The Crusades- Islamic Perspectives

by Carole Hillenbrand

  What is the difference between the jihad envisaged by Ibn Taymiyya and the propaganda campaign utilised so effectively under Nur al-Din and Saladin? Certainly there were many similarities. The familiar alliance was forged between the ‘men of the swor? and the men of religion, with each supporting the other. There was the same spate of jihad literature, renewing the old ideas of classical jihad theory. Many jihad sermons were written and the sultans were accompanied on campaign by an entourage of clerics, Sufis, Qur’an reciters and preachers. The sultans in turn sponsored a massive building programme of religious monuments in which officially approved Sunni Islam was taught. These monuments often bore titles with a distinct flavour of jihad.

  So what is new in the Mamluk situation and in the role of Ibn Taymiyya? A few significant episodes in his turbulent career may be illuminating here. Ibn Taymiyya’s first public appearance of note was after the fall of Acre. Ibn Taymiyya never forgot, however, the spectre of the Crusaders and the Muslim disunity which in the early twelfth century had allowed these outsiders to gain territory in the Islamic world. He was invited in 692/1293 to give a fatwa on a Christian who had been accused of insulting the Prophet. Ibn Taymiyya decreed the death penalty for him. In 696/1297 the Mamluk sultan Lajin asked Ibn Taymiyya to arouse the people to fight jihad against the Christian Armenians of Cilicia. In 699/1300 Ibn Taymiyya participated personally in a campaign waged by the Mamluk sultan in the Lebanese mountains against Shi‘ites who were accused of collaboration with Christians and Mongols. In 702/1303 he was again present personally on campaign with the Mamluk army. On this occasion he pronounced a fatwa, in which he allowed the soldiers to be excused the Ramadan fast so that they would be able to fight the Mongols more effectively. Ibn Taymiyya argued that ‘fasting weakened the mujahidun and compromised the success of the jihad for the triumph of the True Religion’.161

  There was in the Mamluk period a greater fanaticism, a profound conviction that the world of Sunni Islam must be rid of ‘infidel contamination’ altogether. It was Ibn Taymiyya who best articulated this change of approach. Ibn Taymiyya was a figure with a high public profile whose words were often heeded and never ignored. There had been no comparable man of religion in the twelfth century whose views became synonymous with jihad propaganda. In Ibn Taymiyya’s time, there was no longer an overriding preoccupation with recapturing the Holy City of Jerusalem. Jihad now went deeper and had much wider implications. For him jihad is defensive – to purge the Sunni world both of the infidel presence and of Muslim heresy. Both these aspects are important in his views on jihad. His anti-rationalist faith and traditionalist approach were ideally suited to his aims. He is not an advocate of military aggression into the ‘House of War’(Dar al-harb) but he argues that Muslims should strive to put their own house in order first. Thus he favours the moral rearmament of the Muslims within their own lands and strong resistance to any external intervention. His implacable diatribes against all kinds of innovations in Islam – against mystical practices, philosophy, theology, the veneration of tombs – are all motivated by his desire that the True Religion should not resemble in any way the practices of nonMuslims.

  Figure 4.30 Helmet, Dioscorides, De Materia Medica, c. 1225, Iraq

  Figure 4.31 (above and opposite) Warriors wearing a ‘corset cuirass’ with lamellar and laminated armour. Above, Rashid al-Din, Jami‘ al-Tawarikh (‘World History’), 714/1314, Tabriz, Iran; opposite, Firdawsi, Shahnama (‘Book of Kings’ – the Great Mongol Shahnamaj, c. 1330, Tabriz, Iran

  For him, jihad, both spiritual and physical, is a force within Islam which can create a society dedicated to God’s service. With Ibn Taymiyya, jihad to Jerusalem is replaced by an internal movement within the Dar al-Islam (‘House of Islam’) itself, both spiritual and physical. Hence Ibn Taymiyya lays great emphasis on the greater jihad, the spiritual dimensions of which he outlines in his fatwas on jihad. At the same time, whilst stressing the prototypical religious importance of the Prophet’s career for those who wish to wage jihad, Ibn Taymiyya is sufficiently a man of his own age to draw parallels between Muhammad’s time and contemporary events. Ibn Taymiyya sees the Muslim world assailed by external enemies of all kinds162 and the only solution is to fight jihad so that ‘the whole of religion may belong to God’.163

