The Crusades- Islamic Perspectives

by Carole Hillenbrand

  Al-Aqsara’i

  A typical example of a furusiyya manual is the work of al-Aqsara’i (d. 749/1348) entitled An End to Questioning and Desiring [Further Knowledge] Concerning the Science of Horsemanship.20 Although this treatise with its typically pompous title dates from a period a little after the disappearance of the Franks from the Near East, its contents can reasonably be taken as typical of other such manuals of a slightly earlier date which have not survived or which have not yet been published.

  Figure 7.8 Prince in majesty, Seljuq stone relief on city wall, c. 1220, Konya, Turkey

  The work covers the following topics: an introduction which extols the virtues of jihad and of martyrdom in the path of God, followed by sections on archery, the lance, the shield, the mace, the ‘art of soldiers and cavalrymen’, weapons, conscription and assembling troops, battle lines (cf. figure 8.8), incendiaries and smoke devices, the division of spoils and a final discussion with useful hints to the soldier.

  Al-Aqsara’i claims to be giving the sum of knowledge of the military art in his own time. It is a model work of furusiyya, outlining the qualities and skills which should be possessed by an accomplished cavalryman. Yet, as Tantum suggests,21 it is hazardous to argue that this manual necessarily reflects actual fighting methods in the writer’s own time. Al-Aqsara’i borrows material and quotes verbatim from earlier military manuals, including a work by al-Kindi (d. c. 235/850) on swords and a treatise on the lance by Najm al-Din al-Rammah (d. 694/1294), whose name means ‘the manufacturer of lances’. In fact al-Aqsara’i goes even further back in time for his source material; he uses about a third of the Tactica of Aelian, written in Greek during the reign of the Roman emperor Hadrian around 106 AD.22

  The ‘Mirrors for Princes’ Literature

  This genre was widespread in the medieval Islamic world. Such works gave advice to kings, princes and governors on how to rule, and they often included whole chapters on military matters. Again it is prudent to remember that they reflect model rather than actual practice, advice rather than information. They too have their roots in the pre-Islamic period, especially in Sasanian Iran.

  The Book of Government by Nizam al-Mulk23

  Nizam al-Mulk (d. 485/1092) wrote this work for the Seljuq sultan Malikshah. In it he includes chapters on spies, couriers, the ethnic composition of the army, hostages and the preparation of arms and equipment for war.

  The Wisdom of Royal Glory by Yusuf Khass Hajib

  Written in 1069 in Kashgar in Central Asia under the Karakhanid dynasty by Yusuf Khass Hajib, the Wisdom of Royal Glory is the oldest surviving monument of Islamic literature in a Turkic language. It is a work in the Mirrors for Princes genre and advises the ruler on how to govern. Apart from the language in which it is written, this work, despite its distant origin, is very similar to other works of this kind written in Arabic or Persian. These two examples of the Mirrors for Princes literature have been selected as useful source material for this chapter because they deal respectively with the Seljuq armies (which operated not just in Iran but also in Iraq and Syria) and with the Turkish military tradition (and of course Turks provided much of the manpower of the Muslim armies in the Levant).24

  Figure 7.9 Seated ruler, Kitab al-Diryaq (‘The Book of Antidotes’), c. 1250, Mosul, Iraq

  The Composition of the Muslim Armies at the Time of the Crusades

  Introduction

  The composition of most medieval Muslim armies had long been mixed, embracing varying combinations of tribal warriors, compulsory levies and irregular volunteers, as well as paid professional troops, who were often slaves. From the middle of the ninth century, there was an increased tendency on the part of Muslim rulers to rely on the services of professional armies rather than tribal contingents, Bedouin, Berber or Turcoman, which had often brought them to power and from which they soon wished to distance themselves. These professional armies were not drawn from one area or ethnic group and were based on the acquisition of military slaves (mamluks). Such slave troops were bought in the markets of Central Asia, or obtained as prisoners of war or as gifts from other potentates; at all events, they came from outside the Muslim world (the dar al-harb). They were brought to the court of their new masters, housed nearby in barracks and given a military training plus instruction in the Islamic faith. Rulers believed that such troops, without any tribal bias or previous affiliations in the Islamic world, would give total loyalty to their masters. Turkish knights had acquired a high reputation in horse archery and formed an important part of the contingents of professional soldiers used by the ‘Abbasid caliphs from the ninth century onwards.25

