Herbert Hoover

by Glen Jeansonne

  After the Detroit speech, Hoover devoted several days to public matters in Washington and to writing his next major address, scheduled for Indianapolis. From a strategic perspective, the Indianapolis talk was the high point of the campaign.21 This wrap-up, whirlwind tour included brief speech stops in Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. The president exhibited Democratic propaganda that was being employed against him that mocked some of his most important accomplishments. He displayed flyers distributed by the Democratic National Committee with banner headlines reading “How President Hoover has failed children.” Another stated, “His real interest in the Nation’s children may be gained by his recorded effort to emasculate and disrupt the Children’s Bureau.” Another was entitled “The Bunk of the Home Loan Bank.”22 On his return the chief executive spoke for half an hour in Philadelphia. Then he headed to Baltimore and Wilmington, Delaware. The president whistle-stopped through several coal and industrial states, devoting special attention to the hard-hit mining districts, and conferred with United Mine Workers president John L. Lewis.23

  Although by early November Hoover accepted that his chances for a second term were remote, those final days before the election saw him revitalized. As he returned to the East, which he considered his base, he planned to make one final effort in New York City, his October 31 speech at Madison Square Garden. Hoover had said from the beginning that he must carry New York to win the election, and he vowed to make a supreme effort there. In each of his previous speeches, the president had emphasized a single theme. Now, in his New York speech, he attempted to weave the strands into a common theme, provide moral uplift, and explain how his philosophy differed from his opponent’s. En route, the chief executive delivered a speech to seventy-five thousand GOP partisans at Newark. He dwelled on business conditions, which he said had been improving since his debt moratorium and standstill agreement. He indicated that there had been an upswing in most economic indices since midsummer.24

  The crowds that lined the streets to Madison Square Garden were enthusiastic, and Hoover hoped the mood indicated a shift in his direction. The audience inside the Garden was massive. Some twenty-five thousand people had to be turned away for lack of seats. In his address, Hoover attacked Roosevelt’s philosophy of government, which, he complained, was built from the top down rather than from the grass roots. FDR would build layers of bureaucracy through which the average citizen must meander. Bureaucracies are self-perpetuating and wasteful, Hoover pointed out; they represent their own interests rather than those of the people. Above the bureaucracy stand the politicians, whose objective is to keep their own jobs by doling out favors, not to the neediest, but to those most likely to vote for them. Such a model for government is unwieldy and does not have the best interests of the common people at heart. This election, Hoover stated, represented a difference not merely between two candidates but between two philosophies of government. Hoover continued to hammer away at the contradictions in Roosevelt’s public pronouncements, seeking to contrast his policies with FDR’s. He attacked his opponent for pandering to the popular mood rather than delivering substance, and he defended his own economic program and personal character against the attacks that had been made on him. A few days before the election, in Springfield, Illinois, Hoover accused his rival of pledging one type of tariff policy in the East and the diametrically opposed position in the West. Roosevelt could not be trusted to keep his promises, Hoover warned.25

  Maintaining a vigorous pace through Election Day, Hoover spoke by radio to his home state of California, where polls showed him trailing, and announced that he would cross the country by rail to vote in Palo Alto. Along the way he made twenty-eight speeches from the rear of his coach and major addresses at Springfield, Illinois; St. Louis; St. Paul; Salt Lake City; and Elko, Nevada. The president conceded to his staff that only an unlikely rapid improvement in the economy could carry him to victory. Before departing the White House, he spent three arduous days writing his speeches in longhand, with minimal input from associates. He tried to be upbeat but realistic. Along the way, the president reached the point of near exhaustion, stumbling over words and almost collapsing on the platform at St. Paul. He spoke haltingly and his voice was weak. He repeatedly lost his place in the manuscript and struggled to complete the speech.26 In Washington, a dismayed Theodore Joslin listened to Hoover’s address by radio. “The President was absolutely punch drunk tonight,” Joslin wrote in his diary after speaking with Hoover over the telephone. “The content of the speech was good,” explained Joslin. “But the delivery of his speech was terrible. Hoover’s speech didn’t help him any in the circumstances. It is too bad for we were hoping it would swing Minnesota and perhaps North Dakota.”27

  Not every address showed the wear and strain of campaigning. Speaking in St. Louis, Hoover was combative and assertive. The president blamed Roosevelt for the nasty tone of the campaign, saturated with distortion and innuendo. Hoover defended his record and said the Democrats could not escape a share of the blame for conditions that instigated the implosion of the economy. “I submit that some of the greatest leaders amongst the boom promoters of this period belonged to the Democratic Party, and the Democratic candidate himself assisted actively in promotions.” He added that “the Governor in his speeches conveys the impression that as President I should have stopped the boom. He does not prescribe the method by which I should have stopped it.” Finally, he said, “If the President had attempted to stop that boom, one of the persons he would have needed to warn is the present Democratic candidate.”28 The president also rebutted the Democratic argument that charged him with sole responsibility for the Depression by pointing out that Democrats had offered few tangible alternatives of their own.29 Logic was on Hoover’s side, but emotion was on FDR’s side. Hoover’s train continued westward to Salt Lake City, where he addressed ten thousand in his final major speech, then to the small town of Elko, Nevada, where he delivered his last radio address. Then it was off to Palo Alto. At Stanford University, where classes were dismissed for Election Day, Hoover addressed two thousand students who had gathered to support him. The Hoovers cast their votes at the Stanford Union. The president carried the precinct easily. He retired to his home nearby, where family and old friends waited by the radio and listened to the returns until early evening.

