The Last Great Cavalryman

by Richard Mead

  Marshall would probably have been content for 15th Army Group to remain on its line for the rest of the war, provided that it threatened the Germans so much that no sizeable formation would be permitted to slip away. Alexander took an entirely different view and in this he was supported to the hilt by Clark, Truscott and Dick. All of them were unanimous that the Germans should be comprehensively defeated south of the Alps, but Clark made it clear that the key role would be filled by Fifth US Army, attacking out of the mountains with Bologna as its primary goal. Eighth Army would play a supporting part, attacking first, much as X Corps had done on the Garigliano, and drawing away the enemy reserves.

  Dick was having none of it and, much as Clark had found with Alexander, the latitude available to an army commander was much greater than that accorded to a corps commander. He decided from the beginning that, whilst obeying Clark’s orders in principle, he could also fulfil his own objective, which was to destroy the German divisions facing him before they could withdraw over the Po. Having cleared his lines with Alexander first, he began to formulate a plan which would deliver much more than expected by Clark, who continued to believe that Eighth Army was worn out. Dick conferred closely with Truscott, who agreed with him that between the two armies they could achieve a much better result,8 and they found a ready ally in Al Gruenther. Clark’s Operations Instruction No. 4, issued on 24 March, brought the plans of both armies together as agreed by their commanders, although Dick was irritated to read that it still envisaged Fifth US Army launching ‘the main effort’ of Fifteenth Army Group.

  Dick’s own plan, codenamed Operation Buckland, was nothing short of masterly. In conformity with Clark’s orders a strong force, comprising the whole of II Polish Corps and 2 New Zealand Division from V Corps,9 was to attack in the direction of Bologna parallel to Route 9, forcing a crossing over the Santerno and then the Sillaro. This the enemy would be expecting and would take measures to counter it, achieving Clark’s objective of drawing some of the opposition away from Truscott. The Germans also had a consistent fear of a full-scale seaborne landing further up the Adriatic coast, north of the mouth of the Po, but Dick never contemplated this, although he did decide to mount a limited attack on the spit of land separating Lake Comacchio from the sea, which would keep the enemy on his toes. This deception, aided by conspicuous naval activity around Ravenna visible to German spotter planes, worked well. Von Vietinghoff kept one of his strongest formations, 29 Panzer Grenadier Division, in the Venice/Treviso area until well after the Allied offensive had started.

  What the Germans were not expecting was that a significant part of Eighth Army, 8 Indian, 56 and 78 Divisions from V Corps, with the Cremona Group, two armoured brigades and a tank brigade10 in support, would attack north towards Ferrara. On their right would be the great and apparently impassable area of Lake Comacchio, whilst to the west of the lake the Germans had flooded the country on both sides of the River Reno where it ran parallel to Route 16 to Ferrara, just before the road reached the town of Argenta. The gap between the waters was very narrow, little more than 2 miles wide. Dick’s plan, conceived as a result of the many flights in his ‘whizzer’, was to send as strong a force as possible across the water in Buffaloes, turning the German left flank on the north-east side of the Reno near Bastia and thereby unlocking the door to the Argenta Gap. Once the gap was forced, the road to Ferrara would be open and he would release 6 Armoured Division, until then kept in army reserve, in a pincer movement to join up with the Americans and cut off the retreating Germans south of the Po.

  Of his remaining formations, 10 Indian Division also remained in reserve, ready to be inserted into the battle as soon as the front was wide enough to admit it, as did 2 Parachute Brigade, which was prepared to drop behind the Argenta Gap defences if necessary. The Folgore and Friuli Groups and the Jewish Brigade Group would threaten the German flank from the mountains south-west of Route 9. Dick also planned to activate XIII Corps as soon as the number of formations in V Corps grew too large for Keightley to control effectively.

