Ever since King Faisal's advent to Iraq I had left no stone unturned in the difficult endeavour to promote cordial relations between the two potentates, both allies of H.M's Government and regarded with affection by myself, and it would have been a bitter personal as well as official disappointment to me, had a serious breach occurred. But the position of H.M's High Commissioner was a most delicate one at this time. The news of the raid had created profound indignation in certain quarters in Bagdad and immediate reprisals were demanded without any reflection as to whether means existed for carrying them out. It was even suggested quite seriously that the raid had been instigated by the British authorities as a means of making Iraq realise the extent of her dependence upon us! Unfortunately the episode took place at a moment when a serious divergence of view already existed between the British and the Iraq Governments as to the precise nature of their relations with one another. It was extraordinary with what aversion the mandatory idea had always been regarded in Iraq. The mere terms "Mandatory" and "Mandate" were anathema to them from the first, for the simple reason, I am convinced, that the words translate badly into Arabic, or rather were wrongly rendered in the Arabic press when they first emerged from the Peace Conference. I assume the term mandatory to have been introduced by its sponsor, President Wilson, in the particular and recognised sense of "one who undertakes to do service for another with regard to property placed in his hands by the other"; "the other" in this case being the League of Nations, while the "mandate" is the contract under which service is performed. But it was taken in Iraq in its other sense, "of an authoritative requirement, as by a sovereign"; and the "mandatory " as one who exercised the authority. Two widely different conceptions. Misunderstanding their meaning, as they did, there was always intense eagerness on the part of those in authority in Iraq, to get rid of the hated expressions, as defining their relations with us, and much needless controversy was the result.
H.M's Government had indeed agreed on my recommendation, that the terms of our mandatory relations with Iraq should be set out in the form of a treaty, instead of as first drafted, but King Faisal and his Ministers now went further and pressed for the complete abrogation of the mandatory relation, as being incompatible with the country's independence, and its replacement by a simple treaty of alliance; whereas the British Government had in mind a treaty within the scope of the mandate. It was as I have said unfortunate that this acute difference should have been synchronous with the incident of the desert raid. The anti-mandate agitation gained impetus and continued throughout the summer. In June, a vigorous campaign started in the Arab Press; symptoms of disorder again began to appear on the Euphrates, while the collection of revenue dropped to vanishing point, and though at the end of June the Council of Ministers accepted the treaty, it was with the characteristic reservation that it should not be ratified until agreed to by the forthcoming Constituent Assembly. The month of August was marked by the formation of two extremist political parties, and on the 16th of that month the whole of the existing moderate Cabinet, unable to keep the extremist elements within bounds, resigned, with the exception of the Naqib,who retained his post as Prime Minister in the hope of preventing a land-slide.
Meanwhile the extremist elements proclaimed that a new Cabinet was to be formed out of their number, under the presidency of a certain religious firebrand and a joint manifesto was published in the vernacular papers demanding that the British element in the administration should be entirely eliminated.
It was in such a highly charged atmosphere that on a stifling day in August, the 23rd to be precise, I proceeded officially to the Palace to offer my congratulations to His Majesty on this the first anniversary of his accession, and just before entering the building was treated to an anti-mandate demonstration by what proved to be a small packed crowd. I took immediate steps to demand an apology, which was accorded, but at the same moment it was announced that King Faisal had been struck down by a sudden and dangerous attack of appendicitis, necessitating an immediate operation and involving his complete insulation from the affairs of state for some time to come. I was thus faced with a unique if critical situation. The cabinet had resigned; the King was incapacitated; the Bagdad Vilayet and the Euphrates tribes were on the verge of rebellion to all appearances likely to be not less serious than that of 1926 and organised by the same elements. The Turks at the same moment, with their prestige greatly increased by their defeat of the Greeks, were in Rowanduz and Rania and were threatening Sulaimaniyeh. No authority was in fact left in the country except my own as High Commissioner and I felt bound to use it to the full. Accordingly a proclamation was at once issued explaining the situation and stating that the emergent measures which were being taken did not portend any change in the settled policy of H.M's Government. At the same time all friendly and moderate persons who had the welfare of their country at heart were called upon to rally to the side of the High Commissioner and resist irresponsible agitators. The ringleaders were forthwith arrested; the two new extremist parties closed down and certain mischievous papers suppressed. At the same time the two Persian divines who had been responsible for the anti-Foreign manifestoes were advised to repair to their own homeland for the benefit of their health, while some of the Arab officials on the Lower Euphrates who by their intrigues had fostered the disaffection, were dismissed or transferred.
The effect of these measures was instantaneous; and except for a few isolated acts of defiance, and the chronic unrest in the Kurdish districts which continued for some time to respond to Turkish propaganda and incitement, the whole of Iraq proper was quiet by September 10th. On that date King Faisal was reported strong enough to give me an interview, whereat he thanked me cordially for the action taken during the interregnum.
