The Crusades- Islamic Perspectives

by Carole Hillenbrand

  Even allowing for the usual exaggerations and bias of both these authors, there is here a lively picture of the strategies of attack and defence used in an important siege.

  The Siege of Caesarea in 663/1265

  In 663/1264–5 Baybars began his first major attacks on the Frankish strongholds in Syria. During this campaign he reduced the key Frankish possession of Caesarea. This was a very difficult citadel to storm. As al-Maqrizi points out:

  The Franks had taken there blocks of granite which they had placed horizontally in the body of the walls, in such a way that they would have nothing to fear from sapping, and so that they [the walls] would not fall when they were mined. The attacks and assaults followed one another uninterruptedly. The fortress was continually hit by the impact of machines, ballistas and a hail of arrows.109

  Baybars had five catapults of Maghribi construction. Additional siege equipment, stonemasons and carpenters were summoned from surrounding fortresses and soldiers set about making scaling ladders.110 On 9 Jumada I 663/26–27 February 1265 he encircled and stormed Caesarea. The struggle then began for the citadel. It lay on a peninsula which, with naval help, could be attacked from the town, but from one side only. Louis IX had fortified it very well. He had reinforced its walls by classical granite pillars secured crosswise with one another. They could not be mined, as Arabic chroniclers themselves point out. The citadel became the target of stones and Greek fire from catapults and the defenders were overwhelmed with arrows from siege towers. Baybars himself shot arrows continuously from a nearby church tower. When a siege tower was successfully brought up to the wall, Baybars himself participated in the fighting. On 15 Jumada I/5 March the defenders surrendered the citadel and embarked for Acre.

  Baybars ordered the town and the citadel to be razed to the ground, probably in order to prevent once and for all Caesarea ever being used again as the bridgehead for a Crusading army.111

  Figure 8.17 Foot-soldiers in combat, Blacas ewer, inlaid brass, 629/1232, Mosul, Iraq

  The Siege of Krak des Chevaliers in 669/1270–1271

  The sources give plentiful details of the siege of Krak des Chevaliers (Hisn al-akrad).112 In Safar 669/Sept.–Oct. 1270, Baybars, feeling no longer threatened by a Frankish attack launched from overseas, for he had heard of the death of St Louis, led a powerful force into Syria and laid siege to Krak. There were various stages to the siege which are recorded in the sources; first, on 19 Rajab 669/3 March 1271, Baybars occupied the front defences and battered the outer enceinte. Two days later, he captured the first barbican (bashura); on 1 Sha‘ban/15 March he took the second barbican, at the elbow of the access ramp. Lastly, on 15 Shafban/29 March he forced an entry into the central courtyard and the defenders fled into the keep. Baybars launched further attacks with ballistas and on 25 Sha‘ban/8 April the keep was surrendered to him and the knights in it were allowed to leave under safe-conduct to take refuge in Tripoli. This citadel was clearly a vital fortification for the Muslims to retain and Baybars personally supervised the necessary repair work to restore it to its former state before leaving on 15 Ramadan/27 April. The short period needed for these repairs indicates clearly enough that the damage inflicted on the fortress was limited – but it must have been at absolutely key areas of the defence.

  The Siege of Marqab in 683/1285

  Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir gives a detailed account of the siege of Marqab by the Mamluk sultan Qalawun in 683/1285.113 His account shows the careful preparations which preceded the actual siege. He begins by stressing the difficulties of taking the citadel: ‘It is a great forbidding citadel which our master Sultan al-Malik al-Mansur – may God grant him victory – continually persevered to command and tried to take for Islam.’

  Yet the taking of it eluded him, although he tried on more than one occasion to do so. The Hospitallers in it had waxed very proud and powerful and had held other nearby citadels in thrall. Indeed, the Franks believed that Marqab could never be taken.114

  Qalawun equipped mangonels from Damascus: ‘Weapons of iron and naft, the like of which were only to be found in his store houses and arsenals, were prepared.’

