By the time I reached London a few days later, the public at home were thoroughly disturbed at the turn things were taking in Iraq and a strong agitation was at work in a certain section of the Press which demanded that we should cut our losses and evacuate the country.
H.M's Government too were greatly exercised by the disquieting telegrams now coming in from Bagdad and there was considerable divergence of view as to what was the wisest course to pursue. But in any case it was clear that the rising must be suppressed before any other course of action was possible and the question at issue really was as to whether, after the restoration of law and order, we should cut our losses, abandon the Mandate and evacuate the country, or immediately set up a national Government, if that was really a practical alternative with reasonable chances of success. Asked for my opinion as the officer on the spot, I replied that to my mind evacuation was unthinkable; it would mean the abandonment of the Mandate and of the seven or eight millions worth of capital assets which we had in the country; the complete violation of all the promises we had made to the Arabs during the war, and their inevitable re-subjection to chaos and the hated yoke of the Turk as soon as we left; and lastly that an evacuation, which would arouse the active resentment of the betrayed inhabitants, could only be carried out without bloodshed if at least another division were sent to see it safely through. As to whether the alternative policy of establishing forthwith a national Government had a reasonable chance of success, I replied that without being too confident, I thought it had, and that the risk was at any rate worth taking if regarded as the only alternative to evacuation. Considerable discussion followed but ultimately I was asked whether if this course was decided upon I was prepared to undertake the task. I replied in the affirmative and left for Bagdad with my instructions by the next mail. It is no little satisfaction to me, six years later, to know that the ship thus launched on a somewhat tempestuous sea has safely reached port, and that so far as we are concerned the venture may be regarded on the whole as an imperial success. The Kingdom of Iraq has been placed on its feet, and its frontiers defined its future prosperity and progress rest with the Iraqis themselves.
But come what may, I can imagine no case in which H.M's Government have implemented their promises and obligations and pursued their settled policy with more complete good faith and resolution; dismayed neither by persistent and organised newspaper campaigns, nor by the interminable delays and difficulties which marked our peace negociations with Turkey.
While these deliberations were going on in London, the rising in the Bagdad Vilayet was gathering force and reinforcements had to be drafted in from India for its suppression, so that by the time I reached Basrah on 1st October 1920, though active disaffection still smouldered in some places, the main centres of disturbances were under control, and the general situation no longer gave much cause for alarm.
I reached Bagdad on 5th October and a day or so later took over charge from Sir Arnold Wilson, who proceeded on leave. The task before me was by no means an easy or attractive one. The new line of policy which I had come to inaugurate involved a complete and necessarily rapid transformation of the facade of the existing administration from British to Arab and, in the process, a wholesale reduction in the numbers of British and British-Indian personnel employed. Many of the individuals affected had served with the utmost devotion during most difficult times and some had even abandoned all idea of returning to their pre-war posts in the hope of making a career in Iraq., Added to that not a few of the British element were sceptical — and one could not blame them for their misgivings — as to the likelihood of the new enterprise succeeding, and did not disguise their feelings. But fortifying myself with the conviction that the project had at least an even chance of success, and was at any rate the only alternative to evacuation, I took heart of grace. My position however, was a very solitary one to begin with and the presence of Gertrude Bell and of Mr. Philby and Mr. C. C. Garbett both of the I.C.S. whom I had brought out with me from home was a great asset to me at this time. Except for a short spell of leave in England and a sojourn in Paris in the summer of 1919, the former had been in Bagdad with Sir Arnold Wilson throughout the two years of my absence at Teheran and had all the personnel and politics of the local communities at her fingers end, while I knew that her own ideas and those of the two Indian Civilians on the subject of Arab aspirations were such that I could be sure that at any rate in principle they were heart and soul in sympathy with the present policy of government. A year later I had to part company with Mr. Philby because at the stage of development at which we had then arrived his conception of the policy of H.M's Government began to diverge too much from mine, but I none the less readily recognise the great value he was to me in the early days. As regards the others, many of whom were strangers to me, it necessarily needed a little time for me to get my bearings; but whatever the primary feelings of many of my comrades may have, indeed must have been, most of them gradually came round to the view that as an alternative to the bag and baggage policy the new experiment was worth trying and was not necessarily doomed to failure. At any rate they rendered devoted service notwithstanding that for a long time to come the question of their future careers continued to hang in the balance, pending conclusion of peace with Turkey.