But the north-eastern frontier continued to give cause for anxiety. A Levy force from Sulaimaniyeh, pursuing a band of Kurdish rebels having become involved too far from their base, an Indian regiment was sent to reinforce them; the combined force getting into difficult country suffered a reverse near Rania in 1st September 1922 and was with difficulty extricated; in consequence it was decided to withdraw all British personnel from Sulaimaniyeh and the withdrawal was carried out by air in the course of a day without the slightest hitch — a remarkable example of the utility and efficiency of the air-method in such circumstances. It was undoubtedly a disappointing setback, but with Sheikh Mahmud in control of the town effective administration from Bagdad east of Erbil, Kifri and Kirkuk had become impossible.
Fortunately at this stage the face of the picture was transformed by the execution of a measure decided upon in principle at the Cairo Conference eighteen months before, namely the placing of all the Imperial Forces in Iraq, Ground Troops, Levies and Royal Air Force, under the Command of the Air Officer Commanding. It had not been intended to bring the change into force until a settlement had been reached with Turkey and the northern boundary determined, but Air Marshal Sir John Salmond assumed charge from 1st October 1922, and the vigorous air action taken from that date against the Turks and their adherents whenever they showed their heads had the effect 4 months later of forcing them to withdraw entirely from the Rania district and to concentrate in Rowanduz, whence they were finally ejected in April 1923. With the restoration of the King's health the moment had come for the instalment of a new Cabinet, which the Naqib had succeeded in forming by the end of September 1922. Difficulties with regard to the Treaty and the Mandate had by now been cleared away in correspondence with the Secretary of State and on October 10th His Highness the Naqib and I signed the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Iraq, which was published on 13th October, together with a Proclamation by His Majesty King Faisal to his people expressing his profound satisfaction with the event. The period for which this, the original Treaty, was to run was 20 years, and during the long negociations which led up to it nothing less than 15 years was ever discussed, but, as the sequel shows, the period was destined to be considerably curtailed.
With the n
ear approach of the first Lausanne Conference Turkish propaganda, suggesting the intended restoration of Iraq to Turkey, grew stronger and stronger and had considerable effect both on the Sheikhs of the Euphrates and the inhabitants of northern Iraq. The King's Irade on 21st October ordering elections for the Constituent Assembly, which was to accept the Treaty and pass an Organic Law laying down the Constitution was countered by a "fatwah" or religious decree countersigned by some disaffected divines of Karbala and Kadhimain, forbidding participation in the elections.
It was now realised that a more vigorous line of action on the part of the Iraq Government was needed to cote with these adverse forces, and the venerable Naqib who had remained at the helm of affairs so gallantly through so many changes of weather felt that the time had come when he could resign the ship of state to the command of a younger man, and he was succeeded by Abdul Muhsin Bey, who reconstructed the Cabinet.
At this juncture a change of Government took place in England which profoundly affected the future in Iraq. The Coalition Government under which the Iraq Treaty had been framed and signed had resigned on 23rd October, 10 days after its signature, and the question of Iraq became a prominent plank in the course of the general election which followed; a fierce newspaper campaign being conducted against the expenditure of British money in the country and several members of the new House of Commons pledging themselves to work for its evacuation by the British at the earliest moment. As a consequence, a Cabinet Committee was set up in London in December 1922 to decide upon the future of Iraq. Meanwhile the Treaty lately signed, with its 20 years duration clause, had not been ratified, while at the first Lausanne Conference the Turkish delegates had resolutely refused to entertain any idea of the Mosul Vilayet remaining with Iraq, or to refer the Turco-Iraq frontier question to the League.
It was of course open to Great Britain to refuse to ratify the Treaty and thus for 4 months Iraq remained in dire suspense (flooded all the time with Turkish propaganda) as to whether she would not after all be handed back to Turkey. I was called home to attend the deliberations of this Conference and Sir Henry Dobbs having in the meanwhile arrived, on appointment as Counsellor to the High Commission, with the prospect of succeeding me at the end of my term, I left for London on 19th January 1923, leaving him in charge, and though he was no stranger to the country, having served with me for 2 years, early in the war, the situation which he had to take over was full of awkward possibilities.
I returned from my mission on 31st March bringing with me the results of the deliberations of H.M's new Government. They were in the shape of a draft Protocol to the Treaty of Alliance, reducing the duration of the treaty from 20 years to 4 (the period to commence on the date of the ratification of the Treaty of Peace by Turkey) but concluding with a consoling provision that "Nothing in this Protocol shall prevent a fresh agreement from being concluded, with a view to regulate the subsequent relations between the High Contracting Parties; and negotiations shall be entered into between them before the expiration of the above period." This document was signed by the Prime Minister of Iraq and myself on the 20th April 1923, and may be said to have been my last official act as High Commissioner; for being due for leave before the advent of the hot- weather pending retirement from the service and having many things to see to before my departure, I was content to leave the direction of current affairs in the experienced hands of my Counsellor and successor, Sir Henry Dobbs.
