Hitler's Brandenburgers

by Lawrence Paterson

  Hippel was summoned to Tirpitzufer to discuss his ‘case’. Arriving at the Abwehr office, a meeting was held with Canaris in the company of Oster, Lahousen, Kewisch and Stolze. Canaris was cordial in his manner as he gently rebuked his subordinate for refusing to obey a direct order. However, Hippel was not deflected from his convictions and explained his reasoning in the clearest terms he could, given free rein to state his case.

  ‘Herr Admiral, I would only mention the following incident, which could easily occur. Picture the possibility of six men seized in English uniforms during an operation like Seelöwe. These men would almost certainly not be immediately shot or hanged, but paraded in their English uniforms in front of cameras and microphones. If only one man says that they have been ordered to do so, the entire world would soon be talking about it! Keep in mind that America is still neutral. All current and future operations would be called into question.

  ‘The principle in the Lehrregiment is the voluntary commitment of each individual. The individual or the leader of a group, a platoon, or even the regimental commander can still refer to such stratagems, but there can be no “commander’s orders”.’

  Canaris was impressed with Hippel’s argument and rescinded his original directive. The voluntary nature of Brandenburger service, at least while the Abwehr had control, remained intact and Kewisch was instructed to issue an order of the day to the regiment with the corresponding declaration. The charges against Hippel of disobeying an order were dropped, though his tenure in the regiment had ended. Canaris was aware that some form of reaction would be required and so Hippel was transferred back to Africa per a longstanding wish that he had previously discussed with his commander. He had been promoted to Major on 1 October 1940, his departure from the regiment possibly seen as a brief sideways step back to the Wehrmacht Engineer Corps (his original service branch) before returning to the Abwehr. After service with an Abwehr mission in Casablanca, he emerged in North Africa as an officer in the Deutsche Arabische Lehr Abteilung (DAL – German-Arab Legion), promoted to Oberstleutnant on 1 June 1942 and taking command of Kommando Deutsch-Arabischer Truppen (KODAT, a restructured DAL) after the death of its previous commander Hermann Meyer-Ricks in an air raid on 24 February 1943.

  Hippel’s KODAT command was attached to Fifth Panzer Army and was divided into companies of 150 Arabs with five Germans each. Additionally, each battalion was formed along the national lines: 1st and 2nd Tunisian Battalions, the Algerian Battalion, the Moroccan Battalion and the Kampfbataillon (Combat Battalion) der DAL with Palestinian volunteers, Iraqis, Syrians, Transjordanians, Saudis, Lebanese, Egyptians, Bedouins, Sanussi tribesmen and the like. While recruitment was handled in Tunisia, KODAT’s headquarters – Ersatz Abteilung der DAL – was in Sicily near the Aussentelle des OKW für Arabische Frage (Wehrmacht Office of Arab Affairs) in Palermo. It was at the head of KODAT in combat against American troops in May 1943 that Hippel was captured.

  Meanwhile, Kewisch had gradually been moving the regiment away from its commando-style origins during the previous months, which had had a discernible destabilising effect within the ranks. Correspondingly, at the same time that Hippel was transferred, Kewisch too was removed from the regiment and posted elsewhere, rising to the rank of Oberst on 1 June 1944. Major Hubertus von Aulock, a veteran of the First World War and current Quartermaster of III Army Corps was placed temporarily as acting commander until the more permanent appointment of Oberstleutnant Paul Haehling von Lanzenauer on 30 November 1940.5

  Born in February 1896 in Berlin-Charlottenburg, the son of a Generalmajor, Lanzenauer had served during the previous war as an officer of the 1st Badischen Leib-Grenadier-Regiment Nr. 109 from 1915, ending his wartime service a Leutnant decorated with the Iron Cross, Wound Badge and the Order of the Zähringen Lion (a Baden decoration). At the end of hostilities, he began a career as a police officer in Karlsruhe, made Polizei Hauptmann in the Baden Interior Ministry during 1924 and acted as adjutant to police chief Erich Blankenhorn. During October 1935, he rejoined the Army as a Hauptmann, appointed company commander in the 13th Infantry Regiment. By November 1940 he had risen to Oberstleutnant and been a battalion commander in the 11th Infantry Regiment before transferring to the Lehrregiment ‘Brandenburg’ z.b.V. 800.

