Highways Into Space: A first-hand account of the beginnings of the human space program

by Glynn S. Lunney

  The Soyuz 11 report and closure was a major step in our ASTP process. In addition, there was another positive indicator on the political front.

  At the October ‘73 meeting, we were in Moscow during the Yom Kippur War. The U.S. and USSR supported different sides in this conflict, but there was no effect on our joint work. ASTP seemed to be compartmented as a separate and valued effort and therefore continued without interruption. During the conflict, we received telexes from the embassy on the progress of the war. We posted them on our bulletin board for our working group members. There were often Soviet working group visitors reading the telexes.

  On joint participation, we had observers in the life support testing both in Houston and Moscow. We were also planning on joint docking seal tests in December and a two-month test period in the Dynamic Docking Test Facility in Houston. We agreed to the participation of U.S. specialists in the preflight checkout of the VHF/AM radios at the Soviet launch site. We had ongoing crew training exercises, total of six in all. And we had plans to provide observation and training exercises for the two flight control teams in each others’ MCCs. Joint activities were golden in terms of enhancing understanding and teamwork.

  On documentation, we were generally making good progress. But, we were still concerned that the time was growing short to launch and there was less opportunity to accept slippage. Petrov promised that he would personally watch the Soviet performance and it certainly was on our watch list.

  Later, as further background, we were informed that there were three flight tests to verify the system changes caused by the Soyuz 11 accident – two cosmos tests #466 and #473 were flown in 1972 and 1973. Soyuz 12 was flown shortly before this meeting with two cosmonauts in pressure suits. From this point on in their program, the Soviets would use only two men crews, suited for entry and that would be their standard.

  There is another lesson here. Notice the number of flights to satisfy their solutions – two unmanned flights and one manned flight. That would be considerably more flight testing than we would have done. Likewise, in the earlier dispute, which ran in our Washington circles, the Soyuz 15 must have been a failure in terms of failing to dock. Professor Bushuyev had reported that they could not accomplish an automatic docking which was their main purpose of the flight. So with the loss of that primary objective, it was time to return. In our program, we flew less often to verify or test developments. But when we did fly, we tried to do everything we could. It was a different approach based on their respective capacity to fly quickly and often. This enabled them to take smaller steps and come back and try it again later.

  Once it was decided, the Soviets were forthcoming in explaining the Soyuz 11 accident. Their scenario was completely credible and understandable. It is obvious that the Soviet side representing ASTP (Professor Bushuyev, Academician Petrov) had pushed the view to their internal colleagues that we had the right to know what happened and our position was justified. We were also confident that this failure during entry did not constitute a risk to the on-orbit docked phase of our mission. The frank and honest revelation of needed details was an act of solidarity with the purposes of ASTP.

  In terms of the performance in the technical working groups, there had been significant progress and this was summarized for the Review Board.

  It was the result of very serious technical effort on the major issues confronting the project. We were far advanced in the development and testing of a new and universal docking system that we believe is more appropriate for the future than previous designs of both countries. One of the significant planning difficulties had been alleviated by the positioning of a second Soyuz ready for launch in case of a problem with the first. The guidance control for the docking phase was settled. And, a major concession from the Soviet side of lowering their space craft pressure to about ten pounds per square inch and adding repress gas and tankage, made internal transfer of the crewmembers much easier by eliminating the need for lengthy pre-breathing before returning from the higher pressure of Soyuz to the lower pressure of Apollo. The PAO subgroup on the U.S. side rightfully insisted on preserving open access to the project and its people. And that was underlined again by George Low. One of the working groups (4) specializing in radio systems had been very weak in their delivery and completion of scheduled work. This had been acknowledged by Professor Bushuyev and Petrov and they promised to fix it.

  The last comment on the working groups is an intangible. But it was observed and commented on by both Arnold Frutkin and Chet Lee. They were impressed by the very strong sense of dedicated professionals working through the barriers and making the project work.

  The Soviets, and particularly Petrov, were very pleased that George Low wanted to visit some of their facilities in Moscow. Even though he was not able to attend, I would guess that Academician Keldysh made a point to his colleagues that he wanted a first class showing for Low. They visited a laboratory that housed their lunar samples and then to the Institute of Space Research which was directed by R. Sagdayev, a well-known name to us. They discussed the Soviet exploration of Mars and the four spacecraft involved. Low visited Star City and was impressed with the pace of construction there for training facilities for Apollo Soyuz. They were also building what they referred to as a hotel that was living quarters and a dispensary for the astronaut group. Leonov took George for a ride in the Soyuz simulator and I expect that Low surprised him with his quick study and hands-on approach. Next was the spacesuit familiarization by Kubasov. Feoktistov gave Low a tour of the Salyut mockup. And that gave both of them the chance to talk about their January 1971 meeting where the joint mission got a kickstart. A number of us joined Low for the visit to the Soviet MCC in Kaliningrad. This was a little eerie; it felt like such a familiar place. The room had far more similarities to ours than differences. There were very large displays all across the front wall. It had a very tall ceiling, more than two stories. There were levels of consoles, much like ours. Their management levels sat in the back row, and the consoles tiered down toward the front of the room. Visitors entered on the balcony level. All in all, it felt like our MCC at home.