  Smail rightly stresses the composite nature of those Muslim armies which were mustered for large military enterprises, and this is clearly revealed in the Islamic chronicles. A sultan or commander would call on the provincial governors with their contingents and other auxiliaries, including urban militia forces and Turcoman or Kurdish tribal contingents.26 For smaller engagements a standing force (‘askar) was usually enough. Before the emergence of the great military commanders of the twelfth century – Zengi, Nur al-Din and Saladin – the Muslim armies lacked effective leadership against the Franks and were prone to disorder and dispute. They lacked staying power and quarrelled over the spoils of war. A notorious example was the conduct of Il-Ghazi, the Artuqid ruler of Mardin (and for a short time Aleppo), who celebrated his victory over Roger of Antioch at Balat in 513/1119 by indulging in excessive bouts of drinking.27 Instead of following up his success by moving immediately on Antioch, Il-Ghazi allowed his troops to disperse with their booty.28

  Figure 7.10 Plans for mobilising troops in battle, furusiyya manuscript, c. 1500, Egypt

  The Turkish Heritage: The Seljuq Armies

  Whilst it is clear, as we saw in Chapter 2, that the Seljuq sultans in the eastern Islamic world exerted very little effort to fight the Franks, the influence of the Seljuq empire and of the Turks generally on the military heritage of the Levant in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was very strong. Nur al-Din and Saladin stood firmly in military traditions which came from the Eastern Islamic world.

  The Role of the Turcomans

  Since their irruption into the Islamic world in the first half of the eleventh century, the Turcomans had proved to be something of a loose cannon. They were an unavoidable fact of life; they could not be dislodged and, as time went on, they continued to move into and across the Islamic world from its eastern perimeter to the western-most parts of Asia Minor, and it became increasingly clear that they were inside the Islamic world for good. Their relationship with the Seljuq sultans and military commanders was complex and often turbulent. In the Crusader context they were often an important element in the Muslim military machine.

  In Iran in the eleventh century the Turcoman tribesmen had paved the way for the eventual seizure of the eastern Islamic world by the Seljuqs, a family which indeed came from their ranks. Soon, however, a rift seems to have developed between the Turcomans, who retained their perennial nomadic way of life, and their Seljuq overlords, who were tempted to adopt concepts of power and government alien to the traditions of the steppe. The presence of large groups of lightly Islamicised and even marauding nomads was often inimical to the security of both city and countryside and the Seljuq sultans encouraged the Turcomans to move to the borders of Seljuq territory, towards the Caucasus and Asia Minor and away from the centres of Seljuq power in Iran. There, on the periphery of the Islamic world, they functioned, according to the Muslim sources, as warriors for the faith (ghazis). They are often mentioned in the sources as being called on to provide troops if there was a concerted Muslim effort against the Franks.

  Figure 7.11 Enthroned ruler and attendants, underglaze painted ceramic dish, early thirteenth century, Kashan, Iran

  In the Islamic sources the activities of the Turcomans are portrayed as jihad. But this high-sounding title cannot be taken at face value. It is even debatable whether they were at this point more than superficially Islamicised
. Their piecemeal but persistent erosion of infidel territory seems rather to have been the continuation of their time-honoured means of survival, the opportunistic raid. They led a precarious and hard life and were always prone to the lure of booty. This motive led them on many occasions to accept the call from the leaders of the Muslim Counter-Crusade as part of the Islamic contingents in engagements against the Crusaders. But it was precisely their lack of deep religious commitment, or of any supra-tribal loyalty, that made them so unreliable in the early Muslim military encounters with the Franks.

