Nelson: Britannia's God of War

by Andrew Lambert

  Nelson’s connection with William did have one positive result, when the Prince used his authority and rank to force the procrastinating Herbert to hasten his marriage to Frances. The ceremony took place on ii March 1787 at Montpelier, Herbert’s palatial residence, and William insisted on taking the starring role by giving away the bride.

  William also found Nelson a useful occupation to fill his last months on station, when he passed on a complaint about frauds in the local purchasing of government stores: a cartel of merchants was colluding to keep up prices and spread the rewards. This offered Nelson another opportunity to gain credit with Maurice Suckling’s successor at the Navy Board, Captain Charles Middleton: if his response was successful it could mark him out as a suitable man for a dockyard or Board appointment. Whatever his mistakes over the Prince, Nelson was still William Suckling’s nephew, in tune with the economic reform agenda of the age, and he would show the same determination and moral courage in assailing corruption and illegality as he had against the Spanish works on the San Juan river. But the affair brought Nelson no glory, and in any case his future did not lie in shipbuilding or administration. However, it did secure him an important friendship with George Rose, Secretary to the Treasury: a key confidant of Pitt and a name for the future.20

  *

  Nelson left the West Indies in June 1787, low in spirits, though this was probably more the result of boredom than real ill-health: he needed to be busy, active and at the forefront of events. A month later he anchored at Spithead, remained there for six weeks and then cruised round to the Nore. While the Dutch crisis remained unresolved the Admiralty was unwilling to pay off any ships, but Nelson found the wait demoralising. He was entitled to a spell ashore, he was newly married and if there was not going to be a war he might as well go home.

  The Boreas was ventually paid off in late November 1787 and after various official and personal journeys the Nelsons arrived at Burnham in mid-1788. Initially they planned a brief visit before travelling to France to complete the linguistic studies interrupted four years earlier. Instead they ended up settling at the Rectory, where old Edmund found his naval son a source of great comfort as young Edmund slowly died. Fanny, however, as a child of the tropics, did not flourish in the biting cold winds of the open coast, often keeping to her bed for days on end.

  Nelson’s complaints about being ignored should not be taken too seriously. Six years ashore for a young captain was hardly unusual in peacetime, especially after a four-year commission. In any case, these years, as well as allowing Nelson to indulge in a little ‘Capability’ Brown-style gardening and resume his place in local society, gave him the leisure to reflect on his career, and develop his professional understanding. He read the periodicals and the limited literature available; he studied charts, wrote and took in the wider political scene. His analysis of the link between local conditions and political unrest demonstrated a mastery of the labour market, the political claims of the radicals, and the most effective methods of securing the loyalty of lower orders. The people, while naturally loyal, required higher wages to remove the attraction of the radicals.21 It was an analysis that the Navy would have to adopt five years later.

  Nelson’s evident mastery of the Navigation Acts and other legislation related to his profession stands in marked contrast to the failure of his efforts to master French. His acute intelligence was practical, not abstract. Nelson was not a deep or original thinker – such traits were ill-suited to the dynamic aggressive methods of junior leaders in 18 th century naval warfare. His great strength was a quick and clear grasp of issues, the ability to acquire, assimilate and assess large amounts of information, which then formed the basis of his decisions. Nelson’s detailed analysis also shows that he remained determined to play his part in current political events, rather than being the isolated, lonely figure implied by his correspondence

  The one thing Nelson did not analyse with sufficient honesty was the value of his connection with the Prince. Unlike Nelson, William had been given another ship, more as a sop to the King, who wanted to keep him out of the way, than as a sign of approval of his conduct in the Schomberg affair. Yet Howe and Hood had already settled their views on William’s career prospects. He was a liability, and could not be given fleet command either in peace or war.22 William was created Duke of Clarence in 1789 and given a ship of the line in the Nootka Sound armament of 1790, unlike Nelson, but his quarrel with the King and increasing espousal of reform and the Whig cause in the House of Lords did nothing to endear him to Pitt’s ministry. With Lord Chatham, Pitt’s elder brother, at the Admiralty, and Hood as his principal professional adviser, William’s chances of employment were not good. Unlike his equally outspoken and wrong-headed brothers, William had the misfortune to serve in a professional force, where rank could not replace ability. After war broke out William was quickly booted upstairs to flag rank, where his lack of experience precluded any active service. Even so he remained optimistic, considering himself an ideal First Lord of the Admiralty and promising to reward Nelson once in high office.23 While making himself a thorough nuisance, William also ruined any hopes Nelson had of rising on his coat-tails.

