Antiochus the Great

by Michael J. Taylor

  *[Refers to primarily to formerly Seleucid cities in Asia which the Romans gave over to Eumenes II and Rhodes as benefits of their collaboration.]

  Antiochus shall pay to the Romans [twelve] thousand talents over a period of [twelve] years in instalments of 1000 talents, each talent shall weigh no less than eighty Roman pounds, and five hundred and forty thousand modii of corn. He shall pay to King Eumenes three hundred and fifty talents in the next five years, paying seventy talents a year at the same time that is fixed for his payments to the Roman and in lieu of the corn, as Antiochus estimated it – one hundred and twenty-seven talents and twelve hundred and eight drachmas, the sum Eumenes agreed to accept as a satisfactory payment to his treasury.28

  *[A modius was a volume measure, equal to roughly 2 litres. A modius of wheat weighed roughly 15 lb/6.8 kg. The grain indemnity was equivalent to the yearly rations of 11,250 Roman soldiers. Antiochus’ total indemnity to Eumenes, with the grain requirement translated into cash, was 477.2 talents.]

  Antiochus shall give twenty hostages, replacing them every three years, not below eighteen years of age and not above forty. If any of the money he pays does not correspond to the above stipulations, he shall make it good in the following year.

  *[The most important hostage would be Antiochus’ son, the prince Antiochus, the future Antiochus IV.]

  If any of the cities or peoples against which Antiochus is forbidden by this treaty to make war begin first to make war on him, he may make war on such, provided he does not exercise sovereignty over any of them or receive them into his alliance.

  *[The Romans granted Antiochus the right of defensive war, which was more lenient than their 201 BC treaty with Carthage, which required Carthage to request Rome’s permission even to fight defensive wars.]

  All grievances of both parties are be submitted to a lawful tribunal. If both parties desire to add any clauses to this treaty or to remove any by common decree, they are at liberty to do so.

  The pro-consul sent two envoys, including his brother Lucius, to obtain an oath from Antiochus that he would respect the treaty as written. Q. Fabius Labeo, the commander of the Roman fleet, sailed to Patara, took possession of the Seleucid ships stationed there, and burned them.29 Antiochus’ elephants were confiscated and handed over to Eumenes. Ten Roman commissioners arrived to determine which Seleucid territories in Asia Minor would remain independent and which would be handed over to either Eumenes or Rhodes. Ariarathes of Cappadocia, who had recently married to Antiochis, the daughter of Antiochus, now hastened to betroth his own daughter to Eumenes.30

  At the end of the year, Manlius Vulso crossed the Hellespont with his army and ten commissioners. While battered by Thracian raids, he was still able to display lavish sums of treasure in his triumph back in Rome. While his senseless Galatian war was viewed with some cynicism in Rome, Manlius Vulso curried political favour with the plebs by using much of his loot to refund the Roman taxpayers, then groaning under the financial strains of the Seleucid-Aetolian war.31

  The final journey East

  In the wake of the disaster in the west, Antiochus looked again to the east. He travelled to Babylon in 187 BC and reaffirmed his status as King of Babylon through a lavish set of sacrifices at the great Babylonian temples: Esaglia, Erzida, and Borsippa. In return, the priests and governor of Babylon bestowed extravagant gifts on him: a gold crown worth 1000 shekels, gold bullion, and the purple robes of King Nebuchadnezzar, the greatest king of the Neo-Babylonian dynasty. Through the tested rites that predated his own dynasty by centuries, Antiochus asserted his undiminished kingship before his native subjects.32

  From Babylon, Antiochus advanced eastward into Elam with an armed force. It is possible that he intended another grand anabasis to rebuild his royal prestige. But having paid 3000 talents to the Romans (and with another 1000 talents coming due), the King was badly cash strapped. As in Ecbatana in 210, the stored wealth of a native temple proved irresistible:

  Antiochus, short of money and hearing that the temple of Ba’al in Elam possessed much silver and gold from its votive deposits, decided to pillage it. He came to Elam and after accusing the inhabitants of starting a war, he plundered the shrine. Gathering together a great hoard of wealth, he soon received the just retribution from the gods. (Diodorus 29.15)

  The despoliation went badly awry: outraged subjects counterattacked and killed Antiochus, an inglorious death for an old king who had spent his entire adult life on military campaign.33 He died at the age of fifty-three, having reigned for thirty-six years.34 The priests in Babylon diligently noted his passing on the cuneiform king list:

  Year 125, Month Three: The following was heard in Babylon: On the 25th Day, Antiochus the King was killed in Elam.35

