Terrible Victory
Page 23
‘B’ Company, meanwhile, had kicked off its advance only to be stopped by a strong German position midway to the railroad. But it was still able to range small-arms fire on the road and railway. The day’s fighting cost the Royals three dead and twenty wounded.55 German casualties were estimated at about fifty dead, approximately twice that wounded, and 156 prisoners.56
Both sides spent the night regrouping and preparing respective attacks–the Germans to restore control over the isthmus, the Canadians to sever the link. Each greeted the dawn of October II by raining the other with heavy artillery bombardments. The Royals’ ‘A’ Company jumped through ‘C’ Company’s lines at 1530 hours, while the paratroops let them come forward unmolested “until they were making a charge up an embankment then opened up with heavy fire resulting in heavy casualties particularly to 7 [Platoon]. Mortar fire then became intense and a counterattack was made on ‘A’ Company from their objective with the result that they withdrew through ‘C’ Company.”
The Germans then struck both ‘C’ and ‘B’ Companies with a counterattack supported by flamethrowers, which was barely driven off.57 As the light bled from the sky, both sides were like two punch-drunk fighters, glaring at each other across the mat, neither willing to make the next swing. Remarkably, no Royals had died this day, but thirty-three were wounded.58 The paratroops entrenched themselves deeply into the railway embankment. Before them lay the open polder, which their many heavy machine guns transformed into a killing zone. From Woensdrecht, the Germans could also saturate the polders with flanking fire. They would wait for the Canadians, who held Hoogerheide and were within several hundred yards of controlling the isthmus itself, to make the next move.59
But this would not be for at least two days, as Brigadier Keefler had decided it would take this long for 2 CID to regroup and develop a new offensive plan.
[ 12 ]
Did our Best
WHILE 2ND CANADIAN Infantry Division had been pushing north from Antwerp, on the evening of October 4, two 3rd Canadian Infantry Division brigades had concentrated south of the Leopold Canal near Maldegem. This move to face the Breskens Pocket had only come after the division captured Calais on October I, freeing 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade to carry out a ninety-mile march to the canal. Major General Dan Spry now prepared to implement a precisely planned four-phase reduction of the pocket as set out by Lieutenant General Guy Simonds. Operation Switchback seemed deceptively simple.
Phase One, to begin the morning of October 6, would see 7 CIB assault the canal dead north of Maldegem across a mile-wide front with Strooibrug and Moerhuizen anchoring the ends. At Strooibrug, the Dérivation de la Lys angled southwards away from the Leopold Canal, so an assault here meant crossing only one waterway rather than two–the situation that had contributed to the Algonquin Regiment’s September 13–14 defeat.
The brigade was to establish a bridgehead bounded by Middelburg to the west, Aardenburg to the north, and extending east to Moershoofd. The bridgehead’s deepest point of penetration would be at Aardenburg, just under two miles from the canal. From this bridgehead, 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade would kick off Phase Two to capture the town of Sluis, two and a half miles to the northwest, while 7 CIB pushed northwest on its left flank to the Bruges–Sluis Canal.
Phase Three would follow on October 8, but on an entirely different front. While 7 CIB and 8 CIB concentrated at Maldegem, 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade had gathered near Ghent. Here, it was undertaking a hurried refresher course in amphibious landings. On October 8, Simonds planned to send 9 CIB aboard amphibians from Terneuzen, across the mouth of the Braakman Inlet, to land close to Hoofdplaat. Having struck the Germans from behind, the brigade would drive straight along the coast to Breskens. Simultaneously, 7 CIB would be moving northeast from Sluis to seize Oostburg and Schoondijke, while 8 CIB headed west for the coast near Retranchement. As a final touch, 7th Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (the Duke of York Royal Canadian Hussars) armoured cars would clear the Leopold Canal. Once all this manoeuvring was quickly completed, Phase Four would see 8 CIB close the pocket by moving south along the coast to the city of Knokke-aan-zee, which showed on Canadian maps as Knocke-sur-Mer. The essence of Operation Switchback was to overwhelm the Germans by hitting them hard on so many fronts that their forces could never be concentrated.
