Antiochus the Great

by Michael J. Taylor

  Yet Hannibal was not necessarily an entirely welcome presence in the Seleucid court. His past outsized military and political achievements were viewed with suspicion by Antiochus, who likely resented Hannibal’s claims of military pre-eminence.

  Hannibal’s position in court was complicated by the arrival of a new Roman delegation in 193. Hoping to sow discord, the Romans paid a great deal of attention to Hannibal’s presence. Sensing that he was falling out of favour with the king, Hannibal responded by telling Antiochus a famous story from his youth: how as a young boy his father, Hamilcar, compelled him to swear an oath of eternal enmity against Rome. According to Polybius, this story convinced Antiochus of Hannibal’s loyalty as an ally in his ongoing tensions against Rome, and the Carthaginian’s standing within the Seleucid court improved.38

  The view from Rome

  The government in Rome was run by a small set of aristocratic families. Politically ambitious nobles ran for office in elections determined by popular vote; the consulship was the most important office. Two consuls were elected annually with a one-year term, although consular commands might be extended (prorogation) so that ex-consuls might serve as ‘pro-consuls’ in order to conclude an assigned task. Four to six junior magistrates called praetors held subordinate commands. The electoral predilection of the populace was relentlessly conservative and preferred a small number of well-established families. The same assembly of voters (the comitia centuriata) also declared war and ratified peace. Exmagistrates formed a separate body known as the senate, literally a ‘body of old men’ (senes). While technically the senate was merely an advisory body to the consuls, it had claimed several important powers by this time: the right to assign elected magistrates to a particular province and control over the money stored in the Roman treasury.

  Rome lacked formal political parties, although factions around powerful politicians and successful generals defined the political process. By 196 two powerful generals were in ascendance: Quinctius Flamininus, who conquered Philip V and settled the affairs in Greece, and Scipio Africanus, who had defeated Hannibal and the Carthaginians.

  Flamininus had one primary objective: to preserve his influence over Greek policy. Having publically committed himself to the ‘freedom of the Greeks’, and the quick withdrawal of Rome’s armies from Macedonia and Greece, it was in his political interest to avoid immediate military actions to confront Antiochus in Thrace and Ionia. At the same time, Flamininus was not naïve. While he hoped for a diplomatic solution to Antiochus’ incursions in the area, he realized that force might become necessary as Seleucid aggressions moved toward the Greek mainland.

  Finding his military pre-eminence upstaged by Flamininus’ victory at Cynoscephalae, Scipio Africanus was eager to obtain a fresh military command. Custom prevented him from holding two consulships without a ten-year interval, and his first consulship had been in 205 BC. In the interim period, he served as censor: counting Roman citizens, revising the senate rolls, and awarding public contracts. In 195 he ran for consul again and easily won. He hoped to obtain a command in Macedonia for the consular year 194 so that he might confront Antiochus directly, but Flamininus still hoped that diplomacy might preserve his own settlement in Greece and his allies in the senate prevailed. The senate sent one consul to continue an ongoing war against the Gauls of Northern Italy, and Scipio Africanus was assigned the province of Italy, where he established a chain of maritime colonies on the Adriatic coast. Flamininus achieved his goal of the complete evacuation of Greece, fulfilling the dramatic promise even as his misgivings over Seleucid intentions began to grow.

  The factions of Scipio and Flamininus meanwhile enjoyed alternating electoral successes. The election of 194 (for the consular year of 193) brought two Scipionic supporters to power: Cornelius Merula, from the same gens as Scipio himself, and Minicius Thermus. Thermus had served under Scipio in Africa, and as tribune of the plebs in 201 fought to protect Scipio’s peace settlement against Hannibal. The senate, however, refused to assign Macedonia as a consular command, and both consuls fought in northern Italy, Merula against the Gauls and Thermus against the Ligurians. The next year, however, saw Flaminius’ brother Lucius elected consul along with Domitius Ahenobarbus, defeating the Scipionic candidate Scipio Nasica. Thus, in 192, the consuls in power were close to Flamininus, who had until now personally opposed military intervention in Greece. Furthermore, the Romans had ongoing wars in Northern Italy to occupy their armies and provide commands for ambitious consuls. Despite the claims of William V. Harris, who argued that the Romans were a ‘pathologically aggressive’ people who actively sought war on the flimsiest of pretext, there is little evidence that the Romans plunged headfirst into the war with Antiochus.39

