Herbert Hoover
Page 35
By February 1936, his campaign was as wobbly as a newborn calf. Sufficient funds to continue printing and distributing Hoover’s speeches could not be raised. The GOP National Committee had refused to help, and Landon’s strength was growing. A poll of sixteen hundred Ohio Republicans showed that only 4 percent supported Hoover’s nomination. Hoover remained highly visible because of his attacks on the New Deal, yet he neglected the mundane task of gathering delegates, instead relying on speeches and friends. Some counseled Hoover to withdraw if prospects did not improve by May 1, but a few urged him to remain in through the convention and hope for a deadlock. Finally, on May 18, Hoover withdrew from the nominating campaign. The GOP, it appeared, loved Hoover, but it loved winning more.30
The taint of the Great Depression and the electoral debacle of 1932 still haunted Hoover. Governor Landon, the front-runner, was a popular personality yet a mediocre speaker who lacked experience in national and international affairs. Landon distanced himself from Hoover, wary that some of Hoover’s stigma from the Depression might rub off on him. Landon planned on running slightly to the left of Hoover but somewhat to the right of FDR, gaining the moderate vote and making inroads into the usually monolithically Democratic South. Hoover disdained this tactic as “me too, but cheaper,” implying that the governor was Roosevelt writ small. Hoover’s influential friends arranged a prime-time speaking engagement at the Cleveland convention. Like an old-time evangelist, Hoover inspired the delegates with GOP orthodoxy and almost ignited a stampede to his standard. He still held a place in the hearts of the Republican faithful. “I think these people are trying to tell Mr. Hoover that they are ashamed of the way they doubted him and deserted him and that now they are trying to convince him that their hearts are with him,” one spectator said.31
During the campaign, the Democrats dredged up Hoover and dragged him through the mud again, virtually ignoring Landon. Democratic orators, including President Roosevelt, reviled his predecessor, pounding him incessantly, making it a rerun of 1932. Landon was the real “forgotten man” of the election. He carried only two states, with nine electoral votes, Maine and Vermont. If Hoover was trounced in 1932, Landon was virtually annihilated in 1936. Hoover himself would doubtless have lost overwhelmingly to the incumbent in 1936, but almost certainly he would have fared better than Landon and might have helped generate more support for GOP congressional candidates. Landon was no more a rousing speaker than Hoover and his attempts to straddle made his speeches weaker in content. The Kansan wanted to reach out and expand the Republican base while Hoover preferred to solidify the base and reinforce it. Neither could have conceivably outflanked Roosevelt in 1936, because the New York aristocrat had driven a silver stake through the heart of Republican credibility.32
Following the 1936 slaughter at the polls, the Republican Party was in disarray. Landon remained the titular head of the party, but as an ex-president, Hoover retained as much, if not more, clout. During 1937 and 1938 a power struggle ensued between Hoover and Landon. They had different visions for the GOP, and their followers believed the victor in the clash would emerge as the front-runner for the 1940 nomination. Both men considered a party reorganization vital, yet they veered in opposite directions. Hoover wanted to purify the party of left-leaning supporters of Landon and return to traditional Republican principles. His vehicle for this reorientation was a large general conference to meet in 1937, draft a set of Republican principles, and enunciate the party’s position prior to the 1938 congressional elections. Most Republicans in Congress, however, preferred not to challenge the New Deal directly and wanted to emphasize local issues. Landon’s approach was more radical. He wanted to detach conservative Democrats from their party, woo independents, and meld them with moderate Republicans to create a third party as an alternative to the conservative GOP and the leftist Democrats. Landon, like Hoover, wanted a conference, to serve as a launching pad for the new party and, possibly, a second run at the White House. Landon and Hoover were divided by personality, policy, and organizational differences, and both wanted recognition as the Republican spokesman and, possibly, the 1940 nominee. Hoover considered Landon’s third-party idea impractical because third parties had been relentlessly mowed down by major parties, despite Populist fervor for William Jennings Bryan in the 1890s and Progressive zeal for Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, both of whom were more engaging and charismatic than Landon. Further, Hoover considered the 1932 and 1936 elections aberrations. It might be more feasible, he believed, to resurrect the party that had dominated the 1920s than to quixotically spin off a new one.33
Despite media battles, speeches, and a great deal of political intrigue, neither man saw his vision materialize and neither conference ever met. Landon lost the backing of prominent Democrats who had initially expressed interest in his coalition, and Hoover’s large general conference never moved beyond the planning stages. A face-saving compromise was arranged. Instead of a general meeting to formulate a united front on issues, the matter was handled by subcommittees of the Republican National Committee, which issued a watered-down, generic list of proposals. Hoover, though disappointed, professed to be satisfied, because his only purpose was to influence policy, not to reenter politics. The internal scrimmage ultimately produced little of lasting substance. Rather, the New Deal in 1937 and 1938 was weakened by its own excesses and a precipitous economic decline.34