Army intelligence reported that the 64th Infantry Division consisted of only seven thousand troops, but had no information regarding the strength of “artillery and coastal defence units or possible battle groups” that might augment this strength.1 There were, in fact, about fifteen thousand Germans in the pocket.2 Their backs were against the wall formed by the West Scheldt and they were ordered to fight to the death. Yet Allied intelligence repeatedly dismissed any possibility that the division would make a determined stand. Instead, the concern was the Breskens landscape itself. “The area,” intelligence staff wrote, “is completely flat, with a network of minor canals and ditches, and numerous areas which are permanently flooded. It is criss-crossed by dykes which mostly carry roads or tracks. The fields, or ‘polders,’ are open and afford little or no cover. Church towers and buildings are the only viewpoints.”3
Because of the exposed landscape, Operation Switchback was to enjoy lavish artillery support. The heavy guns of II Canadian Corps and Ninth British Army Groups Royal Artillery were committed. And 4th Canadian Armoured Division’s field regiments would be added to 3 CID’S inherent firepower to put six field regiments on the gun lines. This meant that 144 25-pounders, 128 mediums–with calibres of 4.5-inch, 5.5-inch, or 105-millimetre, and 55 heavy 7.2-inch guns capable of ranging a shell weighing more than two hundred pounds onto targets almost ten miles away–were available. “The maximum amount of artillery that can bear will support each operation in turn,” Simonds had declared.4
Of course, not all of this great weight of artillery could range on every potential target, so the regiments were detailed to support either 7 cib’s assault across the Leopold Canal or 9 cib’s amphibious operation at Hoofdplaat. Although units additional to 3 CID’S field regiments were committed, full operational control rested with that division’s commander of artillery, Brigadier Stanley Todd, rather than–as was standard–the artillery commander of II Canadian Corps. There were two reasons for this unorthodox decision. First, the gunners were only supporting 3 CID rather than multiple divisions. Second, communications between the gun regiments, the infantry battalions, and the overseer of artillery operations would be too ponderous if all communications had to pass through corps headquarters, which was situated two miles east of Ghent in Destelbergen.
Todd assigned the 15th and 19th Field Regiments and the 10th Medium Regiment to 9 cib, while 7 CIB would initially be supported by the British Ninth Army Group’s medium and heavy gun regiments, from positions to the right, and the batteries of II Canadian Corps’s regiments to the left of the Leopold Canal crossing point.5 Despite the preponderance of artillery, Simonds and his staff knew the German fortifications on the Leopold Canal were unlikely to suffer extensive damage because they were dug in on the north-facing side of the dyke–making them largely immune to all but a chance hit. Still, the intensity of fire should force the Germans to hunker inside these positions until 7 CIB was almost across the canal and the fire had to lift to avoid friendly casualties. Further, to prevent the Germans realizing precisely where the canal was to be crossed and reinforcing that section, the artillery would fire only as the Canadian Scottish Regiment and the Regina Rifles began 7 CIB’S attack.
These restrictions served as a serious handicap to the artillery’s effectiveness, so an additional weapon was sought to improve the odds. A careful reconnaissance from Strooibrug east to the Isabella-polder had given the Canadians a good understanding of the canal’s defensive positions. While this confirmed that artillery bombardment promised to be ineffective, it also revealed that the fortifications were possibly susceptible to a novel form of attack. Flamethrowers had so far seen little use in northwest Europe,
but the Canadian arsenal contained both the man-packed Lifebuoy and a modified Bren carrier designated as the Wasp Mk II. Each battalion had a small contingent of these carriers. In September, Wasp crews had tried firing their flame guns across canals similar to the Leopold. “It was discovered that by inclining the carrier part-way up the slope of the bank its flame could be thrown not only against the opposite bank, but beyond it, where enemy slit trenches and dugouts might be expected to be sited.”6
Consequently, twenty-seven Wasps would support the assault.7 While most were 3 CID’S inherent machines, those of 4th Canadian Armoured Division’s 10th Infantry Brigade were also allocated.8 With an effective range of 120 to 140 yards, the Wasps could easily project streams of flame across the canal. Lieutenant George Bannerman, a flamethrower specialist assigned to First Canadian Army, believed the weapon’s main purpose was to cause demoralization rather than physical injury–as few defensive positions could actually be penetrated with fire. But the Leopold Canal fortifications were different, perfectly suited for subjection to “Golden Rain.” To cause a Golden Rain, he wrote, the “gun is fired at maximum elevation, in the direction of the enemy, with the result that the rod of fuel breaks up in mid air into small, ignited blobs of fuel. Depending on the wind, this ‘Golden Rain’ will cover a very large area of ground.”