  In many ways, however, Scipio Africanus’ plan to dispatch an army to Greece or Macedonia in order to demonstrate against Seleucid ambitions in Europe would have been the best policy. It would have made clear to Antiochus that Greece was off limits, and would have perhaps prevented any miscalculation on his part that an invasion of Greece would bring war with Rome. The senate did not do this for two reasons. Firstly, Flamininus had committed himself to the idea of ‘freedom’, and was therefore trapped by his own rhetoric. Aside from Flamininus’ own immense prestige, many senators resented Scipio’s preeminent military glory, and were hesitant to give him yet another command.

  Ongoing negotiations

  In 194 (or possibly early 193), Antiochus sent another delegation to Rome. It consisted of the two veterans of the conference at Lysimacheia, Hegesianax and Lysias, as well as Menippos, a rising star in the Seleucid court. Flamininus, fresh from Greece, was present in the senate to confront the Seleucid delegation. Hegesianax, who wrote history as well as poetry, offered the senate a history lesson, noting that the contested regions of Thrace and north-western Asia Minor had once belonged to the successor king Lysimachus. When Seleucus defeated Lysimachus, the territory became Seleucid by right of conquest. Other cities in Thrace, Hegesianax argued, belonged to Antiochus, his due for wresting them away from the Thracians. He argued that Lysimacheia had long been abandoned, so Antiochus wronged no one by appropriating and repopulating it. His history lesson complete, Hegesianax requested a treaty of friendship and equality with Rome that would acknowledge the rights over Thrace and Asia Minor.

  Flamininus was less than impressed at this ‘history lesson’.40 In a counterpoint lesson, he pointed out that while Seleucus I had taken Thrace and Asia Minor from Lysimachus, Antiochus’ own father and grandfather had failed to control these regions effectively. Thus, the Great King could make no claim to regions so long removed from Seleucid dominion. Flamininus then adamantly insisted that the cities of Ionia and Aeolis were to be free as well, if Antiochus wanted to maintain peace with Rome.

  Menippos begged the senators to soften their line, lest ‘by their decision the whole world fall into chaos’.41 Realizing that the heated rhetoric might push both sides into an undesirable war, Menippos begged both sides to reconsider, and the Romans agreed to send to Syria the Roman delegates who had previously met with the King at Lysimacheia: Publius Sulpicius, Publius Villius and Publius Aelius.42

  The Seleucid delegate Menippos, however, did not represent only Antiochus. He also had been charged by the city of Teos to negotiate a pact of asylia with Rome; such a pact would protect the city from piracy and violence. Teos had already negotiated these pacts with a number of other foreign powers, and the Roman praetor Marcus Valerius Messala granted Menippos’ request, forwarding to Teos a letter acknowledging the city as sacred and inviolate. Sensing the winds of war, Teos hoped to guard itself against the possibility of a Roman sack.43

  The Roman delegation arrived in the Seleucid court the next year, travelling first to Ephesus and subsequently on to meet with the king in Apamea. There they found troubling signs. Hannibal was still present in the court at Ephesus, and a delegation of visiting Aetolians was in Apamea to court Seleucid intervention in Greece.

  The negotiations of 193 we
re cut short by the sudden death of Antiochus the Younger. The cause of death is not certain. Livy implies that Antiochus III had his son poisoned by court eunuchs, ‘the father thinking the crown prince as a hazard to his old-age’.44 Such court gossip cannot be substantiated, and it is highly unlikely that Antiochus III murdered his son. First, Antiochus was only forty-seven at this time, not an elderly man. He had carefully groomed Antiochus the Younger for succession: the son was already holding court in Ephesus and receiving ambassadors and dignitaries. He had earned his spurs through an important military command at Panium. Three years previously he had been married to his sister, and the royal incest marked him as the favoured son.