  This was all done in advance and the expertise of those who knew about sieges was utilised: ‘The mangonels and weapons were carried on necks and heads.’115 The Muslims used three so-called ‘Frankish’ mangonels, three ‘black bull’ mangonels, and four ‘devilish’ mangonels.116

  After taking the citadel and deliberating whether to destroy it or not, Qalawun decided to keep it and to reinforce it. He placed in it warriors, 400 artisans, mangonels, weapons, blocks of wood, firewood, arrows, arsenals, Greek fire and other items of siege warfare.117

  Figure 8.18 Mangonel, Rashid al-Din, Jami‘ al-Tawarikh (‘World History’), 714/1314, Tabriz, Iran

  General Remarks

  It is clear from the Islamic sources that the most common form of Crusader-Muslim confrontation was the siege. These sources cor-roborate Marshall’s conclusion that sieges decided the fate of the Crusaders and that ‘other forms of military activity were largely incidental’.118 What the Islamic sources do not reveal – perhaps because it was so self-evident to them or because such a truth would have undermined the glory of their victory – is the overwhelming fact of the Muslim numerical superiority over the Franks.119

  The Evidence of Three Islamic Works of Art

  The Fustat Drawing

  The twelfth century is almost entirely devoid of Islamic painting on paper. There is, however, one surviving piece of artistic evidence from the twelfth century which because of its rarity is of great value; it is a much damaged Fatimid drawing found in the rubbish heaps of Fustat, the old Islamic capital of Egypt before the building of Cairo,120 and is probably datable to some time between 1150 and 1180 (colour plate 13). This tinted drawing shows us a first-hand illustration of weapons used in the twelfth century (figure 8.16). In particular, it depicts the kite-shaped shield which had been known in Egypt at least since the erection of the Bab al-Nasr (Gate of Victory) in Cairo, where it is depicted in monumental form. It also depicts a round shield.

  Figure 8.19 Foot-soldier, drawing with added colour, twelfth century, Fustat, Egypt

  It is difficult to ascertain what actual historical event, if any, this painting is commemorating. As already mentioned, the Franks fought against the Fatimids at various points in the twelfth century, and these clashes included the initiatives of al-Afdal in the early stages of the Crusader presence and the involvement of the Franks in Egyptian affairs during the 1160s. It is possible, therefore, that this picture records a real military encounter between Fatimids and Franks, even one involving the Syrian troops sent out by Nur al-Din. A significant date to be remembered here is 1168, when the Fatimid wazir burned down Fustat. Probably the picture dates from before that time since it was found in the debris there.

  The painting depicts some kind of military encounter which is being enacted just beneath the walls of a town or fortified place. The seven warriors illustrated all carry shields and at least four of them are wearing mail. The warriors’ headgear is carefully shown: one is wearing a conical Norman helmet with a short nose-piece whilst others have what appear to be turbans on their heads. The two mounted warriors are wearing long mail hauberks. One of the infantrymen wears baggy knee-length pantaloons.

  The Baptistère of St Louis

  The Baptistère of St Louis is an acknowledged masterpiece of Islamic metalwork. It was the subject of a masterly study by Storm Rice accompanied by a series of beautiful drawings and photographs (cf. figures 8.17, 8.18, 6.44, 1.7, 8.24, 1.20, 1.9, 9.2, 3.15, 1.8, 8.14, 3.16, 6.72, 1.16 and colour plate 9).121 This brass basin, now in the Louvre, is signed by a Muslim artist, Muhammad b. al-Zayn, and the consensus of scholarly opinion dates it to the period 1290–1310, though other datings have been suggested. The whole surface of the basin is covered with engraved designs inlaid with silver and gold, and since most of them depict figural scenes, they are a remarkable visual historical document. They show the Mamluk cou
rt, battles and hunting expeditions. The details of the costumes are striking. One amir is heavily armed,122 carrying a sword, mace and bow. Two oth-ers are armed with axes.123

  The battle scenes depicted on the ‘Baptistère’ are especially interesting (figure 8.18). In one such scene a central figure is wearing splint armour worn over a quilted garment.124 He is shown having just shot an arrow from his bow. The arrow is lodged in his enemy’s neck.125 A second battle scene shows three horsemen equipped with lance, bow and sword respectively.126 The dismembered parts of an enemy soldier lie at their horses’ feet. The artist has powerfully evoked the danger and ferocity of the battlefield. The basin, which presumably formed part of the table service of a high-ranking Mamluk notable, brings to life the dry, somewhat lifeless instructions of the military manuals.127 It corroborates their information and adds much vivid detail of its own. We also have here first-hand evidence of the Mamluk obsession with adding blazons (marks of rank) to the various objects used in an amir’s service, such as clothing and weapons. The basin depicts a wide variety of weapons – axes, maces, daggers – in precise detail. It is also an excellent source for contemporary military costume, from headgear to boots, and for the details of horse harness and accoutrements.

