Antiochus the Great

by Michael J. Taylor

  The Battle of Side

  As this time, Antiochus was also assembling a new fleet in Syria out of the port of Seleucia Pieria. The commander was Hannibal Barca, who after five years as a courtier in the Seleucid court now received his first serious military command. It was an odd choice, given that Hannibal had no naval experience, despite his significant military accomplishments. Indeed, Hannibal’s strategy in the Second Punic War had neglected naval affairs almost entirely, leaving the Romans to command the seas. Antiochus, however, planned to lead the land forces against Rome himself and did not want to be upstaged by a foreign commander of Hannibal’s celebrity. The naval command gave Hannibal a role and prevented him from interfering in land preparations. The King likely hoped that such a military genius would flourish similarly at sea. In this task, Hannibal enjoyed one notable credential: a linguistic affinity with many of Phoenician sailors in the Seleucid fleet, who like Hannibal spoke a Phoenician dialect.

  Hannibal mustered a fleet of forty-seven ships: thirty quinqueremes or quadremes, ten triremes, and seven ships larger than a quinquereme (with six or even seven decks). As he sailed north to meet the blockaded Polyxenidas, a Rhodian fleet swooped down to intercept him. The Rhodians got the best of the resulting spirited engagement, and Hannibal retired after twenty ships suffered serious damage. This defeat marked the anticlimactic end of Hannibal’s storied military career. He limped the fleet back to base at Seleucia Pieria, and played no further part in the war effort.49

  The Battle of Myonessus

  Meanwhile, the praetor Aemilius Regulus, in command of the Roman fleet, had been fighting a frustrating campaign, suffering from dissensions among military tribunes as he had failed to capture the Selecid stronghold of Iasos. He had also suffered a personal setback with the death of his brother who had accompanied him on campaign.50

  Aemilius decided to sail down the coast of Asia Minor, thus allowing Polyxenidas to finally exit the harbour of Ephesus. The Roman fleet became distracted by matters in the city of Teos, previously proclaimed ‘inviolate’ (asylos) by both Antiochus and Rome. Teos had since become an ally of the Seleucids, and a major supplier of wine to the navy. In retaliation for this betrayal, the Romans sailed into the Tean harbour and extorted some wine for themselves, disregarding the supposed inviolability of the city.

  Polyxenidas, now on the prowl, had hopes to ambush the Romans along the coast. But by the time he found them at Teos, however, Aemilius had been alerted to his presence and deployed his ships in battle order. In the head-on clash, the Romans and their allies again proved victorious. Polyxenidas lost twenty-nine ships, with another thirteen captured. While both Polyxenidas and Hannibal retained rump fleets in the wake of defeat, the number of surviving ships was insufficient to challenge Roman naval superiority.51

  Meanwhile, the Scipio brothers planned to advance north through Macedonia to Thrace, then cross the Hellespont and enter Asia Minor. Africanus warned that such an operation would require diplomatic preparations to ensure Philip V’s cooperation in entering his territory, and a young military tribune named Tiberius Semperonius Gracchus was sent ahead to facilitate coordination with the Macedonian king. Gracchus arrived to find Philip V groggy after a night of heavy drinking, but the King’s sloth was superficial. Philip V had made ample preparations to aid the Romans in crossing his realm: stockpiled supplies, built bridges, new roads – all were at the ready. He also personally accompanied the Scipios and their army across Macedonia and into Thrace. The King also permitted his subjects to join a 2000-strong brigade of Macedonians and Thessalians who accompanied the Roman army in the crossing.

  Philip V had his own reasons for giving this generous aid to the Romans. He was in no position to deny requests from the consuls, but his enthusiastic aid also revealed a private agenda. He hoped for – and later received – material rewards for his cooperation. His son Demetrius, a hostage in Rome, was returned, and he also received certain territorial concessions. The 50-talent indemnity to the Romans was cancelled.52 He also had reason to hope for a quick defeat of Antiochus: this would place the Great King on equal terms with his own humbled position. Furthermore, Philip likely suspected that the Romans would leave Greece after a victory, just as they had done four years earlier. With the Romans absent, he could resume his patient work of rebuilding his realm.