  Chapter Ten

  The End of a Dynasty

  The Great King was dead. Seleucus IV, the eldest son already serving as general and co-king, obtained the empire in a peaceful succession. His twelve-year reign was relatively quiet, as the substantial Roman indemnity constrained major military operations. Seleucus IV did briefly consider moving against Eumenes II, who was then attacking Pharneces, the king of Pontus, but he ultimately declined to do so. Financial problems were also evident. The Selucids failed to pay several instalments of the Roman indemnity, and his epi ton pragmaton Heliodorus attempted to despoil the treasures in the Temple of Yaweh in Jerusalem, a common Seleucid tactic in times of fiscal crisis.1

  Seleucus IV was murdered in an episode of court intrigue.2 Demetrius, Seleucus IV’s adult son, was a hostage in Rome. The Romans refused to release Demetrius, instead supporting the claim of Seleucus IV’s younger brother Antiochus IV, then living comfortably in Athens. Antiochus IV was an unusual character. He too spent time in Rome as a hostage following the treaty of Apamea, and there developed a passion for gladiatorial games and Roman culture in general. He exhibited gladiators in Antioch and formed a special ‘legion’ of 5000 men armed in the Roman fashion, soldiers who wore chainmail, carried oblong shields, and wielded javelins instead of pikes.3

  Despite his passion for gladiators and his admiration for Roman military kit, Antiochus IV was not a Roman lackey. Rather, he was a Seleucid king with traditional ambitions, harboured particularly against Ptolemaic Egypt. Child kings and dynastic dysfunction again plagued the Ptolemaic kingdom, and by 170, the kingdom had split between two brothers, Ptolemy VI Philometer (Mother-lover) and Ptolemy VIII Euergetes (Benefactor), then twelve years old. This power sharing arrangement was not to last. In 169, Philometer invited Antiochus IV to intervene on his behalf, and the Seleucid king was more than willing to comply. After two years of campaigning, Philometer was crowned as a puppet king in Memphis while Antiochus prepared to besiege Alexandria.

  At this time, Rome was engaged in a stalemated war with Macedonia. The Romans supported Euergetes, and were alarmed by the notion that Antiochus IV might become de facto ruler of Egypt. Additional Roman military commitments in Spain and Liguria prevented Rome from committing to military action against Antiochus IV. However, in 168, the Romans won a significant victory at the Battle of Pydna. Legionary swords butchered more than 20,000 Macedonians, and Perseus, the last Macedonian king, was removed to a Roman dungeon.4 The swift conclusion of the war meant that more than 60,000 Roman troops stood ready for potential redeployment against Antiochus IV.

  A delegation of twelve ambassadors led by the ex-consul Popilius Laenus arrived at the Alexandrian siege lines. Laenus had been dispatched earlier but lingered on the island of Cyprus waiting for definitive news from Macedonia. As long as the stalemate continued, Laenus knew his threats would be empty. As soon as the victory at Pydna was confirmed, however, he hastened to the port of Pelusium in Egypt.

  The Romanophile Antiochus IV met the Roman delegation as it disembarked at Pelusium and affably offered to shake hands. This was a gesture of tremendous respect and good will. In a spectacular and arrogant gesture of showmanship, Popilius Laenus remained silent. He took his staff, drew a circle in the sand around t
he King, and handed him a written copy of Roman demands. Finally speaking, he told the King not to step out of the circle until he had agreed to Roman demands, demands that included the complete evacuation of Egypt. Antiochus IV was humiliated. But a fellow Hellenistic monarch had just been deposed by Rome, making manifest the potential cost of defeat. He told Laenus of his decision to comply and swiftly withdrew his forces.5

  But an angry and humiliated king is a very dangerous thing. With his prestige shattered, Antiochus IV looked for avenues of quick and violent retribution, and while marching back through Palestine up the Gaza strip, a convenient opportunity presented itself.

  Antiochus III had granted the city of Jerusalem special status and accommodated unusual Jewish practices, but the cultural and religious politics of the city had grown significantly more tense over the years. Over the past decade, a rift had opened between a ‘Hellenizing’ faction, Jewish elites interested in emulating Greek culture, and a more conservative faction. Following a disputed election for high priest and outbreaks of bitter street violence, the Hellenizing faction invited Antiochus IV and his passing army to intervene. Given the King’s ugly mood and his desperate need to reassert his power, this invitation would turn out to be a very bad mistake.

