Terrible Victory

by Mark Zuehlke

  On October 17, confusion about safe lines resulted in Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Cripps Lewis–8 CIB’S acting commander–driving into a German ambush while en route to meet the Chaudière commander. Lewis and his driver were travelling alone, the officer seeking a vantage from which he could locate the French-Canadian regiment. About two hundred yards from a farm, the jeep suddenly drew fire from Germans hidden in its buildings. Both men dived into a ditch, but were pinned by machine-gun fire. Moments later, an artillery concentration landed square on their position and Lewis was killed instantly by shrapnel. Once the shelling lifted, Germans took the driver prisoner, locking him in one of the farm buildings. Lewis’s body was stripped of personal effects and left where it had fallen.

  After nightfall, the Germans withdrew, leaving the driver behind. He was picked up the morning of October 19 and Lewis’s body was then recovered. The farm was subsequently discovered to have been subjected to a Canadian defensive fire mission close to the time the driver believed they were shelled, leading to the conclusion that Lewis had been killed by friendly fire. Lieutenant Colonel P.C. Klaehn, commander of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, had taken over the brigade when Lewis went missing. He would retain this position until a permanent brigadier could be appointed.52

  October 17 brought the Queen’s Own Rifles to the town of Ijzendijke. To deny the Canadians access to a good road running northwest to Schoondijke, the Germans resisted fiercely. Rifleman Jack Martin was having the usual problem firing a mortar in the polders. Fire a round; dig the base plate out of muck. His section sergeant, Carl Warnick, was directing the fire towards a little wood where some Germans were milling about. The sergeant had initially told Martin to toss a bomb into the woods to see what response it elicited. The bizarre result saw the Germans all shuffle leftwards as if they were in some chorus line. “Go and throw another bomb down,” Warnick called. Another leftwards shuffle ensued, taking the Germans just beyond the last zone of fire. Then Martin saw a German running along the dyke to the right, swivelled the tube to range in on him, and fired. As soon as the bomb left the mortar, Martin ran to the top of the dyke behind which the platoon was emplaced. He came up on the dyke just as the round struck the German square in the chest. The enemy soldier disappeared in a red mist of gore mixed with grey smoke. Mortars seldom hit men directly and Martin had never seen a man killed by his fire.53

  ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies bulled their way into Ijzendijke despite tough opposition. Closing on the town square, Major Dick Medland’s ‘A’ Company came under heavy machine-gun fire from a sandbagged house on the opposite side, and No. 7 Platoon was pinned down. The two companies had been moving quickly along the streets to this point, but now Medland knew he would have to slow down and organize a company-scale attack. Actions over the past few days had tended to be short, sharp affairs fought at the platoon or even section level: a lot of crawling, dashing, and rolling across distances of three to five hundred yards to wipe out German positions set up inside haystacks, houses, barns, pigpens, chicken coops, or greenhouses with the overhead glass generally blown out, but the three-foot-high brick walls providing a perfect firing step for machine guns. Men died or were wounded in these piecemeal engagements that warranted not even a mention in the regiment’s war diary. Consequently, ‘A’ Company reached Ijzendijke’s main square with only half its allotted strength, each platoon section numbering six to seven men.

  Medland ordered No. 7 Platoon, hunkered inside a house on the east side of the square, to bring the fortified building under fire. No. 8 Platoon would move left to gain a position from which it could cover No. 9 Platoon’s swing around to the right to get behind the German position. Like the others, No. 9 Platoon was in rough shape. It had lost two officers in a row, was short a couple of sergeants, and low on riflemen. Before being promoted company sergeant major prior to D-Day, Charles Martin had been No. 9 Platoon’s sergeant–a role he had reverted to because of the leadership shortage. Martin arranged for the battalion’s mortar platoon to fire behind the building for fifteen minutes to force any Germans under cover while he slipped one section in for an attack.