  Though Nelson had gone to the West Indies with the backing of the two most important men in the service, his privileged access to Howe and relationship with Hood did not translate into close personal contact. Hood, the closer of the two, did not correspond with him while in the West Indies, and made his views on the Prince William affair clear by distancing himself from Nelson and bringing Schomberg into his own ship. Nelson banked on William becoming admiral, so that he could command one of the ships in his line of battle. His letters to the Prince were both prescient and shameless in their flattery: ‘It is only by commanding a Fleet which will establish your fame, make you the darling of the Nation, and hand down your Name with honour and glory to posterity.’ The same letter even requested a household appointment for Fanny.24

  In 1790 a fleet was mobilised for a possible war with Spain. Despite William’s intervention with Chatham Nelson was ignored.25 It was obvious to everyone but Nelson that the Prince had no influence. Nor did Hood do anything for Nelson in 1790, or in 1791 when he commanded the mobilisation aimed at Russia. Even in 1793 he remained distant. Nelson had abandoned Hood’s school for William’s entourage, exchanging duty and honour for the coat-tails of a loose-living, hard-drinking lightweight. Had William gone on to better things − and Nelson beleived he could have been a useful flag officer – his move would have seemed astute. In the event, though, it was another royal who rescued Nelson from the unemployed list: his name was Louis, and he had recently lost his head.

  Notes − CHAPTER II

  1 Goodwin, pp. 106–13

  2 Goodwin, pp. 113–17 lists the offences, and the number of lashes awarded.

  3 According to his first lieutenant James Wallis, who retailed the story to C&M [1840] p. 143. There is a complete transcript of this memo taken from Add. 34,990 in Rawson ed. Nelson’s Letters from the Leeward Islands, pp. 47–54. Pocock, Young Nelson, p. 194

  4 Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy Towards the United States, 1783–1795, PP. 3–17, 218–21

  5 His letters to William frequently refer to this fraud. See 29.12.1786; Nicolas I p. 204

  6 Nelson to William Nelson 29.3. and 2.4.1784: Nicolas I p. 101–2

  7 Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688–1783, pp. 101–5

  8 Ehrman, The Younger Pitt: The Years of Acclaim. Nelson to Suckling 14.1.1784: Nicolas II, pp. 479–80

  9 Nelson to Hughes January 1785, and copied to the Secretary to the Admiralty 18.1.1785: Nicolas I pp. 114–18

  10 Rawson ed. Nelson’s Letters from the Leeward Islands, pp. 23–40

  11 Nelson to Suckling 25.9. and 14.11.1785; Nicolas I pp. 140–6

  12 Nelson to Locker 5.3.1786; Nicolas I pp. 156–60

  13 Nelson to Moutray 6.2.1785 and Nelson to Admiralty 17.2.1785; Nicolas I pp. 118–19, 121–3
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  14 Fanny’s letters to him were burnt on the eve of the attack on Tenerife.

  15 Nelson to Fanny 4.5.1786; Nicolas I p. 167. Vincent notes at p. 71 that this was still being used as a homily for young naval officers in 1954.