In compiling this condensed narrative of the period of our association, it has not been possible for me to allude repeatedly to the great degree to which Gertrude Bell enjoyed my confidence and I her devoted co-operation, a co-operation which I know from my successor she rendered with the same singleness of purpose to him. Her letters will tell their own story.
P. Z. C.
By H.E. SIR HENRY DOBBS, K.C.S.I., ETC.
High Commissioner for the Iraq
On 22nd December, 1922, I arrived in Bagdad to take up the newly created post of Counsellor to the High Commissioner, with the prospect of succeeding Sir Percy Cox when, as was understood, he retired in the ensuing year. The prospect was not a firm one, since it was possible that, as a result of the deliberations of the British Cabinet, there might shortly be no High Commissioner to succeed. Almost immediately on my arrival, Sir Percy Cox was summoned to London to assist in those deliberations, and he left Bagdad by air on 19th January, 1923. He did not again take an active part in the general work of the High Commissioner, returning only to announce the new policy of the British Government, to sign the Protocol of the Treaty necessitated by the change, and to prepare for his final departure on leave, which took place on 3rd May, 1923.
On taking up the work of High Commissioner in January, 1923, I found that all hope of holding an early election for the Constituent Assembly had vanished, while the Turkish threat on the north was growing more insistent. The first Lausanne Conference was on the verge of collapse. In Sulaimaniya the newly restored Sheikh Mahmud was already showing signs of revolt. The mass of the people of Iraq were silent, showing that strange and admirable restraint with which Oriental peoples await the fulfilment of the purposes of God; but unshakeable through all had been their belief (dimmed only for a time in the murk of the years succeeding the war) in the generosity and high purpose of Great Britain towards weaker peoples.
Sir Percy Cox returned on the 31st March, 1923, bringing with him the result of the deliberations of the British Government in the shape of a draft Protocol to the Treaty of Alliance. The Protocol cut down the period of the Treaty from twenty years to a maximum of four years from the date of ratification of peace with Turkey, and provided that, if before the lapse of that maximum period, Iraq became a member of the League of Nations, the Treaty should terminate immediately. The Protocol was signed on 30th April 1923. The more farseeing people feared that the reduced period was too short to enable Iraq to stand upon her own feet, and the so-called pro-British sections of the populations, especially some of the Euphrates tribes, the inhabitants of Basra and the Assyrians of Mosul, professed to regard this reduction as a betrayal of their interests. But the politicians of Bagdad and Mosul welcomed it with enthusiasm, and even King Faisal and his Ministers, while expressing constant gratitude for the support and favours received in the past, were undisguisedly delighted that a near term had been put to authoritative control by Great Britain of their affairs.
Sir Percy Cox left Iraq at the beginning of May, 1923, amid spontaneous demonstrations of affection and regret from all classes of the population. During his absence in London I had in January, 1923, taken steps to restore general confidence in the face of the Turkish threats. For this purpose a force, composed partly of British and partly of Iraq troops, moved up to Mosul, and His Highness the Amir Zaid, the brother of King Faisal, who had arrived in Iraq in November, 1922, took up his residence at Mosul to initiate political measures for winning over Kurdish sentiment to the Iraq side. He also superintended the formation of a force of Arab tribal irregulars to operate, if need be, against invaders of the plains to the west of Mosul. This demonstration, combined with the firm stand of the British representatives at Lausanne, had an immediate effect on the whole country. But Turkish irregulars remained at Ruwanduz, and plans for a Kurdish rising with the co-operation of Sheikh Mahmud of Sulaimaniya came to light. To forestall such a combination, Sheikh Mahmud's headquarters were bombed from the air and he took to the mountains. It was now time to complete the pacification of the frontier by the reoccupation of Ruwanduz. Two columns of troops advanced on the town, which the Turkish irregulars and their leader, Euz Demir, evacuated without fighting on 22nd April, 1923, two days before the second conference of Lausanne began its sittings.
The district of Ruwanduz was placed under the Arbil Division and the Kurdish leader, Saiyad Taha, the hereditary chieftain of Neri, who was at that time a refugee in Iraq, was appointed Qaimmaqam. He was a man of strong character and of great reputation among the Kurds, and his appointment was an earnest of the wish of the
British and Iraq Governments to administer the Kurdish districts through Kurdish officials. Helped by the presence of a battalion of Assyrian Levies, he succeeded in excluding Turkish influence from the important strategic centre of Ruwanduz.
Letters From Baghdad Page 56