  Figure 8.20 Battle scene, inlaid brass basin known as the ‘Baptistère de St Louis’, c. 1300 or earlier, Syria

  Figure 8.21 Battle scene, inlaid brass basin known as the ‘Baptistère de St Louis’, c. 1300 or earlier, Syria

  A Seljuq Bowl

  A surviving early thirteenth-century polychrome mina‘i Seljuq bowl in the Freer Gallery in Washington is a unique piece of material evidence about the conduct of war in the Crusading period (colour plate 12).128 Although it comes from Iran and not from the areas under attack from the Franks, it is highly relevant to Crusading warfare because it depicts Turkish warriors attacking a fortress. There was, as already mentioned, a heavy preponderance of Turkish mamluk forces and Turcoman auxiliaries in the armies of Zengi, Nur al-Din, Saladin and later commanders. There were probably no great differences in military practice between the Turks in Iran and those in Syria. The dish is therefore of obvious relevance to that military environment. Although some of the warriors depicted here are named on the bowl – most of them bearing Turkish names – the actual event which this bowl commemorates has not been identified in print. It may, however, depict Turkish warriors attacking an Assassin fortress in western Iran. The assailants are in mid-action; the battle has not yet been won. This is not a slow, painstaking siege but a fierce cavalry attack on the fortress. Perhaps it is even the climax of the battle if the figure falling from the battlements is indeed the leader of the defenders.

  The mounted attackers rush towards the fortress in parallel rows: their leaders are dressed in greyish-purple, those immediately behind them in green. Perhaps this denotes that only the leaders are wearing coats of mail, which, as already mentioned, were very costly. Certainly, the attacking figure in the centre of the fray, identified in the writing above his head as Khudavand Muzaffar al-Dawla wa’l-Din, seems to be wearing a mailed jacket of some kind. None of them is wearing a helmet or other protective headgear. It has to be said that the military advantage to be derived from a headlong cavalry charge against a well-defended fortress is by no means clear, but there is no reason to doubt that the painter has represented the kind of attack that such riders would have carried out against the enemy on the field of battle.

  Figure 8.22 Horsemen, mina’i dish, c. 1240, probably Kashan, Iran

  Figure 8.23 Armour types, mina’i dish, c. 1240, probably Kashan, Iran

  The defenders in the fortress, the lower part of which is ornately tiled, are firing arrows through openings in the ramparts. They are also using a catapult which is mounted at the highest point in the fortress and is discharging stones on to the attackers. In the foreground, some of the defenders have come out of the fortress on foot, bearing either sword, spear or bow, in a counter-attack which seems doomed to failure, in view of the dead bodies which lie, already stripped of armour or clothing, on the ground. Some aspects of the depiction of the fortress remain rather enigmatic – perhaps the empty suits of armour and weapons strewn along the ramparts are intended to make the attackers believe that the fortress has more defenders than there really are, or perhaps this section depicts an arsenal.

  Although the bowl incorporates many stylised and symbolic elements, it exudes the atmosphere of a real battle and manages to portray the very heat of war, its bloody chaos, panic, confusion and terror; the attacking warriors spill over on to the sides of the bowl and suggest the still invisible menace of many more to come.

  Figure 8.24 (above and opposite) Mamluk blazons for the barid (postal service) couriers, thirteenth–fifteen th cen turies, Egypt and Syria

  Other Aspects of the Conduct of War

  Raids and Ambushes

  Much of the fighting between Muslim and Frank was more desultory and mundane than pitched battles with all their attendant pomp, bloodshed and expense. A raid had limited objectives like seizing a caravan and its merchandise, or helping to capture a castle; or it formed part of larger offensives. Sometimes a raid was undertaken to exact vengeance and as a show of strength. Marshall’s book outlines in detail the importance of raids in Crusader-Muslim military encounters.129 In the Islamic sources it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between fully-fledged battles and small-scale engagements, although many encounters probably fall into the latter category.