  Martin and six men loaded up with firepower. Each carried four grenades. One had the company’s two-inch mortar and smoke rounds in case they had to throw out a screen for the rush on the house. Riflemen Jack Morgan and Drew Kehoe packed Bren guns. Martin and Rifleman Bob Dunstan had Stens. The section moved as quietly as possible around the buildings facing the square, taking advantage of every concealing feature while the mortar rounds exploded behind the house. Finally, they were looking at its back, seeing no sign of Germans. Taking out a fortified house was always dangerous work. Martin and Dunstan decided they would go in first through the single window facing the back. Morgan and Kehoe would then kick in the back door.

  Smoke was dropped and the four men charged. Dunstan chucked a grenade through the window and the moment it exploded, Martin dove through. He rolled left and came up spraying the Sten in an arc across that section of the room, while Dustan rolled right and worked that side over. The door flew open. Morgan and Kehoe burst in with Bren guns blazing from the hip. Everyone fired until their magazines were dry and then reloaded. The room was full of smoke, drifting bits of plaster, and dust. Several men were shouting, “Kamerad.” When the smoke cleared and the debris settled, Martin saw only three Germans. Except for a few minor flesh wounds, they had amazingly been unhurt by the grenade explosion and the shooting spree. Sometimes it went that way. Kehoe rustled up a white sheet, and carefully unfurled it out a window facing the square to let the rest of the company know the house was taken. Then Martin fired a green flare as a signal to Medland. Only after the adrenaline stopped pumping did he notice that a sliver of shrapnel had pierced his left shoulder. He had the company stretcher-bearer put a bandage over the wound. Nobody bothered going back to the Regimental Aid Post for minor wounds anymore. Almost everyone had a bandage covering some injury.54

  Ijzendijke was taken. From cellars, civilians emerged “who all wanted to shake our hands, feed us and to see the ‘Kanadeesh’ or some such name,” wrote the battalion’s war diarist. “However Jerry whistled a few shells in and we had a magical disappearing act.” The shells caused several large fires. When ‘C’ Company’s No. 15 Platoon led the battalion out of the town, it came under intense mortar fire from a position on the outskirts. With night falling, it was decided to hold tight inside the battered town until dawn.

  Next morning, ‘C’ Company raided the mortar position and found “six very forlorn Germans who were only too willing to surrender. We used them to peel potatoes back at rear [battalion headquarters]. The Jerry’s are very good at that job. They peel very fine, not like our boys, who just cut the peel off.”55

  [ 17 ]

  A Godsend

  THIRD CANADIAN INFANTRY DIVISION broke the German lock-hold on the Leopold Canal before Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery issued an October 16 directive that finally gave opening Antwerp “complete priority over all other offensive operations in 21 Army Group without any qualification whatsoever.” The “whole of the available offensive power of Second Army” was to support First Canadian Army. Previously, I British Corps had been moving northeast away from the Scheldt to assist British Second Army. Now that army was to shift northwestwards and guard First Canadian Army’s right flank. This would allow Lieutenant General John Crocker to clear the ground to the north and east of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, which was still attempting to sever the South Beveland isthmus north of Antwerp.

  To provide Crocker with sufficient strength, 4th Canadian Armoured Division had already begun moving from its guard position along the Leopold Canal to a concentration area northeast of Antwerp. The division came under Crocker’s control on October 17. Crocker announced his intention to prevent German interference with 2 CID’S efforts to capture South Beveland. He planned to commit 4 CAD on October 20 to an advance towards Essen and then Bergen op Zoom. Right of 4 cad, the 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division
would move north from Brecht to seize Roosendaal. Clearly signalling the importance that General Eisenhower put on freeing Antwerp, the 104th U.S. Infantry Division was also under Crocker’s command, and would clear the country east of the 49th Division’s right flank, while farther east still, 1st Polish Armoured Division’s job would be to drive through to Breda and then gain control of the mouth of the Maas River.1 If successful, this operation–codenamed “Suitcase”–would bring all southwestern Holland into Allied hands.