  It is small wonder that Ibn Taymiyya’s ideas have been embraced enthusiastically by modern Islamic reform movements. What is less well known are the formative influences which moulded his uncompromising stance. The spectre of the Franks in Muslim territory exacerbated his deep-rooted hatred of infidels and heretics and his strong desire to purify Islam and Islamic territory from all extraneous intrusion and corruption. And while the Franks were plainly a spent force by the later thirteenth century, the Mongols were the exact opposite – the most fearsome enemy that the world of Islam had ever encountered, an alien force that had taken over most of the eastern Islamic world and seemed poised to extend its conquests to the Levant. No wonder that Ibn Taymiyya saw it as his responsibility to galvanise the forces of the Islamic faith against such perils.

  Mamluks and Jihad: An Overview

  It is clear that jihad as a propaganda weapon and as a rallying cry uniting the Muslims became revitalised under the Mamluk sultans. These tough military men, relative newcomers to the Near East and to Islam, were ideally suited to the promotion of clear-cut and uncompromising Sunni beliefs and to the hammering of those who opposed them – be they external infidels (Mongol, Armenian or Frank), or internal ‘heretics’ such as Isma‘ilis. As Sivan remarks, the Mamluks revitalised in dramatic fashion the jihad tradition which had flourished in the last part of the twelfth century.164 Indeed, the Mamluks saw themselves as heirs to Saladin’s achievements. The propaganda benefits of contrasting themselves with the laissez-faire attitude of their Ayyubid predecessors was also no minor consideration.

  Historical events exacerbated Mamluk xenophobia and hostility to those who followed other faiths. Above all, the dreaded Mongol threat loomed over the early Mamluk period and enhanced the urgency of the need to defend the state against this formidable foe. Victory over the Mongol army at ‘Ayn Jalut in 658/1260 gave the Mamluks great prestige and they readily donned the mantle of protectors of the ‘House of Islam’. Clearly Mamluk jihad efforts were directed first and foremost against the Mongols (cf. figures 4.24 and 4.31), but in moments of respite on the Mongol front they turned their attention to the Franks. The Mamluks were all too aware of the possibility of further Crusades coming from Europe to the Syrian coast. Hence their determined efforts to raze many of the ports and fortifications to the ground.165

  Although the Mamluk sultans, especially Baybars and Qalawun, were at pains to patronise the building of religious monuments in Jerusalem, the Holy City now in Muslim hands could of course no longer form the focus of an anti-Frankish jihad campaign as it had done to such great effect under Nur al-Din and Saladin. New targets had to be found. Hence jihad against the Franks formed part of the defence of the House of Islam against a wide range of infidels from without – Franks, Armenians and Mongols – and all kinds of heresy and innovation from within. The interpretation of jihad propounded by Ibn Taymiyya, who had himself lived through the Mongol assaults, epitomises this need to rid the House of Islam of all extraneous elements and to return to what was perceived as the pristine religion practised by the early Muslims. As we shall see in Chapters 5and 6, anti-Christian polemical writing and anti-Christian political measures characterised the early Mamluk period. Nur al-Din and Saladin, and their Ayyubid successors, had grown up in the multi-confessional atmosphere of the Near East and did not generally penalise the Oriental Christians within their territories. The situation with the Mamluks was fundamentally different. The Mamluks’ recent conversion to Islam, their aloofness from the indigenous population and their narrowly focused military education predisposed them to a much harsher approach to non-Muslims. The massive crisis brought to the Islamic world by the Mongols, and their destruction of Baghdad and the caliphate in 1258,
can only have sharpened these attitudes.

  Figure 4.32 Mosque of al-Nasir Muhammad, citadel, minaret, 735/1334–5, Cairo, Egypt

  Figure 4.33 Mamluk epigraphic disc: ‘Glory to our lord the sultan, personal blazon of Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad, early fourteenth century, Egypt

  Figure 4.34 Palace of Amir Beshtak, plan and perspectiva.1 view, 735–40/1334–9, Cairo, Egypt

  A true interpretation of jihad, however, should have gone hand in hand with the honouring of the covenant (dhimma) with the ‘People of the Book’ within their lands. This long-cherished principle seems to have been threatened in the Mamluk period, even though it was enshrined in Islamic law. Whether the Franks had contributed to this rise in hostile feelings towards Oriental Christians (and Jews) within the Mamluk empire will be discussed in Chapter 6.