By firing over the dyke, the Golden Rain would shower down on the positions, setting alight any straw or wood covering the slit trenches or spattering into the trenches themselves. “Enemy who were hit by a sizeable ‘shot’ of the fuel died almost immediately. If only a few blobs of the burning fuel struck a man it was possible for him to smother the flame. But, if he was struck by a large blob, smothering was practically impossible and in this case the fats in the human body were literally burned up.”9 This was the horror Banner-man prepared to visit upon the men defending the Leopold Canal.
In addition to providing its Wasps, 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade would support 7 cib’s assault with an elaborate deception the day before, intended to “draw off much German strength from the real crossing to the westward.”10 Two battalions–the Algonquins and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders–were to play the primary role. Since their September 23 failure to force a breach at the Isabella-polder adjacent to the head of the Braakman Inlet, the Algonquins had been locked in a “succession of patrol after patrol. Patrols that didn’t start off right, patrols that never came back, patrols that came back at half-strength, with not even a prisoner to show for the cost.”11
The luckless Algonquins again drew the short end of the straw, receiving orders to assault an enemy “dug in solidly in concrete bunkers underneath the [dykes whose] quality [was] demonstrably high… They were skilled in the use of their weapons, and the defensive belts of fire that they had woven were almost impossible to traverse, even at night,” Major George Cassidy lamented. “The machine gun fire, for instance, was laid on so that it would sweep the [dyke] tops at about eight inches height. One could not even crawl under this. Their mortar targets were registered to a matter of feet, rather than yards, and they had plenty of mortars to use. Besides the ubiquitous 88mm. guns, they had the use of the coastal and railroad guns still in the ‘pocket’ area, and the fire from these could be brought to bear on almost any point on the pocket perimeter. Altogether, it would take Spartan measures to achieve any success here.” To date, successes had been entirely absent. The Algonquins greeted the orders grimly, particularly as they were not informed as to its purpose.12
The Argylls, meanwhile, were spared the casualties that would inevitably be suffered by actually trying to cross the canal. They would instead stage an elaborately choreographed demonstration to hoodwink the Germans into believing that they and the Algonquins were trying to break into the Breskens Pocket.
Both battalions played their hands on October 5, the Algonquins advancing three companies into the killing field, ostensibly to “test the enemy defences and to take [prisoners] in the vicinity of Isabella,” with predictable result. Twenty-eight men were killed or wounded, including thirty-four-year-old Captain Fred Grafton, who died after being evacuated to hospital in England for absolutely no gain. “The above mentioned [operation],” the war diarist bitterly recorded, “though necessary, will probably appear in the papers as ‘only patrol activity.’ We wonder if the contented readers realize the amount of blood and lives lost under the heading of those three little words.”13
By contrast, the Argylls were mere bystanders to a surreal attack mounted by nothing more than a troop of sound effects specialists. Equipped with “mobile record-players with an amazing set of records, representing bridge-building activities, complete with typically Canadian dialogue and expression,” the specialists broadcast over powerful speakers aimed at the Germans, while a thick smokescreen obscured the canal, artillery and mortar fire saturated the area, and “tanks and carriers” raced “madly back and forth on our side of the canal, ‘revving’ their motors constantly and making as much noise as possible.” The result was a great deal of German fire thrown at the Argyll line, but no casualties.14 Whether the ruse worked was never determined.