  One piece of unexpected good fortune had come the Allies’ way. Although the autumn of 1944 had been exceptionally wet, causing immense difficulties to Eighth Army in its attempt to cross rivers which were invariably in spate, there had been very little rain since the end of January and the water levels had dropped significantly. This was to help the ensuing operations considerably as the width requiring to be bridged at each crossing was much less than anticipated. However, it had one unfortunate consequence, which was that the water level of Lake Comacchio, shallow at the best of times, had fallen to such an extent that it had exposed large areas of slime. When the operation was mounted by 2 Commando Brigade on the evening 1 April to take the spit of land separating the lake from the Adriatic, it was found that the Buffaloes attacking from the lake side were next to useless, unable to get a grip on either water or earth. Stormboats were quickly substituted and the Germans were taken by surprise, as they were by an assault crossing of the Reno on to the base of the spit. By the evening of 3 April the brigade had advanced to the Valetta Canal, connecting the lake to the sea, and was threatening Porto Garibaldi on the far side. The use of some landing craft strengthened in German minds the threat of a larger seaborne landing.

  There was one more important move to be made before Dick launched full-scale operations. In his flights in the ‘whizzer’ Dick had been able to see the Argenta Gap in the distance and to work out in his own mind how to force it. Now in the knowledge that the lake itself was impassable to the Buffaloes, it was necessary to confine their use to the inundations. From the air Dick had seen a wedge of dry land just south of these but north of the Reno. For the Germans this was not a high defensive priority, as they assumed that any landings there would lead to a dead end, blocked from advance by the floods. To Dick, however, it was just the springboard he needed to get the Buffaloes into action. On the night of 5/6 April 56 Division’s 167 Brigade made an unopposed crossing of the Reno and secured the wedge.

  By the eve of battle, Dick was confident of his army’s ability to win a great victory and he had instilled this confidence in others. Alexander had just left well satisfied after two days with Eighth Army. Archie Nye, the VCIGS, who had visited the army in late March, wrote to say: ‘I came away from Italy with a grand feeling of exhilaration after having seen your troops, who have every right to feel immensely proud of their achievements.’11 Morale overall had improved enormously since the beginning of the year, boosted by the home leave scheme and the provision of entertainment for troops out of the line, culminating in a race meeting which Dick had arranged for them at Cesena on 10 March and which was long remembered by those attending. The highly focused training had given the troops great confidence in their ability to overcome the obstacles ahead and at the 17th/21st Lancers ffrench-Blake recalled the thrill of excitement which ran through the soldiers when they heard the plan.

  The old steeplechaser was ready for its last race.

  Chapter 23

  The Last Battle

  The weather on Sunday, 8 April, was exceptionally windy and the Allied airfields on the Adriatic coast were all out of action. Dick was relieved when Clark came on the telephone to reassure him that the forecast for the following day was fine, as good flying conditions would be critical. Dick’s other major concern was that von Vietinghoff would withdraw from the Senio to the Santerno before the start of the battle and that the heavy punch he had planned would land on thin air. He had no need to worry. The German commander had indeed proposed a withdrawal, which would have been tactically sound, but he was prevented from executing it by a direct order from the OKW, inspired by Hitler himself, who insisted that there should be no retreat and that Army Group C should fight to the death on its existing front.

  That afternoon Dick was visited by Wilfred Lyde, an old friend and fellow officer from the 1st Reserve Regiment of Cavalry at The Curragh in 1918. Lyde wrote later that, on entering Dick’s caravan, ‘I noticed that he was reading
a Bible. Little did I realise what it meant to him, he was obviously finding some strength to help him bear the strain of the final battle of the River Po, with the consequent casualties, which started the following day.’ He and Lyde talked about their mutual interest in hunting, racing and polo and Lyde recalled, ‘when I left he thanked me, I felt it was a great privilege if I had helped a little to ease the great strain he was bearing.’1