  A general reshuffling of the regiment’s officers was undertaken to bring a welcome period of stability, while also serving as an opportunity for Canaris to take what he hoped was a firmer ideological hold of the regiment. Through personnel reassignment by Lahousen as head of Abwehr II, Canaris desired the regiment to maintain a core of officers and men who were loyal to Germany the historical nation state rather than the political entity of the Third Reich. His aversion to Hitler’s government remained undiminished and the Brandenburg Regiment was still hoped to be a weapon that could be turned against the Reich government at the moment of insurrection. However, it was an unrealistic view. The machinations of power within the Third Reich was a veritable minefield for all those involved, as remembered by Lahousen:

  My deputy, General Stolze had been active in the Abwehr for thirteen years. He is a born Prussian (typical Berlin philistine). In the counteractivity, I could use him only with limitations and even then, only with the greatest care. At times, he was a serious drawback for me. Stolze was a moderate Nazi, with links to Prussian reactionaries. Within the narrow limits of his Prussian mentality he intrigued against me as the Austrian who had been advanced ahead of him.

  The role that [Canaris] had destined for my Abteilung, specifically, for me and the Brandenburg Regiment was as follows: I was to prepare myself at a given time for the acquisition of materiel (explosives and time fuses) for the accomplishment of the ‘action.’ On the other hand, the Brandenburg Regiment was to a degree to be set up as Special Troops at the disposal of that first, powerful occupation by certain ‘key units’ of the National Socialist juggernaut (the RSHA radio network, Intelligence branch of OKW etc.).

  These two assignments – variously adapted over the course of time – remained the ‘leitmotif ’ of the conversations that Canaris had with me on this subject. His and Oster’s particular confidant in the ‘20th of July’ affair was Hauptmann [Friedrich Wilhelm] Heinz, at that time (1938–39) still assigned to Abwehr, Abteilung III.

  With the establishment of the Lehrregiment ‘Brandenburg’ – 1940/1941 – Heinz at the particular request of Canaris and Oster was ‘smuggled’ by me into the outfit as Battalion CO, in order thereupon to assemble around him a core of reliable officers. Heinz commanded the battalion that was based in Brandenburg. Heinz’s confidant was Leutnant Herzner. Whether Heinz had initiated others, I don’t know since, generally speaking, I was rather poorly up on the ‘goings-on’ within the Brandenburg Regiment, both ‘official’ as well as secret.’

  The great majority of those in this special outfit, comprised of Volks and Ausland Germans – some ignorant idealists, others fanatical adherents of Hitler – had reported voluntarily for an especially hazardous undertaking (the so-called ‘Ascension Day Commandos’).

  These people – particularly the young officers – at the slightest suspicion that something inimical to the system was being undertaken, would at once have taken a stand against Heinz and those few, mostly the more elderly officers of the circle, to wit, would have shot them out of hand. This was recognised by Oster also, who in my opinion acquiesced completely. Canaris, on the other hand, clung to the point of view that Heinz would make it work. Heinz himself, however, may well have recognised the difficulties of a mission with such a topsy-turvy order of battle’ (‘Verkehrter Front’), since from 1942 on, the Brandenburg Battalion was manned very strongly by Russian – particularly Mohammedan, I believe – volunteers from the Caucasus whom Heinz had levied with the secret thought of their utilisation in something like a ‘20th of July’.6

  Even the former Brandenburg commander Hippel – who had remained ignorant of Canaris’ intention of keeping the regiment as a blunt weapon of potential revolt – later expressed surpr
ise that it was even thought a possibility: ‘I consider this line of reasoning mistaken. The Brandenburgers certainly accepted a large number of ardent Nazis after 1940 and their fighting spirit made them unfit for being part of a popular insurrection.’7

  Nonetheless, amongst Canaris’ conspirators was Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, a veteran of the First World War, during which he had won the EK I and II and been severely wounded. He had been part of the ‘Marinebrigade Erhardt’ Freikorps in the revolutionary fighting in 1919, being wounded again in action in Upper Silesia during the Polish uprising. Heinz was a conundrum to some who knew him, capable of gentle sentimentality at times while also fierce in combat, a crack shot and able to create explosives from the simplest of ingredients. Until 1935 he was part of the Stahlhelm, Bund der Frontsoldaten, an anti-republican paramilitary nationalist organisation that was monarchist in its philosophy and attempted to resist National Socialism until the organisation was officially dissolved in 1935 by Führer decree. Heinz, who had written a semiautobiographical novel Sprengstoff and numerous articles for the Stahlhelm magazine, had long been critical of Hitler and his Party, even after joining the SA for a brief period, perhaps inspired by his own nationalism more than an affinity with Nazism. Eventually, his writing was placed on the subversive list by the Gestapo.