  As the Roman army crossed the Hellespont, Antiochus suffered a diplomatic setback: the previously unaffiliated King Prusias of Bithynia sided with the Romans. Antiochus had been courting Prusias assiduously, but the King remained coyly neutral, hedging his bets until the expected outcome became clearer. With the Romans’ naval triumphs and movement into Asia Minor, Prusias went with Rome, the likely victor.53

  Kings were not the only ones trying to pick winners, but also the town councils of cities in Asia Minor. The city of Heraclea-ad-Latmos, for example, sent envoys to advancing Roman army, throwing their lot in with the Scipios. The surviving negotiations preserve an interesting hybrid of Roman and Greek diplomatic idiom. The Scipio brothers accepted what in Roman diplomatic idiom was a deditio in fidem, a ‘surrender into the faith’ of the Roman people. In return, the Scipios promised freedom and autonomy, the standard slogans of Greek relations between kings and cities.54

  Final negotiations

  Antiochus did not wish to fight a battle he might not win. The Romans had proven themselves the most dangerous enemy he had faced to date. And although military preparations had been extensive throughout the whole empire, perhaps one final attempt at negotiation could end the war without further military disaster.

  Antiochus sent an envoy authorized to offer generous terms to the Romans. Rome would receive the contested cities of Lampsacus, Smyrna, and Alexandria Troas as allies, along with others that wished to leave the Seleucid sphere of influence. Furthermore, Antiochus offered to pay half of the Roman costs of war.

  The envoy had additional instructions. He was to attempt to arrange a secret meeting with Scipio Africanus, and offer him a generous bribe in exchange for supporting the Seleucid position. Scipio declined. Essentially, these were the terms that the Romans had requested four years previously during the conference at Lysimacheia – before hostilities began and before the impressive string of Roman victories. Yet Antiochus had one potential trump card: he had captured Scipio Africanus’ son Publius in a minor skirmish.55

  Hearing these terms, the Romans response was the following: if he wanted peace, Antiochus must pay the full costs of the war and evacuate all of Asia Minor north of the Taurus Mountains.56 The Scipionic family lore as recorded by Polybius suggests that Scipio Africanus also indulged in a bit of diplomatic ‘trash talking’. He told the envoy that in exchange for his son, he would give Antiochus III a bit of useful advice: the King would be wise to agree to Roman terms to avoid battle with the Romans.

  Given the many years Antiochus spent campaigning to secure Seleucid rights in Asia Minor, the Romans’ terms proved unacceptable to the King. Negotiations ended and both sides prepared for the final, decisive battle. Antiochus did, however, release the young Publius Scipio back to his father, which can be interpreted as a chivalrous act of royal magnanimity, or perhaps an effort to bank Scipio’s goodwill in the event of further military setbacks.57

  Chapter Nine

  The Battle of Magnesia

  With the conclusion of peace talks, both armies sought to force a battle in a location suitable to each one’s particular dispositions and strengths. Antiochus positioned himself in the Hyrcanian plain, a flat agricultural region that offered plenty of open space to deploy his overall numerical superiority and his enormous advantage in cavalry. L. Scipio, however, manoeuvred his army and constructed a camp in the narrow horseshoe formed by the confluence of the Hermus and Phyrgios Rivers. He then marched out and formed his army where the plain was only three kilometres wide, with either flank anchored on a riverbank, effectively negating Antiochus’ numerical advantage. Antiochus refused to do battle here, although he dispatched detachments to ra
id Roman forward positions.

  Yet winter was coming, bringing with it the end of the campaign season. Antiochus would still be king in the next year, but L. Scipio could not be sure of an extension to his pro-consular command. The Scipio brothers had many enemies back in the Roman senate that would gladly vote to revoke his imperium, and L. Scipio therefore had reason to force a decisive battle. Since the King would not fight the Romans in their cosy position with guarded flanks, L. Scipio advanced his camp forward to a position where the horseshoe widened. He now offered battle with only one flank protected by the riverbank.