Frustrated by a conservative, narrowly divided Supreme Court, which nullified legislation intended to implement New Deal objectives, in 1937 FDR proposed to pack the Court with additional judges appointed by him, thereby obtaining a liberal majority. Rebellion against the plan was nearly universal among both Democrats and Republicans. Even Democrats considered the bill a flagrant power grab and led the fight against it. Republican congressional leaders, content with the internecine strife, avoided comment to preserve the bipartisan nature of the opposition. Hoover, however, could not resist delivering a vehement speech denouncing the bill, which troubled GOP strategists, who feared his intervention might drive some Democrats to the president’s defense. Hoover’s rhetoric produced nothing more than an irritation, but it did estrange him from some congressional Republicans, at least temporarily. The Court-packing bill was soundly defeated, an embarrassment for the president.35
More choppy waters lay ahead for the incumbent, once considered invincible. In the summer of 1937 the economy plummeted, the worst sudden debacle in history, eclipsing the 1929 crash. It has been attributed to a backlog of overspending, a reduction in spending, overregulation, which paralyzed investment, or underregulation. Whatever the cause, the economy fell off a cliff. Between September of 1937 and the following June, industrial production plunged 33 percent, national income plummeted 13 percent, profits fell by an enormous 78 percent, payrolls eroded by 35 percent, and industrial stocks lost more than 50 percent in value. Manufacturing employment slid abruptly by 23 percent. Any hope that the Depression was ending was shattered. The Court-packing fiasco and the economic catastrophe, combined with simple battle fatigue among Democratic voters, opened a window of opportunity for the Republicans in the 1938 off-year elections. The economic and political furies also combined to bring the New Deal to a virtual standstill. In fact, except for the European war, the historical verdict on the New Deal’s success in dealing with the Depression might remain a hung jury.36
In April 1938 Hoover claimed to have found another example of a Roosevelt power grab in New Deal legislation facilitating government reorganization, which the ex-president warned would permit the incumbent to perpetuate the spoils system. Forgetting that he had labored for reorganization during his own administration, Hoover descended into hyperbole by equating the reorganization bill with home-brewed Fascism. The ex-president was gratified when Congress handed his successor a thumping defeat on the bill, the House voting 204–196 against, including 108 Democrats who defected to the opposition. The Chief felt Roosevelt was on the ropes, dangling in a hangman’s noose.37
Hoover felt frustrated by being steamrollered consistently by the Roosevelt machine. He was unapologetic about his viewpoint. “One of the most discouraging things going on in the Republican Party is the constant apology being made for it,” he reminded fellow Republicans. “The attitude on the part of many speakers implies that the party has no record of economic reform or humanitarian actions; that we must debase ourselves in sack cloth and apologies for the failure of our party; that we must acknowledge that the New Deal has the only righteousness in that field; that we must adopt New Deal methods; and that we will do it a little cheaper.” He warned, “It [the GOP] can never win on that foundation.” Hoover’s angry words carried conviction and were clothed in articulate indignation.39
Hoover’s purpose was not merely the triumph of abstract principle; he wanted to hit the bull’s-eye in the 1938 elections. Silent in 1934, he planned three major speeches for 1938. He argued that Congress needed independent lawmakers instead of rubber stamps and felt driven by a sense of urgency. The stakes were high. Another defeat might be a knockout blow for the party of Lincoln. In addition to speaking, Hoover traveled through the Mountain and Western states, cultivating support. In his final speech at Philadelphia he rebutted FDR’s claim to have restored stability and prosperity, pointing out that 11 million remained unemployed. For the first time since Roosevelt had entered the White House, in 1938 the Republicans handed him a thrashing reversal in the congressional elections, gaining an additional eighty-one seats in the House, seven in the Senate, and several governorships. Hoover could reflect that he had contributed to the triumph, though events were in the saddle, notably the 1937 recession and the failed Court-packing plan. Further, the New Deal simply had not fulfilled its promise to end the Depression and Roosevelt’s star had dimmed. Hoover’s three nationally broadcast speeches were timely, and made an impact, nonetheless. He believed they solidified the grudge that barred him from the White House, though it hardly needed strengthening. Only Roosevelt knew his reasons. But the feud intensified. FDR would no more let Hoover set foot in the White House than he would free a caged tiger.40
THIRTEEN
Politics and Diplomacy Before the Second Great War
In December 1935 Hoover received an invitation to visit Belgium in order to be honored for his contributions to saving that nation from starvation during the Great War. The journey, his first return to Europe since 1919, was expanded to include fifteen European nations. On February 16, 1936, he arrived in Belgium to an enthusiastic reception. Awarding the American a special medal and giving him the title “Friend of the Belgian People,” bestowed by King Albert, the grateful nation issued a stamp in his honor. Afterward, he was guest at a reunion dinner attended by 40 survivors of the 120 Belgians who had worked for him in the Commission for Relief in Belgium.1
