Antiochus the Great

by Michael J. Taylor

  …. and immediately to cut the wood for the reconstruction of the city and to take it from the forests of Taranza, as Zeuxis may decide. We also exempt you from the on-twentieth tax that had been added to the city tax, and have ordered that the gymnasium you used previously be restored for you.8

  In this respect, Antiochus III appears not as a mindless conqueror but rather a pragmatic imperialist. His wars caused significant destruction, but he also took measures to help affected communities rebuild. Yet this was not done out of compassion for individual or collective suffering: all of his conquests were designed for tributary exploitation. Antiochus and his administrators seemed particularly aware of the need to ‘prime the pump’, to jumpstart war-torn economies so that they might quickly return to reliable sources of tax revenue. Other royal benefactions to Sardis followed that pushed the city forward economically. The number of houses occupied by royal troops was reduced from half the houses to one third. A generous gift of 200 measures of oil was granted for use by the young men in the gymnasium, although this also supported the physical training necessary to provide future recruits for the Seleucid army.9 When Sardis proved its loyalty by celebrating the Laodician festival in honour of the King’s wife, Antiochus exempted the city from taxation for the three days of the festival.10 John Ma has used a series of inscriptions around Sardis to illustrate the ongoing process of negotiation between subject communities and the royal administration. The King, of course, negotiated from a position of military strength, but the King and his army could not possibly be everywhere at once. In order to achieve desired ends, he was obliged to employ incentives as well as military coercion. Benefactions, even to a formerly disloyal city such as Sardis, provided additional glue that bound the empire together after troops departed. And indeed, Antiochus would soon depart Asia Minor with his royal army. He left behind Zeuxis, who would loyally serve as governor of the region for the next twenty-three years.11

  Chapter Six

  The Anabasis

  In 212 BC, Antiochus embarked on an ambitious campaign east to restore Seleucid power and influence in the Upper Satrapies and the breakaway regions of Parthia and Bactria in particular. An eastern campaign was filled with historical significance: the obvious point of comparison was the epic march of Alexander the Great from the Hellespont to the Hydaspes River in India. Seleucus I Nicator had undertaken a similar march to secure the upper satrapies that ended in the Indus River valley. Yet victory in the East was not guaranteed. Antiochus’ own father, Seleucus II, had launched a fruitless campaign against the Parthians in the 230s.

  We do not know the exact size of Antiochus’ army in this undertaking. Justin states that he brought with him 100,000 infantry and another 20,000 cavalry, but these numbers are undoubtedly exaggerated.1 A more reasonable estimate would be an army under 70,000 soldiers, based on the figures attested for his armies on other major campaigns (68,000 at Raphia and 72,000 at Magnesia). Familiar components are attested: mercenaries (including Cretans), archers and slingers, roughly 10,000 peltasts (most likely the elite Silver Shields fighting as light troops), miscellaneous light infantry, the heavy infantry phalanx, and the cavalry. The sheer size of the army was an argument marching in cadence, reminding peripheral regions of the enormous coercive force that backed Seleucid claims to dominion.

  Prior to his departure, Antiochus III proclaimed his son (also named Antiochus) co-king.2 This continued the long Seleucid tradition of naming a son as co-regent, although in the past co-kings were adult men who were capable of undertaking kingly duties. Antiochus, the son of the King (as he was commonly referred to differentiate himself from the King himself), was likely only eight or nine years old at this time, and did not accompany his father on the campaign. Instead, the son remained in Antioch as a figurehead, though one who received a practical education in the day-to-day administration of the empire.

  The Armenian campaign

  The first recalcitrant vassal in Antiochus’ path east was Xerxes, the king of Greater Armenia. The Armenian landscape was mountainous and treacherous terrain for an army but of vital strategic importance, as it linked Anatolia and Mesopotamia to the Caspian Sea through mountain highways well trod by both traders and armies. The Armenians had stopped paying tribute in the time of Xerxes’ father, taking advantage of the severe instability that shook the Seleucid realm in the 230s BC.