Though, as I have said above, the back of the rebellion was practically broken by the time I reached Basrah, a good many sections of the tribes in the Bagdad Vilayet were still "out," and it was not until February that the rising could be said to have been finally cleared up. Meanwhile, it did not take me long after my arrival at Bagdad to realise that I was being confronted at every turn with questions of policy affecting the future of Iraq which I did not feel justified in disposing of myself without consultation with the representatives of the people. As an immediate expedient therefore, I determined to institute at once a Provisional Government which, under my control and supervision, should be responsible for the administration and political guidance of the country until the general situation had returned to normal and a start could be made with the creation of national institutions. It was here that I felt that my venerable friend the Naqib, who had given me such friendly co-operation on our first occupation of Bagdad, could now — if he would — render great and patriotic service, and I decided to appeal to him to preside over the proposed Council of State. Age and failing health might well have excused him from emerging from the studious seclusion of a Darwish in which he had preferred to spend the latter years of his life, but on October 23rd when I appealed to him, in the interests of his country, to shoulder the task, he courageously rose to the occasion, though with no little hesitation, and agreed to undertake the formation of a Cabinet. The high religious and social position of the Naqib and the universal respect he inspired placed his motives above all suspicion and endowed the Council of State with the necessary dignity and I shudder to think how my early efforts would have fared had he failed me at this time. For one of his venerable age and retired habits, it was a signal act of patriotism for which I could not be too grateful. The Council comprised 8 portfolios, Interior, Finance, justice, Defence, Public Works, Education and Health, Commerce, and Religious Bequests, and included, Saiyad Talib Pasha, eldest son of the Naqib of Basrah; Sassun Effendi Heskail who commanded universal respect and confidence as a leading representative of the Jewish Community in Baghdad; General Jafar Pasha el Askeri who had served with much distinction both during the war and afterwards in King Faisal's regime in Syria; and Abdul Latif Pasha Mandil a native of Nejd and one of the leading notables and merchants of Basrah.
The principal questions to which the Council had to give attention were the return from internment on Henjam Island of a number of the leaders of the late revolt; the repatriation, at the expense of the Government, of Iraqi Officers who had been serving in the Hejaz Army or in the Arab régime at Damascus, and who were left stranded on its collapse; the organization of a Civil Administration under Iraqi officials; the drafting of the electoral law; and a
scheme for the formation of an Iraq Army. Under the Naqib's wise direction the Council carried on their work with surprising efficiency and absence of friction; and in the meanwhile many other Iraqis of experience and education who had held civil or military appointments under the Turks, as well as private individuals, were streaming back to their country and becoming available for employment under the new régime. It was in fact the advent of this contingent from Syria, who had mostly been enthusiastic adherents of Amir Faisal's cause, which started, or revived, the demand for him in Iraq, and of course at this time the question of the new ruler and the character of the permanent government which was to succeed the present provisional régime was being discussed in every coffee-shop.
In the meanwhile, in connection with the new departure of policy in Iraq the control of its destinies had been transferred from the India Office to the Colonial Office, of which Mr. Winston Churchill had now assumed the portfolio on transfer from the War Office. In order speedily to acquaint himself with the strings of his sphere and to consider the various aspects of the future of the Middle East, he determined to summon a conference at Cairo early in March, which I, among other British representatives in this region, was bidden to attend. Thanks to the satisfactory working of the provisional Government, I was able to leave Bagdad at the end of February in H.I.M.S. "Hardinge" in company with Sir Aylmer Haldane, G.O.C. in Mesopotamia, taking with me Sasun Effendi, Minister of Finance, and Jaafar Pasha, Minister of Defence in the Provisional Iraq Government; and among the British Staff, Major General E. H. Atkinson, Adviser to the Ministry of Works; Lieut. Col. S. Slater, I.C. S., Financial Adviser; and Miss Gertrude Bell, Oriental Secretary. Major General Sir Edmund Ironside, Commanding the troops in Persia was also a member of the party, while Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, judicial Adviser, held charge during my absence.