  The Last Months of 1973

  There were three more splinter meetings through the end of the year. Two of the three meetings engaged WG3; there was a series of docking tests, one with a full-scale development version of the docking system to prove the design adequate. Over the months from September to December, there was a very extensive testing period on the Dynamic Docking Test Facility in Houston. This was a very sophisticated test facility and it had been a race for the facility team to have it ready on time. Yet still, there were some facility delays on the front end of the testing. There were some heroic efforts to make up the time loss, long hours and extra effort by both WG3 and the facility teams. The intensive testing over a wide range of conditions generated a strong basis for confidence in the new docking system design. The three plus months tests were an opportunity for bonding of U.S. and Soviet teams and they took full advantage. They even mixed the players on the two teams in order to compensate for the U.S. lack of soccer skills.

  In November, docking system seal tests were performed at the Rockwell plant in Downey and the Soviet team witnessed the test. The joint effort also helped our team towards a solution relative to the seals at extreme temperatures which the NASA/Rockwell team had been struggling with.

  DS Dynamic Testing Team

  Additionally, the ASTP crews joined each other in Star City for their first training exercise in the USSR. Training and language were a full time agenda for all the members of the crew complement. Free time was filled with language practice. By this time, Gene Cernan had joined our office after Dave Scott was reassigned to the NASA Flight Research Center as Center Director. Gene had flown twice with Tom Stafford (Gemini 9 and Apollo X) and they both were happy to be teamed up together again. And the hosts at Star City arranged snow for their visitors.

  Our crews were impressed with the progress of the Soviet crews in language
proficiency. Based on their experience, our language officer, Nick Timacheff, selected four individuals to shadow our crews. Their tasks included classroom work and a buddy system with individual astronauts resulting in near-full time language awareness and usage.

  By this time, Tom Stafford and Alexei Leonov had a solid and growing relationship as the public face of ASTP. We all enjoyed the exchanges between the two of them. And when it was time to tell an audience how it would be to fly on this pathfinder mission, Alexei would always finish the remarks with a heartfelt and a slightly accented, “We will do our best.” It was always a hit in any audience. Alexei and, even more often, Cernan, would rib Stafford about speaking a rare form of Rouston, little bit of Russian with a touch of Houston thrown in to cover the Oklahoman. It was also impressive to see the respect from everyday Russians accorded to Leonov who was usually recognized as one of “the cosmonauts.” When he came to the hotel Russiya to visit Stafford, the normally somber staff lit up with that “something special is going on tonight” energy. They were very proud of their cosmonauts and Leonov seemed to be one of the most popular.

  Chapter Twenty-seven: 1974 and 1975: Years of Completion

  1974

  In 1974, the project had three plenary sessions and thirteen splinter meetings. This was a time of hardware testing of qualification and flight units across the board – a natural result of the design schedules. The testing and training exercises, sometimes over months, gave the teams the opportunity to explore details and build a much more complete understanding for handling the possibility of unexpected surprises later in the flow or during the flight itself. This was done with various accommodations for the language skills of their respective participants. The resultant problem solving capability added depth, resilience and speed to our team. It was another part of the growing confidence in project readiness on both sides.

  WG1 had a full year of work in 1974. The operations planning cycle emphasized the drive to finalize the flight documentation and the training exercises of both the flight crews and the ground based flight controllers. This latter training was for the flight controllers of one side to learn the spacecraft systems and operations of the MCC of the other side. There was also still new work on the emerging definition of the experiments complement and the photo and TV plan.

  In January, in Houston, the group focused on finalizing some details of the mission plan, understanding the requirements for the five joint experiments, use of the communications and tracking systems, and the crew procedures for the transfer between ships. The five bilateral “joint” experiments addressed biological interaction, microbial exchange, use of a multi-purpose furnace, an artificial solar eclipse, and ultraviolet absorption and the other U.S. experiments. All of these had gone through the usual screening by a science board. Notification of selected experimenters went out within two months of the proposals submission. We were still limited by the Dale Myers cap of ten million dollars for the full complement. This cap led to a loosening of the usual quality/reliability schedules. These experiments were not in the same category as the high value experiments of Apollo, which were the main objectives of the lunar science program. The ASTP experiments were not tightly tied to the main purpose of the flight. It was more of an opportunity to do as much science as practical with less overhead. At some point in this process, the cap was also raised to sixteen million dollars, by virtue of our keeping the spacecraft expenditures a little lower. Some additional experiments were added or traded for others and by the end of the year, the total was twenty-eight experiments – five joint, twenty-one unilateral, and two from other international sponsors. The artificial flare/eclipse capitalized on using the circular pattern of the spacecraft to eclipse the sun and then focus on solar flares. The WG1 use of communications and tracking and crew transfer capitalized on the work done in Working Groups 2, 4 and 5. This process also enhanced understanding across working groups.

