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Tiger Force

Page 37

by Michael Sallah


  We drew on interviews with Tiger Force members and CID records for the section about Ybarra beheading the baby. The atrocity eventually led to the Tiger Force investigation—four years later. It’s interesting to note that some witnesses withheld information from CID investigators. For example, Harold Fischer never told CID agents he looked into the hut and saw the baby’s body. In an interview, Fischer told us he held back information from CID agents because he was “afraid of Ybarra.” In the end, CID agents failed to substantiate the atrocity because of a lack of cooperation from Tiger Force soldiers.

  For the section on the attack on the village, we relied on extensive interviews with Tiger Force soldiers. Many of them told us that by October 1967, it was “open season” on villagers. Anyone in villages or huts was considered “the enemy,” and few soldiers seemed concerned that no weapons were being seized. As Operation Wheeler continued, the platoon began counting dead civilians as enemy soldiers. They would include them in the body count when they radioed battalion headquarters. “We knew they were civilians, not VC,” Causey said.

  Our account of the execution of the young mother was based in part on James Barnett’s sworn statement to CID agents. He told investigators that Sergeant Harold Trout ordered him to shoot the woman. Trout refused to talk to the CID in 1973. When we contacted Trout in connection with the Toledo Blade’s series “Buried Secrets, Brutal Truths,” he talked about his time in Tiger Force—the patrols and ambushes. But Trout refused to discuss the CID investigation or war crimes.

  Army Records

  The sworn witness statement of Harold Fischer on November 30, 1972. The document was Exhibit 8 of the Coy Allegation. It included the following about the baby’s death:

  FISCHER: This incident occurred towards the end of Operation Wheeler. I recall that this operation started in September of 1967 and ended on or about 25 Nov. 67. I think that this incident with the baby happened during the middle of Nov. 67. We were in a village or hamlet which consisted of about three or four huts. I was standing about 15 meters away from one of the hooches when I saw Kerrigan walking towards me. He looked a little excited and as he passed by me he said that Sam had just cut the baby’s head off. We didn’t discuss the incident any further and Kerrigan went on his way.

  QUESTION: What was your reaction to this?

  FISCHER: I just shrugged it off. It was no big thing to me at the time. In the situation we were in, people were dying every day.

  QUESTION: Do you really think that this happened the way Kerrigan told you?

  FISCHER: Yes. Sam was a very cold-blooded person and he was capable of such an act. Also the way Kerrigan expressed himself I had no doubt that this incident occurred.

  The sworn witness statement of William Carpenter on January 18, 1973. The document was Exhibit 23 of the Coy Allegation. It included the following about 327 kills:

  CARPENTER: On one occasion in Nov. 67 during Operation Wheeler I overheard a radio transmission from Ghost Rider to the Tiger Force that they needed a certain number of additional bodies to make the number 327 which was the number that stood for our infantry battalion “327.” I don’t know if it was Morse, it could have been someone else, whoever the person was used his call sign. I don’t recall just how many additional kills were needed. It was several I believe. I remember that the radio transmission was answered to the effect that “Do you want them before or after breakfast?”

  Later during the interview:

  CARPENTER: I remember that the NVA, VC, and Vietnamese civilians killed in the incidents that I have seen and detailed in this statement were included in the body count which was reported to the battalion headquarters.

  The sworn witness statement of Lieutenant Stephen Naughton on February 5, 1975. The document was Exhibit 124 of the Coy Allegation. It contained the following:

  QUESTION: Do you know anything about Capt. McGaha, who replaced him?

  NAUGHTON: Only that he was good at karate and practiced it all the time.

  QUESTION: What was Hawkins’s reputation as the Tiger Force commander?

  NAUGHTON: It was lousy. The man was incompetent in the field resulting in several members of the Tiger Force losing their lives, and was a heavy drinker and was always drunk in the field. His reputation after he left the Tiger Force was just as screwed up.