  While the redirection of I British Corps to closely support II Canadian Corps sounded significant, the 49th Division had seen hard fighting and was understrength. And by mid-October, 1st Polish Armoured Division was recognized as close to becoming “ineffective.” On October 12, Lieutenant General Guy Simonds had sent Crocker a note stating that the division remained under his command only for use “to hold a quiet sector… but I do not think you should count on them being used offensively until they have had a chance to reorganize and properly train and absorb reinforcements.”2

  An appended report by Brigadier E.O. Herbert of Simonds’s general staff stated that the division was short 90 officers and 750 other ranks, having taken about 600 casualties in the first six days of October while driving northeastwards from the Antwerp–Turnhout Canal from Merksplas to Alphen. Reinforcements would not be available until the second part of November, and consisted of about 250 Poles who had been found serving with British Royal Armoured Corps and 600 Polish conscripts taken prisoner while serving in German units. The latter had become the primary source for Polish divisions, whether serving in northwest Europe or Italy. But Herbert recognized that such prisoners “are not fighting well. They are not well trained, often bomb-shy, and very frightened of being captured. As a result much more leadership is necessary; this in turn results in more [officer casualties,] and the best [officers] at that.” Herbert recommended the division be withdrawn for rebuilding, coinciding with 4 CAD’S coming under I British Corps command.3

  Crocker was not of a mind to wait until mid-November to commit the division again to operations. It must reorganize and integrate troops as well as possible, while remaining in readiness to carry out securing the mouth of the Maas River whenever the divisions operating west of it made this possible.

  Operation Suitcase came into being as 2 CID was almost as much at the breaking point as the Poles. The past week had yielded both tragic failures and near pyrrhic successes. Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade had gained control of Hoogerheide immediately east of Woensdrecht, but had been so badly cut up that it desperately needed relief. Meanwhile, 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s Royal Regiment of Canada had by October 11 established itself out in the polders west of this village. The narrow isthmus linking South Beveland to the mainland had been successfully blocked by Germans manning positions astride a raised railway embankment.

  As Montgomery had not yet agreed to redirect Twenty-First Army Group away from British Second Army’s front near Nijmegen, the division’s right flank was critically overextended, considering its depleted manpower. Recognizing this, Simonds had sent what reinforcements he could to guard the division’s right and free its fighting battalions for the offensive needed to capture Woensdrecht and cut off the isthmus. The South Alberta Regiment–4 cad’s armoured reconnaissance unit–and one rifle company from the Algonquin Regiment took over the front near Brecht to the north of the Antwerp–Turnhout Canal. This freed the Fort Garry Horse Regiment’s tanks to support the Woensdrecht attack. The 3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment was also temporarily given rifles and put into the line as infantry with the 2nd Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment, in a long line that stretched all the way from near Hoogerheide to Brecht. It was a desperate gamble, 2 CID’S Brigadier Holly Keefler literally crossing his fingers that the Germans would not discover the fragility of his defences there. To give the illusion of strength, tanks and other armoured vehicles regularly cruised the front’s length.

  Earlier, on October 9, Keefler had attached the South Saskatchewan Regiment from 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade to 4 CIB. The battalion made a night move from Brecht, and deployed near the highway leading from Putte to Woensdrecht, with orders to advance up the Abdijlaan, a dirt road running on a northeasterly axis to join the Huijbergseweg at the midway point between Hoogerheide and Huijbergen. Here, a thickly wooded area identified on maps as Het Eiland (The Island), lay north of the road. As a German advance from these woods or Huijbergen via the Abdijlaan would threaten the division’s rear, Keefler wanted the South Saskatchewans to establish a blocking position.4

  Meanwhile, on October 11, Keefler relieved 5 CIB in Woensdrecht with 4 CIB’S Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and the Essex Scottish. Although the Black Watch was pulled out of Hoogerheide that afternoon, it was not being offered a rest. Instead, this 5 CIB regiment was to tee up an attack from out of the Royal Regiment’s positions in the polders to seize the railway embankment near Woensdrecht Station.5