  Using the civil unrest as a pretence, Antiochus IV’s army sacked Jerusalem, carried off 1800 talents of treasure from the temple, and installed a permanent garrison. Jewish ritual was forbidden within the city, although there was no attempt to ban Judaism altogether within the empire. (The prominent Jewish community in Babylon, for example, remained untouched by the King’s wrath.) The conservative faction within Jerusalem soon rebelled. The leaders, Matthias and John, dubbed themselves the ‘Maccabees (Hammers)’ and took to the hills to wage moderately effective guerrilla war.

  Antiochus IV had more important matters to attend to than the petty rebels in Judea. The Parthians were on the move in the east, while the Greek kings of Bactria were expanding at Seleucid expense. Marshalling an impressive army, Antiochus paraded it through Daphne: some 45,000 men altogether, including 26,000 phalangites and his pet Roman ‘legion’. The parade stands as a potent reminder of the lingering power of the Seleucids. But such display of force costs money. Perhaps learning the lesson of his father’s death, Antiochus IV attempted to mask the despoliation of native temples with a new conceit: he married himself to a native goddess in order to appropriate her treasures as a ‘dowry’. This worked well enough in the Syrian town of Bambyke, where he married the goddess Atargatis and then stole all the plate in her temple, leaving the hapless deity only a single ring to symbolize their marriage.6 A similar ‘holy marriage’ (hieros gamos) was attempted in the Temple of Nanaia in Elam, but Antiochus IV was killed in the process, much like his father before him.7

  Antiochus IV left an infant son, Antiochus V, who was perhaps only a year old. Again, an infant’s succession was complicated by the fact that one adult son of Seleucus IV was still alive: Demetrius, still a hostage in Rome. The baby ‘ruled’ for two years, largely through the general and regent Lysias. Eager to quell domestic problems, Lysias made major concessions to the Jews and granted them moderate autonomy; he seems to have reinstated the ‘charter’ of Jerusalem granted by Antiochus III.8

  In 163 BC, a Roman delegation led by Gnaeus Octavius arrived to verify that the Seleucids were indeed in compliance with the Treaty of Apamea. It seems that the Seleucid kings, probably beginning with Antiochus III himself, had intentionally maintained ships and elephants that were banned by the treaty, and the Romans may have decided that a tenuous regency provided the perfect opportunity for a full inspection. Octavius ordered that the elephant herd of Apamea be hamstrung and killed, while the excess warships were to be set on fire. The butchery of the elephants was particularly disturbing. A man named Leptines, distraught by the animal cruelty, murdered Octavius in the gymnasium at Antioch. While the murder of an ambassador could easily justify a declaration of war (for example, the Roman invasion of Illyria in 229 BC was made under such pretences), the Romans remained uninterested in a war against an already troubled kingdom.9

  Meanwhile, the hostage Demetrius contrived an escape from Rome. His primary accomplice was none other than the historian Polybius, who helped to provide him with a ship. Given Polybius’ close ties with the Scipios, it is very likely that Demetrius’ escape had the unofficial approval of a faction of the Roman aristocracy. Demetrius linked up with defecting army units and staged a coup in Antioch; the toddler Antiochus V was cruelly murdered. Lysias, the real power behind the throne, was also executed. To remain in good standing with Rome, Demetrius diligently surrendered Leptines, the murderer of the Roman envoy Octavius, to the Romans for punishment.10

  Demetrius I turned aggressively toward two breakaway parts of the empire. He sent a series of expeditions against the rebellious Jews. Despite several setbacks, his general Bacchides eventually crushed the Maccabees, leaving the legendary Judas Maccabeus dead on the battlefield and forcing his sons to flee into exile. In Media, the satrap Timarchus had scored a major victory over the Parthians and used this victory to proclaim himself king of a breakaway kingdom centred on Babylon. Demetrius marched east, where he defeated and executed Timarchus.

  The defeated Timarchus had a brother named Hereclides, who remained in the Seleucid court in a significantly reduced role. Demetrius would have been wise to execute him for good measure, as Hereclides now brought forth another pretender. He found a young man, Balas, gave him the name of Alexander, and proclaimed him the natural son of Antiochus IV. Demetrius’ purges had made him unpopular in Antioch, and his military competence made him dangerous to Rome. The Roman senate threw diplomatic support behind the pretender, and Egypt and Pergamon lent material aid to the new Alexander. Demetrius fell fighting while engaged in personal combat in 150 BC. Alexander Balas was proclaimed king, and quickly gained a reputation as an adolescent voluptuary.