  The sworn witness statement of James Barnett on November 27, 1974. The document was Exhibit 177 of the Coy Allegation. It included the following about the young mother’s death:

  QUESTION: How far were you from the woman when you shot her?

  BARNETT: About 10 to 15 feet.

  QUESTION: You are talking about that woman who was the wife of that VC or NVA?

  BARNETT: Yes, she was the one who had the child.

  QUESTION: Was she dead after you shot her?

  BARNETT: She fell after I shot her and I turned around and left. I didn’t check her if she was dead. I can’t even recall the impact of the shots or the bullet holes in her chest. I know that I hit her and I assumed she was dead. I also knew at the time what damage an M16 round can do.

  QUESTION: Why did you shoot that woman, Mr. Barnett?

  BARNETT: Because I was told by Trout to do it and I carried out what he told me.

  QUESTION: Did you have to carry out this order?

  BARNETT: I felt at the time I had to do it because I was told to do it. Today I know better. I didn’t have any idea what an unlawful order was while I was in RVN with the Tiger Force or that I could refuse such an order and not get into any trouble over it.

  Books

  Herring, George. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam. New York: Knopf, 1996.

  Langguth, A. J. Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975. New York: Touchstone, 2000.

  Olson, James S., and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

  The Pentagon Papers. New York: Bantam Books, 1971.

  The Winter Soldier Investigation: An Inquiry into American War Crimes. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.

  CHAPTER 20

  Main Sources

  We talked at length with Gustav Apsey, Captain Earl Perdue, and other CID agents involved in the Coy Allegation. We also drew on thousands of CID documents related to the four-and-a-half-year investigation, including more than one hundred sworn witness statements from Tiger Force soldiers and commanders. In addition, we examined hundreds of documents from the Colonel Henry Tufts Archive at the University of Michigan. Tufts was an important figure in CID history. In the 1960s, he spent a year reorganizing the agency to make it more efficient. He also oversaw high-profile investigations, including the My Lai Massacre. We talked at length with Dennis Stout, a former military journalist with the 1st Battalion/327th Infantry in Vietnam. In addition, we interviewed friends and family members of Sam Ybarra, including his wife, Janice Little, and mother, Therlene Ramos. We also talked to Ken Kerney, Harold Fischer, and friends and family members of Terrence Kerrigan.

  Our account of Apsey’s being assigned the Coy Allegation was based on extensive interviews with the lead agent and other Tiger Force investigators. It’s interesting to note that the investigation was already one year old—with only a handful of interviews conducted—when Apsey was handed the case.

  For the section on the history of war crimes and the My Lai Massacre, we drew on records in the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. During the Vietnam War, the Army investigated 242 war-crime allegations. We examined each case. In addition, we reviewed the records of the Working War Crimes Group, a special U.S. panel created in the wake of the My Lai Massacre. The group—consisting of six military officers—was established to review war-crime cases to prevent cover-ups. After journalist Seymour Hersh broke My Lai, President Nixon told the nation the massacre was an “isolated incident.” In response to the public condemnation of My Lai and pressure from congressional leaders such as U.S. Representative Morris Udall, the CID promised to swiftly investigate war-crime allegations.


  For the section on pressures facing the CID, we drew from the Colonel Henry Tufts Archive. We also relied on records of the Working War Crimes Group. In addition, we examined transcripts of the Winter Soldier hearings.

  Our account of the Stout Allegation was based on numerous interviews with Stout and former battalion soldiers, as well as on hundreds of CID documents related to the case. It’s interesting to note that after Stout told his story to a Phoenix newspaper, the Nixon White House was considering the possibility of seeking an injunction to prevent the news media from publishing war-crimes allegations. In a letter to a civilian, Major General Kenneth J. Hodson, the Army’s judge advocate general, wrote, “On behalf of President Nixon, I am replying to your telegram of 11 December concerning the possibility of an injunction against the news media. Whether the United States Government could enjoin the news media from disseminating certain news depends upon the facts of any given case. The Department of Justice is considering the possibility of seeking such an injunction.”