  WG4 was involved in a major test of the compatibility of the communication and tracking systems. The test ran from early February to early April 1974 and gave the interfacing systems a very thorough workout. In addition, there were several systems (e.g. voice, TV, power) supported by a drag-through cable so that we had hard wire backup to the wireless systems. Several minor problems were quickly corrected. The extended test period also gave this group the opportunity to improve their personal communications. And that better understanding carried through the rest of the preps and the flight.

  In March, some of our WG5 experts traveled to a Soviet Air Force base near Moscow for an altitude chamber test of the modified Soyuz life support systems, Walt Guy was the leader of this team and they were briefed on the design and operation of this altitude chamber. Besides steady state operation, this test also permitted the varying of the Soyuz cabin pressure to simulate the planned changes in flight and to verify that the gas composition was safe during these and other changes. It all worked fine. More joint participation enhanced our understanding and communications with the Soviet specialists. Our old friend, Lavrov, attended this demonstration of his modified life support system.

  As earlier, the next pages illustrate the content of our March eighth weekly session with Chris Kraft. ASTP is now at an advanced state and the Skylab work is in the history books.

  Chris Kraft’s Meeting Notes Page 1, March 25, 1973

  Chris Kraft’s Meeting Notes Page 2, March 25, 1973

  Chris Kraft’s Meeting Notes Page 3, March 25, 1973

  Working Group 0 joined the full complement of working groups in the plenary session in April. Experiment planning was still the major topic for WG1 and the development schedule of the hardware allowed completion of the ICDs and high fidelity mockups for training in the spring of 1974. Testing of the Soyuz pyros in the Apollo radiation field was approved. The PAO subgroup had already finished Part One of the PAO document, and Part Two still needed more work. Also, in response to its high priority, the subgroup on photo and TV planning and simulations for the docked phase was making appropriate progress. The definition of what might be called the “ceremonial” crew activities while docked proceeded. More work was done on the checklists, but this is an area that continues with changes well into the final weeks.

  We discussed the upcoming Soyuz 16 flight, which was planned as a dress rehearsal for our flight. There was some sparring on one aspect of this flight. The Soviets wanted us to join in the tracking of Soyuz 16 as we would for the joint flight. They wanted to tell us the launch date, but on condition that we not reveal the scheduled date to our media. Based on our previous position, articulated in the PAO discussions, we would not agree to withhold that information from the media. Rather, we agreed that they would call us after launch and its announcement and we would commence tracking.

  The call came in at 6:30 a.m. on December second, and was answered by a guard. I called back later, copied the state vector and our tracking exercise went perfectly. Soyuz 16 was completely successful. Professor Bushuyev filled us in on the details during our next telecom, which we were doing regularly now. This was another good step for the project and another example of the Soviet willingness to commit more resources to verify their readiness. Another interesting sideline was the press conference that was held at Star City after the Soyuz 16 crew returned. Our Bob White, WG3 chairman, was in Moscow for the mate check of our flight docking system and attended the press conference. Our western media also attended the conference and were able to ask questions of the flight crew – a first for them.

  WG3 conducted the major dynamic docking tests on the facility at JSC from July to September to qualify the design of the docking system. This took an all-out effort by our facility team and both sides of the WG3 team. All the tests were completed successfully within the test window – a credit to all involved.

  The Soviet ground controllers traveled to Houston for their familiarization and training on the Apollo spacecraft and MCC operations. Likewise, the United States flight controllers completed their training in
September. The training schedule for the astronauts and cosmonauts was for June and September. Frank and Timchenko met in December to continue their work, with emphasis on the joint experiment plan. The group also confirmed the updates of the flight documents and the continuing definition of the photo and TV plan. Both sides were very interested in doing this well because of the global attention this phase of the flight would receive.

  Crew Training

  WG2 was close to finished in its major area of work. Certainly, they were complete in their plan for using the Soyuz GNC system. But they were also the group studying the RCS thruster impingement on Soyuz and the recently identified Soyuz pyrotechnic testing to verify safety in the radiation environment of Apollo. They also were analyzing the reflectivity of Apollo-Soyuz external materials as it affected their instruments.