  The next morning was still, exactly as the meteorologists had predicted. Dick had found a good OP in a ruined house in the village of Celle, just south of Route 9 and close to the front line. An unglazed window provided a fine view along the fronts of both the Poles and the New Zealanders for the numerous VIPs, including Clark, Cannon and Foster, whom Dick had invited to watch the first phase of Operation Buckland. This was in the hands of the air forces. Cannon had made available to Eighth Army not only the Desert Air Force and its American equivalent, XXII US Air Support Command, with their medium and fighter bombers, but also 825 Flying Fortresses and Liberators of the Fifteenth US Air Force, normally employed on strategic bombing missions over the Reich. The heavy bomber pilots had no experience of supporting ground attacks and Dick had hoped that there might be a rehearsal, but Cannon had decided that it was not necessary. The intention was for the heavy bombers to blanket the area between the Senio and the Santerno, where the Germans had all their support services, whilst the actual defences would be hit by the medium and fighter bombers, now highly experienced in such actions. When the first wave of heavies arrived punctually at 1350 hrs most of their aiming was accurate, but to Dick’s horror one group released its bombs straight into the middle of a Polish brigade forming up for the attack, causing 160 casualties. There were a few ‘shorts’ also in the New Zealand and 8 Indian Division sectors, but they did little serious damage.

  BOLOGNA AND THE ARGENTA GAP

  The next phase was an excellent example of Dick’s use of deception. At 1520 hrs an artillery barrage from over 1,000 field, medium and heavy guns opened up, targeting the bund defences. The barrage stopped after half an hour and was followed by a wave of fighter bombers, leading the Germans to expect an immediate attack. This failed to materialize and, after a gap, a second barrage and air attack followed, then a third and a fourth. The last artillery barrage ended at 1910 hrs and, 10 minutes later, just when the Germans were expecting another drubbing from the fighter bombers, these pulled up without firing and the ground attack went in while the defenders still had their heads down. By this time Dick was aloft in his ‘whizzer’, from which he had a marvellous view from 5,000ft of 36 flame-throwing Crocodiles and even more Wasps, the infantry equivalent derived from the Bren-gun carrier, followed by the assault brigades.

  By first light on the next morning 2 New Zealand Division had secured a sizeable bridgehead across the Senio to the south of Lugo and was making excellent progress. 3 Carpathian Division was further behind as the Germans still held the bund on its side of the river and these defences had to be eliminated first. Dick visited Anders, expecting to find him deeply unhappy about the bombing error, but the Polish general was not only philosophical about the casualties, but actually requested further heavy bomber support. On the right 8 Indian Division, with the Churchills of 21 Tank Brigade in support, was a mile and a half beyond the river to the north of Lugo, whilst the Cremona Group had put in a good attack to take the small town of Alfonsine on the far bank. The heavy bombers made their second bombing run that afternoon and there were more ‘friendly fire’ incidents, Freyberg being particularly indignant, although his casualties from this direction remained light. He may have suffered precisely because he had made such good progress, his forward brigades reaching the Santerno before nightfall.

  By the morning of 11 April the Poles also had two brigades across the Senio and the New Zealanders crossed the Santerno, the engineers in their wake being quick to erect Bailey bridges. At the same time 80 Buffaloes, crewed by men from the 27th Lancers and the 755th US Tank Battalion, carried two battalions of 56 Division’s Queen’s Brigade across the flooded land bordering Lake Comacchio to solid ground near the villages of Menate and Longastrino. The attack achieved complete surprise, outflanking the enemy’s left along the line of the Reno and producing 300 prisoners. With 8 Indian Division across the Santerno to the south that evening and 56 Division’s 167 Brigade pushing along the north bank of the Reno, the Germans were compelled to fall back towards Bastia, the gateway to the Argenta Gap, to avoid being cut off.