  For the section on Sam Ybarra’s life, we drew on his juvenile court record. We discovered Ybarra was found guilty of illegal consumption of alcohol on December 14, 1964, and sentenced to fifteen days in jail in lieu of a $100 fine. On February 13, 1965, Ybarra was convicted of disturbing the peace and illegal consumption. For that offense, he spent twenty-five days in jail in lieu of a $125 fine. On April 9, 1965, Ybarra was convicted of illegal consumption and received a six-month suspended sentence. Records show that Ybarra was sentenced to fifteen days in jail in lieu of a $200 fine after being found guilty of illegal consumption on October 10, 1965. Ybarra was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and illegal consumption on January 8, 1966. After the hearing, Ybarra was released from jail so he could be inducted into the Army.

  Army Records

  The sworn witness statement of Private Gary Coy on February 3, 1971. The document was Exhibit 1 of the Coy Allegation. It included the following about the baby’s beheading by a Tiger Force soldier:

  COY: I was with the 3rd Platoon, the second element behind the 1st Platoon, which was leading the column. About this time the point of the column began to receive fire from one of the four huts to our front. We dispersed and took the huts under fire. Shortly after that we heard two explosions in the vicinity of the huts. After the firing stopped we were told to move into the village which consisted of the four huts. As we passed between the huts, I overheard two men arguing inside one of the huts. I stepped into the hut, I saw two or three bodies lying on the ground, one of the bodies was that of a woman. I also heard a baby crying. The two men were arguing about taking the baby with them or leaving it in the hut. I stepped outside and talked to a friend of mine called John Ahern (KIA: Mar-Apr 68). I stepped back into the hut. I didn’t hear the baby crying, and then I noticed that the baby’s throat had been cut and there was a lot of blood on its throat and front. I said, “What happened?” and one of the men that had been arguing said, “Sam did it.” Then I turned around and walked out. Later I told Ahern about it, and he said, “It’s just one of those things, there’s nothing you can do about it.”

  QUESTION: Who is Sam?

  COY: He was assigned to Tiger Force (similar to a Ranger unit) out of HHC, 1st Bn, 327th Inf Bde. He was about 68 inches tall, dark complected, of Indian background, I believe from New Mexico.

  QUESTION: Do you know Sam’s full name?

  COY: No. All I know is that he had been in-country longer than a year.

  The sworn witness statement of James Barnett on March 10, 1971. The document was Exhibit 6 of the Coy Allegation. It included the following statement by CID agent Frank Toledo, who interviewed Barnett:

  Barnett stated that he considered Sam Ybarra a “gross person,” however, did not elaborate, nor had he knowledge that Sam Ybarra had murdered any Vietnamese child. Barnett named a Sgt. Trout, later identified as SSG Harold G. Trout, RA 27 551 931, HHC, 1st Bn, 327th Inf, as being a Team Leader of Sam Ybarra during the tactical operation of 7-15 Nov. 67. Barnett also said that the actions of the men on a search-and-destroy mission depended upon who issued the order for the execution of the mission.

  The following information was contained in the final report of an investigation known as the Stout Allegation:

  Allegations made by Mr. Stout generated widespread local news coverage in Phoenix, AZ, in Dec. 69. Mr. Stout alleged that while in RVN from Sep. 1966-Sep. 67 he witnessed and was informed of numerous atrocities perpetrated by members of his unit, including rape, mutilation and torture of the enemy, murder, and other indiscriminate acts.

  A March 2, 1972, letter from Colonel Henry Tufts to U.S. Representative Morris Udall about the Stout investigation. It included the following information:

  In the course of this investigation, USACIDC identified, located, and reconstructed Army records pertaining to the identification of former members of Mr. Stout’s unit. Additionally, Army operation records concerning combat activities of the unit during the time in question were located and examined. As a result 112 former members of Mr. Stout’s unit, located throughout the United States and RVN, were identified and interviewed. Investigation disclosed insufficient evidence to prove or disprove Mr. Stout’s allegations.

