily show up with fanfare. We were making an assumption that they surely had gas storage. In the end, it was confirmed that the Soyuz did not. It was also curious that they did not make more of the existence of the second Soyuz. We certainly would have. But the only way to minimize surprises was to use every opportunity to engage and explore.
WG2 completed the definition of requirements for the targets, lights, and control system use. The newly chartered WG4 agreed that the U.S. side would build the VHF/FM radio for operation on the Soviet selected frequency, as that frequency would continue to be used in the future. As I remember, we were not going to continue with our frequency and, therefore, it made more sense to provide one of our transceivers to install on the Soyuz.
WG3 inspected the U.S. two-fifths scale model of the docking system and made refinements. Joint testing was scheduled for the December meeting.
As the meeting proceeded and afterwards, the team experienced some of the same problems with language and getting to closure. It is a shock to come from the well-oiled process we lived in at the Center and then have to struggle with language problems, verification of translations, false assumptions, time sliding by very quickly, and the very different backgrounds of the participants. It is hard to take things for granted, but it takes time to be sure both sides understand things the same way. We noticed that you couldn’t assume that because you told one person that the message would be communicated. Their internal dynamics are different from ours. If our documenting score is ten, theirs is under five. Their Soyuz program was continuing; our Apollo program could see the end. Much was different.
In a few short and busy months, our delegation was off again to Moscow in October 1972.
Pete Frank and Vladimir Timchenko were the co-chairs of WG1. Both sides had qualified specialists to address all of the aspects of their work: mission plans, mission documents, Mission Control, flight crew training and contingency plans for non-standard events. They also had to reconcile to a standard set of gravity and mathematical models. Crew training sessions were planned for two sessions in 1973, one in Houston in summer and one in Moscow in the fall. On their side, the Soviets were in evaluation to select two prime and two backup crews.
Ed Smith was our new chairman of WG2 and joined Victor Legostayev. They decided to delete the TV camera for docking that was to be mounted on the hatch centerline. And, they completed plans for their next meeting.
Vladimir Syromyatnikov and Don Wade were the Chairmen of WG3 that was focused on completing the Preliminary Systems Review (PSR). The purpose of the review was to conduct a formal configuration review before commencing detail design. They also redid plans for the two-fifths scale model tests in December. The Technical Directors approved th
ree safety items for follow-up – spring thruster failure to compress, indicators on structural latches, and the identification of any failure mode that would cause structural latches to open inadvertently.
WG5 came into the sunlight in their meeting. Ilya Lavrov was back as the Chairman with our Ed Smylie and it became apparent what Lavrov had been working back in Moscow. The crew transfer scheme was still not resolved and was the last major configuration question for the project. The situation revolved around the big differences in cabin pressure in each of the ships, approximately fifteen pounds per square inch (PSI) in Soyuz and five PSI in Apollo. The problem is the potential for the onset of bends when moving from the high to the low-pressure environment. When the ratio of pressures is greater than two, the risk of bends is there. The ratio between Soyuz and Apollo is three. Apollo cannot increase very much because five PSI is the Apollo structural design limit. Soyuz cannot reduce to Apollo levels because if its pressure is reduced to five PSI, the partial pressure of oxygen is reduced to one-and-a-half PSI, too low for breathing. One alternative is to schedule a period of pre-breathing pure oxygen to purge the nitrogen bubbles in the blood. But that becomes cumbersome in terms of equipment and time, an hour or so. So, Lavrov was prepared to lower the Soyuz cabin pressure once on-orbit to about ten PSI and to re-pressurize Soyuz to approximately fifteen PSI for the return to Earth. Ten pounds per square inch of air would have an oxygen partial pressure about three, sufficient for breathing. This required a new tank of air or nitrogen to replenish the Soyuz cabin. And, I am sure, he had much hard discussion to convince his in-house Soyuz managers. After tweaking the numbers, that became the baseline plan and was tested on-orbit in Soyuz 16. Thank you, Ilya. He did not participate again in our regular meetings, but he returned in early 1974 to join Walt Guy to witness the modified life support tests in Moscow.
Working Groups 2 and 4 would meet in November; Victor Legostayev transferred the WG4 agenda to Boris Nikitin at this meeting. WG2 focused on control systems, docking targets and analysis and tracking plans. They reviewed control laws as mechanized in the two ships and settled on a control system configuration for the docked phase. They also devised backups if the docking targets were misaligned. Credit was due to the Soviet members of WG4 for their strong efforts to satisfy the agenda, but some of that pressure was because they held to a fixed departure date. The WG agreed to the Soviet desire to build the Soyuz antennas for both radio frequencies. The WG also defined the compatibility test plans for next year and the installation of the AM radio aboard Soyuz at the launch site.
Vladamir Syromyatnikov and Don Wade (WG3)
WG3 tests of the two-fifths scale model found the Soviet team ready to go and they had English and Russian versions of the working subjects. The testing went well with no substantive problems. Discussions and closures went well. WG3 continues on track and on schedule. Syromyatnikov was clearly a pro in the development of docking systems. Sometimes I think he did not appreciate our WG0 reviews, and he would look displeased. But then, he would joke about it, referring to me as the big cheese.