  Further good progress was made on the following day when Keightley passed the fresh 78 Division through the Indians to reach Conselice, whilst the Cremona Group continued to advance on the right, getting a bridgehead across the Santerno near the main road to Bastia. By the morning of 13 April both 56 and 78 Divisions were closing in on the bridge over the Reno at Bastia in a pincer movement, led in the case of the latter by the ‘Kangaroo Army’, a composite force made up of the Shermans of the 9th Lancers and the Kangaroos of 38 Irish Brigade, but it was unable to stop the bridge being blown. This minor setback was accompanied by a more major one, when 24 Guards Brigade sent a battalion in Buffaloes in another flanking movement with the ambitious aim of taking Argenta itself. This time the Germans were ready for them and the force took a heavy punishment, although it did manage to establish itself on dry land. For the first time some of its prisoners were identified as coming from 29 Panzer Grenadier Division, indicating that von Vietinghoff was committing at least part of his reserve.

  Progress was far better on the north-west front, where the New Zealanders and the Poles reached the Sillaro respectively on 13 and 14 April, the latter having taken Imola. The Poles managed to capture a bridge over the river intact and both divisions established bridgeheads. With Keightley temporarily frustrated in his attempt to break through the Argenta Gap and needing to concentrate all his efforts in that direction, Dick decided to bring XIII Corps into the battle. An impatient Harding had visited Floyd at Eighth Army HQ every day since the battle began and was delighted to take over responsibility for 2 New Zealand Division at 1800 hrs on 14 April. He immediately ordered 10 Indian Division, waiting in the mountains, to move up behind the New Zealanders, from where it took over a sector of the rapidly widening front two days later.

  The other major event of 14 April was the opening of Fifth US Army’s offensive, two days late due to fog on its front preventing the use of supporting aircraft. Crittenberger’s IV US Corps moved first along Route 64, which ran north to the west of Bologna, launching the excellent 10 US Mountain Division against the last remaining Apennine ridges, supported by 1 US Armored Division and the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. On the night of 15/16 April Keyes struck with the four divisions of II US Corps on a narrow front just to the east along the parallel Route 65 to Bologna itself. Both corps experienced hard fighting, but made considerable progress.

  Keightley meanwhile had changed his tactics following the disappointment over the Bastia bridge. Instead, he sent a brigade of 78 Division across the Reno on a Bailey bridge east of Bastia on ground which was held by the Cremona Group. Adding this force to two brigades of 56 Division proved too much for the Germans, who evacuated Bastia, falling back to Argenta. Keightley recognized that the key to forcing the gap was now the capture of the Fossa Marina, a high-banked waterway leading from the Reno to Lake Commacchio and tenuously held at one end by 24 Guards Brigade. His two divisional commanders, Arbuthnott and Whitfield, combined their forces intelligently, but the fighting became intense and it was not until 17 April that the Germans were pushed back and V Corps at last entered the shattered town of Argenta. Further bitter struggles took place on the Fossa Benvignante further north.

  Dick now had a very wide front to visit, stretching from the foothills of the Apennines near Monte Grande, where the Folgore and Friuli Groups and the Jewish Brigade Group were edging forward in conformity with the advance of the Polish Corps, to Medecina, a small town between the Sillaro and the Idice which was taken on 16 April by those former comrades fr
om Iraq, 43 Gurkha Brigade and the 14th/20th Hussars, and then to Argenta and the north-west corner of Lake Comacchio. Whilst remaining as close as possible to the battle, he insisted on returning to his Main HQ near Forli every evening to review the day’s events with Floyd, Foster and others, flying in his ‘whizzer’ to his Tac HQ on the following morning, from where he would go on either by air or by jeep.

  On 16 April he began a typical day by driving along Route 9 to see Rudforce,2 a battle group of II Polish Corps which was tasked with driving up the highway itself towards Bologna. From there he moved to the 2nd/10th Gurkha Rifles of 43 Gurkha Brigade and then on to 5 Kresowa Division, which had taken over responsibility for the main Polish advance from 3 Carpathian Division. After that Dick went to see Freyberg at his HQ, finding him ‘in v.g form’, as his attack over the Sillaro on the previous evening had been very successful, resulting in more than 600 prisoners. Finally he called in on V Corps to see Keightley, with whom he needed to talk about the next phase of the battle.