When China Rules the World
Page 59
decline
and East Asia
economic strength
and Europe
foreign policies
hegemony
human rights debate
importation of investment
and India
industrial employment
insularity
and the international system
and Japan
Mandarin teaching
and Middle East
overseas Chinese
population
rise of
self perception
understanding of
universities
United States Africa Command
unity
universalism
universities
urban population
urbanization
US dollar
US National Intelligence Council report
US Treasury bonds
values
Veriah, Harinder
Vietnam
Vietnamese (language)
village election
Wang Gungwu
Wang Xiaodong
war on terror
waterway systems
Wen Jiabao
Wen Yudio
the West
concept of
decline of
and the developing world
share of world population
view on Asia modernity
view on China
Westernization
food
language
physical appearance
politics and power
Westphalian system
wet rice farming
Wolferen, Karel van
Wong Bin
workplace
World Bank
world history
writing system
WTO
Xinjiang
Xu Zongheng
Xuchang Man
Yan Xuetong
Yang Qingqing
Yangzi Delta
Yangzi river
Yasukuni Shrine
Yellow Emperor (Huang Di)
yellow races
Yoshino, Kosaku
Yu Yongding
Yuan dynasty (1279–1368)
Yuan Shih-kai
Yukichi, Fukuzawa
Zambia
Zhang Qingli
Zhang Taiyan
Zhang Wei-Wei
Zhang Xiaogang
Zhang Yimou
Zhang Yin
Zhang Yunling
Zhang Zhidong
Zhao Suisheng
Zhao Ziyang
Zheng He
zhongguo
Zhou dynasty (1100-256 BC)
Zhou Enlai
Zhu Feng
Zhu Rongji
Zi Zhongyun
Zimbabwe
About the Author
Martin Jacques is currently a visiting research fellow at the London School of Economics Asia Research Centre. He has recently been a visiting professor at Remnin University, Beijing, the International Centre for Chinese Studies, Aichi University and at Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, and was a senior visiting research fellow at the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. He was editor of the highly respected journal Marxism Today until its closure in 1991. He was founder of the UK think-tank Demos, has been a columnist for The Times and the Sunday Times and was deputy editor of the Independent. He currently writes a regular column for the Guardian. He is the co-editor and co-author of The Forward March of Labour Halted? (1981), The Politics of Thatcherism (1983) and New Times (1989).
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[1] John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 74.
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[2] Alastair Bonnett, The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), Chapters 1–2, 6.
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[3] We are already living in what is, in economic terms, a multipolar world; Pam Woodall, ‘The New Titans’, survey, The Economist, 16 September 2006. Also, Brian Beedham, ‘Who Are We, Who Are They?’, survey, pp. 14–16, The Economist, 29 July 1999.
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[4] Martin Wolf, ‘Life in a Tough World of High Commodity Prices’, Financial Times, 4 March 2008; Jing Ulrich, ‘ China Holds the Key to Food Prices’, Financial Times, 7 November 2007.
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[5] ‘Sharpened Focus on Sovereign Wealth Funds,’ International Herald Tribune, 21 January 2008; ‘ China ’s Stake in BP’, Financial Times, 15 April, 2008.
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[6] Dominic Wilson and Anna Stupnytska, ‘The N-11: More Than an Acronym’, Goldman Sachs Global Economics Papers, 153, 28 March 2007, pp. 8–9.
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[7] John Hawksworth and Gordon Cookson, ‘The World in 2050 — Beyond the BRICs: A Broader Look at Emerging Market Growth Prospects’, PricewaterhouseCoopers, March 2008, p. 3.
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[8] www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm.
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[9] Charles Krauthammer, ‘An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World’, Irving Kristol Lecture, American Enterprise Institute Dinner, 10 February 2004.
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[10] Philippe Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules (London: Allen Lane, 2005), Chapters 3–4, 10.
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[11] www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/ArmsTrade/Spending.asp#InContextUSMilitary. SpendingVersusRestoftheWorld.
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[12] The argument against the inviolability of national sovereignty, of course, has various rationales, notably failed states and so-called rogue states. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), and ‘Civilise or Die’, Guardian, 23 October 2003; Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 2003). Ignatieff quite wrongly suggests (p. 21) that ‘we are living through the collapse into disorder of many [my italics] of these former colonial states’ in Asia and Africa.
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[13] G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition: Essays on American Power and World Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 12.
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[14] Joseph S. Nye Jr, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. x.
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[15] Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power is Transforming the World (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007), Chapter 9.
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[16] Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana Press, 1988), for example pp. 472-80, 665-92.
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[17] Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD, 2003), p. 261.
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[18] Ibid., p. 258.
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[19] See Christopher Chase-Dunn, Rebecca Giem, Andrew Jorgenson, Thomas Reifer, John Rogers and Shoon Lio, ‘The Trajectory of the United States in the World System: A Quantitative Reflection’, IROWS Working Paper No. 8, University of California. A dramatic and early illustration of the effects of the UK’s imperial decline was the rapid loss of British Asia between 1941 and 1945; Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941- 1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2004).
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[20] Joseph E. Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (London: Allen Lane, 2008), Chapter 1.
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[21] Adrian Wooldridge, ‘After Bush: A Special Report on America and the World’, The Economist, 29 March 2008, p. 10.
