Year Zero: Berlin 1945

by David McCormack

  One of the miracles of this period was that, despite all of the unfortunate circumstances of the bombed-out cities, attempts were made to continue cultivating culture even while most concert halls, theatres and cinemas were destroyed. One didn't just think of making money, rather that life should just go on.

  Hartmann's sentiments were not altogether uncommon, as there was a feeling that culture was essential for the nation's spiritual survival in the wake of stories emerging concerning the scale of atrocities committed by the National Socialist regime in the people's name. Experimental musician Arno Huth was unable to practice his art during the National Socialist era. The shattering defeat of May 1945 brought with it the uncertainties of occupation by the victorious powers. However, for people like Huth, it also brought new opportunities. Interviewed in January 1946, he stated :

  After the surrender, hardly any opera groups or complete orchestras were left, nor were many theatres or concert halls usable because heavy bombings during the last months of the war had destroyed or badly damaged most buildings of any size. In spite of this, artistic life has picked up rapidly, thanks chiefly to aid from the Allied occupation forces.

  Just how rapidly artistic and cultural life revived in Berlin can be demonstrated in the remarkable figure of some 120 premières being hosted in the city between July and December 1945. By early 1946, there were approximately 200 stages and halls available in the city for artistic performances. However, the co-operation of the Allied occupation forces was doomed to failure as long buried ideological differences came to the fore. Over the next two years, the various cultural instruments created by the four occupying powers began to mirror the increasing divide between east and west.

  Chapter Fourteen

  Hearts and Minds

  The Allied sponsored cultural revival in Berlin was but one element in winning the battle for hearts and minds. Whilst the Western powers aimed to replace Hitler's dictatorship with freedom of expression within a democratic multi-party system, Stalin had other ideas. His decision to send the German Communists back to Berlin represented his own attempt to win over the hearts and minds of the German people by creating a national party of the workers that would also appeal to the intelligentsia. His ultimate goal was to complete the revolution of 1848 by eliminating feudalism in a united Germany. The revolution would be subject to political control from Moscow. To this end, the so-called 'Moscow emigrates' were the perfect conduits for his planned social remodelling.

  The group chosen for the mission was led by Walter Ulbricht. All were dedicated Communists and totally loyal to their masters in Moscow. By and large, Stalin and Beria regarded the group as no more than 'useful idiots'. Nonetheless, Ulbricht and his group had something to prove as they had been subject to withering attacks regarding the German Communist Party's lack of opposition to Hitler. The main task of the group was to support the Soviet occupation authorities and to convince the people that Stalin was their liberator, not their enemy. Little did the group know at this time of the terrible suffering of the civil population at the hands of their 'liberators'. Their illusions would soon be shattered.

  On 27 May 1945, the group arrived in the devastated city. Such was the level of destruction that greeted them, that their task appeared at first to be utterly futile. Markus Wolf (later head of intelligence) was a member of the group. Given the pseudonym 'Michael Storm', he worked as a journalist and propagandist for a Soviet controlled radio station. The topics of rape, the fate of German prisoners of war in the East and the future boundary lines with Poland were never to be broadcast. As these were all topics which were of intense interest to the German population he was able to quickly glean from numerous sources the full picture of what the early stages of the Soviet occupation had meant. In his diary he wrote :

  Our frontoviki have wrought havoc. All women raped. Berliners have no more watches...Then came the experience, the reality, and as a result the absolute majority of Germans, especially those east of the Elbe, were very, very anti-Soviet.

  Wolf's reflections accurately characterise the prevailing mood amongst the population. Yet, none of this mattered to Ulbricht, his immediate superior. This charmless, ambitious and unscrupulous individual was totally guided by his loyalty to Stalin and Soviet policy.

  The goals of the German Communist Party had been laid out as, 'The establishment of an anti-fascist, democratic republic with all democratic rights and freedoms for the people'.However, Ulbricht's vision was somewhat different. His plans for the new Germany were based around authoritarian leadership and strict controls over all elements of civil society. Nonetheless, he understood the requirement for a democratic façade, stating that, 'It must appear democratic, but we must control everything'. Ulbricht went on to create the foundations for a virtual dictatorship by pressurising the Social Democrats to merge with the Communists (on his terms) which subsequently led to the creation of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Ulbricht's dictatorship marked the beginning of a new era in German politics. A line had been drawn under the National Socialist era. With the establishment of incompatible systems of government in those areas of Germany controlled by the democratic powers in the West and the Soviet Union in the East, a new era had begun.

  Chapter Fifteen

  The Balance Destroyed

  To the general public in America and Great Britain, Stalin was known by the affectionate title of 'Uncle Joe'. This appellation gave the impression that the Soviet leader was a genial, benevolent figure whose life and work was devoted to serving the interests of his people. In reality, nothing could have been further from the truth, as behind his somewhat unremarkable and benign appearance lay almost unfathomable levels of viciousness and jealousy which arose from his love of power. Wearied to near exhaustion by the demands of war, Stalin was nonetheless determined to rebuild his shattered state. Therefore, the last thing he wanted was another war. The engine of history would take care of the capitalist nations in due course.