“IN THE WEIRD half-light of the cold October morning… the grimly determined” Canadian Scottish Regiment and Regina Rifles “trudged heavily along the dirt verges of the cobblestone roads” towards forming-up positions near the canal.15 Much of the dim light that guided their way came from exploding shells fired to cover the sounds made by the troops and machines congregating behind the south canal bank. Teams of engineers had marked out approach lanes with white tape and were now readying the narrow floating kapok bridges. Once a toehold was gained on the other side, these would be unlimbered to span the canal and enable most of the men to cross on foot rather than aboard boats. Preparing and crewing the boats had been tasked to troops from 8 cib’s North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment’s ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies. Also forming behind the high southern canal bank were the Wasp carriers. Despite this hubbub, there was no indication that the Germans suspected anything amiss, the eight- to ten-foot-high canal bank blocking their view.16
The Canadian Scottish would cross east of the village of Oosthoek, while the Reginas went over just in front of Moerhuizen. An unusual wrinkle in the Regina plan was the fact that one of the lead companies was not actually part of the battalion. Rather, it comprised First Canadian Army’s Headquarters Defence Company drawn from the Royal Montreal Regiment (RMR), which had exchanged duties with the Reginas’ ‘B’ Company just before Calais to gain combat experience. The RMR had performed well during the Calais operation, and Lieutenant Colonel Foster Matheson had decided there was no reason it should not participate in attack. For simplicity, battalion headquarters referred to the RMR as if it were ‘B’ Company. As Major A.H. Lowe had seen action at Calais, he was designated Left Out of Battle in order to give his second-in-command, Captain Robert Schwob, some command experience. This company would cross on the left and Major Ronald Shawcross’s ‘A’ Company on the right.
Twenty-eight-year-old Shawcross had joined the Reginas in 1936 and risen from the ranks to lead ‘A’ Company onto the sand on D-Day. A tough soldier, he was bloody unhappy about today’s plan. It seemed that every time a hard fight was ensured, ‘A’ Company got put on the sharp end and the strain on the men was showing. They “were getting very tired and the NCOS were getting worn out, you could see it from looking at them. They were losing weight, getting gaunt, they were turning a yellowish colour and their eyes were just blank.”17
Even assembling for the attack had been tough. The company had moved across the open fields with mud oozing over boot tops, only to come under German mortar fire. Rifleman Fred Kidd had thrown himself into the mud so only his nose showed until the bombardment ceased. Then he joined the others trudging forward.18
Lying on his stomach in the mud on top of the canal, Shawcross looked across to where a machine-gun post in a cement blockhouse enjoyed a clean field of fire precisely where his company was to go over. He had been a
ssured this would pose no problem. The Wasps “would be brought up to us, trained on the far side and we would go over after the flame throwers had played for about five minutes. That would have fried everybody on the far side and we would have gone over with no opposition.”19 He hoped to hell this would prove the case.
At 0525, the Wasps opened up with huge streams of fire. “The sky lit up in a scarlet glow which was visible for miles,” reported the Canadian Scottish regimental historian. As the flamethrowers began to run out of fuel, both battalions moved forward. The Can Scots’ ‘B’ Company headed for the water in front of Oosthoek, while ‘D’ Company started from a point midway between this village and Moershoofd to the east. The last flames fell just as the two companies scrambled into the assault boats. Everyone knew, as Captain E. Fraser later wrote, that “to have success in such a show the infantry must actually go in under the flames or cross when the last flame has left the Wasp and to be able to take up the positions which [the enemy] have vacated or surrendered on the opposite bank of the canal.”20 Getting it right, the Can Scots paddled out while the “liquid fire was still burning whatever it struck, and some houses 30 yards north of the canal were set on fire. Flaming gobs of liquid fire were even burning on the water. Any enemy in the trenches immediately opposite the ‘Wasps’ was put out of action, and many who escaped were terrified.”