  Despite their very different lifestyle, the Turkish nomads were admired by Muslim writers of the Middle Ages for their military prowess and qualities of endurance. Sharaf al-Zaman Tahir Marvazi, writing in the 1120s, remarks: Those (Turks) who live in deserts and steppes and lead a nomadic life in winter and summer are the strongest of men and the most enduring in battle and warfare.’29

  As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Turcomans in western Anatolia were a serious obstacle to the progress of the First Crusade and they continued to impede those Franks from the West who wished to take the land route from Constantinople to the Holy Land. The Turcomans were also located in small principalities, closely or more tenuously linked with the Seljuqs of Iran, in eastern Anatolia and northern Syria during the Crusading period. This meant that they were well placed to respond quickly to appeals from the Syrian leaders for help against the Crusaders.

  In the first half of the twelfth century Turcoman troops billeted in the cities of Syria and the Jazira were clearly a mixed blessing, both to the Muslim rulers who wished to deploy their military expertise and to the local population. Zengi, for example, installed Turcomans in Aleppo, where they were given their own quarters. They formed the backbone of the ruler’s army. At first they had camped outside the city in tents, and they were brought within the protection of the walls only in case of attack. Their women were sheltered inside the citadel.30 Later on, after the local situation had improved somewhat, the Turcomans were allowed to build houses for themselves, no doubt causing tensions with the local population.

  From quite an early stage of their rule, the Seljuq rulers had seen the danger of relying solely on Turcoman tribal troops. They may well have been warned by Nizam al-Mulk, who as the principal minister of state dominated the Seljuq polity for over thirty years. In his Book of Government, the nomadic Turks, the Turcomans, are no longer mentioned as being the support of the sultan; Nizam al-Mulk has learned from bitter experience that it is better to lean on an army drawn from a variety of backgrounds and ethnic origins: ‘When troops are all of one race, dangers arise; they lack zeal and they are apt to be disorderly. It is necessary that they should be of different races.’31

  Figure 7.12 Mounted warrior, Seljuq tombstone, thirteenth century, Turkey

  Figure 7.13 Mounted warriors, stucco relief, twelfth-thirteenth centuries, Iran

  This tendency not to place exclusive reliance on Turcoman forces, as the early Seljuq leaders had done, continued into the twelfth century and beyond amongst the rulers of the Seljuq successor states in Syria and Palestine. This is not to say that Turcoman troops were not used; on the contrary, they continued to be invited to participate in campaigns against the Franks, although their presence tended to create certain problems. As early as 1090 or so, Nizam al-Mulk could remark with the understatement of the trained bureaucrat that ‘the Turcomans have given rise to a certain amount of vexation’.32

  To judge by the evidence of the eleventh- and twelfth-century sources, this vexation had various aspects: insubordination, unreliability, flat rebellion, lust for plunder and – more generally – the tensions which resulted from the collision of the nomadic Turcoman lifestyle with that of the settled population in both town and country.

  Slave Troops

  The Seljuq sultans, then, saw the disadvantages of relying solely on Turcoman troops. These they replaced by professional Turkish mounted archers; indeed, the Seljuqs rapidly created a standing army, which included, besides Turkish slave soldiers (mamluks), slave troops of other ethnic origins. The Seljuq armies also used Kurdish mercenary troops; these were skilled cavalrymen who fought with lance and sword.

  According to Nizam al-Mulk, the regular payment of troops was essential for morale. If the sovereign could pay them in person, so much the better, ‘so that they will strive more eagerly and steadfastly to perform their duties in war and peace’.33 The Seljuq standing armies were thus paid troops with a strong personal loyalty to the sultan.

  As for the size of these armies, it is reasonable to assume that the ideal numbers suggested by Nizam al-Mulk in his Book of Government were broadly based on actual practice. He advises that the ruler should have a bodyguard of two hundred men who should attend him at home and abroad.34 Such men were horsemen. According to Nizam al-Mulk, it was, however, necessary, in addition to cavalry, that ‘the names of four thousand unmounted men of all races should always be kept on the rolls’. Of these one thousand were for the exclusive use of the sultan and three thousand were for the retinues of governors and commanders ‘so as to be ready for any emergency’.35

  It is important to remember that many of the Turkish military commanders in Syria and Palestine in the early twelfth century – men such as Il-Ghazi, Tughtegin and Zengi – had come to prominence in the military service of the Seljuq sultans, and they must have passed on many of the features of the Seljuq military system to the independent rulers of the Levant. So the blueprint of Nizam al-Mulk may well have been followed there, to some extent at least.