  The campaign was largely uneventful. Antiochus besieged the Armenian royal city of Arsamosata, located between the uppermost reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Xerxes himself abandoned Arsamosata and withdrew his armies to the interior. The ease with which the Seleucid army occupied his territories and besieged his capital undermined Xerxes’ political position, and rather than trying to fight, Xerxes sent messages to Antiochus proposing a peace conference.

  According to Polybius, Antiochus’ closest advisors (‘the most trusted of his friends’) then dispensed a piece of Machiavellian advice: under the banner of truce, the King should seize Xerxes, execute him, and then install his own nephew Mithradites on the throne. But Antiochus decided against this course of action.3 As he was about to embark on a lengthy campaign that would necessitate both diplomacy and force, it would not look good to acquire an early reputation for such acts of bad faith.

  With respect to the peace, Antiochus and Xerxes hammered out a compromise. Xerxes remained the king of Armenia and would pay most of the back-taxes owed by his father. The initial payment would be most useful for the ongoing campaign: 300 talents of silver destined for Antiochus’ war chest, along with 1000 horses and 1000 mules: Armenia was famous for its excellent horses. Xerxes also received in marriage Antiochus’ sister Antiochis, at once a wife and Seleucid agent in a foreign court.4

  The operation in Armenia was a propagandistic victory. The King had easily proven his military supremacy over the despot Xerxes, but the generous settlement allowed him to portray himself in the best of light, as a ruler who ‘acted in a great-hearted and kingly fashion’.5 In a postscript to this saga, his sister Antiochis had the hapless Xerxes murdered several years later, but it is unclear whether she did this on her own accord, or in collusion with her brother.6

  The temple at Ecbatana: 211 BC

  From Greater Armenia, Antiochus marched into Media, pausing at the capital of Ecbatana to muster his forces. He pillaged the temple to the Iranian goddess Anaitit located within the city. The loot from this despoilage was approximately 4000 silver talents or 140 tons of bullion. Seleucid policy toward native deities was generally one of respect and accommodation, but as he set out on his great campaign, Antiochus needed the cash to cover his expenses and pay his soldiers.

  Military pay is uncertain, but the standard rate seems to have been a base pay of 5–6 obols a day, plus rations.7 An army of 50,000 paid at this rate would cost around 3000 talents a year in pay alone, not counting the considerable expenses associated with provisioning such a large force. Thus, Antiochus needed the money and took it. While the looted bullion would serve as a down payment for the cost of the campaign, Antiochus need continual access to money to keep his troops paid, either through the expensive transport of specie east from his mints, or from funds acquired from the sale of loot or extorted from native populations along the way.

  The temple in question had been pillaged before: both by Alexander the Great and Seleucus Nicator.8 Here perhaps we might find a justification, or at least one that likely resonated with the Greco-Macedonian subjects of the empire: Antiochus wished to present himself as an equal and successor to both of these godlike kings. If they had removed wealth from the temple at Ecbatana to fund their Eastern campaigns, Antiochus’ own expropriation was therefore defensible.

  The Parthian campaign: 210–208 BC (Polybius 10. 27–31)

  From Ecbatana, Antiochus prepared to cross the long Madayan desert to the city of Hecatompylos. The city was the largest in the region, and had recently come under Parthian control. Polybius calls Hecatompylos the ‘centre of Parthia’, but this is somewhat mis
leading. At that time, Hecatompylos lay on the periphery of Parthia; the administrative centre at the time was located in Nisa (now in modern-day Turkmenistan). Still, Hecatompylos was an important Parthian possession. It name literally means ‘100 gates’, an exaggeration of course, but one that points to its importance as a major node on the desert road network.

  A march of nearly 350 miles from Ecbatana to Hecatompylos took over a month. It is unlikely that an army of that size could cover more than ten miles in a day, usually much less. Antiochus’ army would likely have been quite spread out, with cavalry and light skirmishers in the vanguard, ahead of the plodding heavy infantry, who transported their sixteen foot long pikes on wagons or mules. Behind them followed the long baggage train necessary to supply the men in such an arid environment. Indeed, Antiochus’ logistical network must have been impressive.9 A total of 50,000 men could easily eat thirty-five tons of grain a day, all of which had to be shipped east from grain growing districts, foraged, or purchased from locals.10

  While arid, the desert territory was not a wasteland, but was rather dotted with wells and the remnants of Persian reclamation schemes. The Parthian king Arsaces deployed mounted troops to destroy wellheads along the route, but Antiochus sent an officer named Nicomedes and a thousand cavalrymen ahead of his main body to secure the water supply before each day’s march. Sharp skirmishing ensured that Antiochus controlled a string of wells to water his thirsty troops and pack animals.