  Major General Charles Foulkes, temporary commander of II Canadian Corps, delivered the order for the Black Watch attack personally to Keefler and 5 CIB’S Brigadier Bill Megill that night. His intention was “to plug the neck” of the isthmus. Once the Black Watch gained the railway embankment, the rest of the brigade would pass through to seal the approaches to the isthmus from Korteven to the east and Bergen op Zoom to the north. Megill protested the order. He believed the Germans too strong and well dug in to be defeated by a head-on assault. As for his men, they needed rest, not another battle. Like all of 2 cid, the brigade had lost many veterans, and over the past two weeks, reinforcements had been fed in haphazardly without much thought to proper integration.

  Foulkes remained adamant. Montgomery was still focused on Nijmegen, so the corps commander believed that 2 CID must fend for itself. Although the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division and the 104th U.S. Divisions had been promised, the former was slated to assist 3 CID and the latter would not be available for about ten days. First Canadian Army was to get Antwerp open, and to do that the isthmus had to be cut now. He promised Megill all the artillery and mortar ammunition needed. Foulkes wanted the attack that coming morning, but the brigadier convinced him to delay it to October 13. That was the only compromise. There was no question that the Black Watch would have to carry the day. Le Régiment de Maisonneuve was short two hundred men and the Calgary Highlanders had faced the worst of the fighting in Hoogerheide.6 Keefler, Megill, and their staffs got to work developing an artillery support plan.

  Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Ritchie was dismayed. The Black Watch had hardly enjoyed a field day in Hoogerheide. It had taken two hundred casualties between October 6 and 8. This, after Ritchie had only completed rebuilding the battalion after taking command in the third week of September, and then had led it through stiff fighting on the Antwerp–Turnhout Canal. Morale was poor. When Ritchie sought intelligence from brigade on the German defences, the intelligence staff had nothing to offer. He was reassured that they were nothing special. Ritchie believed none of it.7

  EVIDENCE OF BOTH the growing number and fighting quality of German units facing 2 CID was demonstrated when the South Saskatchewan Regiment advanced at 1500 hours on October 11 up the Abdijlaan. The initial objective was a position along the track that 4 CIB’S Brigadier Fred Cabeldu instructed Lieutenant Colonel Vern Stott must be “held at all costs.” ‘A’ Company led the way, and the South Saskatchewans were soon on the objective without meeting any opposition. Emboldened, Stott decided to push to the intersection with the Huijbergseweg. ‘B’ Company led, with the other rifle companies behind.

  Night was falling as No. 11 Platoon under Lieutenant W.L. Brown closed on the crossroads. Brown, who had been badly wounded at Verrières Ridge in Normandy, had just returned to duty that morning. As the platoon reached the Huijbergseweg, heavy machine-gun fire hit it from both flanks. Brown and his men “immediately went to ground and became the fire platoon, opposing fire with fire.” Despite the fight being lopsided in favour of the Germans, who had overwhelming fire supe
riority and had allowed the platoon to walk into the middle of a carefully prepared killing zone before tipping their hand, only a few of Brown’s men were hit.

  Captain Fraser Lee, a Chinese Canadian from Saskatoon, responded quickly by ordering No. 10 Platoon to move leftwards to occupy three houses directly across the road from Het Eiland. From here, it was able to cover No. 11 Platoon as it cleared several houses closer to the crossroads. But when Brown tried to push a section across the road itself, the men were driven back by withering machine-gun fire. Clearly, the Germans were willing to cede the south side of the road, but determined to lose no ground within the forest opposite. Lee set up an all-round defensive perimeter centred on the string of houses, with No. 10 and No. 11 Platoon facing the road and No. 12 Platoon covering the company’s rear. The carrier platoon, serving as a reserve, was sheltered near the house he took over for a tactical headquarters. Even though separated only by the narrow road, neither side fired at the other, not wanting the tracers and gun flashes to betray their positions.