Victor Legostayev and Don Cheatham (WG2)
I had made a point of identifying problems with Soviet readiness for our meetings and timely delivery of products to Professor Bushuyev. And, by the end of 1972, the overall performance was very good, with WG4 on probation. I conveyed that single weakness to Professor Bushuyev and asked him to pass my appreciation to his other Working Group chairmen. Professor Bushuyev stated that steps would be taken to resolve the WG4 problems. R.H. Dietz was our chairman of WG4 and he was even more frustrated than I was. He had to deal it with all the time. Every time we got ready to make a real issue out of it, Professor Bushuyev promised to take action. At times, I wondered if Nikitin was family of some high-ranking Party official.
In WG5, I was very impressed and so was Ed Smylie, our WG chairman, with Lavrov. He never travelled with his delegation to Houston, but he was impressive when he was involved.
NASA was very fortunate to have the “Two Georges” overseeing the manned space efforts at North American Rockwell. George Jeffs was the head of Rockwell’s Manned Space Division in Downey and George Merrick was the program manager. They both brought deep competence and a great passion for the work. I was always impressed by many of the traits displayed by George Jeffs, who might be described as a North American Rockwell Chris Kraft. He set the tone for his organization every day. He always sought the best solutions for his customers even if his own people did not agree. George saw serving the customer as his job and he saw that as winning. He was in the first Berlitz class at Downey to “learn Russian” and did better than most. He joined us on the December 1972 trip to Moscow to see for himself what this interaction was like. It was good trip to join us on. The Zagorsk Monastery visit was last year and he should have been glad to leave that one to Dr. Gilruth and Chris Kraft. Besides observing the interaction of the working groups, George went with us on a weekend train trip to Leningrad. Some called Leningrad the Paris of the North. Others still called it St. Petersburg. George did pick up the Leningrad bug and, with his research, helped explain it to us. There were mostly huge three to four story buildings fronting on the water. We visited the Hermitage museum. The highlight for me was the very large painting by Rembrandt, “Taking Jesus down from the Cross.” The scale and the power of that painting still sticks with me.
So, as 1972 came to a close twenty-six months since our first meeting in October 1970, it was time to take stock. We had significantly expanded the scope of the initial purpose, which was to define the requirements for compatible systems for rendezvous and docking to enhance safety of space travelers. We took it to the point of a test mission to verify and confirm that we could make technical systems compatible and we could demonstrate them in a real live mission. We considered several configurations – Apollo to Soyuz – Apollo to Salyut – Soyuz to Skylab – and settled on the Apollo/Soyuz option for the Presidential summit in May. We had staffed the working groups with excellent technical talent, and with the necessary human and diplomatic skills. We built a two-language documentation capability and developed a roster of translators and interpreters. Most of the significant project configuration choices were in place by this time – U.S. docking module to serve as an airlock – a rendezvous sequence supported by two Soyuz spacecraft and launch vehicles – a Soyuz cabin pressure reduction and repress system which greatly simplified the crew transfer between vehicles – the joint test of a two-fifths scale docking system model, with the same features as the full scale version. We know there is much to do and there will be more surprises and difficulties. But, at the two-year point, with two-and-a-half years to launch, I think we surprised a lot of people including ourselves.
Cutaway of Docked Configuration
As part of our look back, it was also clear that our working groups were operating at a higher level of productivity and autonomy. As a measure of that autonomy, a compilation of our total meeting schedule to launch clearly showed the trend.
Besides being an indicator of the strong Working Group ownership of their respective domains, it is also true that the project formation years of 1971 and 1972 were behind us. The number of individual working groups splinter meetings had matched and would soon be the predominant feature of working group engagement.
The larger plenary meetings with all or most of the working groups represented remained at two to three per year, throughout the project. By 1972, the splinter meetings exceeded the number of plenary meetings. Rather than a mere count, the rapid uptake of splinter meetings was a reflection of being at the point in the project where the “grinding out” of all the necessary work becomes the main operating mode. Dealing with the big options of how to configure the project was basically over by the end of 1972. What remained was implementation, execution and vigilance. There were thousands of details to be mastered. This was now where the project succeeds or fails. Sometimes, the need for a disciplined approach to this stage of the project life cycle can wea
ken or get lost. Grinding it out well made the earlier choices look good. Grinding it out with our partners created the common understanding that would hopefully prevail in case we faced an emergency. It was gratifying to see how quickly the team jumped into splinter meetings. They saw what was needed and did it.
Meetings Leading up to ASTP Launch
There are now physical models, breadboard systems, development units and testing, qualification tests and flight units in production. There are tests and checkout procedures and operational plans to be put in place, from PAO plans to docking module pressurization. Software is everywhere and must be configured to this mission. Technical arrangements are needed with the launch vehicle, launch site, recovery forces and weather services.
Twenty-six: 1973: Year of ASTP Mid-term and Skylab Flights
More Momentum to the ASTP Team
NASA started a new year of 1973 with a late January announcement of the names of the U.S. crews for ASTP. This was a real up-tempo step for our whole team. Now, we had a prime and back up crew, as well as a support crew, which always adds a strong sense of moving toward a launch. Tom Stafford was the commander of the prime crew, Deke Slayton would be the docking module pilot, and Vance Brand would be the command module pilot. Slayton had been grounded since early 1962, when he was expected to fly in the second Mercury orbital flight, after John Glenn. That was not to be and the NASA-wide team celebrated his return, just as was the case for Al Shepard. Tom Stafford had flown two landmark Gemini flights and Apollo X, the precursor to the moon landing.
Highways Into Space: A first-hand account of the beginnings of the human space program Page 28