  The homeward journey had been difficult. On his return to California to vote, Hoover’s train was halted because a vandal was spotted pulling up spikes, hoping to derail the engine. The man was arrested. In Nevada, Hoover was pelted with eggs, and the state’s governor refused to greet him. With morbid humor, a man cabled Hoover: “Vote for Roosevelt and make it unanimous.”30 Once a beloved world-renowned figure, Hoover was no longer termed the Great Engineer or the Great Humanitarian except in mockery. The stereotype that replaced his heroic status was the personification of the Great Depression, which, ironically, he had labored tirelessly to alleviate. The modest Quaker has often been depicted by historians as glum, dejected, defeated, eager to depart the White House and release his burden. Just the opposite was true. He was eager to win a second term because he felt certain the Depression was almost over. On November 8, the American voters denied him that opportunity. Roosevelt carried 42 states, winning 472 electoral votes and 57.4 percent of the popular vote. Hoover took only 59 electoral votes and 39.7 percent of the popular vote. It was a resounding renunciation of his administration. At nine thirty p.m. Hoover conceded defeat as calmly as he had accepted victory four years earlier.

  In the weeks that followed the election, major newspapers tried to explain Hoover’s presidency in perspective. Considering his decisive defeat, most major dailies demonstrated respect, even praise. One common sentiment was that anyone who had found himself in Hoover’s position would have been hard-pressed to do better. The Washington Post agreed with the president’s own assessment that the American economy was reviving from its slumber in 1931 when the European economic crisis plunged it into a coma. “Mr. Ho
over,” the Post observed, “has earned the gratitude of the country for his services. He has battled with gigantic and unprecedented forces of destruction, without sparing himself.” The New York Herald Tribune wrote that in his “resolute self-sacrificing devotion to the ‘American System’ Mr. Hoover proved himself a great President.” On the other hand, the Chicago Tribune accused Hoover of incubating socialism in America.31 As for the judgment of history, it was then too early to ascertain whether he would be labeled with an epitaph suited for ruining the country, or apropos the first Jeffersonian Republican. He still had more than a quarter century to make a difference and to write much of his own legacy.

  The long interregnum between the voting in November and Roosevelt’s inauguration on March 4, 1933, was one of the most contentious in history. During the interim between the election and the swearing in, the nation was in limbo. Hoover was the last president to experience the long transition as a lame duck. The Twentieth Amendment, which ended the period on January 3 for Congress and January 20 for the president, did not take effect during his term. Although he still had the legal mandate to govern, he was deprived of meaningful power. The interlude between the inauguration and the election had created a difficult transition during earlier administrations, but the tense nature of the Hoover-Roosevelt transfer of power occurred during a precarious time. While en route to Washington by train, two days after the election, Hoover addressed a long telegram to Roosevelt, outlining the intention of America’s Great War allies to cancel or reduce their war debts to the United States in light of the worldwide economic downturn. Hoover wanted to work with Roosevelt to craft a bipartisan response. Roosevelt agreed to meet with Hoover but refused to take action, declaring that the problem needed to be sorted out by the outgoing administration. Congress, rudderless, meandering, and lacking guidance, balked at even the most mundane request from the outgoing president and blocked confirmation of even low-level government appointees. Hoover was president in title only; the ship of state lay beached. Seldom was the transfer of power between an outgoing president and his successor as awkward or acrimonious. This was not because of any lack of vital executive business. Roosevelt said he would not act or comment until attired in the requisite authority of president. When Hoover talked, the public appeared deaf. A logjam of business piled up in Congress and in the executive branch. Roosevelt instructed Democrats not to vote without instructions from him, but he issued few specific guidelines except to kill Hoover bills and appointments. Almost the entire four years of Hoover’s administration had been frustrating, but the interregnum proved the most frustrating. At least during previous crises he had been in charge. Now no one was in charge. The stressful interregnum was characterized by a series of dilemmas that included a banking panic, acute unemployment, unsettled economic issues with Europe, a decline in world trade, and a fiscal crisis punctuated by uncertainty over the future of the gold standard. Hoover turned to Roosevelt, who rejected every overture. Some of FDR’s advisers believed the outgoing president wanted to trap the governor into pursuing his discredited script. By March 4, Inauguration Day, the men were bitter and remote.32