  The King finally arrived at Hecatompylos, where he rested his exhausted army. Aside from small groups of skirmishers, he had no contact with anything that could be described as a Parthian army. However, he realized that his force was even more vulnerable in the arid territory beyond Hecatompylos, and he suspected that Arsaces was retreating with the very purpose of drawing him deeper in order to strain his logistics and demoralize his troops.

  It was probably for logistical reasons that Antiochus therefore decided to turn north and advance into Hyrcania, on the eastern bank of the Caspian Sea. By pillaging the relatively fertile lowlands on the bank of the sea he would be able to replenish the army’s supplies. Furthermore, he would deny Parthian access to this land, where they already controlled at least one city. It would have been a 60-mile march from Hecatompylos through the Harborz (Elburz) mountain range, and in crossing with his army, Antiochus and his forces would have to crest the ridge at about 7000 feet.

  Antiochus’ scouting intelligence seems to have been quite good in this portion of the campaign, for he knew that the army needed to pass through a narrow defile created by winter snowmelt. Furthermore, he expected ambush from local ‘barbarians’, whose determined resistance suggests affiliation with the Parthian army. The enemy fighters effectively blocked the defile, the most feasible route for the heavy infantry and the animals of the baggage train. Yet reconnaissance revealed that the enemy forces had focused too much on blocking the pass itself and were vulnerable to attacks by light troops who could scramble across the boulders and crags to challenge their position from the flank and rear.

  Antiochus prepared three elements to assault the Parthian roadblock. The first was a specially assembled contingent of archers, slingers, and javelin throwers, drawn from men from mountainous regions and commanded by a lieutenant named Diodotus. A second contingent comprised 2000 Cretan mercenaries commanded by the mercenary captain Polyxenidas of Rhodes, the third was two companies of light troops commanded by the mercenary commanders Nicomedes of Cos and Nicolaus the Aetolian.

  Antiochus ordered the missile troops to move in loose formation outside the main defile. Their task was to launch a hail of stones, arrows, and darts down upon the enemy forces manning the roadblock. Simultaneously, the Cretans and other light troops would charge the defile directly. Once a section had been secured in this manner, the light troops would clear obstacles and debris to allow heavier components to move through; the process was to be repeated continuously for eight days until Antiochus and his forces reached the main pass.

  Here, a high altitude battle developed, as a concentrated mass of enemy fighters attempted to block the army. For the first time in this alpine fighting, Antiochus deployed his heavy infantry phalanx. Unbeknownst to the enemy fighters blocking the pass, Antiochus had that night dispatched a flying column of light troops (probably the same ad-hoc task force) to flank the pass. As Antiochus’ heavy infantry fixed the enemy in the defile, his light troops materialized in the rear, yet the enemy fighters managed to flee before the trap closed hard upon them. Fearing that elements of his army might become lost in the mountains, Antiochus had the trumpeters call off further pursuit. With the collapse of enemy resistance, the King regrouped his forces and crossed the pass into the plain of Hyrcania. He camped near the un-walled city of Tambrax (Zadrakarta), and was informed that resistance was hardening nearby in the walled city of Sirynx. In a short, aggressive siege Antiochus filled the city’s moat and tunnelled under the walls. Enemy soldiers massacred a number of Greek citizens in the city (who were probably sympathetic to the Seleucid crown) and attempted to evacuate their position, only to be driven back within the walls by Antiochus’ mercenary forces. His peltasts finally forced their way into the gap in the breached wall and captured the city.