  Prior to his death, Demetrius secured his sons in the city of Cnidus on the coast of Asia Minor, along with a substantial reserve of money. The older son, also named Demetrius, raised a small force of Cretan mercenaries and launched a stealth raid on Antioch, catching Alexander Balas entirely by surprise. The return of Demetrius II seems to have been welcomed by the population. Balas was quickly murdered; Demetrius II officially restored the legitimate line in 145 BC. He too gained a reputation as a voluptuary (it was good to be king!), but he also promptly undertook military campaigns necessary to restore faltering control of the east, where the Parthians had overrun Seleucid domains.11 Unfortunately, Demetrius was captured by the Parthians in 139 BC and held in gentlemanly captivity for the next ten years; the Parthians then controlled much of Mesopotamia, including Babylon. For the first time, the waxing Parthian realm grew larger than the waning Seleucid Empire.

  In captivity, Demetrius II was succeeded by his younger brother Antiochus VII, nicknamed Sidetes, who had just turned twenty years old. Antiochus VII moved first against the pretender Tryphon, who earlier had proclaimed the infant son of Alexander Balas king (Antiochus VI), subsequently murdered the baby, and then claimed to rule Antioch himself. Antioch fell to Antiochus VII in 138 and Tryphon was summarily executed.

  The defeat of the pretender allowed Antiochus VII to turn his attentions back to the East and the Parthian threat. In 129 BC, he marched east with a sizable army that included a large contingent of Jewish troops from the semi-independent client state of Judea.12 He enjoyed some initial successes, including the recapture of Babylon.13 In a catastrophic battle, however, the Parthians killed Antiochus VII and annihilated his army. This was the worst military defeat in Seleucid history and proved far more consequential than the savaging suffered by Antiochus III at Magnesia. The Parthians recaptured Babylon; now only Syria remained as the pathetic rump of the Seleucid kingdom. For a military city like Antioch, contributor of so many citizens to the final expedition, the results were heart wrenching, as the Greek historian Diodorus Siculus relates (34/35.17.1–12):

  When the
citizens of Antioch learned of Antiochus’ (VII) death, not only did the city mourn publically, but every private household filled with gloom and lamentation. The wailing of the women especially kindled the grief. Since 300,000 had been lost, including camp followers not in the ranks, not a household could be found that was free from misfortune. Some women mourned for brothers, some for husbands, and some for sons, while many unmarried girls and boys, orphaned, grieved their desolation, until time, the best doctor for sorrow, blunted the edge off their misery.

  The Parthians released Demetrius II from captivity to rule the humbled empire as a vassal king married to a Parthian princess, much in the same fashion as Antiochus had forced sisters and daughters upon defeated enemies. The Seleucid Empire was now little more than a petty kingdom in central Syria, ruled by a final succession of ineffective kings who focused their attention on tedious rounds of petty dynastic strife.14 In 66 BC, the Roman general Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (Pompey the Great) obtained a command in the east to conclude a drawn out war against the Pontic king Mithradites VI. With the steep decline of Seleucid power, Mithradites had transformed this previously peripheral kingdom into the last great military power of Hellenistic world and boldly challenged Rome for control of the Eastern Mediterranean. Mithradites’ successes took place in the context of the civil wars between Marius and Sulla, but once these bloody distractions ceased, Rome gained the upper hand. With the defeat and suicide of Mithradates, Pompey looked to reorganize the politics of the Eastern Mediterranean. To a large extent, this involved granting new kingdoms to loyal clients and transforming large swaths of territory into Roman provinces. With little fanfare, Pompey reconfigured what remained of the Seleucid kingdom into the province of Syria, ruled by a Roman pro-consul.15 The empire of Antiochus III was no more.

  How could the mighty and expansive empire of Antiochus III decline so swiftly? First and foremost, the Seleucid Empire had the grave misfortune of physical location between two dangerous external powers: Rome and Parthia, and thus experienced military pressure from both sides. The well-organized Roman state was by far the more potent of the two external threats, but the Romans had little appetite for large-scale territorial annexation in the second century BC. Their main goal was to stymie the Seleucids so that they would not jeopardize Roman interests in the eastern Mediterranean. The Romans did not begrudge the Seleucid empire their core territories, as long as the dynasty remained weak and devoid of further Mediterranean ambitions. Yet almost as destructive as direct conquest was the senate’s constant meddling in royal succession after the death of Seleucus IV, as repetitive succession crises produced a string of insecure and ineffective kings drawn from competing parallel dynasties. The ongoing Seleucid civil wars sapped the dynasty’s military strength, and perhaps more dangerously, its claim of legitimacy.