  The Fatimid Armies

  The Fatimid armies were made up of very disparate elements. Just as the Seljuqs had come to power on the basis of nomadic Turcoman military support but had rapidly distanced themselves from this often precarious assistance in favour of a paid standing army, so too the Fatimids had relied initially on Berber military strength but had soon seen the wisdom of diversifying the composition of their army. Various ethnic groups are mentioned as having formed part of the Fatimid armies: these include Berbers, Armenians, Sudanese and Turks, as well as Arab Bedouins (cf. colour plate 3).

  The Fatimids used troops from a variety of sources: the easterners (mashariqa) who came from the countries east of Egypt, the westerners (maghariba) from North Africa, and the blacks (sudanis) from sub-Saharan Africa. Such diversity could on occasion prevent one group from gaining too great an influence in the armies as a whole, but it also aroused factional strife in times of political weakness. The Fatimid armies contained both professional troops and irregular militia. In the latter category were the Bedouins from Egypt and southern Palestine, as well as Turkish and other mercenaries.36

  Hamblin describes the Fatimid army in the three battles of Ramla (1101–5) as being a medium-sized but well-developed fighting machine composed of various ethnic units and arms’. It lacked leadership and motivation.37 The Fatimid army in the field, as Hamblin and Brett contend on the basis of the Arabic sources, numbered between 5,000 and 10,000 men.

  Figure 7.14 Standard Mamluk blazons of office showing the types of shield employed, thirteenth–fifteen th cen turies, Egypt and Syria

  The Armies of Saladin and His Successors, the Ayyubids

  Like those of his predecessors, Zengi and Nur al-Din, Saladin’s army was made up to a large extent of Kurdish and Turkish professional fighting men. Saladin also had an elite corps which was composed of slave soldiers (mamluks). Apart from this bodyguard of his who were attached to him by bonds of personal loyalty, he relied for military support on the power of blood links between himself and his sons, nephews, brothers, cousins and other relatives whom he had estab-lished in provincial posts throughout his territories. In other areas he hoped for the honouring of alliances made through the usual mixture of coercion and inducements.

  Figure 7.15 Two warriors, ink drawing on paper, eleventh century, Egypt

  On occasion he also used the services of mercenaries of various ethnic origins as well as tribal troops, whether Turcomans or Arab Bedou
in. Despite the Kurdish origins of Saladin and his descendants, the Ayyubids, their armies contained more Turks than Kurds.38 At the battle of Hattin Saladin also had in his ranks volunteer jihad fighters (al-mutatawwi’a) who are described as being ascetics and Sufis. Each of them asked Saladin’s permission to execute one of the Templars and Hospitallers who had been captured during the battle.39

  The Mamluk Armies

  There is considerably more information in the sources on the Mamluk armies than on those of earlier periods and extensive research has been done in this area, notably by Ayalon. The Mamluk military was characterised by unusual cohesion and unity. Based as it was in Cairo, which was the cynosure of all Mamluk eyes, its formalised structures were repeated in microcosm in the provinces and were the main factor contributing to the longevity of the dynasty. Sultans and governors could come and go, sometimes with remarkable speed, but the firm foundation of this remarkable political state was its military organisation and the loyalty it engendered amongst those who belonged to its military elite. Baybars relied on a caste of commanders who were, like him, Mamluks. These commanders were assigned the revenues from pieces of land or other endowments (iqta‘s) a portion of which was distributed to the commanders’ own mamluks. Everybody within the elite had a stake in its continuing stability. The Mamluk army had three principal units: the sultan’s mamluks, the mamluks of the commanders, and the halqa troops, a corps of freeborn cavalry. The Mamluk sultans were able to replenish their supplies of troops by the import of new Turkish slaves from the Caucasus and Central Asia along the trade routes through Anatolia. The Mamluk state could draw on far more troops than the Franks were ever able to do. Moreover, when the time came to embark on the systematic destruction of Frankish castles, settlements and ports in Syria, the Mamluks could draw on tens of thousands of auxiliary troops – Turkish, Kurdish and Mongol – to help in the carrying out of this task.