  Stalin firmly believed that time was on his side, as the greedy and rapacious Americans and British would enter into conflict with each other as they sought to dominate world trade. All he had to do was sit back and wait for the inevitable clash which would result in the destruction, or the fatal weakening of these rival powers, then, and only then would a rejuvenated Soviet state step in to claim the spoils. His thinking was clearly influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology which argued that capitalist states could only cooperate for a limited period as their self interests would inevitably come to the fore sooner or later. Stalin remained stubbornly wedded to the dialectics of Marxist-Leninist ideology. His assertions regarding the inevitability of a clash between competing capitalist states were published in Pravda :

  Some comrades affirm that in consequence of the development of international conditions after the Second World War, wars among capitalist countries have ceased to be inevitable... These comrades are mistaken. They see the external appearances which glitter on the surface but they fail to see those profound forces which, though at present operating imperceptibly, will nevertheless determine the course of events... It is said that the contradictions between capitalism and socialism are greater than the contradictions between the capitalist countries. Theoretically this is of course true. It is true not only now, at the present time, but it was also true before the Second World War. And this the leaders of the capitalist countries did more or less understand. Yet the Second World War began not with a war against the USSR, but with a war among the capitalist countries.

  After the First World War it was believed that Germany had been finally put out of action... Yet in spite of this Germany revived and rose to her feet as a great power... It is typical in this regard that none other than Britain and the USA should have helped Germany to revive economically and to raise her economic war potential. Of course, through helping Germany to revive, they intended to direct her against the USSR. However, Germany directed her forces in the first place against the Anglo-French-American bloc. When Hit
ler attacked the USSR, The Anglo-French-American bloc not only failed to join with Hitler, but, on the contrary, were obliged to enter into a coalition with the USSR. Consequently, the capitalist countries struggle for markets and their desire to crush their competitors turned out to be actually stronger than the contradictions between the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism... It follows that the inevitability of wars amongst the capitalist countries remains.

  It would be easy to dismiss Stalin's assertions as wishful thinking. However, his views have some credibility in that the First World War was essentially a war amongst capitalist states. It should also not be forgotten that the unwelcome interventions by foreign powers during the 1918-20 Civil War left a lasting impression on the Soviet body-politic. There were those, including Stalin himself who thought that the capitalist powers would intervene again in Soviet affairs, given the chance to do so.

  Whilst Stalin had enjoyed a good relationship with Roosevelt, his successor was far more business like and less accommodating. He was in many respects an unknown quantity. If Stalin thought that it was going to be business as usual, he was in for a rude awakening. Shortly after assuming office, Truman met with his Moscow ambassador Averell Harriman, State Secretary Edward Stettinius, Under Secretary Joseph C. Grew and Charles 'Chip' Bohlen. Prior to the meeting, he had stayed up late every night for a week studying the minutes of the Yalta negotiations in the map room of the White House. His nocturnal work schedule was necessary as he had been kept woefully ill-informed by his predecessor. However, thanks to his own efforts, he was now almost up to speed on the state of current affairs and international relations. Ambassador Harriman used the meeting both as a conduit to pour out his frustrations concerning relations with the Soviet Union and as an opportunity to appraise the president about some 'unpleasant facts' concerning Stalin's intentions in Eastern Europe. Bohlen's memorandum of the meeting provides a clear picture of how the tone set by Roosevelt for the conduct of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union was to harden considerably :

  At the President's request Ambassador Harriman made a brief report on his opinion of the present problems facing the United States in relation to the Soviet Union. He said that he thought the Soviet Union had two policies which they thought they could successfully pursue at the same time – one, the policy of cooperation with the United States and Great Britain, and the other, the extension of Soviet control over neighbouring states through unilateral action. He said that he thought our generosity and desire to cooperate was being misinterpreted in Moscow by certain elements around Stalin as an indication that the Soviet Government could do anything it wished without having any trouble with the United States. He said that he thought the Soviet Government did not wish to break with the Soviet States since they needed our help in order to reduce the burden of reconstruction and that he felt we had nothing to lose by standing firm on issues that were of real importance to us... The President said that he was not afraid of the Russians and that he intended to be firm but fair since in his opinion the Soviet Union needed us more than we needed them... He said that only on a give and take basis could any relations be established.

  Ambassador Harriman said that in effect what we were faced with was a “barbarian invasion of Europe”, that Soviet control over any foreign country did not mean merely influence on their foreign relations but the extension of the Soviet system with secret police, extinction of freedom of speech, etc., and that we had to decide what should be our attitude in the face of these unpleasant facts. He added that he was not pessimistic and felt that we could arrive at a workable basis with the Russians but that this would require a reconsideration of our policy and the abandonment of the illusion that for the immediate future the Soviet Government was going to act in accordance with the principles which the rest of the world held to in international affairs...