  In theory, Antiochus would benefit from delaying battle and sending both sides into winter camps, actions that might allow additional time for a negotiated settlement. But the debacle at Thermopylae had cost him a great deal of political capital. He needed to prove to his court that he could triumph against the Romans, especially given his overwhelming numerical advantage. Although Antiochus was enough of a tactician to refuse battle against Scipio’s tidy position, now that his opponent advanced forward and exposed a vulnerable flank, the King likely felt enormous pressure from his ‘friends’ to commit to a fight. After all, Alexander had never backed away from a pitched battle. With such pressure mounting, Antiochus drew up his battleline and prepared for a final showdown with the Roman army.

  Composition and disposition: Seleucids

  The most detailed description of Antiochus’ army in this effort comes from Livy (37.40), who likely uses Polybius as a source, given that his report of army strengths closely mirrors Polybius’ description of the Battle of Raphia.1 From left to right, Antiochus deployed his force as follows:

  Left wing

  Cyrtian singlers and Elymaean archers

  4000 peltasts (light infantry)

  1500 Illyrians

  1500 Carians and Cilicians

  1000 Neo-Cretans

  2500 Galatian cavalry

  (500) Tarentine cavalry

  1000 royal cavalry

  3000 cataphracts

  2700 miscellaneous light infantry

  2000 Cappadocians (light-medium infantry)

  Centre

  1500 atians

  16,000 phalanx, 22 elephants

  1500 Galatians

  Right wing

  3000 cataphracts

  1000 Agema

  (10,000) Silver Shields, 16 elephants

  1200 Dahae cavalrymen

  3000 light infantry, Cretans and Illyrians

  2500 Mysian archers

  Elymaean archers and Cyrtian slingers

  To the front of Antiochus’ main line on the left were his scythed chariots, Arab archers mounted on camelback, and sundry light infantry. The phalanx at his centre was arrayed in a double depth of thirty-two ranks rather than the traditional sixteen. It was divided into ten battalions, each 1600 strong. Between each division of the phalanx the King posted two elephants, supported by a platoon of light infantry. In addition to the twenty-two elephants supporting the phalanx, another thirty-two were held in reserve, sixteen on either wing.

  Livy reports that, in all, Antiochus commanded some 60,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry.2 Unfortunately, Livy’s own numbers do not indicate such a total; he lists strengths totalling a 45,200 infantry and 11,500 cavalry. Yet Livy does not report the strength of several units: the Silver Shields, the Tarentine cavalry, and many of the light troops. Bar Kochba offers some sensible conjectures: the Silver Shields contained 10,000 men, based on their earlier strength at Raphia, while the Tarentine numbered 500.3 The remaining ‘missing’ can be accounted for by light infantry and skirmishers, including the infantry left to guard the Seleucid Camp; contingents for which Livy provides no numerical strength.

  Livy’s disposition has a number of major flaws, the biggest of which is the fact that there was not space in the plain for such a lengthy line of troops. The dispositions make more sense if many of the light infantry were posted ahead of the main line as skirmishers, in particular the Cyrtian slingers, Elymaean archars and Mysian bowman, who could open up the battle with their volleys. Other units listed by Livy on the extreme flanks of the Seleucid battle line were most likely held behind in reserve, or were simply squeezed out as the plain between the rivers narrowed. The placement of the Silver Shields to the right of the Seleucid cavalry on the right wing was also a highly unorthodox development, as standard Macedonian tactics positioned the elite heavy infantry to the immediate right of the main phalanx (where Antiochus had positioned the Silver Shields at Raphia, over twenty years before), in between the phalanx and the cavalry. Why Antiochus would now put his cavalry to the right of his phalanx, followed by another large unit of heavy infantry is unclear. It is quite possible that Livy has made a mistake in transcribing Polybius’ description of Antiochus’ battleline (or that a copyist has made a mistake transcribing Livy!), and that the Silver Shields, in fact, held the standard position to the immediate right of the phalanx, although any modification of Livy’s battleline is inherently speculative.