  16 Nelson to Fanny 6.3.1787; Naish ed. Nelson’s Letters to His Wife and Other Documents, 1785–1831, p. 50

  17 William to Hood 9.2.1787: Ranft, ed. ‘Prince William and Lieutenant Schomberg’, in Lloyd, ed. The Naval Miscellany: Vol. IV. London, 1952 pp. 270–2

  18 William to Nelson 3.12.1787 and William to Hood 26.12.1787 and 5.1.1788; Ranft pp. 286–95

  19 Howe to Hood 2.7.1787; Ranft p. 287

  20 Rose recalled this meeting in conversation with Clarke or McArthur. See C&M (1840) I p. 150

  21 Nelson to Clarence 10.12.1792; Nicolas I pp. 294–7

  22 Ziegler, King William IV, pp. 37–95, for Prince William’s relationship with Nelson and the Navy.

  23 Clarence to Nelson 3.10.1796; Add. 34,904 f. 400

  24 Nelson to William 2.6.1788; Nicolas I pp. 275–6

  25 Nicolas I p. 288

  The burning of the French fleet at Toulon

  CHAPTER III

  The Chance for Glory 1793

  In late 1792, as the European situation deteriorated and war with France came closer, the Navy began to mobilise. Once again, Nelson reminded the Board that he was anxious to serve. This time he did not rely on Hood, whom he had not spoken to since 1790. Within the month, however, he had seen Lord Chatham at the Admiralty, and had been promised a sixty-four as soon as it was ready, or a seventy-four if he was prepared to wait. Characteristically – and fortunately, as it would turn out – Nelson went for the more immediate prospect, although he was anxious to commission the ship at Chatham, rather than Portsmouth or Plymouth. He got his way, and his exuberance at the prospect was clear from his report of the interview to Fanny: duty called, and in his mind he was already off to sea. By late January he knew the name of his ship: the Agamemnon, then refitting at Chatham.1 The symbolism of a ship named for the king of men might have been lost on the crew, who referred to her as ‘Eggs and bacon’, but it would be appropriate: over the next three years, the Agamemnon would make Nelson a prince among captains.

  To man his new ship, Nelson called back many old Albemarle and Boreas officers and petty officers, recruited in Norfolk, and asked Locker, then commanding at the Nore, to find a clerk and extra men. There was a personal and parochial strain to his selections: his new-entry midshipmen included Josiah Nisbet, a Suckling cousin, and William Hoste, son of another Norfolk parson. He would make them all captains, although only Hoste became a naval hero.

  As he rushed back and forth between Burnham, London and Chatham, Nelson was still Hood’s man. Only slowly would he come to rely on his own judgement, and he never dreamt of refusing Hood’s orders as he had those of Hughes a decade earlier. While Hood held command Nelson deferred to him, although unlike most of his fellow captains he never ceased learning from the master. His period under Hood’s orders would be the penultimate stage of his education in leadership and command.

  War was finally declared on n February 1793. Initially, the British government had not been unduly concerned by the outbreak of war between Austria and revolutionary France in 1792. The Prime Minister, Pitt, had convinced himself and his colleagues that the internal condition of France was a force for peace, leaving the Ministry profoundly unprepared later in the year when the French extended their war into the Austrian Netherlands (modern Belgium), an area of fundamental concern to Britain.

  The French occupation of Antwerp undermined the basis of British security: a hostile fleet at Antwerp was ideally placed to attempt an invasion, far better than at any French base. Preventing the city from falling into the hands of a major rival had been the basic tenet of British policy since the Tudor period. The threat from the north-east would be a major issue throughout the next twenty-two years of war.

  In 1793 Britain lacked the troops to take on France in the Low Countries, her old ally Holland was no longer a major power, and the military resources of the three eastern monarchies – Austria, Prussia and Russia – were largely occupied by the partition of Poland. In addition all three were close to bankruptcy. The minor powers and petty principalities of Europe were no better placed. The only assets that Britain could use to secure her strategic interests were her fleet, and her credit.2 Pitt, committed as he was to fiscal stability, was convinced the French would be defeated by the collapse of their economy. To this end, Britain applied her major military effort to the French West Indian islands, the motor of their economy and source of key maritime resources, ships and seamen. The islands would also be useful assets for any peace negotiations, and end the threat to the immensely valuable West India shipping from locally based warships or privateers.