  In 1936 he joined the Wehrmacht as Leutnant der Reserve with the 26th Infantry Regiment before transferring as Hauptmann to Abwehr III. It was here, while engaged in scripting an anti-espionage film for the UFA (Universum Film AG) studios that he came into the orbit of Oster and other National Socialist sceptics, taking part in the abortive plot to arrest Hitler during the Sudetenland crisis that had also involved Dr Hans-Albrecht Herzner. On 26 August 1939, he assumed command of Abwehr IIIC, still concerned with propaganda, but also using the position to accumulate documentary evidence of Nazi excesses in occupied Poland. However, the opportunity to educate an unsuspecting German population with such material and attempt to bring about the overthrow of Hitler’s government never transpired as the Wehrmacht’s military success only increased Hitler’s popular appeal. Though Heinz and Lahousen were not on particularly good terms, on 1 December 1940 the latter appointed Heinz commander of the Brandenburger Regiment’s 1st Battalion at Oster’s request. Lahousen regarded him as ‘a decidedly conspiratory type … I frequently had differences with him in official matters. Personally I, as an Austrian, did not like his character, mixed together from his Stahlhelm and Freikorps past and with a strong Potsdam imprint.’

  Lahousen also continued his reshuffling of men in the Brandenburg Regiment. Despite his obvious qualities as both a purely military and an intelligence officer, amongst those that were transferred out was Hans-Joachim Rudloff, relieved of his command on 1 November 1940 after a brief period of illness. Lahousen later described him to Allied interrogators as an ‘overbearing Prussian’ but it is clear throughout his recorded testimony that he was a staunch Austrian nationalist with a declared aversion to any trace of ‘Prussian officer mentality’ such as one was likely to find in the Wehrmacht. Rudloff was promoted to Major and transferred to Abwehr I, dealing specifically with Spain and Portugal. One of his final activities before leaving the regiment had involved liaising between Canaris and Spanish Army officers regarding the potential seizure of Gibraltar. During July, Rudloff travelled to Madrid to investigate the feasibility of the plan.

  Encouraged by senior officers, Hitler had ordered the preparation of Operation ‘Felix’, the planned capture of Gibraltar. General Heinz Guderian went as far as to urge postponement of the French armistice in June 1940 so that he could race through Spain to take Gibraltar with two panzer divisions and then invade French North Africa. Canaris and his small group of officers met with the Spanish dictator General Francisco Franco and his Minister of War General Juan Vigón. Militarily, one of the primary logistical obstacles was the transfer the necessary troops – at least two infantry regiments, three engineer battalions and twelve artillery regiments – through neutral Spain without attracting international attention. With Vichy France neutral at that time it was proposed to transfer them by sea into Spain, where they would be concentrated in camps, disguised as Feldpolizei while training for the assault. To spearhead the attack, the bulk of Rudloff’s 3rd Battalion were to travel overland by truck, using minor roads and disguised as civilians.

  The plan was ambitious to the point of being ridiculous and, though the objective of Gibraltar’s capture was worthy, the entire proposal was shelved, but only temporarily. Officially, it appeared to Rudloff that security difficulties created by a large concentration of Spanish-speaking Brandenburg troops in southern France were the deciding factor as they would have aroused intense suspicion at the very least. Plus, he reported to Canaris that even with the use of unfrequented roads and camps in the wild, the likelihood of successfully sneaking a battalion of Brandenburgers – not matter how they were disguised – undetected through a country swarming with British spies was virtually zero. The final obstacle to the attack was the complete absence of cranes in Ceuta harbour to unload the heavy weapons of the seaborne invasion force.