  Livy suggests that when Antiochus III granted his middle son Seleucus (who eventually succeeded him in 187 BC) the territory of Lysimacheia, he intended to elevate him above the doomed Antiochus the Younger. But the grant to Seleucus is better understood as provision for a son who would not become king. Livy makes this false accusation against Antiochus in order to craft a tidy historical parallel between Antiochus III and Philip V, who without question murdered his elder son in the 170s. Historical inventions aside, there is no reason to believe that young Antiochus was murdered, and certainly not by his father.45 Upon the death of the young Antiochus, the entire Seleucid court went into mourning, and the Roman embassy that had recently arrived politely withdrew to Pergamon.

  One result of young Antiochus’ death was a curious name swap. Antiochus III had named his youngest son Mithradites, the traditional dynastic name used by the allied Pontic Kingdom, used in part because the third boy was born to an exhausted supply of traditional dynastic names. But the death of young Antiochus had created a void: it would not be appropriate to use a Pontic dynastic name when there were no living sons named Antiochus. Young Mithradites, probably only ten years old, now assumed the name Antiochus.46 He would eventually assume the diadem, known by modern scholars as Antiochus IV.

  The Aetolian invitation

  In 192 BC, neither Rome nor Antiochus actively wanted a war. Both powers had spent four years posturing and negotiating, trying to define a periphery that neither side wished to fight for more aggressively. Yet as frequently occurs in such situations, the actions of a minor power finally spurred the two reluctant giants to engage. In 192, the Aetolian League, acting on its own volition, invited Antiochus to liberate Greece.

  Two major federal leagues (koina) dominated Greece, the Aetolian and the Achaean. Although they were occasionally allies, they had a longer tradition of hostility. During the Social War beginning in 221 BC, the Achaean League allied itself with Philip V of Macedon against Aetolia. A peace treaty was signed at Naupactus in 217, but the Aetolians were convinced to join Rome against Philip in 211. While this war was a sideshow for Rome, it also reflected the traditional Aetolian hostility toward the menacing power of Macedonia. As long as Macedon and Achaea were allies, Aetolia was cornered, and the alliance with Rome provided them the opportunity to alter the balance of power.

  After the Battle of Cynoscephalae and the curbing of Macedonian power, the two federal leagues became the two most important military powers in Greece. Despite a twenty-year history of cooperation with Philip V, the Achaean League sided with Rome in 198 BC and received significant rewards. Corinth, the site of Flamininus’ dramatic declaration of Greek freedom, became an Achaean stronghold. Under the aggressive leadership of the general Philopoemon, the Achaeans grew even more powerful, counting a string of military victories throughout the 200s and 190s. The Achaean success alarmed the Aetolians, who felt that the Roman-backed era of Greek freedom favoured the Achaeans and made them a potential target. Seeking new alliances, the Aetolians looked east to Antiochus with the hope that Seleucid aid might rebalance the situation.

  In 193, the Aetolians sent an embassy to Antiochus to enquire whether the Great King was interested in an alliance. Antiochus gave no response, likely in part because he was still mourning the death of his son.47 The next year, the strategos of the Aetolian League, Thoas, led a second Aetolian delegation to the Seleucid court. This time, Antiochus expressed interest in increasing cooperation with the Aetolians and sent his experienced diplomat Menippos back to Aetolia.

  The Romans closely watched the Aetolian assembly.48 Flamininus felt obliged to leave Athens to deliver a warning to the Aetolians in person, yet he had no troops to back up the strong words. Meanwhile, Menippos presented a declaration of Seleucid support and friendship. In private, it seems that Menippos stressed to Aetolian delegates the vast military resources of the Great King and hinted at his willingness to use them. The Aetolians, in full view of Menippos and the Romans envoys, then passed a public resolution ‘in which he [Antiochus] was invited to liberate Greece and settle affairs between the Aetolians and Romans’.49

  Once Menippos relayed this message, Antiochus was trapped by the dramatic request made by the Aetolian assembly, as it was difficult to refuse the offer without losing face. How could a Great King turn down the opportunity to liberate Greece? To decline would suggest a fatal lack of confidence in his own martial prowess.