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[22] George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002.
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[23] For a discussion of the US �
�s current account deficit, see Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (London and New York: Allen Lane, 2004), Chapter 8.
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[24] Speech by Henry Hyde, chairman of the House International Relations Committee, 26 January, reprinted as ‘The Perils of the “Golden Theory”’, Strait Times, 21 February 2006. Paul Kennedy, ‘Who’s Hiding Under Our Umbrella? ’, International Herald Tribune, 31 January 2008.
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[25] The US has even become a net importer of investment: the difference between the overseas assets owned by Americans and the American assets owned by foreigners fell from 8 per cent of GDP in the mid 1980s to a net liability of minus 22 per cent in 2006; Niall Ferguson, ‘Empire Falls’, October 2006, posted on www.vanityfair.com.
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[26] Steven C. Johnson, ‘Dollar’s Decline Presents a Challenge to US Power’, International Herald Tribune, 28-9 April, 2007.
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[27] ‘US’s Triple-A Credit Rating “Under Threat”’, Financial Times, 11 January 2008.
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[28] There is no precedent for the extent of the militarization of the US economy both during the Cold War and subsequently; Eric Hobsbawm, Globalisation, Democracy, and Terrorism (London: Little, Brown, 2007), p. 160.
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[29] For an interesting discussion of the economic cost to the United States of its military expenditure, see Chalmers Johnson, ‘Why the US Has Really Gone Broke’, Le Monde diplomatique, February 2008.
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[30] Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999), pp. 309-22; Gerald Segal, ‘Globalisation Has Always Primarily Been a Process of Westernisation’, South China Morning Post, 17 November 1998.
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[31] For a discussion on the fundamental importance of cultural difference in the era of globalization, see Stuart Hall, ‘A Different Light’, Lecture to Prince Claus Fund Conference, Rotterdam, 12 December 2001.
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[32] Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), Chapters 4–5.
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[33] Chris Patten, East and West: China, Power, and the Future of East Asia (London: Times Books, 1998), p. 166.
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[34] Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, National Interest, summer 1989. See also for example, Edward Luttwak, Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), p. 25.
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[35] John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), for example Chapters 2, 6, 12, Epilogue.
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[36] Ezra F. Vogel, The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: and London: Harvard University Press, 1991); Jim Rohwer, Asia Rising (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1996), Chapters 1–3.
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[37] Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, p. 261.
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[38] Martin Jacques, ‘No Monopoly on Modernity’, Guardian, 5 February 2005.
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[39] Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. III, End of Millennium (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 277.
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[40] James Mann, The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression (New York: Viking, 2007), pp. 1–2, 11–12.
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[41] Wilson and Stupnytska, ‘The N- 11’, p. 8.
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[42] G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?’ Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008, p. 2. Also Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial Ambition, pp. 7–8.
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[43] Göran Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory of European Societies, 1945-2000 (London: Sage, 1995), pp. 4–5.
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[44] C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), p. 11.
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[45] Therborn, European Modernity and Beyond, p. 3.
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[46] Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 11.
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[47] Mark Elvin, ‘The Historian as Haruspex’, New Left Review, 52, July-August 2008, p. 101.
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[48] Ibid., p. 10.
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[49] David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (London: Little, Brown, 1998), p. 342.
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[50] For a pessimistic view of China, see ibid., Chapter 21; Eric L. Jones, The European Miracle: Environments, Economics, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
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[51] Kaoru Sugihara, ‘Agriculture and Industrialization: The Japanese Experience’, in Peter Mathias and John Davis, eds, Agriculture and Industrialization (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 148- 52.
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[52] Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century (London: Verso, 2007), p. 69.
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[53] John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 102.
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[54] Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 34-5, 43-6, 61-2, 70, 168.
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[55] Mark Elvin, ‘The Historian as Haruspex’, New Left Review, 52, July-August 2008, pp. 96-7, 103.
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[56] Pomeranz, The Great Divergence, pp. 36-9, 49.
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[57] R. Bin Wong, China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 27-8.
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[58] Paul Bairoch, ‘The Main Trends in National Economic Disparities since the Industrial Revolution’, in Paul Bairoch and Maurice Levy-Leboyer, eds, Disparities in Economic Development Since the Industrial Revolution (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1975), pp. 7, 13–14.
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[59] Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: OECD, 2003), pp. 249- 51. In fact, the Yangzi Delta was one of Eurasia’s most developed regions over a very long historical period, from 1350 to at least 1750; Bin Wong, China Transformed, p. 29.
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[60] Peter Perdue writes: ‘Recent research on late imperial China has demonstrated that in most measurable aspects of demographic structure, technology, economic productivity, commercial development, property rights, and ecological pressure, there were no substantial differences between China and western Europe up to around the year 1800.’ Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 536-7. See Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing, pp. 24–39, for an interesting discussion of these issues.
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[61] ‘In the light of this recent research, the Industrial Revolution is not a deep, slow evolution out of centuries of particular conditions unique to early modern Europe. It is a late, rapid, unexpected outcome of a fortuitous combination of circumstances in the late eighteenth century. In view of what we now know about imperial China, Japan, and India, among other places, acceptable explanations must invoke a global perspective and allow for a great deal of short-term change.’ Perdue, China Marches West, p. 537.