Apart from the incidental advantage of achieving personal touch with our new Ministerial Chief, who had been Secretary of State for War when I had last met him in the council chamber, and of being able to discuss with him Mesopotamian problems in general, it was clear that the main questions which would have to be threshed out at the Conference would be, the reduction of the present heavy expenditure; the qualifications of the various possible candidates for the throne of Iraq; the treatment of the Kurdish provinces; and the nature and composition of the force to be created for the defence of the new State in the future.
As regards the question of expenditure, if my memory serves me right the figure for the past year had been 37 millions sterling, whereas the Commander-in-Chief and I had come prepared with a draft scheme providing for reduction forthwith to 20 millions, with a progressive annual reduction thereafter, until the irreducible minimum should be reached.
The Secretary of State seemed no little relieved at the receipt of this preliminary news on our arrival.
As to the second question, it was easiest to arrive at a result by the process of elimination. My experience of public feeling on the question in Iraq had convinced me that among the several local candidates whose names had been suggested from time to time there was no individual who would be accepted or even tolerated by all parties in Iraq, while among the non-Iraqi possibilities there was no doubt whatever that one of the family of the Sherif of Mecca (King Hussein of the Hejaz) would command the most general if not the universal support of the inhabitants. I myself knew none of the family except from hearsay, but in the absence of any fresh candidate who might be suggested at the Conference, I went to Cairo prepared to recommend that that one of King Hussein's 4 sons whom a consensus of opinion should decide to be the most likely to fit the part, should be allowed to take his chance with the people of Iraq. It is common knowledge that the Amir Faisal won the ballot.
The other important question discussed was the treatment to be accorded to the Kurdish districts in the mandated territory and in this connection it was decided to make an attempt to ascertain the wishes of the Kurdish communities as to the degree of their prospective inclusion in, or separation from, the Iraq State.
But before the results could be made public it was incumbent on the Secretary of State on his return home to lay before the Cabinet the conclusions reached at the Conference, and unfortunately owing to the pre-occupation of H.M's Government with matters of grave importance at home, the much needed announcement on the subject by the Secretary of State was delayed until June.
On the 13th June, on the strength of telegrams received by Iraqis from the Hejaz, news was published in Bagdad that the Amir Faisal was leaving for Iraq. Friendly telegrams passed a day or two later between King Hussein and His Highness the Naqib and on 22nd Amir Faisal sent a personal wireless greeting to the Naqib announcing his early arrival at Basrah. Meanwhile the publication of the Secretary of State's pronouncement of policy had given to the bulk of the population that for which they had been asking, namely guidance from the Government whose obligation it was to offer advice. The express exclusion of a republican form of Government was recognised to be in accord with the traditions of Islam while the assurance of H.M's Government that they would regard the Amir Faisal as a suitable ruler should he be chosen by the people of Iraq dissipated apprehensions born of previous misunderstandings. But the Amir himself was his own best advocate. It was as the result of the popular tributes that he received during the first fortnight of his presence in Iraq that His Highness the Naqib, without any consultation with me, proposed to the Council on July 11th a resolution, which was unanimously approved, that the Amir Faisal should be declared King, on condition that his government should be a constitutional, representative and democratic one. On receiving a copy of the resolution according to the usual routine, I replied that before concurring in or confirming it I felt it necessary to fortify myself with direct evidence of the choice of the people by means of a referendum and the task of carrying out the measure was at once put in hand. The people of the Sulaimaniyeh District of Southern Kurdistan decided to abstain, as they were at liberty to do, from taking any part in the election of a King for the Iraq; with this exception the referendum was applied throughout the country and the results showed 96 per cent. of the votes to be in favour of the Amir Faisal's election, the remaining 4 Per cent. coming mainly from the Turcoman and Kurdish communities of Kirkuk. On 18th August the Ministry of the Interior informed His Highness the Naqib, as President of the Council, that an overwhelming majority of the people supported the Amir Faisal's election and accordingly on 23rd August in the presence of representatives of all local communities and deputations from every Liwa and Iraq, except Sulaimaniyeh and Kirkuk, I proclaimed His Highness the Amir Faisal to have been duly elected King of Iraq and at the same time announced his recognition as King by His Britannic Majesty's Government.