A week later, Hoover was driven to France, where the people expressed their gratitude for his feeding of that nation. The University of Lille awarded him an honorary degree, the first of twelve he received in Europe. A street was named for him, and then he conferred with the French president in Paris. On March 3, after a brief stopover in Geneva, where he concluded the League of Nations stood in a state of collapse, he traveled to Vienna, where he received another degree. Sadly, he saw European diplomacy disintegrating, demoralized. In all, Hoover spent seven weeks in Europe in 1938. Part of the trip was ceremonial and sentimental, but he also gathered intelligence about the state of European economic, military, and diplomatic conditions. He wanted to study the causes whereby some thirteen countries had abandoned free institutions established after the Great War and adopted some form of collectivist government. Hoover, two close friends, and a retinue visited Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Sweden, and England. They had personal discussions with twenty-two presidents, kings, and prime ministers, fifteen foreign ministers, a host of cabinet officers, editors, professors, and business and labor leaders—a total of more than 350 such interviews. The most significant part of his itinerary was his stopover in Germany. Hoover had many callers anxious to meet him in Germany. He was still more popular in Europe than in America, a figure of mythical proportions. Ordinary figures, such as professors, spoke in soft tones and were discreet, careful not to criticize. When several Germans were in the room together they talked in banalities. Only one or two offered any criticism of the Nazis. They seemed to believe they had mastered economics, though a few confided they were on the road to destruction. A few businessmen described how the Nazis had taken over their companies and reduced their standards of living. Wages and promotions were fixed by the government and men could not change jobs without government permission.2
Adolf Hitler issued an invitation to the ex-president. Reluctant to accept, Hoover was persuaded by the American ambassador that he might glean intelligence valuable to the U.S. government. The two men met alone, with only an interpreter. The scheduled courtesy call was extended to more than an hour by the führer, who did most of the talking. Hoover found him more intelligent than he had expected, lucid on many topics, with a firm grip on Germany’s destiny. Yet the Reich chancellor’s highly unstable personality included certain trigger points. Specific words or topics, such as Jews, democracy, and Communism, evoked explosions of manic, profane, uncontrollable rage. On some occasions Hoover had to calm the German by terminating conversations and moving on to more amenable topics. Hitler boasted of the economic progress Germany had made, and Hoover conceded the progress but added that it had come at the cost of a degree of regimentation that would prove unacceptable to Americans. Hoover did not feel that the führer wanted war with the West, at least not imminently, but the German dictator hinted indiscreetly that he might be compelled to seize the rich breadbasket of Ukraine. Hitler tried extremely hard to impress the American and seemed disappointed that he could not intimidate him, as the former president maintained his equanimity. Certainly there had been no meeting of minds. Hoover was struck by the fear that stalked the German streets. Average people seemed wary about speaking freely. Hoover could sense the presence of spies and believed his hotel phone might be tapped. Moreover, he was appalled by the darkest side of Hitler’s Third Reich, the persecution of innocent, helpless Jews. Hoover did not know the full underside of the Reich, but he did have ominous forebodings.3
Hoover also met with the second-ranking Nazi, Hitler’s Luftwaffe commander, Hermann Göring. Less bombastic than Hitler, but far more pretentious, Göring strove to impress the simple Quaker with his extravagant hunting lodge, where they dined on a luncheon catered by one of Berlin’s finest restaurants. Carinhall was located northeast of Berlin, on a lake, surrounded by a forest. The lodge was constructed around a central court with low buildings on each side. Opposite the great hall stood offices for the staff officers and servants who served Göring. The grea
t hall, where they were greeted by other guests, was about two hundred feet long by fifty feet wide. A huge fireplace sat at one end and a mammoth plate-glass window through which the lake could be viewed, at the other. The walls were lined with paintings, tapestries, and statues worth millions of dollars, making the room resemble a museum. After lunch, the group enjoyed coffee in another large room decorated with Göring’s hunting trophies. As Hoover departed, Göring aligned some twelve to sixteen huntsmen garbed in green uniforms, carrying hunting horns, on which they played a Wagnerian melody. The conversation had focused largely on production. Göring mined Hoover’s brain for ideas on standardization and waste reduction, which the American had introduced as commerce secretary and which Göring wanted to transplant to Germany. The German was evidently a great admirer of Hoover’s industrial and engineering expertise. Both Göring and Hitler seemed to respect Hoover and were eager to obtain his respect in return. Hoover was not rude, but he remained noncommittal and focused on his fact-finding mission.4
Hoover planned to remain in Britain only overnight to catch the Normandie home but was delayed in port five days by fog, which gave him the chance to talk with British leaders and journalists. He told reporters he did not think war could happen for at least a year. In a meeting with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, he explained that he believed the Germans would be ready for war in eighteen months. Chamberlain agreed completely, adding that the weak spot in Europe was France, which feared Germany and tried to overcompensate by arming to the teeth. The French alliance with Russia made it certain that if war broke out, it would begin in the West, where Hitler would attack the weakest nation first, Chamberlain said. After speaking with the prime minister, Hoover had tea with King George VI, who was handicapped by his stuttering. Hoover sensed the strength had been sucked out of England by the last war, when their best had been drafted first and died first. They could not stand up to Germany, yet they were tenacious and would fight for their empire. He sensed the leaders he met were a notch below those he had known during the Great War. Notwithstanding the League of Nations, their foreign policy pivoted on balance-of-power politics on the continent.5