  Unfortunately, with the fall of Sirynx, we enter a narrative black hole that engulfs the rest of Antiochus’ eastern anabasis, yet geography provides some clue to the end of the campaign against the Parthians. The next time we hear of Antiochus’ location, he is near the Arius river. The most direct route from Hyrcania to the River Arius would have taken him through the Astuauene valley, between the modern day Kopet Dagh and Binalud mountain ranges. This was the Parthian heartland, where Parni nomads had first settled as they wandered in off the European steppes, a fact that suggests his victory over the nascent Parthian state was almost total.

  The Parthians were vanquished but not exterminated. The Parthian king Arsaces II was humbled, but Antiochus allowed him to maintain local authority after reducing his realm to the Astauene Valley and the northern steppeland around the capital city of Nisa. Historians often forget that Antiochus reclaimed significant territory from Parthia, in particular the crossroads city of Hectambylos and the fertile flatlands of Hyrcania. Indeed, he reincorporated the Parthians’ most arable land into direct Seleucid rule, leaving local autonomy over mountainous terrain on the edge of the empire. Allowing local ‘client kings’ to manage their own affairs was a consistent policy of ancient empires, one practised previously by Achaemenid Persia and later by Rome. The later growth of the Parthian empire in the 150s, a rise that occurred at the expense of Seleucid power, has led many historians to suggest that Antiochus was too mild in his settlement with the Parthians. The most ruthless course would have been a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing to root out the Parni entirely, but Antiochus lacked the military capacity to wage such a war, and thus settled for a conditional victory. Nonetheless, Antiochus checked Parthian expansion, expelled the Parthians from Hecatompylos and Hyrcania, and reduced them to the status of fringe vassals, setting back the course of Parthian state development by twenty-five years.

  Administrative business

  During the war in Parthia, Antiochus maintained long-distance correspondence with Zeuxis, who had been left in charge of Asia Minor. Through these letters, which travelled more than 1700 miles to reach him, Antiochus appointed Nicanor, his chamberlain and a close confidant in court, to the High Priesthood (archireos) of the entire region north of the Taurus Mountains – nearly all of Asia Minor then under Seleucid control. It is not clear what Nicanor was going to be the high priest of. It is quite possible that by this date Antiochus was already taking control of the royal cult, so that Nicanor’s job would be overseeing and possibly standardizing the royal cult in the region.11

  Antiochus’ letter worked its way down the Seleucid chain of command: to Zeuxis, the overall commander in Asia Minor, then to a subaltern named Philotas, and then to a regional official names Bithys.12 The letter is evidence th
at despite the distance, Antiochus still concerned himself with important domestic policy decisions. The King did not simply vanish into the east, leaving viceroys to function independently in his absence; rather, the Seleucid Empire remained a centralized state. While men like Zeuxis obviously retained a local initiative in their spheres of responsibility, many decisions were reserved for the King alone. The ability to govern over such distances implies certain governmental infrastructure and a form of organized post-rider system in particular. Even if a post rider managed to cover 50 miles a day (the top speed of the Roman imperial post), well over a month would have elapsed before Antiochus’ letter from Parthia reached Zeuxis in Mysia.13

  While he was in Anatolia, Antiochus was notified of revolts in both Phrygia and Lydia, yet these do not seem to have been serious. We do not know how it was repressed; though presumably Zeuxis proved capable and the King did not learn of the unrest until after the rebellion was crushed. From a distance, Antiochus III ordered additional measures to contain future problems in the region: the establishment of military colonies of 2000 Jewish military settlers, recruited from the large Jewish populations in Babylon and Mesopotamia and settled in strategic locations in Anatolia.

  Antiochus also ordered that the unique religious identity of the colonists be preserved, guaranteeing the integrity of Jewish law by royal decree. It is likely that Antiochus specifically ordered the recruitment of Jewish settlers as desired custodians who were outsiders to the region. Perhaps the original revolt involved military settlers who had mixed too closely with the native population (this had certainly been the case with the troops who had previously supported Achaeus). While other polytheist military settlers might mingle and socialize with locals in pagan temples and religious festivals, the monotheism of the Jews would keep them necessarily separate. Unusual dietary practices would also stand in the way of assimilation, and the Jewish practice of circumcision and other social customs would keep them out of the baths and gymnasia. In short, Jewish identity was a military asset. Unlikely to sympathize with the local native population, they could prove loyal guardians for the King’s interests in the area.