  To address the European dimension of the French problem, Pitt needed to build coalitions based on mutual interest, money and sea power. Mediterranean strategy was driven by the need to secure a friendly base within the Straits. Gibraltar was unable to handle a large fleet, and without a major base, like Minorca, Naples or Malta, the fleet would be hard-pressed to protect British merchant ships, let alone exert any influence over France. As Hood’s fleet was assembling, British diplomacy was building a useful coalition. Piedmont-Sardinia signed a treaty in April, promising to keep fifty thousand troops in the field, in return for an annual subvention of £200,000 and the presence of a major fleet. The King of Sardinia was anxious to recover Nice and Savoy, which the French had seized in 1792. In July, Naples promised to provide six thousand troops and a naval squadron at no expense, although the British would have to transport the soldiers.3 Further treaties with Spain and Portugal completed a Mediterranean system that encircled France, while providing bases and troops. Keeping the French fleet inside the Straits would greatly simplify the defence of oceanic trade, while providing distant cover for the West Indian campaign.4 With a fleet in place, and allied armies to hand, France could be invaded on all fronts, her resources stretched along her frontier from Dunkirk to the Pyrenees.

  As Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean, Hood was taking on the most complex task that fell to a British officer in wartime. While his primary task, like that of Howe off Brest, was to watch the French fleet and give battle if it came out, he was also responsible for theatre strategy, alliance-building and coalition warfare. Naval dominance, by battle or blockade, would enable Britain to use the Mediterranean for trade, diplomacy and strategy. He was to use any opportunity of ‘impressing upon the States bordering on the Mediterranean an Idea of the strength and Power of Great Britain’. This would require the fleet to be spread across the theatre.

  By staying in port the French would force Hood to keep his battlefleet concentrated, while trying to protect trade from Gibraltar to the Dardanelles, cooperate with allies and clients and exert diplomatic leverage over the Barbary states. In conducting these multifarious tasks he would have to rely on his own judgement, forming his plans on the basis of local information supplied by British diplomatic representatives, and any intelligence that could be gleaned from passing ships, local newspapers, and chance occasions. Furthermore he would have to operate without a major base, or dry-dock. It was a task that called for a range of skills above and beyond fleet command – it needed a self-sufficient, confident personality, with the political courage to take responsibility for major initiatives without being able to consult London. Only Hood and Nelson truly rose to the challenge of commanding the Mediterranean theatre.

  *

  In March the Agamemnon went down the Medway to Sheerness: Hood hinted that Nelson should prepare for a cruise and then join the fleet at Gibraltar. The combination of getting to sea and a letter from Hood put Nelson in fine spirits; he told Fanny that ‘I was never in better health’.5 While the ship completed for sea Nelson’s personal possessions arrived on coasters from Wells. A short stretch down to the Nore in mid-April demonstrated a key feature of his command: �
�we appear to sail very fast’.6 Desperate to join Hood, and fearful that his orders might change, he found every delay for bad weather a terrible trial. The vigour with which he drove two French frigates and a corvette into La Hougue, while cruising off the Normandy coast, spoke volumes about his anxiety to prove himself.

  Nelson was anxious to get on with the war, and found another Channel cruise with Admiral Hotham’s division between Guernsey and Land’s End doubly annoying as neutral ships reported that the French Atlantic ports were full of captured British merchant ships.7 Not content to do as he was told, Nelson needed to know the purpose of his orders, spending much mental effort trying to understand their rationale. This was an important lesson in command: as a result of his frustration, he himself would always take junior commanders into his confidence, ensuring they understood the broader mission so they could exercise their judgement rather than relying on orders.

  The purpose of the cruise only became clear to Nelson later on: because the Channel fleet would take some time to mobilise, detachments preparing for the Mediterranean were being used to cover the western approaches before proceeding to their proper station. On 25 May Hood brought his division out to join Hotham, and took command of the fleet. The master quickly took his charges in hand, conducting tactical exercises as they waited off the Scilly Isles to cover the incoming Mediterranean convoy against a French fleet sortie. An outbound East India convoy also passed through this dangerous choke point. The next day the fleet headed for Gibraltar, and Nelson called on Hood on board his flagship, HMS Victory. He was relieved to find Hood very civil, and told Fanny ‘I dare say we shall be good friends again.’ This personal warmth was vital, since without Hood’s approval Nelson would have cut a very sorry figure. Had he joined the Channel fleet, under the austere, uncommunicative Howe, his ardour for the service may have cooled.