  After almost five years of tense diplomacy, Antiochus III knew that moving an army into Greece to ‘settle affairs between the Aetolians and Romans’ would lead to war with Rome. Antiochus had not sought such a war willingly, but he was no pacifist. With most of his royal career dominated by military operations, there was little reason for him to flinch from this new challenge.

  The King was also led to believe that the Aetolians would contribute a substantial contingent of troops, and that other Greek cities would contribute additional forces. These contributions were important, as the only troops at his immediate disposal for operations in Greece were the 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry occupying the Chersonesos. And these would not be enough to stop a standard Roman field army, usually composed (as Hannibal could certainly tell him) of two legions of 4000–5000 foot soldiers, and an equal complement of Italian allies, around 20,000 infantry altogether. An Aetolian levy of at least 6000 infantry and 400 cavalry would be necessary to even the odds.50

  During Antiochus’ deliberations, Roman sources depict Hannibal as playing the role of evil counsellor, goading Antiochus into war in order to renew his personal vendetta against Rome.51 This is no doubt a caricature, although Hannibal did become a well-regarded member of Antiochus III’s court and eventually assumed command of Antiochus’ Phoenician fleet. Still, Hannibal never rose high enough to lead a sizable land force, despite his brilliant record as a ground tactician. Perhaps such a charge was out of the question, given the risk that he might use these resources to act independently.52 Yet in this situation, we do not know how Hannibal advised Antiochus III. At best, he offered valuable information concerning Roman military capabilities, facts that Antiochus needed to know. However, Hannibal remained in Syria during the initial outbreak of war and thus was not in a position to advise the King personally during the course of the campaign.

  The facts that Hannibal relayed were likely encouraging: the Roman army was an amateur militia commanded by amateur aristocrats. It had no standing units, but rather each year fresh recruits were distributed into legions. Half of the army was composed of ‘allied’ wings; these soldiers lacked citizenship. As Hannibal had proved, the Roman army had suffered stunning defeats, due mostly to the combination of poorly trained levies and inexperienced or even incompetent generals. At best, a Roman consul had one or two years of provincial command as a praetor or pro-praetor; Antiochus III had commanded armies for thirty years. While the Seleucid army also contained citizen militiamen in the phalanx, it also had a splendid professional corps, the 10,000 Silver Shields, and the two regiments of royal cavalry. Thus, despite recent Roman successes against Carthage and Macedonia, Antiochus entered the war confident of victory.

  The Aetolian first strike

  With Antiochus’ promised support, the Aetolians launched their own campaign in Greece. They targeted two key Greek cities: Demetrias and Sparta. Demetrias, a city in Thess
aly on the modern-day Bay of Volos, was one of the most important harbours in northern Greece. Founded by Demetrius Poliorcetes, it was also one of the aforementioned strategic ‘fetters’ of Greece. The Aetolians conspired with disgruntled local politicians to plan a coup. Eurylochus, one such local worthy, had recently obtained permission to return from exile and was escorted into the city by a troop of Aetolian cavalrymen. The plan was for a few select troopers to gain control of the city gates as Eurylochus made his return, which would allow the main body of Aetolian horse to occupy the town. A few of Eurylochus’ political enemies were executed, but the coup overall proved reasonably popular. The Aetolians now controlled Demetrias and the harbour that would accommodate Antiochus’ landing.

  Control of Sparta would also be particularly favourable to the Aetolians, as control of Spartan territory in Laconia would challenge the Achaean domination of the Peloponnese. The Aetolians had a long tradition of alliance with Sparta, and to this end a small contingent of 1000 infantry and 300 cavalry was sent to support the tyrant-king Nabis in his war against the Achaeans. However, the Aetolians sensed that Nabis was increasingly unpopular with the Spartan elite: he indulged in policies that redistributed land from wealthy oligarchs to his mercenary soldiers. The primary goal of this policy was to expand the number of arms-bearing Spartans, a number well below 1000 by the second century BC. Nor did Nabis rule as a traditional Spartan king, but rather he abolished the Spartan ‘diarchy’ of two kings. These unpopular reforms led many traditional Spartans to see him as a petty tyrant backed by a mercenary force. While Nabis’ previous military successes had made him popular, recent defeats suffered at the hands of the Achaeans cost him much of his remaining political capital.