  General Reflections

  We have seen how highly successful campaigns of jihad propaganda harnessed to charismatic leadership reached two climaxes within the Crusading period: the first in 1187, when Saladin reconquered Jerusalem, and the second in the drive which culminated in the Mamluk expulsion of the Franks from the Levant in 1291.

  It is clear from the evidence presented here that the full exploitation of an extremely effective and multifaceted jihad propaganda machine was the key factor for the revitalisation and reunification of those Muslim territories contiguous with the Crusader states and for the Muslim reconquest of areas snatched from them by the Crusaders. The propaganda was given an extra emotional dimension, lacking in early manifestations of jihad movements, such as the Hamdanids’ struggles on the Byzantine frontier, by the increased focus on Jerusalem as a tangible goal linked to the general aims of jihad. Subsequent jihad propaganda did without the symbol of Jerusalem. In Ibn Taymiyya’s time there was no overriding preoccupation with recapturing the Holy City of Jerusalem. His jihad was defensive – to purge the Sunni world of the infidel presence and of Muslim heresy.

  It will also be apparent that neither in the example of the jihad waged by Nur al-Din and Saladin nor in the jihad propaganda of the Mamluks and Ibn Taymiyya was there any question of jihad being taken to mean ‘waging war’ so as to convert the infidel. Jihad was waged as a reaction to perceived aggression from outside. All this is a far cry from the stereotyped image of Islam as the religion of the sword.

  It is tempting in view of the preceding discussion to put the primary emphasis on religious motivation and ideological considerations. After all, the actions of the great Muslim warriors against the Franks, such as Nur al-Din, Saladin and Baybars, are depicted in the sources as an expression of jihad, and there is a marked crescendo in ideological fervour at the time of Saladin’s capture of Jerusalem and in the descriptions of Baybars’ activities after the arrival of the dreaded Mongols. As already mentioned, Saladin is shown by his biographers as seeking to justify every act on his way to Jerusalem as taken in the ‘path of God’(fi sabil Allah). Baybars’ biographers too portray him as waging jihad against both Frank and Mongol and they rise to heights of exaggerated ideological rhetoric in a way strongly reminiscent of Saladin’s panegyrists.

  Figure 4.35 Northern minaret, Mosque of al-Hakim, upper part, plan and elevation, 703/1303–4, Cairo, Egypt

  Taken as a whole, the period of Frankish presence in the Near East – 1099–1291 – is characterised by two main surges of jihad fervour. The first built up to the battle of Hattin and the second occurred after the accession of Baybars and the deep shock experienced by the Muslim world with the horrific invasions of the Mongols. This certainly had its repercussions on Muslim determination to rid their territories of the unwanted presence of aggressive infidels from both east and west, and led ultimately to the definitive removal of the Franks from Muslim soil.

  Figure 4.36 Funerary complex of Sultan Qalawun, perspectival view, 683–4/1284–5, Cairo, Egypt

  Yet the jihad card must not be overplayed. It is clear that in the first fifty years of Frankish occupation the Muslims learned quickly to co-exist with their unexpected neighbours from Europe; they traded with them, they signed truces and they formed military alliances with them. The same atmosphere of détente and petty local politics is apparent in the period between Saladin’s death and the establishment of the Mamluk sultanate in 1260. The descendants of Saladin, the Ayyubids, were far too preoccupied with internal dissensions and rivalries amongst themselves to wage jihad in a concerted effort to build on Saladin’s achievements and to oust the Franks. They were too weak to wage such a war. The Near East in the Ayyubid period was indeed a jigsaw of small territorial entities, sometimes at war with each other, on other occasions in a state of truce, with constantly shifting alliances; amongst them the Franks were so well established and familiar by this stage that they took their full part in the local internecine squabbles and were almost just another ‘indigenous’ group in the area, together with the Ayyubid princes, the Isma‘ilis and others.