  Typical of a small-scale engagement was the so-called ‘battle’ of al-Quhwana (al-Uqhuwana) on the shores of Lake Tiberias in Muhar-ram 507/June 1113. An advanced Turkish foraging party from the combined forces of Mawdud of Mosul and Tughtegin of Damascus encamped at al-Quhwana only to find that the Franks under Baldwin and Roger of Antioch had already pitched their tents there:

  battl ewas joined on both sides without any preparations for an engagement, pitching of tents, settling down in camps, or preliminary skirmishing. Both sides engaged in a hand-to-hand fight, and God the Bountiful, to Him be praise, gave victory to the Muslims, after three charges.130

  A typical example of a minor military engagement was an ambush laid by Saladin against a Frankish contingent near Ramla in 1192. For this engagement Saladin employed Bedouin Arab troops131 who fought with lances made of reeds. He had chosen them because of their speed and agility. In the ambush a number of Frankish cavalry were unseated by the attack of the Bedouin. Thereafter, some Turkish troops joined in and inflicted serious injuries on the Frankish knights by throwing javelins at them. No doubt a very useful outcome of this encounter would have been the capture of enemy horses.

  Raids had a number of other benefits. They could weaken the enemy and undermine their morale.132 They were conducted against villages, churches and mosques and often damaged agricultural land. Al-Aqsara’i’s manual contains an interesting section on surprise attacks and ambushes. Tantum concludes that here the author is describing the actual practice of his own time. The value of ambushes is clearly underlined: ‘Ambushing is necessary for the army and the safeguarding of it… Men of perception judge ambushes by their effectiveness; they are a principle laid down for an army as a mighty source of strength.’133

  Al-Aqsara’i explains, but in no great detail, how to mount an ambush:

  Now it is better if the ambush party is divided into two groups because of the likelihood that if the enemy sees them to be few in number they will seek to attack them and when the Muslim force is routed will give chase and then the second group will break out upon them.134

  He emphasises the importance of choosing a good site near water for the ambush, in case the Muslims have to wait to attack, and the need for maintaining silence whilst in hiding.

  Communications

  During the Crusading period, the simplest way to transmit messages of military import was to send messengers on fast horses or camels. But flares were also used to communicate news from one high place to another over considerable distances.13
5 Even swimmers were charged with the task of transmitting important messages. A swimmer notified Saladin of the situation in Acre in 586/1190–1.136 The Egyptian postal service (which had an intelligence arm) used mules and swift camels.137 Baybars reorganised his postal service, which eventually extended as far as the Syrian coast and the Taurus fortresses, and he established special staging posts on the routes for changing horses and housing riders.138

  Figure 8.25 Tents in an early fourteenth-century album painting, probably Tabriz, Iran

  Figure 8.26 The state of the postal routes at the time of Baybars’ death, 676/1277. The network of pigeon-houses is marked by a strong black line, and signal towers by a dotted line

  Pigeons were used to send messages too (figure 8.27). In his military manual, al-Ansari says: ‘It is obvious that pigeons are among the fastest means of communication because the pigeon covers the distance of twenty days’ walking in less than a day.’139 According to al-Ansari, Egypt had a whole network of pigeon towers.140 As for Syria, Ibn al-Athir gives a detailed account of the way in which Nur al-Din set up a system of pigeon post within his territories there:

  In the year 567 [1171–2] al-Malik al-’Adil Nur al-Din gave orders to use carrier pigeons. These are the messenger birds which fly back to their lofts from distant lands. They were adopted in all his territories.

  The reason for this is that his territories had become so extensive and his realm so great that it reached from the border of Nubia to the gate of Hamadan, with only the land of the Franks intervening. The Franks, may God curse them, sometimes attacked some of the border areas, but by the time news of this reached him and he was able to set out against them, they had already in part achieved their purpose. He therefore issued orders concerning this matter and sent them in writing to all his territories. He authorized rations for the pigeons and for their breeders. They gave him great satisfaction. News reached him at once in this way. On every border he had men on duty with pigeons from the neighboring city. When they saw or heard anything, they at once wrote it down, attached it to the bird, and sped it without delay to the city from which it came. There the message was transferred to another bird, which came from the next city on the way to Nur al-Din, and so on until the report reached him. In this way the borders were protected, and when a band of Franks attacked one of them, news reached him on the same day. Then he wrote to the troops nearest to that border, ordering them to muster and march with dispatch and take the enemy by surprise. They did so and were victorious, while the Franks were lulled in the belief that Nur al-Din was far away from them. May God have mercy on Nur al-Din and be pleased with him. How great was his concern for his subjects and his realms!141