  Rumors gathered that the new president planned to devaluate gold-backed money or abandon the gold standard entirely, which provoked the greatest bank panic of the Depression, eclipsing 1929 and 1931. House Speaker Garner recklessly published the names of banks that had received RFC loans, which started a panicked run on those banks. Exchange rates became scrambled, destabilizing foreign trade. Roosevelt resolutely refused Hoover’s request to spell out what steps he would take about banks and the currency despite the tide of bank failures sweeping the nation. Hoover and some of Roosevelt’s most trusted advisers warned him that this would inspire turmoil in financial markets. The incoming president seemed content to let the economy drift for the remainder of Hoover’s tenure. Banks and repositories were drained of assets and toppled like children’s blocks during the disorderly interlude. Congress and the people would not follow Hoover, and FDR would not lead. The longer the power vacuum lasted, the worse conditions became. Some three-fourths of the withdrawals occurred during the week before FDR’s inauguration, more than half during the final three days. It constituted a far greater economic catastrophe than the crash of 1929. Roosevelt’s intentions remained inscrutable. The president-elect sneered at federal interventions, arguing that he “could see no reason why he should save these bankers,” ignoring the stark reality that when banks failed, depositors were left penniless.33

  The next installment of World War I debts would overlap the Hoover-Roosevelt administrations. Foreign debtors wanted to negotiate reductions during the Hoover administration for payments due during the Roosevelt administration, but the incoming and outgoing presidents could not agree on terms, or even conduct a serious discussion on the subject. Hoover, Roosevelt, and their aides met for two major discussions, but Roosevelt wanted to wait until he became president to deal with the issue. Hoover argued that by that time it would be too late because the deadline would have passed and the debtor nations would have defaulted. The outgoing and incoming administrations also discussed the rash of bank failures. Both sides believed some form of bank holiday might be necessary to avert a total collapse, but time ran out before they could agree on details. Roosevelt consistently refused to negotiate any tentative agreement until he was actually president, and every proposal foundered on that obstacle. Under the existing circumstances, almost any clarification of intended policy would have been stabilizing, yet there were none.34

  Hoover and Roosevelt took different approaches to their meetings, usually with one or two advisers present. Hoover wanted straightforward negotiations resulting in decisive commitments, while Roosevelt preferred pleasant chats during which not much business got done. The two men had common friends, one of whom confided that the New Dealers wanted economic conditions to decline to their lowest point before the new administration took office. Using that valley as their barometer, they could measure recovery against the period when the Depression bottomed out—Hoover’s interregnum—and use those gloomy statistics in future comparisons. Even with the election over, the politically minded FDR wanted to wring every political advantage out of the failing economy.35

  Roosevelt was an intuitively adept politician, while Hoover was no politician at all, simply a public servant with a set of objectives he wanted to achieve. While Hoover’s presidency was scrupulously planned, Roosevelt’s was made up off the cuff, characterized by a weak cabinet but strong advisers. Roosevelt did not initiate most of his own policy; he waited for business to be brought to him and let others flesh out the details. He procrastinated endlessly and changed his mind and his set of advisers often. He frequently borrowed from others (including Hoover), often without attribution. Raymond Moley, an early Brain Truster, commented that to conceive of the New Deal as “the result of a unified plan was to believe that the accumulation of stuffed snakes, baseball pictures, school flags, old tennis shoes, carpenter’s tools, geometry books and chemistry sets in a boy’s bedroom could have been put there by an interior decorator.” Moley made these observations in retrospect after breaking with Roosevelt and leaving the New Deal. Those who saw FDR up close were often not as impressed with his intellect as those who saw Hoover intimately.36

  Inauguration Day on March 4, 1933, was a chilly affair. Hoover and Roosevelt rode together in an open car to the Capitol for the swearing-in ceremony but barely exchanged words. Afterward, Hoover and his family departed Washington for New York. He planned to return to his beloved California for a quiet life in retirement, perhaps dabbling in engineering and farming, writing, continuing his work with charities such as the Belgian-American Educational Foundation and the Boys Clubs of America, and becoming more involved in Stanford affairs. However, although he was relieved of official responsibilities, his pace never slackened.

  Hoover lost the 1932 election primarily because of the woeful state of the economy more than anything he did or did
not do. Like all mortals, he had human foibles and made mistakes. His most fateful mistake was choosing politics as a profession. He was an introvert in a profession that rewards extroverts. He did not enjoy mixing with crowds, shaking hands, or making small talk and could not communicate emotionally to the masses. Hoover enjoyed solitude, unusual for a politician. He was honest to a fault, reluctant to pander or employ patronage in elections. An orphan, reared in modest circumstances in small frontier villages, he sympathized with the downtrodden but could not connect with them in speeches before large audiences. He did not enjoy the public relations aspect of politics and gave little grist to the media mills. He could not dramatize himself or his policies. Even in 1932, after he had spent the previous decade in politics, the political process remained alien and unnatural to Hoover. He expected private charity to do a job that even the entire state and federal governments could not do adequately. He viewed hunger in America as merely a larger version of that in Belgium. He held few lasting political grudges, but those few were intense and obvious. His sense of humor was too subtle for large crowds. Simply put, he lacked political skills. He wanted to win GOP nominations without campaigning for them. Yet if he had been nominated in 1920, when both parties wanted him, he would have presided over the prosperity of the 1920s and might have gone down in history as a great president.