  Sam Ybarra’s military personnel records, or 201 file. Ybarra was court-martialed on December 6, 1968, for being AWOL. He was sentenced to one month in jail and fined $145. On February 12, 1969, he faced an Article 15 hearing for being in an off-limits area. He was sentenced to a reduction in grade from private first class to private second class. A special court-martial was held March 12, 1969, for two violations of lawful general regulations—transporting a Vietnamese civilian without authority and being in an off-limits area, breaking restriction, wrongful appropriation of a two-and-a-half-ton truck, willful disobedience of a lawful order, and disrespect to a superior officer. He was sentenced to six months’ confinement with hard labor (excess of one month suspended) and a fine of $433.

  The sworn witness statement of Ken Kerney on November 16, 1972. The document was Exhibit 110 of the Coy Allegation.

  The sworn witness statement of Harold Trout on November 22, 1972. The document was Exhibit 66 of the Coy Allegation.

  Gustav Apsey’s sworn statement. He interviewed Terrence Kerrigan on December 12, 1972. The document was Exhibit 11 of the Coy Allegation. It included the following:

  APSEY: Mr. Kerrigan appeared hostile and uncooperative throughout his interview on 12 Dec. 72. He related that he and Ybarra were close friends and that his abilities in combat equaled that of Ybarra and that he was the only member of Tiger Force who dared to address Ybarra with the title of “punk.” He indicated several times that he disliked authority used by the officers and NCOs in the Tiger Force, that the unit was an “ass-kicking outfit” that fought the war as they saw fit and they didn’t condone or associate with any outsiders and that everyone was afraid of them.

  Books

  Anderson, David. Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.

  Beattie, Keith. The Scar That Binds. New York: New York University Press, 2000.

  Belknap, Michal R. The Vietnam War on Trial. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002.

  Bilton, Michael, and Kevin Sim. Four Hours in My Lai. New York: Penguin Books, 1992.

  Hersh, Seymour M. My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath. New York: Random House, 1970.

  Kimball, Jeffrey. Nixon’s Vietnam War. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997.

  Kissinger, Henry. Ending the Vietnam War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003.

  Langguth, A. J. Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975. New York: Touchstone, 2000.

  Olson, James S., and Randy Roberts. Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

  Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988.

  Solis, Gary. Son Thang: An American War Crime. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

&
nbsp; Spector, Ronald H. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam. New York: Vintage Books, 1993.

  Vistica, Gregory. The Education of Lieutenant Kerrey. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003.

  The Winter Soldier Investigation: An Inquiry into American War Crimes. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.

  Periodicals

  Phoenix Gazette articles about Dennis Stout recounting alleged atrocities committed by soldiers of the 1st Battalion/327th Infantry in Quang Ngai province. The stories ran in the newspaper on December 12 and December 13, 1969.

  CHAPTER 21

  Main Sources

  We interviewed numerous Tiger Force members, including William Carpenter and Barry Bowman. We talked at length with Gustav Apsey, the lead investigator in the Tiger Force case, and other CID agents who took part in the investigation. We interviewed family and friends of Donald Wood, including his wife, Joyce, and brother, Jim. In addition, we talked to Gerald Bruner’s wife, Karen, and other family members.

  Our account of William Carpenter’s meeting with Gustav Apsey was based on a series of interviews with the two men and extensive CID documents related to the Tiger Force investigation.

  For parts of the chapter about soldier interviews, we drew on numerous CID records. Every time a CID agent interviewed a former Tiger Force member or officer, the agent had to file a report. We examined those reports, along with sworn witness statements and other accompanying information. In addition, we talked to soldiers and their families about the investigation.

  For sections about CID agents interviewing soldiers, we drew extensively on thousands of Army documents related to the investigation. They included sworn witness statements, written reports by agents, and, in some cases, polygraphs.

  Army Records

  Weekly and monthly updates of war-crime cases that Apsey and other CID agents had to prepare for Colonel Henry Tufts, the White House, and the offices of the secretary of defense and secretary of the Army in 1972 and 1973.

 

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