Careful to tread with dignity and in conformity with the constitutional practice usual on the accession of a Sovereign, His Highness The Naqib and the Provisional Government formally tendered their resignation to the King, who while thanking them for their services requested them to continue in Office until a new Cabinet should be formed. It was then my grateful duty to intimate to the Naqib that His Majesty George in recognition of his services to his country had pleased to confer on him the high distinction of Knight Grand Commander of the Order of the British Empire. King Faisal followed with a speech in which he stated the principle by which his Government would be guided, insisting on the maintenance of the alliance between Great Britain and Iraq which he said should be embodied in an instrument to be confirmed by the National Congress as soon as convened.
But it was an insecure and troubled heritage on which the new King of Iraq had entered. On the North the Turks, though theoretically the position was one of prolonged armistice, pending conclusion of peace, were in fact clearly hostile. Turkish garrisons and posts along the frontier were increased and the Kurds incited to rise. In June 1921 a Turkish Official reached Rowanduz within the Iraq frontier, with a small party of irregulars, stirred up all the tribes in the neighbourhood and intermittently kept the whol
e of Kurdistan in a ferment until finally expelled in the spring of 1923. In June 1922 an able Commander of Turkish Irregulars, bearing the sobriquet of " Yuzdemir," arrived in Kurdistan and embarked on an intensive campaign among the tribes, some of their contingents advancing as far as Rania. Disaffection soon spread to the tribes of Sulaimaniyeh; the Harnavand revolted and a general cry arose from Sulaimaniyeh that the only way to compose the situation was to allow back Sheikh Mahmud who had been deported by us in 1919. As we were not disposed to reoccupy the district for the present nothing was to be lost by giving Sheikh Mahmud another trial and he was installed after giving the most binding assurances. Similarly, on the desert frontier of Iraq to the south-west, the bedouin tribes had since the early part of 1921 been in a continual state of unrest as the result of the operations of the Sultan of Nejd against his enemy Ibn Rashid and the Shammar tribes of Hayil. In consequence a large influx into Iraq of fugitive Shammar went on throughout the year 1921 and naturally had a deplorable effect on the relations between Iraq and Nejd, which was aggravated, when, exalted by his capture of Hayil in November, Ibn Saud claimed allegiance from the eastern Anizah tribe which had always been attached to Iraq. In the following March a serious attack took place by a strong raiding party of Ibn Saud's "Akhwan," as the Wahabis now style themselves, upon a harmless encampment of pastoral nomads guarded by a detachment of the Iraq Camel Corps, some 30 miles south of the railway line and near the provisional frontier. It could be taken for granted that the Sultan, at his distant capital, would repudiate the hostile action of his hot-headed tribesmen, and for us to have taken measures of retaliation without first communicating with the responsible Ruler, might have resulted in a state of war between the Sultan of Nejd and Iraq, which would have been a calamity from all points of view; nevertheless some aeroplanes which were sent to obtain news, having been fired on, were obliged to reply and a grave warning was immediately addressed by me to Ibn Saud remonstrating with him for this unprovoked raid by his tribesmen; reminding him of the provisional frontier which had been agreed upon and urging him to concert with me arrangements for its formal settlement.
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