  It could be argued that the assumption made by Harriman and Truman that the Soviet Union would be dependent on aid from the U.S. was as big a miscalculation as that made by Stalin regarding future American policy. With neither side really understanding the other, the scene was set for a complete break in relations and the beginnings of the Cold War.

  Truman had two trump cards to play in his dealings with Stalin, his nation's economic power, and since the successful Trinity Test, a monopoly in nuclear weaponry. He was therefore determined to wring as many concessions from the Soviet dictator as possible. American industrial and economic might was indeed something to behold as the economy had more than doubled during the war years. The days of harsh economic tariffs were well and truly over as this powerhouse nation was now ready and able to trade on a worldwide scale. Furthermore, many former allies now looked to the U.S. for financial relief. Bloodied and battered Britain received a three and three quarter million dollar loan which was partially used to found the welfare state. The Soviet Union too considered tapping into this seemingly inexhaustible well of prosperity, but later pulled-out of negotiations, regarding the political cost as being unacceptable.

  The nuclear monopoly provided tantalising political possibilities which Truman was willing to exploit whilst the going was good. The timing and manner of the announcement of the successful Trinity Test was discussed by Truman and Churchill during a break at the Potsdam Conference. Truman mused, 'I think. I had best just tell him after one of our meetings that we have an entirely novel form of bomb, something quite out of the ordinary, which we think will have decisive effects upon the Japanese will to continue the war'. Churchill agreed, albeit with some deep-seated concerns as he contemplated the ever growing economic and military power of the U.S. vis-a-vis the declining power of Great Britain. Whilst the nineteenth-century had belonged to the British, the twentieth-century unquestionably belonged to the Americans.

  After a particularly difficult and combative session on 24 July 1945, Truman casually sauntered over to where Stalin was sitting. Churchill knew what was going to happen and was determined to catch not just every word, but also the Soviet Dictator's reaction. Speaking through Vladimir Pavlov (Stalin's interpreter), Truman casually stated that America now possessed 'a weapon of unusual destructive force'. Equally casually, Stalin replied, 'Glad to hear it. I hope you will make good use of it against the Japanese'. Churchill later recalled the encounter, stating :

  I was sure that Stalin had no idea of the significance of what he was being told... If he had had the slightest idea of the revolution in world affairs which was in progress his reactions would have been obvious. Nothing would have been easier for him to say, “Thank you so much for telling me about your new bomb. I of course have no technical knowledge. May I send my expert in these nuclear sciences to see your expert tomorrow morning?” But his face remained gay and genial and the talk between these two potentates soon came to an end. As we were waiting for our cars I found myself near Truman. “How did it go?' I asked. “He never asked a question”, he replied.

  Both Churchill and Truman had completely underestimated Stalin. His apparent indifference was nothing but a ploy. Thanks to his spy network, he knew considerably more about the Manhattan Project than the American President. Later that evening, Stalin conferred with Molotov about Truman's disclosure. Molotov reacted decisively by saying, 'We'll have to talk it over with Kurchatov and get him to speed things up'. Later, the actual deployment of nuclear weapons against Japan served to further accelerate the Soviet research programme. The nuclear arms race was now under way. The Cold War had begun in earnest, Berlin would be its focal point in Europe.

  After Potsdam, the Grand-Alliance disintegrated as relations between the former comrades-in-arms soured. There was little if any common ground with which to form a basis of mutual understanding. Indeed, Stalin's policy of 'tenacity and steadfastness' contributed greatly to the vortex of mistrust that was destroying any hopes of future cooperation between the occupying powers. The role of nuclear weapons in this process was 'subtle, but not unimportant'. Stalin once remarked that, 'Atomic bombs are meant to frighten those with
weak nerves'. By remaining steadfast, he appeared strong. In reality this amounted to a resounding 'Nyet' to every proposal put forward by the Americans and British. In Berlin, this meant the end of any active cooperation between the occupying powers.

  Chapter Sixteen

  Orderly and Humane?

  Stalin was determined to alter the Polish political landscape to his satisfaction. Never again would Poland serve as a staging-post for a German invasion of the Soviet Union. Polish lands would now provide a buffer zone against future incursions by the forces of capitalism. To create this buffer zone, the German population in those areas of eastern Germany ceded to Poland would be forcibly expelled. After much discussion, the new Polish border had been finally ratified at Potsdam. The new German-Polish border would now run along the Oder-Neisse line. Millions of Germans living in those areas east of the newly agreed territorial zone faced an uncertain future. The Polish population was on the move too, as those populating the areas ceded to Stalin under the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 1939 were forced westwards. This reordering of populations inevitably raised concerns with the Allies. Truman later recalled how Stalin responded to concerns about the border issue :

  I remember at Potsdam, we got to discussing a matter in eastern Poland, and it was remarked by the Prime Minister of Great Britain that the Pope would not be happy over the arrangements for that Catholic end of Poland. The Generalissimo leaned on the table, and he pulled his moustache like that, and looked over to Mr Churchill, and said, 'how many divisions does the Pope have?'