  The Seleucid army at Magnesia represented military resources from the entire empire and beyond: Psidians, Pamphylians, Lydians, Phrygians Cilicians and Carians were local levies from Asia Minor. The Cyrtians and Elymaens came from the Iranian plateau, in addition to the phalanx of citizen-soldiers mustered from the cities of Syria and Mesopotamia. The Dahae were mustered from parts of Hyrcania re-incorporated during Antiochus’ anabasis, and Parthian horsemen possibly numbered among his heavy cataphracts. The 2000 Cappadocians were the result of the diplomatic match between his daughter Antiochis and King Ariarathes of Cappadocia.

  Composition and disposition: Romans

  Lucius Scipio’s heavy infantry consisted of two legions of Roman infantry, 5400-strong apiece, and two wings (alae) of Italian allies, also 5400 apiece. Scipio’s Roman legions were over-strength for the campaign, as the standard Roman legion consisted of 4200 infantry. To the right of the legions, Scipio stationed light troops of 3000 Pergamenese and Achaean infantry. To the right of these were 3000 cavalry, 2200 Roman and 800 Pergamenese under the command of King Eumenes. The Roman left was anchored on the Phrygios River. A mere four companies (turmae) of cavalry, some 120 horsemen, were posted for flank security. Some 800 Cretan and Illyrian archers were stationed to the front of the main infantry line, while 2000 Thracian and Macedonian mercenaries guarded the Roman camp.4 In all, Lucius Scipio had 25,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, and was therefore badly outnumbered by more than two to one.5

  The Romans fought arranged in the tres acies formation, with the heavy infantry divided into three lines known in Latin as the hastati, principes, and triarii. Age was the primary distinction among infantry classes, with men in their late teens and early twenties as hastati and those in their mid twenties the principes. The triarii were the experienced veterans, generally in their thirties and beyond. The three lines of heavy infantry were screened by teenaged skirmishers called velites, who fought with light throwing darts.6

  Since the soldiers of the Roman militia supplied their own equipment, body armour varied based on the resources of the individual soldier. Poorer Romans wore simple breastplates (pectorale), while wealthier soldiers donned expensive chain mail coats (lorica hamata). All soldiers sported a helmet of bronze or iron, and many wore greaves to protect their shins. All three lines of heavy infantry were also equipped with an oblong shield (scutum) made of plywood. Roman soldiers were universally armed with a sword, usually a vicious Spanish weapon, the gladius hispaniensis, which had a 24–26-inch blade well suited to cutting and thrusting.7

  The first two lines of heavy infantry were also equipped with javelins (pila). They bore the brunt of the fight but might retire once exhausted. The triarii were the reserves of the legion, and unlike the other ranks, armed themselves with pikes and stood in the rear, ready to form a bulwark and rallying point in a crisis. Their function led to the Latin adage, denoting a desperate situation, that ‘things have come down to the triarii’ (ad triarios redisse). However, the triarii were rarel
y employed in battle, and they often kneeled or sat down to watch the younger men fight, as the comic playwright Plautus quipped to his audience at the start of a play: ‘Come now, everyone sit back and relax, just like the tnarii!’8

  The Roman legion was not a solid mass of troops like the Hellenistic phalanx. Rather, it was divided into smaller tactical sub-units called maniples; each maniple in Lucius Scipio’s legions comprised roughly 160 men (maniples of the tnarii contained only 60 men apiece).9 The maniples of the three lines were arranged in a checkerboard pattern (quincunx) with gaps of roughly 10–15 metres among them.10 Each legion of 5400 men had a front between 400 and 500 metres.

  The Roman infantry formation was therefore far more open order than Antiochus’ tightly packed phalanx, in which each Seleucid phalangite occupied a frontage of three feet, with shields, elbows, and sarissai pressing close against each other. Scipio’s legionaries could also press together in a defensive position with interlocked shields (densatis scutis), but in the offensive the maniples flexed forward into the open order formation (laxare manipulos/soluere ordines) to give soldiers sufficient room to wield their swords. According to Polybius, each Roman soldier required six feet of space in order to fight effectively, a figure that implies approximately two feet between soldiers.11 This open order disposition, when combined with the modularity of the manipular system, gave the Roman legion great tactical flexibility, but also made it deeply vulnerable to charges from densely massed infantry or cavalry.