  There was, moreover, even in the times when an atmosphere of heightened jihad prevailed, a gulf between the public written postures of the scribes seeking to justify and eulogise their masters, and the political and military reality. Nur al-Din, Saladin and Baybars had to move slowly towards their goals, and this often involved even these great figures, portrayed in the sources as mujahidun, in temporary truces and such pragmatic concerns as trading with the Franks and exchanging diplomatic missions with them. Saladin clearly lost his focused motivation after the fall of Jerusalem. The Mamluk sultans, often portrayed as the great prosecutors of jihad who hounded the Franks out of the Levant, can also be seen in reality to have moved cautiously and by degrees towards their goals.

  The Theories of Sivan and Köhler

  Was the Counter-Crusade ideological? Sivan argues that it was, and he provides powerful evidence to support his argument. Yet even he stresses in his conclusions that care should be taken not to accord the jihad element too decisive or exclusive a weight in the Muslim wars against the Crusaders. The jihad element always operated in parallel with many others – expansionism, politico-military imperatives, xenophobia, economic factors and fear of attacks from Europe.166

  Köhler goes even further.167 Indeed he challenges the whole sweep of Sivan’s book – the apparent hardening of attitudes towards jihad, the psychological changes in the motivation of the Muslim forces and the grand climax of the jihad campaign, namely the reconquest of Jerusalem. And there is much evidence from the sources to support Köhler’s ideas – above all, the clear picture of a much more complex web of relationships, peace treaties between Muslims and Franks, ‘jihad’ waged against fellow Muslims and the ‘cynical’ use of jihad propaganda for the legitimation of usurped personal and family power on the part of Zengi, Nur al-Din and Saladin.

  Figure 4.37 Complex of Qalawun, minaret, 683–4/1284s, Cairo, Egypt

  Figure 4.38 Carved wooden panel, maristan (hospital), complex of Qalawun, 683–4/1284–5, Cairo, Egypt

  There are many ways of looking at the chronology of the Crusading period. It can easily be divided into sections of weakness, strength, demoralisation, revival, first steps, climaxes. To some extent such a process of demarcation is arbitrary and is imposed retrospectively by scholars wishing to establish order and to see historical patterns. Sivan, who espoused so firmly and persuasively the idea of the awakening of jihad amongst the Muslims of the Levant in the twelfth century, not surprisingly fixes on Saladin’s reconquest of Jerusalem in 1187 as a glorious climax, the culmination of a carefully orchestrated programme of public jihad focused on the Holy City. At first sight this makes good sense, and the argument has a satisfactory shape to it.

  Yet it is clear that such high points did not change social and political realities overnight – if they did so at all. Unfortunately for the Muslims, the victories at Hattin and Jerusalem did not turn out to mean the removal of the Franks. Unfortunately for the neatness of Sivan’s theory there was a so-called ‘relaxation’ in the heightened atmosphere of jihad in the period after Saladin’s death. His immediate successo
rs spoke about jihad but actually embraced détente. Two of the Ayyubids were actually prepared after negotiating with the Franks to hand back Jerusalem to them. It would be possible to argue that the political expediency of using jihad had been temporarily buried again in favour of collaboration, co-existence and co-operation with the Franks and that the particular concatenation of circumstances which surrounded the build-up to Saladin’s conquest of Jerusalem was peculiar, even unique. But the situation was much more complicated: indeed, it seems that the two strands, one of pragmatic co-operation or at least a state of truce with the Franks and the other of military confrontation with them, co-existed for the majority of the time. Certainly the year 1187 can be seen as a high point for the exploitation of religio-political rhetoric. Moreover, the last campaigns of the Mamluk sultans sprang from a heightened xenophobic atmosphere given extra edge by the much greater Mongol menace and they culminated in the final expulsion of the Franks from the Near East. But interspersed with these particular ‘moments’ when jihad feelings were especially aroused, there were prolonged periods of treaties, truces, commercial relations and military alliances. So the role of religion should not be overplayed.

  Whilst there is much to commend Köhler’s arguments – and Chapter 6 of this book deals in some detail with the social relationship between Muslims and Crusaders – ultimately the exact weighting of the interplay between jihad and détente must remain a matter of scholarly debate and of varying interpretations of the primary sources, both Islamic and Crusader. Therein lies the continuing interest and fascination of the history of the Crusades.