  Following his departure from the regiment, Rudloff was returned to Spain where he met with Canaris and Oberst Hans Piekenbrock, head of Abwehr I, responsible for espionage abroad. Rudloff was now known as ‘Rodrigo’ and later tasked once more with planning an operation against Gibraltar. One hundred and fifty Brandenburgers were readied for the mission, fifty transported to the south of France and the remainder held on standby for an attack on the steel fence that delineated Spanish and Gibraltarian territory. Designated Operation ‘Basta’, the Brandenburger attack would precede the same invasion plan as before, the covert troops disguised as Spanish Foreign Legionnaires and carrying Spanish weapons infiltrating the Rock itself to carry out sabotage missions and demoralise any defence. However, ‘Basta’ was also indefinitely put on hold as Canaris could plainly see there was little Spanish enthusiasm to undertake such a risky operation.

  Spain had little genuine appetite to join the fighting; the country was still licking its wounds from its own costly civil war and cooperation with Germany would drag it into this new world conflagration, thereby also rendering its island possessions vulnerable to British attack. Franco feared German invasion should he decline to help but Canaris confidently reassured him that Hitler harboured no desire to open a Spanish campaign, fixated as he already was on the Soviet Union. Over time, Franco’s obstructive prevarication about joining the Axis during subsequent meetings with the Führer – emboldened by Canaris’ assurances – brought an absolute end to Operation ‘Felix’ and any Brandenburger mission in Spain.8

  Canaris also clashed with OKW over orders for the Abwehr – and possibly a small Brandenburger unit – to assassinate the French General Maxime Weygand. Though the directive stemmed from Hitler himself, Canaris refused to countenance the idea of his men acting with the ‘methods of the SD’.9 Weygand had been appointed Delegate General to Vichy’s North African colonies and, although responsible for a harshly repressive regime that included imprisonment of Jews and opponents of the Vichy regime, he also remained an outspoken critic of Nazi Germany. In Berlin, Hitler worried that he could become a focal point for French opposition to either Nazi collaboration or rule and ordered his murder by an assassination squad. Canaris received instructions from Keitel to carry out the killing. All three heads of the Abwehr’s services colluded with Canaris and refused to either plan or pass on the order. As Lahousen recalled, the Abwehr officers were deeply angered and he refused (as the head of Abwehr II) to ‘force my subordinates, whose job was fighting, to become treacherous assassins’.10 Somewhat remarkably, there were no repercussions from their decision, helped by obfuscation on the part of Canaris when later cornered into discussing the matter with Keitel.11

  By the beginning of 1941, the Lehrregiment ‘Brandenburg’ z.b.V. 800 was comprised of three battalions of four companies each, with additional regimental components soon added in the form of speci
al purpose units:

  Regimental Commander: (Headquarters in Berlin) Oberstleutnant Paul Haehling von Lanzenauer.

  Regimental Adjutant: Oberleutnant Johann Zülch.

  Regimental Operations Officer: Oberleutnant Helmut Pinkert.

  1st Battalion (Headquarters in Brandenburg an der Havel): Major Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz.

  Battalion Adjutant: Leutnant Johannes.

  1st Company: Hauptmann Wilhelm Walther.

  2nd Company: Hauptmann Fabian (Dr Hartmann or G. Pinkert?).

  3rd Company: Oberleutnant Werner John.

  4th Company (light engineer unit plus Fallschirmjäger platoon): Oberleutnant Herman Kürschner.

  2nd Battalion (Headquarters in Baden Unterwaltersdorf): Rittmeister Dr Paul Jacobi.

  Battalion Adjutant: Leutnant Ullmann.

  5th Company (Gebirgsjäger; formed in June 1940 by absorbing two platoons of Palestinian and African Volksdeutsche who were training in the Austrian Alps. With additional recruits from south Tyrol, the unit moved to Brandenburg before returning to Austria in August): Oberleutnant Dr Gottfried Kniesche.

  6th Company (reconnaissance company): Oberleutnant Meissner (ex-Luftwaffe).

  7th Company (created from 1st Company, Gebirgsjäger): Oberleutnant Kutschke.

  8th Company (Gebirgsjäger): Oberleutnant Siegfried Grabert.

  3rd Battalion (Headquarters in Düren): Hauptmann Franz Jacobi.